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Abstract 
The 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act afforded all prisoners the right to full legal 
representation. Thereafter, the focus of felony trial proceedings shifted from the 
accused’s character to the forensic scrutiny of evidence by advocates for both sides. 
This thesis examines the ways in which novels which focused on the presentation 
and revelation of character remained committed to a character-focused model of 
representation and how, conversely, writers of sensation and detective fiction began 
to appropriate the adversarial-evidentiary representational practices which flourished 
in criminal courts post-1836, and endorsed them as an alternative and more effective 
means of representing reality. In this way the thesis presents a new analysis of how 
methods of representation employed in the courtroom impacted on nineteenth-
century literary representational practices. Particular focus is given to work by Jane 
Austen, Anthony Trollope, George Eliot, Wilkie Collins, Ellen Wood, Mary 
Elizabeth Braddon, and Arthur Conan Doyle.  
Previous studies have either focused on how nineteenth-century law and 
literature competed to create accurate representations of reality, or have examined 
how the distinction between testimonial and circumstantial evidence presented 
literature with alternative models of representation. By contrast, this thesis argues 
that the competition over the matter of representation occurred within both law and 
literature rather than simply between them, and that the two opposing models of 
representation offered to literature by the law were not based on a distinction 
between opposing types of evidence, but rather on a distinction between character-
focused and evidentiary-reasoning models of representation. In its reconsideration of 
how courtroom representations interacted with and influenced nineteenth-century 
literary representational practices, this thesis offers new readings of some of the most 
enduringly popular nineteenth-century texts, and constitutes the first examination of 
the extent to which the introduction of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act helped shape the 
form and style of nineteenth-century sensation and detective narratives. 
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Introduction 
 
 
As the Judge might once have heard it, so the Reader shall hear it now. 
- Walter Hartright, The Woman in White 
 
The opening paragraphs of Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White (serialised in All 
the Year Round 1859-60) explicitly draw a connection between the object of 
courtroom representations and the object of the novel’s narrative: ‘to present the 
truth always in its most direct and intelligible aspect’.1 In his seminal study The Rise 
of the Novel, Ian Watt also draws a connection between novelistic and courtroom 
representational practices, noting how ‘the novel’s mode of imitating reality may 
[…] be equally well summarised in terms of the procedures of another group of 
specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court of law’.2 Watt’s analogy usefully 
highlights how the jury trial and the novel become connected through a shared 
purpose: the accurate representation of – or in Watt’s terms the ‘imitation’ of – 
reality. In drawing this comparison Watt reveals a fundamental homology at the 
heart of interdisciplinary studies of the law and literature, namely that law and 
literature both seek to structure and represent reality through language.3  
In The Rise of the Novel Watt does not go on to explore the full implications 
of the analogy he makes, pausing only briefly to justify his employment of it by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White, ed. by John Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008 [1860]), p. 5. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
2 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (London: Hogarth Press, 
1987 [1957]), p. 31.  
3 Kieran Dolin has also noted how the law and literature become intimately connected through their 
formal attempts to ‘structure reality through language’: Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: Legal 
Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 
8. Paul Gewirtz has similarly identified a connection between law and literature as they both ‘attempt 
to shape reality through language’: Paul Gewirtz, ‘Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law’, in Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. by Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996), pp. 2-13 (p. 4). 
	   7 
noting that the expectations of the juror and reader ‘coincide in many ways’.4 The 
reason for this is that Watt’s study is not concerned with examining how 
representations of reality are made across both disciplines, but rather with charting 
and analysing the development of the novel form alone. Nonetheless, Watt’s analogy 
opens up the question of how an understanding of the representational practices 
employed in the jury trial might further illuminate our understanding of how reality 
comes to be represented in the novel. 
In Fiction and the Law: Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist 
Literature, Kieran Dolin claims that through a ‘contextualised study of fictional 
representations and appropriations of law, of institutions of law and legal practice’ 
we can gain an ‘enhanced understanding of nineteenth-century culture and its 
dominant genre, the novel’.5 This thesis follows Dolin by offering a contextualised 
study of nineteenth-century fictional appropriations of a specific legal practice: the 
representational methods employed in courtrooms to establish the truth of disputed 
facts in criminal trials. In particular this thesis will constitute the first detailed 
examination of the extent to which nineteenth-century sensation and detective 
narratives were influenced by the introduction of a full defence counsel for prisoners 
accused of felony following the passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act into law in 
1836. In this way I hope to cast new light on, and thereby offer an ‘enhanced’ 
understanding of, the ways in which nineteenth-century literature was shaped by its 
interaction with the law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Watt, Rise, p. 31. 
5 Dolin, Fiction and the Law, p. 4. 
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Nineteenth-Century Fiction and the Representation of Reality 
Nineteenth-century jurist William Forsyth QC, a prominent lawyer and Member of 
Parliament, noted how the jury trial was to be understood as a mechanism through 
which the ‘truth of disputed facts’ could be established.6 With this in mind, the 
analogy which Collins makes between his mode of representation in The Woman in 
White and courtroom representational practices seems an obvious one, as the story 
which Collins tells is explicitly concerned with establishing the truth of disputed 
facts.7 However, The Woman in White’s avowed purpose of representing the reality 
of past events in order that the truth might emerge from such a representation, could 
equally be applied to a wide range of nineteenth-century novels which sought to 
represent accurately some non-verbal reality beyond the page and, often, to reveal 
some ‘truth’ in the process.8  
In his preface to the 1841 edition of Oliver Twist (first serialised in Bentley’s 
Miscellany 1837-9), Dickens states that he wished to teach his readers a ‘lesson of 
purest good’ by revealing the ‘stern and plain truth’ about the frightening social 
reality of the lives of ‘the most criminal and degraded of London’s population’.9 In 
keeping with this reformist spirit, Dickens’s other novels similarly aim to reveal the 
truth about social injustices, from his presentation of the ragged school in Nicholas 
Nickleby (1838-9), to his satiric look at the bureaucracy of government in Little 
Dorrit (1855-7), and his indictment of the workings of the Court of Chancery in 
Bleak House (1852-3). We see a similar impulse in the work of Dickens’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1852), p. 8. 
7 The story revolves around Walter Hartright and Marian Halcombe’s attempts to establish (legally 
and publicly) the truth of Laura Fairlie’s identity. Her husband Sir Percival Glyde and his friend 
Count Fosco, who have stolen her identity, dispute Hartright and Marian’s version of events. 
8 For an examination of the relationship between literature and the idea of truth, see Peter Lamarque 
and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
9 Charles Dickens, ‘Preface’, Oliver Twist, ed. by Kathleen Tillotson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999 [1838]), p. liii.  
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contemporaries, not least in Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1848), where her 
portrayal of working class struggles, poverty, and conflict was drawn from her own 
experiences which she wished to write about ‘truthfully’.10  
In this way authors such as Dickens and Gaskell were writing with a purpose, 
a purpose which J. Hillis Miller has identified as morally didactic: 
George Eliot, Thackeray, Trollope, all tended to agree with Dickens that 
fiction is morally useful because it presents a sincere and accurate picture of 
things and people as they really are. Such fiction, in theory at least, was 
moralistic in the sense that it assumed undistorted pictures of real life would 
show us the consequences of bad or good acts and persuade us to choose 
good.11 
 
What Miller identifies here is the Victorian novelist’s  belief that some moral ‘good’ 
could be achieved through the accurate presentation of reality, whether that good be 
the exposure of some social evil or, as George Eliot wished, ‘the extension of our 
sympathies’.12 As George Levine has suggested, nineteenth-century novels often 
represent ‘an attempt to get beyond language, to discover some non-verbal truth out 
there’, and Lillian Furst has more recently noted how a number of nineteenth-century 
authors laid claim to the ‘overarching truth value’ of their fiction.13 Whatever the 
underlying message the author wished to put across, what is important to note for 
this thesis is that these nineteenth-century authors believed that they could achieve 
their aim, and sought to achieve it, through the accurate representation of reality.  
In The Rise of the Novel Ian Watt traces the development of the novel as a 
new form of literature during the eighteenth century. Watt views the novel as having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Elizabeth Gaskell, ‘Preface’, Mary Barton, ed. by Shirley Foster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006 [1848]), p. 4.  
11 J. Hillis Miller, Victorian Subjects (Hemel Hempstead: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 123. 
12 George Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, Westminster Review, 66 (July 1856), 51-79 (p. 
54). 
13 George Levine, The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 5, and Lillian R. Furst, All is True: The Claims and 
Strategies of Realist Fiction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 8. 
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at its centre an epistemological enterprise as it ‘more sharply than any other literary 
form confronted the problem of correspondence between literary work and the reality 
it imitated’.14 For Watt, the defining characteristic of the novel is the way in which it 
attempts to represent reality, something he calls the novel’s ‘formal realism’.15 Watt 
makes clear that formal realism is not ‘a specific literary doctrine or purpose’ but 
rather a ‘set of narrative procedures’ that work to create the effect that the novel ‘is a 
full and authentic report of human experience’, that it is, in fact, an accurate 
representation of reality as the reader understands it.16 Watt’s analysis of the novel’s 
formal realism highlights that at the heart of the development of the novel is a desire 
to achieve a faithful representation of reality through language. 
The concern with creating accounts which accurately depict some reality 
beyond the words employed to represent it, can be traced back to the emergence in 
the seventeenth century of a plain prose style designed to convey information as 
effectively and as accurately as possible. Watt has noted that the novel’s ‘formal 
realism’ has its roots in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke who believed that the  
‘truth can be discovered by the individual through his senses’.17 In her study 
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth Century England, Barbara Shapiro 
examines how during the seventeenth century there occurred a ‘breakdown of the 
centuries-old tradition that divided “science”, “knowledge”, “certainty”, and 
“philosophy” on the one hand, from “opinion”, “probability”, “appearance” and 
“rhetoric” on the other’.18 Out of this ‘breakdown’ grew a new awareness and 
acceptance of human fallibility, arising from both the unavoidable subjectivity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Watt, Rise, p. 11.  
15 Ibid., p. 10. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 12. 
18 Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth Century England (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 3.  
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limitation of human perception, and from the limitations of language as the medium 
for communicating knowledge to others. This growing awareness and acceptance of 
the problems that surrounded knowledge and its communication occurred in all areas 
of thought, from the scientific to the literary. Shapiro notes how this growing 
scepticism led to a rise in probabilistic thinking, so that the primary concern 
regarding knowledge across all disciplines became a concern with the attainment of 
the highest level of probability: near certainty.19 Alongside this preoccupation with 
attaining near certainty, as Shapiro’s study shows, there also emerged the question of 
how that knowledge could be effectively and accurately communicated to others. 
This led to an emerging preference in all disciplines for ‘unbiased communication’ 
through a clear and objective prose style.20  
The increasing importance placed on using clear and plain language during 
the seventeenth century can be seen in John Locke’s influential An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (1690).  It is clear from the Essay that Locke understood the 
problems facing those who wished to communicate their knowledge and ideas to 
others. In book three of the Essay Locke argues that effective communication is best 
achieved through a plain style of prose which focuses on the precise use of language.  
Whilst Locke notes both the necessity of spoken or written words to record and 
communicate our thoughts and ideas, he is equally alive to the problems of doing so: 
‘it is easy to perceive, what interpretation there is in language, and how the very 
nature of words, makes it almost unavoidable, for many of them to be doubtful and 
uncertain in their significations’.21 Locke explains that this uncertainty often occurs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In the sciences in particular this led to an increase in collaborative work which decreased the margin 
of human error. See Shapiro’s ‘Introduction’ to Probability. 
20 Ibid., p. 227.    
21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 
[1690]), Bk. 3, Ch. 9, pp. 305-306. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the 
text.  
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because one can never be sure that a word one person uses to signify an idea 
corresponds to the same idea in the minds of others (Bk. 3, Ch. 9, pp. 306-307).  
Nevertheless, Locke’s approach to the use of language in this essay demonstrates his 
belief that such problems can be (largely) overcome if language is used in a careful 
and responsible manner (Bk. 3, Ch. 11). Locke’s essay was hugely influential and his 
advocacy of precision and clarity in the use of language came to dominate not only 
the sciences and philosophy, but also those disciplines which before the seventeenth 
century had traditionally been aligned with rhetoric, including both law and 
literature.22 As Shapiro has shown, the development of a Lockean plain prose style – 
meant to convey information as accurately as possible – is linked to the development 
of new literary forms such as newspapers and travelogues which were designed to 
provide factually accurate reports. This new interest in fact-orientated learning was 
also exploited in fictional writing, in particular in that ‘fact-based fiction’, the 
novel.23 
The rise and development of this fact-orientated fiction can be seen in the 
works of eighteenth century authors such as Defoe and Fielding. Defoe's Robinson 
Crusoe (1719) and Moll Flanders (1722), for example, set themselves up as the 
‘histories’ of real people, written as though they are true stories.24 During the 
eighteenth century novelists increasingly began to employ the device of the truthful 
and objective narrator as the faithful reporter of events, in order to create the effect 
that they were authentic stories of ‘real’ people in the ‘real’ world, a trend which 
continued into the nineteenth century. As Lillian Furst has pointed out, nineteenth-
century authors tended to view themselves as ‘chroniclers of their day’, providing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Shapiro, Probability, pp. 256-257. 
23 Ibid., p. 261. 
24 Ibid., p. 263. 
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their reading public with ‘real accounts of the vicissitudes of life’.25 All this is 
suggestive of the fact that nineteenth-century novelists believed that, whatever 
challenges they faced, an accurate representation of reality was ultimately 
achievable.26  
Peter Brooks has argued that one of the functions of the novel is to provide 
the reader with the sense that the accurate representation of reality is possible.27 
Brooks notes how ‘we thirst for a reality that we can see, hold up to inspection, 
understand’, asking why we ‘take pleasure in imitations and reproductions of things 
in our world’.28 Brooks reasons that it is because these imitations and reproductions, 
like scale models, give us the sense that we can ‘master the real world’.29 Brooks 
likens this sense of mastery offered by the scale model to the effect literature 
produces on us for, like the scale model, literature enables us to get ‘our minds 
around objects otherwise alien and imposing’ and gives us a way to ‘bind and 
organize the complex and at times overwhelming energies of the world outside us’.30 
This function of literature gained a special significance in the nineteenth century 
when readers were experiencing a time of rapid and massive social change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Furst, All is True, p. 13. George Eliot, for example, went to painstaking lengths to research and 
select material for her novels so that the final work was firmly grounded in real life. Furst has 
highlighted the care with which Middlemarch (1871-2) was constructed from Eliot’s notebooks in 
which she carefully collected all manner of information from schedules of Oxford University 
examinations to medical information, in order to provide her novel a sense of verisimilitude by 
grounding it in reality. As Furst notes, Eliot’s notebooks certainly reveal a ‘passion for exactitude’ 
and meticulous attention to detail: see Furst, All is True, pp. 84-85 (p. 85).Charles Dickens too noted 
in his 1836 preface to Sketches By Boz (1833-6) that his ‘object has been to present little pictures of 
life and manners as they really are’: Charles Dickens, Sketches By Boz, ed. by Dennis Walder 
(London: Penguin, 1995[1836-7]), p. 7. In Victorian Subjects, J. Hillis Miller highlights how both 
early reviewers and twentieth century critics tend to praise the Sketches for their ‘startling fidelity’, 
their ‘precision’ and ‘wealth of detail’: Miller, Victorian Subjects, p. 123. 
26 George Levine argues that nineteenth-century authors were well aware of the limitations and 
problems they faced in attempting to represent reality, but that they still believed accurate 
representation was possible. See Levine, Realistic Imagination, p. 4. 
27 Peter Brooks, Realist Vision (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), pp. 1-3. 
28 Ibid., p. 1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., pp. 1-2 (p. 1). 
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Industrial and technological advancements, from the coming of the railway to 
the explosion of factory production and the formation and rapid growth of the 
modern city, transformed the English landscape. The rise of the middle-classes 
reflected the strength of new forms of economic power and eroded the traditional 
basis of economic power in land. Such change offered exciting opportunities, but at 
the same time it brought people face-to-face with a new reality which had the 
potential to be frightening, alienating and chaotic. In claiming to offer a 
comprehensible and communicable representation of that new reality, the nineteenth-
century novel offered the reassurance that this reality had order and meaning: as 
Levine has put it, the novel offered to ‘invest experience with value for a new 
audience reading from a new base in economic power’.31 For Brooks and Levine the 
novelist’s endeavour is driven by an intense desire to know, to understand reality 
within the context of a changing society and to prove that it is both understandable 
and meaningful. This endeavour is nowhere more clear than in the nineteenth-
century novel where it is so often easy to identify, as Levine suggests, the ‘struggle 
to reconstruct a world out of a world deconstructing’.32 Such an effort, however, 
necessarily raises questions about what sort of reality was actually ‘“out there”, of 
how best to “represent” it, and of whether, after all, representation was possible or 
the “out there” knowable’.33  
 
Finding the Truth of Disputed Facts: Legal Representations of Reality 
In its attempts at representing reality, the nineteenth-century novel unavoidably 
became concerned with the question of how that reality might be represented most 
effectively. Of course any such representation had to be achieved through the words 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Levine, Realistic Imagination, p. 22.  
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
33 Ibid., p. 5. 
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on the page, and a number of critics have noted how a large proportion of novels 
during this period are characterised by an endeavour to ‘reveal reality through 
language’.34 Jan-Melissa Schramm has noted how many nineteenth-century novels 
claim to be ‘truthful tales’ and so are fundamentally concerned with the question of 
how to achieve the ‘most truthful representation of the “real”’. 35 This concern, as 
Schramm points out, intimately links literature’s aims with those of the law during 
this period. Kieran Dolin also argues that literature becomes deeply connected to the 
law through its formal attempts to ‘structure reality through language’, and Paul 
Gewirtz has similarly noted how a connection arises between law and literature as 
they both ‘attempt to shape reality through language’.36 As Schramm’s study 
Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology demonstrates, 
this connection between law and literature during the nineteenth century is nowhere 
more strikingly revealed than in the aims of the criminal jury trial. 
In the nineteenth century William Forsyth defined the jury trial as follows: 
The Jury consists of a body of men taken from the community at large, 
summoned to find the truth of disputed facts, who are quite distinct from the 
judges or court. Their office is to decide upon the effect of evidence, and thus 
inform the court truly upon the question at issue, in order that the latter may 
be enabled to pronounce a right judgment.37 
 
For Forsyth the jury trial was, in the nineteenth century at least, understood as a 
mechanism through which the ‘truth of disputed facts’ could be established. Forsyth 
believed that this function of the jury trial was its ‘distinctive characteristic’, a 
characteristic fundamental to the administration of justice and the court being able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 John P. McGowan, Representation and Revelation: Victorian Realism from Carlyle to Yeats 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986), p. 21. See also Watt, Rise; Furst, All is True; and Jan-
Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
35 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 23. 
36 See Dolin, Fiction and the Law, quotation at p. 8, and Gewirtz, ‘Narrative and Rhetoric’, pp. 2-13 
(p. 4). 
37 Forsyth, History, p. 8. 
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pronounce a ‘right judgment’.38 The growth of scepticism in the seventeenth century 
surrounding knowledge and its communication played a large role in the 
development of the novel, as Watt and Shapiro have shown. In legal thought this 
scepticism led to the emergence of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ principle. This 
principle dictated that the truth was whatever could be proved to be the truth of 
disputed facts beyond a reasonable doubt.39 There remained, however, the question 
of how this truth could be established and communicated most effectively to a panel 
of jurors as reality. 40 
During the early years of the nineteenth century this question was to be 
deeply contested in Parliament in a series of debates which concerned criminal trial 
practices in cases of felony. The outcome of these debates was that in 1836 the law 
was changed, and the methods employed for representing the truth of disputed facts 
in felony trials altered in a way that signaled an epistemological shift in the criminal 
felony trial process. These legal debates concerned the continued imposition of 
felony counsel restriction in criminal jury trials. Felony counsel restriction was a 
legal rule which denied prisoners accused of felonies the right to a full legal defence, 
which by the nineteenth century meant that a prisoner’s counsel was not permitted to 
address the jury on his behalf. 41 The imposition of felony counsel restriction created 
and maintained what legal historian John Langbein has termed the ‘accused speaks’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid.  
39 See Barbara Shapiro, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” and “Probable Cause”: Historical Perspectives 
on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
40 The concept of ‘truth’ which Forsyth and other nineteenth-century jurists invoke is a 
correspondence conception of truth, where a statement is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs in 
external reality. 
41 Through the centuries a variety of limitations were placed on how far defence counsel could go in 
defending their clients in cases of felony, with the result that defence lawyers in such cases did not 
share the same freedoms as the prosecution in the representation of their client. It should also be noted 
at this point that what constituted a ‘felony’ was never clearly defined, even by the nineteenth century. 
It was, however, understood to include most serious offences, and penalties included capital 
punishment and the forfeiture of land and goods. Strictly speaking treason was a felony, but it was 
traditionally treated as a different (more serious) species of crime: see David J. A. Cairns, Advocacy 
and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 3. 
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model of trial, where the trial itself was understood as an opportunity for the accused 
to respond to the charges against him in person.42 In 1836, however, the Prisoners' 
Counsel Act was passed and provided those persons accused of felony with recourse 
to a full legal defence. As Langbein argues, this change in the law turned those 
representational methods employed in felony trials away from the accused, his story 
and his character, and towards a model of trial where truth was determined through 
the forensic scrutiny of all the available evidence by both the prosecution and the 
defence: a model which I will hereafter refer to as the ‘adversarial-evidentiary’ 
model.  
It is worth noting here that the adversarial-evidentiary model of 
representation employed in felony trials post-1836 was already being used in civil 
trials and criminal trials for misdemeanours and treason before the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act came into force. The detailed research of David Cairns and John 
Langbein has shown that until the eighteenth century all criminal trials were 
dominated by judges, with most cases being conducted without counsel for either 
side. However, the introduction of prosecution counsel in some criminal cases in the 
early eighteenth century prompted the emergence of defence counsel and led to the 
gradual ‘lawyerization’ of the criminal trial.43 The increasing dominance of lawyers 
led to the rise of adversarialism in the eighteenth-century courtroom, as Cairns and 
Langbein have pointed out. Adversarialism promised rigorous inquiry, a 
‘comprehensive investigation of the truth, resulting from the fullest interpretation 
and investigation of the evidence’.44 Yet felony counsel restriction prevented 
adversarialism from emerging fully in felony trials, which instead relied on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 2-3. 
43 See Langbein, Origins, and Cairns, Advocacy. 
44 Cairns, Advocacy, pp. 94-95. 
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‘accused speaks’ model as Langbein has noted.45 When the removal of felony 
counsel restriction was suggested in Parliament in the 1820s, public attention was 
drawn to the contrast between two alternative models of courtroom representation, 
and the merits of both were vigorously debated. Cairns has noted how the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act gave rise to long-lasting debates about the effectiveness of the 
adversarial-evidentiary trial as a truth-seeking model, and in particular raised 
questions about the correct interpretation of facts and evidence.46 As Schramm has 
suggested, the expansion of the role of advocates into the defence of felonies gave 
the issues presented by adversarial advocacy a ‘sharper focus’.47 In the years 
following the removal of felony counsel restriction, for example, there was extensive 
public debate about the ethical implications of defending suspected felons, and the 
licence which counsel should have to defend their potentially guilty clients. 
Following the Prisoners’ Counsel Act’s enactment, ‘anxieties about the nature of 
professional advocacy found their way into a number of fictional narratives’ as 
writers began to engage with the issues the Prisoners’ Counsel debates had raised.48 
While the adversarial-evidentiary model of representation had begun to emerge in 
courtrooms pre-1836, the Prisoners’ Counsel debates are an important context in 
which to examine literature of the period because they attracted the public’s attention 
to the distinction between two alternative legal models of representation, and the 
potential merits and deficiencies of both. The Prisoners’ Counsel debates were 
concerned with how the trial’s aim of uncovering truth, and representing it as reality 
to a panel of jurors, could most effectively be achieved. I aim to show that these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Langbein, Origins, pp. 2-3. 
46 Cairns, Advocacy, Ch. 1.   
47 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 102. The expansion of defence advocacy into felony trials 
was significant because, as Langbein has noted, civil litigation tended to be ‘trial avoiding’, whereas 
criminal justice was ‘trial centred’, see Langbein, Origins, p. 7.  
48 Ibid., p. 103. 
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debates, which articulate concerns about the logic of representational practices, can 
further illuminate our understanding of novelistic representational practices 
employed during the nineteenth century. At the start of this introduction I noted how 
Ian Watt’s analogy between the jury trial and the novel raised the question of how an 
understanding of the jury trial’s mode of representing reality could shed light upon 
our understanding of how reality comes to be represented in literature. In this thesis I 
will answer this question by thoroughly examining attempts to represent reality in 
both criminal jury trials and literary narratives during the nineteenth century. In 
particular I will be examining the effect of a shift in legal thought which altered the 
representational methods employed in criminal trials for felony after 1836, and how 
this shift significantly influenced the development of two of the most popular literary 
genres during the nineteenth century: sensation and detective fiction. 
 
Surveying the Field: Law and Literature  
J. H. Wigmore first envisioned the potential value in studying law alongside 
literature when he created a list of ‘legal novels’ (novels which dealt with the law in 
some way) and suggested that judges and lawyers should study these novels as part 
of their professional development.49 Richard H. Weisberg – who recognised the 
value of Wigmore’s list, updated it, and helped pioneer the Law and Literature 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s – has noted how the stories which Wigmore 
suggests legal professionals read ‘provide sources of legal understanding unavailable 
elsewhere’ and can be valuable, as Wigmore suggested, because ‘reading fiction will 
immeasurably improve lawyer-client comprehension, professional writing, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 John H. Wigmore, ‘A List of Legal Novels’, Illinois Law Review, 2 (1908), 574-593. This list was 
reprinted and extended as ‘A List of 100 Legal Novels’, Illinois Law Review, 17 (1922), 26-41. 
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interpreting the texts of the law’.50 Today the Law and Literature movement is 
generally regarded as containing two complementary sides: Law in Literature and 
Law as Literature, though often these strands interconnect and weave together.  
Studies which fall into the Law in Literature category are interested in the 
ways in which literary texts (generally those which represent the law in some way) 
are instructive to the student of law and legal professionals, especially in regards to 
its ‘capacity for promoting an empathetic understanding of the inner life of others’ 
and ‘its critical perspective towards the phenomenon it represents’.51 Wigmore’s list 
largely falls into this category, and Richard Weisberg has similarly championed the 
relevance of legal-literary texts to the legal scholar and practitioner.52 Law as 
Literature on the other hand seeks to apply the techniques of literary criticism and 
theory to the study of legal texts, from scholarly articles to judicial rulings and 
barrister’s speeches. James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination was the first study 
to fully examine the usefulness of treating legal texts as literary ones, and it 
demonstrates how the tools of literary analysis can be important when considering 
and examining the language used in the law. Law as Literature in particular has 
sparked some interesting and at times heated debates, not least over the matter of 
how legal texts come to be interpreted.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Richard H. Weisberg, ‘Wigmore and the Law and Literature Movement,’ Law and Literature, 21  
(2009), 129-147 (p. 134). 
51 Gewirtz, ‘Narrative and Rhetoric’, ‘pp. 2-13 (p. 3). 
52 See Weisberg, ‘Wigmore’. 
53 For an excellent summary and discussion of this debate see Robin West’s ‘Introduction’ to 
Narrative, Authority, and Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), and also Ian Ward, 
Law and Literature: Possibilities and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
See further, Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature (London: Harvard University Press, 1998);  
Stanley Fish, Is there a Text in this Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, 
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The interdisciplinary study of Law and Literature has been of burgeoning 
interest to literary scholars as well as legal ones. The contextualisation of literary 
texts within the relevant legal background and framework has proved especially 
fruitful, and a number of studies have revealed the nineteenth century to be a period 
of particular interest in this regard. Kathleen Loncar’s study Legal Fiction: Law in 
the Fiction of Nineteenth Century Women Novelists reveals how a correct 
understanding of nineteenth-century law is crucial to a full understanding of literary 
texts which contain any legal aspect.54 Kieran Dolin’s Fiction and the Law is more 
subtle, but likewise argues for a contextualised study of fiction within the relevant 
legal discourses of the time. Dolin examines the dialectical interplay of the law in 
both nineteenth-century and modernist texts, analysing how through this interplay 
law came to help structure and shape literary narratives. Dolin also examines how 
literature began to engage critically with the law, questioning its parameters and 
providing the discursive space for the exploration of alternative possibilities of 
providing justice outside the law.55 Other literary critics too have succeeded in 
revealing the close relation between the law and literature during the nineteenth 
century, in particular how questions and issues being raised in the legal world were 
also being addressed and explored in the literature of the time, often creating a 
dialogue between the two. Lisa Rodensky’s The Crime in Mind is a particularly good 
example of this type of criticism. Rodensky examines how the Victorian novel’s 
representation of the interiority of its characters, through the privileged vantage point 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Kathleen Loncar, Legal Fiction: Law in the Fiction of Nineteenth Century Women Novelists 
(Montreux: Minerva Press, 1995). 
55 In his examination of how the formation of a normative legal world is linked to the development of 
the novel, Dolin identifies and traces a movement from nineteenth-century narrative affirmation of the 
law to modernist critique through the study of six individual texts and their engagement with a 
particular aspect of the law. This general trend which Dolin identifies is complicated by the 
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of the omniscient narrator, engaged the novel in contemporary legal debates and 
ideas about criminal responsibility.56 
The focus of this thesis is the way in which literary narratives engaged with 
the questions and issues raised by the Prisoners’ Counsel debates of the nineteenth 
century, and the extent to which the changes in representational practices in criminal 
trials for felony wrought by the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act impacted on the 
development and structure of sensation and detective fiction. I have already noted 
how Ian Watt recognised the affinity between the legal trial and the novel, but as 
Jonathan Grossman points out in The Art of Alibi: English Law Courts and the 
Novel, the comparison is much more than a useful analogy; it is instead a ‘cultural 
and historical entwining of the novel with the narratologically structured space of the 
court’.57 In this thesis it is my aim to reveal how this ‘cultural and historical 
entwining’ of legal narratives told in the courtroom and nineteenth-century literary 
narratives, was effected in part through law and literature’s active engagement with 
the issues and questions the Prisoners’ Counsel debates raised.  
Grossman’s study undoubtedly reveals the significance of the interplay 
between the narratives of the courtroom and novel narratives in nineteenth-century 
England, but the focus of this thesis is different from that of Grossman in two 
fundamental respects. Firstly, Grossman examines how a shift in the eighteenth 
century away from a penal system centered around the spectacle of punishment to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Lisa Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibility and the Victorian Novel (Oxford: 
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Sensation Fiction, ed. by Pamela Gilbert (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 508-515; Simon 
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one focused on the courtroom trial scene, allowed the law courts to emerge as a 
story-telling forum which began to influence the development of the English novel’s 
story-telling structure. However, Grossman’s focus on the impact of the shift of 
emphasis from the gallows spectacle to the trial scene means that he does not fully 
take into account how the story-telling structure of the courtroom itself changed 
during this period, and so overlooks how two different models of representation were 
competing during the nineteenth century and offering themselves as alternative 
narrative structures for literary texts. Secondly, Grossman’s focus is on creating a 
new history of crime fiction and leads to the conclusion that English detective fiction 
is best understood as a reaction against ‘the larger judicial paradigm’ of the law court 
which other nineteenth-century crime narratives, such as the Newgate Novel, had 
appropriated. I argue, conversely, that detective fiction in fact reveals itself to be 
very much committed to the story-telling structure of the adversarial-evidentiary 
trial, and that this is especially evident in the Sherlock Holmes stories.  
At the heart of this thesis is the attempt to build on the excellent work of 
Alexander Welsh and Jan-Melissa Schramm, whose studies of how eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century literary modes of representation responded to, and were 
influenced by, courtroom representational practices, have demonstrated just how 
illuminating such a contextualised study of literature can be. In Strong 
Representations Alexander Welsh argues that during the eighteenth century there 
emerged a distrust of testimonial evidence and consequently increased reliance was 
placed on the use of circumstantial evidence, which required the construction of what 
he terms ‘strong representations’, that is, representations which subordinate the 
evidence to a particular ‘case’ (explanation of the facts) being made. Welsh argues 
that this preference for circumstantial evidence influenced narratives employed in a 
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number of disciplines, but he is especially interested in how this legalistic narration 
comes to dominate literary narratives in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Welsh’s study reveals the deep connection between legal and literary narratives, 
forged through their shared use of strong representations to tell their stories or make 
their cases. However, as Schramm points out, Welsh wrongly views circumstantial 
evidence as being preferred to testimonial evidence until well into second half of the 
nineteenth century. In fact as early as the 1820s, when the Prisoners’ Counsel Bill 
was first being introduced into Parliament, there already existed a scepticism about 
the reliability of circumstantial evidence, and from this time on the fallibility of 
evidence in general was a matter of both legal and public debate. Moreover, by 
focusing on the (somewhat misleading) distinction between circumstantial and 
testimonial evidence, Welsh does not consider the implications the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act had for both legal and literary representations. 58 
Jan-Melissa Schramm’s study Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, 
Literature and Theology is the work which has most closely examined the 
significance of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act to nineteenth-century literature, and has 
given the fullest account of the interaction between law and literature over the matter 
of representation which resulted from the passing of that Act. Schramm argues that 
following the enactment of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act in 1836, authors created a 
style of literary advocacy that both emulated and reacted against the construction of 
narratives by advocates at the Bar. Schramm’s study is invaluable in identifying the 
importance of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act to the development of literary narratives, 
and this thesis was initially inspired by my enthusiasm to extend the scope of 
Schramm’s study. During the course of my research however, it became clear that 
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the conclusions I was drawing were different from those of Schramm. Schramm 
identifies a tension in nineteenth-century literature between an authorial preference 
for the pre-1836 ‘accused speaks’ model of trial and the use of a literary advocacy 
that imitated adversarial trial practices. However, Schramm does not consider the 
ways in which the narrative techniques of the novels she discusses can in fact be 
considered an imitation of pre-1836 felony trial practices. The novels Schramm 
considers (which she labels ‘realist’) are novels which in fact emulate the character-
focused nature of pre-1836 felony trial proceedings and so allow their authors to 
remain fully committed to their critiques of the adversarial-evidentiary jury trial. In 
addition, Schramm does not include in her study a thorough analysis of fiction which 
does not primarily take a character-focused approach to representation, such as 
sensation or detective literature. Consequently, she does not consider how these other 
types of narratives not only structure themselves around the narrative techniques of 
the adversarial-evidentiary trial, but in doing so hold its methods up as a more 
effective means of representing reality than those employed in a model focused on 
character.  
This thesis presents a new and more thorough analysis of the post-1836 
ascendance of the adversarial-evidentiary legal representational model, and its 
relationship to, and impact on, literary representational practices employed in 
nineteenth-century fiction. In her analysis of the interaction between this legal model 
and nineteenth-century novels, Schramm presents the relationship between law and 
literature as an essentially rivalrous one, arguing that a ‘competition’ emerged 
between law and literature during this period over the matter of representation 
(rooted in literature’s preference for the pre-1836 ‘accused speaks’ model) with each 
discipline seeking to ‘monopolise the representation of the “real” in the cultural 
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imagination’.59 By contrast, this thesis seeks to show how the competition which 
Schramm identifies is not as straightforward as being simply between law and 
literature, and is better understood as a competition between two alternative models 
of representation. Both of these models were employed in law and literature during 
this period, and both of these models were the subject of legal and popular debate. 
In his examination of the changes in representational practices that were 
occurring in law and literature during the nineteenth century, Welsh does identify the 
existence of two alternative modes of representation within both law and literature. 
Yet, as Welsh does not fully consider the import of the Prisoners’ Counsel debates in 
his discussions of evidence and its use in the representational process, he is led to 
conclude that the two competing models of representation are those of the 
testimonial versus the circumstantial. By examining the debates on evidence within 
the wider legal context of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, it becomes apparent that 
testimonial and circumstantial evidence are not completely separable in the way 
Welsh suggests. Instead, the two competing models which are more significant for 
our understanding of nineteenth-century legal and literary representations are those 
of the pre-1836 ‘accused speaks’ model and the adversarial-evidentiary model. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of four chapters. In chapter one, ‘Truthful Representations: 
The Criminal Jury Trial and the Character-Focused Novel’, I chart the development 
of the jury trial from its early beginnings in Anglo-Saxon and Norman England and 
trace the importance which the assessment of the defendant’s character came to hold 
in the criminal jury trial before the introduction of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act. The 
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detail provided is intended to demonstrate just how fundamental the idea of character 
was to establishing the truth of disputed facts in criminal trials for felony up until 
1836. I then go on to consider how a preference for this character-focused model of 
trial can be identified in the work of a number of popular nineteenth-century writers, 
not only in their fictional treatment of the jury trial process but also in the way in 
which their tales are told. Many of the novels and novelists I deal with in this chapter 
are those which critics commonly identify as ‘realist’.60 However, labels such as 
‘realist’ and ‘realism’ are some of the most contested terms in the critical literary 
lexicon, and the difficulty of definition can often lead to confusion and inconsistency 
of application.61 It is not within the scope of this thesis to offer a full analysis of what 
is meant by such terms; such a task could easily form the subject of a thesis in itself. 
However, one thing the authors which chapter one deals with have in common is that 
their narrative method focuses primarily upon the presentation and revelation of 
character. For the purposes of this thesis, and in order to avoid terminological 
inconsistency and confusion, I will be referring to these authors as writers of 
‘character-focused’ novels.62 Schramm argues that such novels are conflicted, being 	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which grew out of the need for a literary form which could engage with the experiences of people 
living in a changing society: ‘Realism and Romance’, in The Realist Novel, ed. by Dennis Walder 
(London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 207-223. See also Levine, The Realistic Imagination, and Georg 
Lukács, Studies in European Realism: A Sociological Survey of the writings of Balzac, Stendhal, Zola, 
Tolstoy, Gorki and Others (London: The Merlin Press, 1972). There are many useful, interesting, and 
diverse studies of ‘realism’ and its use in, and relation to, the novel, some of which aim to give an 
overall sense of the field such as Pam Morris’s Realism, and others which posit a particular theory of 
what realism is, such as Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
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both an ‘imitation of’ and a ‘reaction against, the increasing prominence of defence 
counsel’.63 In contrast, by situating these character-focused novels in the context of 
the jury trial’s development, I aim to demonstrate how novelists who sought to 
represent reality through a central focus on character remain fully committed to their 
preference for an ‘accused speaks’, character-focused model of representation. 
Chapter two,  ‘Making a Case: The Prisoners’ Counsel Act and the Rise of 
Sensation Fiction’, focuses on the enactment of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act in 1836 
and the surrounding debates. Central to these debates, in both legal and popular 
discourse, was the question of how representations should be made in order to reveal 
truth, including how legal evidence should be understood, used, and presented. This 
chapter then goes on to explore how the debates surrounding this legal issue also 
called into question the character-focused novel’s mode of representation, and begins 
to explore how the development of the sensation genre can be read, in part, as a 
response to such a challenge.  
Chapter three, ‘Engaging in the Debate: Evidence, Advocacy, and the 
Sensation Novel’s Response’, examines how some of the most popular sensation 
novels of the period were engaging actively with contemporary debates over the 
matter of courtroom representation, especially in relation to the evidence debates. 
Through the close reading of a number of well known texts I hope to show how the 
sensation novel which emerges in the 1860s does so partly in response to the 
abolition of felony counsel restriction and the mode of telling courtroom narratives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Literature, trans. By Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), in which 
Auerbach examines how ‘realism’ represented the first serious treatment of the lives of ordinary 
citizens and aligns the realist project with a democratic impulse. Other works which aim to investigate 
and understand what the term ‘realism’ means in relation to the nineteenth-century novel often 
provide useful analyses of the work of other critics, see, for example, Harry E. Shaw’s Narrating 
Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Other studies, however, choose 
to focus on one particular aspect of ‘realism’ such as Lillian Furst’s All is True, in which she primarily 
focuses on the use of place to create a sense of authenticity.  
63 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 23. 
	   29 
which flourished in its wake. Crucially I argue that, whilst sensation fiction is often 
critical of the law with regards to specific laws or legal practices and acknowledges 
the representational problems the law faces, readings of the sensation novel as a 
rejection of legal models of justice do not pay sufficient attention to this type of 
novel’s overall representational mode, which not only adopts legal representational 
methods but upholds them as fundamentally effective ones. 
Matthew Rubery has noted the ‘high degree of interaction between 
[nineteenth-century] literature and journalism’.64 In The Novelty of Newspapers: 
Victorian Fiction After the Invention of the News, Rubery demonstrates how ‘the 
shape taken by the Victorian novel must be understood alongside the simultaneous 
development of the news as a commercial commodity read by up to a million readers 
per day’.65 Through the careful analysis of a number of popular nineteenth-century 
novels, Rubery shows how authors, including Dickens, James, Trollope, and 
Braddon, were influenced by the narrative conventions found in the newspaper, from 
personal advertisements to foreign correspondence. In The Sensation Novel and the 
Victorian Family Magazine, Deborah Wynne demonstrates how reading the novel 
within the context of its periodical publication is often crucial to a full understanding 
of the text. In particular Wynne reveals the way in which the serialisation of 
sensation novels in popular periodicals allowed authors to respond to the important 
social and cultural debates of the day which were simultaneously being discussed in 
other articles within the publication’s pages.66 Following Wynne’s approach, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Matthew Rubery, ‘Victorian Print Culture, Journalism and the Novel’, Literature Compass 7 
(2010), 290-300 (p. 290). See also Matthew Rubery, ‘Journalism’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Victorian Culture, ed. by Francis O’Gorman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 
177-194. 
65 Matthew Rubery, The Novelty of Newspapers: Victorian Fiction After the Invention of the News 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 159. 
66 Deborah Wynne, The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family Magazine (Houndmills: Palgrave, 
2001).  
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expanding on her conclusions and methodologies, Julie Bizzotto has similarly 
offered some interesting new interpretations of novels by reading them in the context 
of their periodical publication.67 My analysis of sensation novels is informed by this 
approach in its attempts to reveal the ways in which such texts were directly 
engaging in contemporary legal and popular debate over the matters of evidence and 
representation. 
Chapter four, ‘“The Perfect Reasoning Machine”: The Advocacy of the 
Detective’, builds on the conclusions of chapter three by extending its reading of 
sensation novels to detective fiction, and arguing that this genre was similarly 
influenced by criminal trial narratives post-1836. In particular I offer a new reading 
of the Sherlock Holmes stories that situates Holmes in the context of the rise of 
adversarial advocacy, rather than scientific discourse. This alternative 
contextualisation of Holmes reveals his power to lie not only in his scientific 
expertise, as critics have commonly suggested, but also in his equally important role 
as an advocate. Such a reading has implications for the way in which we read the 
character, function and effectiveness of not only Sherlock Holmes, but also that of 
Dr Watson. 
By reading nineteenth-century fiction within the context of the legal debates 
relating to courtroom representational practices, this thesis offers new readings of 
some of the most enduringly popular nineteenth-century texts. Such readings not 
only offer a fresh perspective on the ways in which these texts are working to 
achieve an accurate representation of reality, but also reveal the significant and 
lasting impact of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act on the development of nineteenth-
century literary narratives.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Julie Bizzotto, ‘Serializing Sensation: The Dynamics of Genre in Victorian Popular Fiction’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, Royal Holloway, 2012), quotation at p. 14. 
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Textual Note 
For ease of reference, quotations from novels, poems and short stories have been 
taken from widely available scholarly editions of these texts. Where such editions are 
not available I have quoted directly from the text’s original publication either in 
serial or volume form (always clearly stated). Where I have used a modern version of 
a text which has reproduced the volume edition of the text rather than the serialised 
version, I have taken care to consult the original text in its periodical publication and, 
where relevant, have made a note of any significant changes between serial and 
volume form. Where quotations are given, any emphasis provided is to be found in 
the original text unless otherwise stated. 
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Chapter One 
 
Truthful Representations: The Criminal Jury Trial and the 
Character-Focused Novel 	  
He has convinced me of his innocence […] not because I am specially soft, or 
because I love the man – for as to that I dislike him rather than otherwise – 
but because there is a real truth in his words.1 
 
Listening to Josiah Crawley’s explanation (or rather lack thereof) as to how he came 
by a cheque for twenty pounds in The Last Chronicle of Barset (serialised 1866-7), 
the lawyer Mr Toogood becomes convinced that the clergyman is innocent of theft. 
The manner in which Toogood is persuaded echoes eighteenth-century jurist 
Sergeant William Hawkins’s argument that the ‘artless and ingenuous behaviour of 
one whose conscience acquits him’ is sufficient to reveal innocence.2 Hawkins’s 
argument is one which was used in support of felony counsel restriction, a rule which 
prevented suspected felons the right to have counsel address the jury on their behalf, 
until its removal by statute in 1836. The scene between Toogood and Crawley, in 
which Crawley is permitted to tell his story in his own words, replicates the 
conditions of a pre-1836 legal model of courtroom representation where the focus of 
the trial would largely be on the assessment of the accused’s character. In The Last 
Chronicle of Barset Trollope contrasts this method of representation with 
adversarial-evidentiary representational practices, implicitly criticising the latter 
model through Crawley’s self-evident innocence once he is permitted to provide his 
own defence. This preference for a more character-focused model of legal 
representation can also be discerned in the novels of other popular nineteenth-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anthony Trollope, The Last Chronicle of Barset, intro. by Sophie Gilmartin (London: Penguin, 2002 
[1868]), Ch. 32, p. 320. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text.	  
2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 4th edn (London: Richardson & Lintot, 1762 
[1724]), Bk. 2, p. 400. 
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century writers who, like Trollope, created character-focused narratives. A study of 
such novels within the context of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act reveals a connection 
between the character-focused representational methods of the pre-1836 felony trial 
and the representational methods of character-driven narratives. This connection will 
form the focus of this chapter. 
In his autobiography, Anthony Trollope identified a prevailing contemporary 
view that there existed a type of novel which was primarily focused on ‘the 
elucidation of character’: 
Among English novels of the present day, and among English novelists, a 
great division is made. There are sensational novels and anti-sensational; 
sensational readers and anti-sensational. The novelists who are considered to 
be anti-sensational are generally called realistic […] The readers who prefer 
the one are supposed to take delight in the elucidation of character. They who 
hold by the other are charmed by the construction and gradual development 
of the plot.3 
 
Trollope’s acknowledgement that there existed a group of novelists who relied upon 
the presentation of character in order to create a ‘realistic’ effect, indicates that a 
narrative focus on character was understood as one way in which the representation 
of reality could be achieved. On this understanding the group of novels Trollope 
identifies might be more properly labelled ‘character-focused’ rather than ‘realistic’, 
and in the interests of consistency and clarity this term shall be employed hereafter.4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography, ed. by Michael Sadleir and Frederick Page (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008 [1883]), pp. 226-227. Further references to this edition are given after 
quotations in the text.  
4 The novels chosen for discussion in this chapter are often grouped together under the term ‘realist’. 
This is the term which Schramm, for example, chooses to employ, and analysis of some of these 
authors is also undertaken in studies of realism such as Arnold Kettle’s An Introduction to the English 
Novel, 2 vols (London: Hutchinson, 1951), and George Levine’s The Realistic Imagination: English 
Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
However, as noted in the introduction (pp. 24-25), the terms ‘realism’ and ‘realist’ are fraught with 
difficulties, and so I have chosen to apply a term to these novels which might prove a more useful way 
of grouping them for this particular study. Whether we apply the term ‘realist’, or ‘character-focused’, 
or something else entirely, no term will ever be perfect. Novels are brought together under one label 
because they have certain characteristics in common which allows them to be grouped together in this 
way. Yet they will also have differences, and so no categorisation will ever be without objection. That 
said, this chapter hopes to show that the term ‘character-focused’ is not without justification within 
this particular context. For useful analyses of the relationship between character and the novel see, for 
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Novels which I take to fall into this category are, generally speaking, primarily 
interested in portraying the growth and development of their protagonists, 
concentrating on their struggle towards eventual triumph (or not) at the novel’s close. 
These novels’ representations are largely dependent upon the reader coming to know, 
understand and engage with that protagonist. This emotional investment ensures that 
the reader judges the protagonists in the way the novel’s narrative suggests, with the 
result that the novel’s final resolution of events is approved by that reader, thereby 
affirming the success of that novel as a truthful representation of the real. For 
example, a large part of the success of David Copperfield (1849-50) depends on our 
judgement of David’s character. The vast majority of the novel is therefore spent 
establishing that David is good and finally deserving of the rewards he receives. 
Similarly, it is important that we judge Uriah Heep as bad and deserving of the 
punishment eventually meted out. In the end this is, broadly, the assessment that we 
make. The result is that our judgement coincides with that of the novel, and so its 
plot, characters, depictions of life and so on, acquire a verisimilitude which helps to 
secure its success. David Copperfield is narrated in the first person, but most 
character-focused novels are characterised by the use of an omniscient narrator who, 
ostensibly at least, has full access to the inner thoughts and feelings of the characters.  
Jan-Melissa Schramm has identified an authorial ‘preference’ for the 
‘accused speaks’ model in character-focused novels as they ‘refused to follow the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
example: W. J., Harvey, Character and the Novel (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965); Jeremy 
Hawthorn, Multiple Personality and the Disintegration of Literary Character: From Oliver Goldsmith 
to Sylvia Plath (London: Edward Arnold, 1983); Baruch Hochman, Character in Literature (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985); Thomas Docherty, Reading (Absent) Character: Towards a Theory 
of Characterization in Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); and James Phelan, ‘Reading People, 
Reading Plots’: Character, Progression, and the Interpretation of Narrative (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989). 
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law and silence their own protagonists’.5 Yet Schramm also sees a tension between 
this preference and the ‘urge to undertake fictional advocacy’, arguing that the third-
person, omniscient narrator assumes a role similar to that of the advocate.6 This 
chapter will argue that instead of there existing a conflict between the character-
focused novel’s narrative method and the underlying desire to hold on to an ‘accused 
speaks’ model, these novels in fact remain fully committed to an ‘accused speaks’ 
model of representation in two ways.  Firstly, the truth of disputed facts is resolved 
through an ‘accused speaks’ model within the events of the novel, and secondly, 
through the narrative mode itself, which aligns itself methodologically with the 
‘accused speaks’ model so that it does not display merely a preference for that model 
but rather becomes the story-telling structure of the novel itself. This is achieved 
largely through the narrator whose omniscience, instead of allying itself with 
advocacy, in fact continues to permit the accused’s voice to be heard and remain at 
the centre of the representational process. Furthermore, the ability of the omniscient 
narrator to read the thoughts of the protagonists suggests that it is possible to have a 
knowledge and understanding of others in a way which is crucial to the 
representational process. This chapter will also concentrate, therefore, on how the 
‘accused speaks’ model and the character-focused novel are further connected 
through a shared epistemology in which the understanding of reality in large part 
rests upon, and is communicated via, the knowledge of the characters of others. 7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), in particular Ch. 3, quotation at p. 192. 6	  Ibid.	  
7 Legal historian John H. Langbein coined this term to describe the trial model employed in pre-1836 
trials for felony. Throughout this thesis I will be employing Langbein’s term when discussing the pre-
1836 criminal trial model for felony. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 2-3. 
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This chapter will begin by tracing the development of the criminal jury trial 
from its early beginnings in order to show the fundamental importance the idea of 
character played in pre-1836 felony trials. It will then go on to consider how 
character-focused novels display a clear preference for an ‘accused speaks’ model of 
trial in their representation of how the truth of disputed facts is most effectively 
uncovered. A connection is then made between the epistemology underpinning the 
‘accused speaks’ model and that which underpins the narrative strategies of the 
character-focused novel. Finally, a consideration is offered of how the narrative 
mode of the character-focused novel mirrors that of the ‘accused speaks’ trial 
through its use of the omniscient narrator.  
 
 
The Accused Speaks: Seeking the Truth of Disputed Facts through Character 
The rules, procedures and methods employed in determining the truth of disputed 
facts in criminal trials have greatly altered through the centuries, and those practices 
employed in the primitive courts of Anglo-Saxon England seem barely recognisable 
when compared with the complexity of our contemporary, or even nineteenth-
century, trials. Yet despite this evolution – which included the introduction and 
development of the trial jury – one feature of early trial practices remained an 
influential factor in the process for determining guilt right up until the early 
nineteenth century: the character of the accused. Before 1836 the procedures in place 
for determining guilt in felony trials were largely rooted in establishing how likely it 
was that an individual had committed an offence by determining whether or not they 
were of good or bad character. 
The methods and techniques used in early nineteenth-century felony trials to 
determine the truth about the fact in issue – that is, the matter in dispute, usually the 
	  	  
37 
 
guilt or innocence of the accused – grew out of Anglo-Saxon and Norman practices 
which governed the settling of disputes in English law’s early beginnings. The 
Anglo-Saxons were the first people in Britain to keep written records of their laws 
and consequently very little is known about the legal structure and systems of 
England before this period.  J. H. Baker has suggested that early England would have 
been guided by the customs passed down from generation to generation within a 
given community, and like the system of Anglo-Saxon England, there would have 
been no coherent or settled body of law during this time. The laws and customs of 
Anglo-Saxon England, including those concerning the settling of disputes, would 
therefore have varied from place to place.8 Nevertheless, the primitive origins of the 
criminal jury trial can be discerned within the legal workings of Anglo-Saxon 
England, not least the understanding of such proceedings as ‘truth-seeking’ and the 
importance of the idea of character to the establishment of that truth.  
Before the unification of England in the tenth century, England was divided 
into separate kingdoms. Each kingdom was divided into shires, with each shire 
divided into hundreds (containing one hundred families), which in turn were divided 
into tithings (containing ten families).9 Each of these divisional units held assemblies 
which dealt with any issues or business affecting the community in question, and 
were presided over by the relevant official.10 With no separation of powers, each of 
these ancient assemblies would have been free to deal with legislative, administrative 
and judicial matters. The result was that, in the case of the hundred and shire at least, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (London: Butterworths, 2002), p. 3. 
9 Some areas (for example, London) were divided into boroughs and wards, rather than shires and 
hundreds but they functioned in much the same way. The division of kingdoms in this way continued 
even after unification and remains largely unchanged to this day. See further, Baker, p. 7.  
10 The King stood at the head of the Kingdom, but in the shires, hundreds and tithings, the Shire-
Reeve (also known as the Ealdorman), the Hundred-man (Hundredes-Ealdor ) and the Tithing-Man 
(Teothings-Ealdor) would have presided respectively. See William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 
(London: John W. Parker & Son, 1852), pp. 62-64. After the Conquest there was also the introduction 
of Lord's Court which had some jurisdiction over feudal issues and existed alongside the shire and 
hundred courts. See Baker, Introduction, pp. 8-9. 
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such assemblies also functioned as primitive courts.11 Above the hundred court and 
shire court stood the King’s court which served as a court of appeal.12 
The purpose of such assemblies in their judicial capacity was to settle any 
disputes arising in the area. When disputes were brought before the hundred or shire 
assembly, if the parties could not be made to settle the dispute amicably (to make a 
‘love-day’), then the dispute had to be settled by ‘proof by oath’. This procedure 
relied on aggrieved individuals bringing cases before the assembly where they would 
swear on their oaths that the claims they made were true. These claims would be 
supported by the provision of other persons (the ‘suit’ or ‘secta’) who were willing to 
swear to the truth of this claim. Once a prima-facie case had been established in this 
way, the accused would swear upon his oath to the truth of his claim (usually that the 
plaintiff’s claim was false), and in his turn would provide persons (known as 
‘compurgators’ or ‘oath-helpers’) willing to swear on their oaths that he spoke the 
truth. After this ritual was completed, if the assembly considered that the accused 
had produced enough compurgators to discharge the weight of the accusation against 
him, then the case would be decided in his favour. If the accused failed to discharge 
the burden of proof in this way, he would have to face trial by ordeal.13  
Whilst proof by oath may appear somewhat divorced from ideas of truth as 
they were understood and articulated by nineteenth-century jurists, the emphasis on 
swearing to the truth demonstrates that, even at this early stage of English Law's 
development, the trial was understood as a mechanism through which the truth of 
disputed facts could be found. What is more, is that it is clear that this process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is unclear if the tithing assemblies also functioned as courts. See Forsyth, History, pp. 62-69. 
12 The ‘Laws of King Henry I’ (Leges Henrici Primi) show how this Anglo-Saxon court ‘system’ 
operated in much the same way during the Anglo-Norman period: Leges Henrici Primi, in English 
Historical Documents 1042-1189, ed. by David C. Douglas and George W. Greenaway (London: Eyre 
& Spottiswoode, 1953), pp. 459-462. 
13 Baker, Introduction, pp. 4-6, and Forsyth, History, pp. 62-82. 
	  	  
39 
 
truth-seeking is closely connected to the notion of character. The accused’s 
compurgators and the plaintiff’s suit were not witnesses to events, but rather 
character witnesses who would swear to their belief in the honesty of their party’s 
character. 14 Furthermore, the weight given to a party’s suit or compurgators 
depended not only on how many people each party could provide to support their 
claim, but also on the social standing and reputation of each individual compurgator 
or member of the suit.15 The settling of disputes in Anglo-Saxon England, therefore, 
relied upon the establishment of truth through the establishment of good character, 
which was in turn established through the good characters of others. This clear, early 
connection between the determination and representation of truth and the idea of 
character, is a link which can be traced through the jury trial’s development right up 
until the early nineteenth century. 
When an accused person failed to discharge the burden of proof by his oath, 
then he faced trial by ordeal. As with proof by oath, trial by ordeal was designed to 
settle the truth of disputed facts, this time by requiring the accused to under go some 
physical test to prove his innocence.16 During the ordeal it was believed that God 
would divinely intervene to protect the innocent and so reveal the truth. As it was 
necessary for God’s judgement to be ‘interpreted’, the clergy tended to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Forsyth, History, p. 74. See also John Hostettler, The Criminal Jury Old and New: Jury Power from 
Early Times to the Present Day (Winchester: Waterside Press, 2004), p. 19. 
15 Forsyth, History, p. 74. 
16 The two most common physical tests undergone by those facing the ordeal were ordeal by fire and 
ordeal by water. In ordeal by fire (also known as ordeal by hot iron), the accused was required to 
carry in his hands a piece of burning hot iron over a specified distance. The burns sustained would 
then be bandaged and left for a set period to recover. After the specified healing period had passed 
(often three days), the bandages were removed: if the wound had healed the accused would be 
declared innocent, but if the burn had festered then the accused was considered guilty. In ordeal by 
water, the accused would be bound and cast into a body of water which had been blessed by a member 
of the church. If the accused sank then it was deemed that the holy water (and so God) had accepted 
him, thereby revealing his innocence. Any bodies which floated were viewed as being rejected by 
God because of their guilt. Variations on these ordeals also existed. See further Forsyth, History, pp. 
80-81; Baker, Introduction, p. 5; and Hostettler, Criminal Jury, pp. 19-20. 
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responsible for overseeing ordeals.17 However, in 1215 the Church made a decision 
to ban clerical involvement in the ordeal process and so effectively ended the ordeal 
as a viable mode of trial.18 It is widely accepted that this decision was responsible for 
the introduction of the jury trial into English Law.19 With no clear directive from the 
King on what was to replace trial by ordeal, the Royal Justices began to permit the 
accused to have a panel of twelve men to determine the issue of guilt, a panel which 
was to become known as the trial jury.20   
The decision of the judges to allow cases to be decided by a panel of lay 
persons had its roots in another type of jury, the presenting jury, which was in 
existence well before trial by ordeal became obsolete. During the Anglo-Saxon and 
Norman periods, most cases were privately prosecuted and so proof by oath had been 
the usual method of bringing disputes to the attention of the relevant assembly. 
Whilst a firm and settled division between civil and criminal law developed 
gradually over time, as early as the Anglo-Saxon period those persons deemed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Most ordeals were carried out in the Hundred Court for here it was common practice for the Bishop 
to support the Hundreds-Ealdor with matters arising in the hundred, including the settling of disputes: 
see Forsyth, History, p. 62. 
18 The decision was made by the Church at the Fourth Lateran Council. The use of the ordeal as the 
primary means of settling disputes continued in England even after the Norman Conquest in 1066. 
This appears partly due to a Charter issued by William I in which he decreed that the English people 
were to continue to ‘have and hold’ the laws of the Anglo-Saxon King Edward the Confessor: ‘The 
Laws of William the Conqueror’, in Documents, ed. by Douglas and Greenaway, p. 400. Baker has 
suggested that the decision of the Church to forbid the clergy from taking any part in ordeals came 
after concerns were raised within the clergy regarding the appropriateness of asking God to intervene 
in human affairs in this way. Baker also argues that there is evidence to suggest that those whose role 
it was to interpret God's judgement increasingly came to feel responsibility for their decisions and so 
began to facilitate the result they believed to be just. In any case it would seem that during the last 
days of the ordeal, the acquittal rate was extremely high: see Baker, Introduction, p. 5.  Maitland has 
also noted how ‘success at the ordeal seems to have been far commoner than failure’, finding only 
‘one single case of failure’ when editing the Select Pleas of the Crown 1200-1225: see Select Pleas of 
the Crown 1200-1225, ed. by F. W. Maitland (London: Selden Society, 1888), p. xxiv.  
19 Baker, Introduction, p. 5, and Hostettler, Criminal Jury, pp. 21-22. After 1215 there immediately 
followed a period of indecision regarding what should replace the ordeal, during which the Royal 
Justices were unclear about what procedure to follow when trying to resolve disputes. In 1219 a Royal 
Writ addressed to the Royal Justices in Eyre stated that the King had taken no decision on what 
procedure was to be used in place of the ordeal. In the interim it stipulated that suspects held on 
suspicion of great crimes were to be detained in prison without trial, that suspects accused of less 
serious crimes were to be banished from the realm, and those accused of minor offences should be set 
free on the condition that sureties could be found to keep the peace. 
20 Hostettler, Criminal Jury, p. 21.   
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have committed the worst offences were put to the King’s mercy. These offences 
came to be known as Pleas of the Crown or Royal Pleas, over which the King’s court 
had full jurisdiction. After the Conquest the number of Royal Pleas began to steadily 
increase, and this extension of royal jurisdiction was consolidated in The Assize of 
Clarendon (1166). This legal document extended Henry II (1154-89) and his 
government’s jurisdiction over all felony prosecution and prescribed the procedure 
of ‘presentment’ to ensure that all suspected felons were brought to the King’s 
justice. 21  The procedure of presentment required that ‘twelve of the more lawful 
men’ (that is twelve men of good social standing and ‘good character’) from each 
hundred, and ‘four of the more lawful men’ from each tithing be chosen to report 
(‘present’) all suspected felons to the King’s Justices. 22 These suspects would then 
be tried by the ordeal. These ‘lawful men’ came to be known as the presenting jury.23  
In addition to making formal presentments, Green has shown how the 
presenting jury also had a discretionary role, which involved them in a ‘screening 
process’.24 After fulfilling their legal duty to report all suspected felons, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Baker has suggested that the procedure of presentment was probably in use before the Assize of 
Clarendon: see Baker, Introduction, p. 73. Green, however, attributes the origin of presentment to this 
document: Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 5-7.  
22 The Assize of Clarendon (1166), in Documents, ed. by Douglas and Greenaway, pp. 407-410  (p. 
408). In practice the procedure of presentment was usually carried out in front of the Sheriff in the 
hundred court: Green, Verdict, p. 7. This system appears similar to the Anglo-Saxon system of Frank-
Pledge which was a mutual social agreement in which the head of each family within each tithing 
made a pledge to stand surety for the other nine men. This system continued into the Norman period, 
and is explicitly set out in ‘The Laws of William the Conqueror’. As with the Frank-pledge, it would 
seem that presenting jurors could be fined if they failed to make presentments: see John G. Bellamy, 
The Criminal Trial in Later Medieval England: Felony Before the Courts from Edward I to the 16th 
Century (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p. 19. 
23 The legal treatise known as Bracton (written during the mid-thirteenth century and so-called due to 
its being attributed to Henry de Bracton) suggests that these jurors were also responsible for arresting 
the suspects or, if this was not possible, to report suspects in writing to the Sheriff who then took 
responsibility for their capture. Bracton: On the Laws and Customs of England, trans. by Samuel E. 
Thorne, 4 vols (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1968), II, 329. The presenting jury ultimately came 
to be known as the Grand Jury and by the 1360s it was usual practice for these juries to examine bills 
of indictment and decide which of these were ‘true bills’ and should be put forward for full trial.  
24 Green, Verdict, pp. 7-10. Green argues this ‘screening role’ can be discerned within the document 
itself. Other legal historians do not go this far but are largely agreed that that the presenting jury did 
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presenting jurors would identify who they believed the real suspects were and so 
which persons should undergo the ordeal. Once again, however, the assessment of 
the accused’s character remained central to this screening process. The presenting 
jury were drawn from the local neighbourhood and so in identifying who they 
believed the real suspects to be, they would take into account their knowledge of the 
accused. Persons of ill-repute who were known by the presenting jury to be of bad 
character would be dealt with summarily, but those persons of good social standing 
and established good character might be spared the ordeal on the advice of the 
presenting jury.  
After the decline of the ordeal, the use of twelve men from the presenting 
jury to decide cases became increasingly common, and by 1229 it had become the 
usual means of settling disputes.25 The twelve men sitting in a panel in this way came 
to be known as the petty jury or trial jury. Eventually the trial jury replaced the 
screening role of the presenting jury and in time it became established that accused 
persons could object to presenting jurors also sitting on the trial jury. It remained a 
requirement, however, that the members of the trial jury should still be summoned 
from the neighbourhood where the dispute arose in order that they could give 
evidence in court from their own knowledge.26 
  The use of trial juries in this way demonstrates that the idea of character 
played a vital role in a process designed to determine the truth. Trial jurors were not 
only required to speak from their own personal knowledge, they were self-informing 
too, even performing an investigative function by enquiring in the neighbourhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have discretion to state who they believed the real suspects were. See, for example,  Hostettler, 
Criminal Jury, pp. 17-18. 
25 Hostettler, Criminal Jury, p. 23.   
26 The jurors were required to take an oath to ‘speak the truth in a plea of the Crown’: Bracton, II, 
329. Both Forsyth and Baker have highlighted this panel of trial jurors functioned as little more than 
witnesses: Forsyth, History, p.108; Baker, Introduction, p. 75. 
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after the accused’s character, his reputation, and how he had conducted himself after 
the accusation: had he acted as an innocent or guilty man? These factors would form 
an important part of the jury's decision, and by the time such cases came to trial the 
jury had usually already made a decision on the issue of guilt based on their 
findings.27 Over time, factors such as increased geographical mobility and the 
introduction of rules governing who was eligible to sit on a trial jury meant that the 
use of jurors who had personal knowledge of facts began to decline, as jurors were 
drawn from increasingly further afield.28 By the seventeenth century the self-
informing jury was essentially obsolete and it was commonplace for witnesses to be 
sworn separately.29 However, even after the jury had relinquished its self-informing 
and witness functions, there continued to operate an open court procedure in which 
members of the jury could ask questions of the court and of the prisoner, make 
observations, and be sworn in as witnesses.30  
What is important to note here is that the idea of assessing the character of 
the accused continued to remain central to the determination of truth right up until 
the early years of the nineteenth century. This remained the case for two main 
reasons. Firstly, it appears to have become common practice to introduce a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Green, Verdict, p. 17. This investigative function of the trial jury was often necessary because all 
felonies had to be prosecuted by the Royal Justices on the Eyre circuit, and so those accused of 
felonies (once having been presented in the Shire or Hundred Court) would often have to wait 
extended periods, sometimes years, before their case could be heard. Consequently those ‘lawful men’ 
of the local area who were to make up the jury would, if they did not know the accused personally, 
make enquires in the neighbourhood. 
28 Forsyth, History, p. 161.  
29 By 1368, although a statute still stipulated that those sitting on a trial jury were to have 'best 
knowledge of the truth and be nearest', it would appear that independent witnesses to events were 
being sworn in separately to give evidence under oath for the trial jury to consider. See Hostettler, 
Criminal Jury, p. 26. The first formal mention of this type of witness appears in 1468 in the treatise 
De Laudibus Legum Angliae, written by Lord Chancellor Fortescue. During this time it was still the 
case that jurors should be from the neighbourhood where the offence was committed and should have 
personal knowledge of events, but separate witnesses now appear as an established part of trial 
proceedings 
30 Such practices continued right up until the eighteenth century. See John Hostettler, The Politics of 
Criminal Law Reform in the Nineteenth Century (Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1992), p. 
44.  
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character witnesses to attest to the good character of the accused in an attempt to 
influence the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The use of character witnesses in 
this way can be seen in the Old Bailey Reports, which suggest that by the eighteenth 
century this practice was not only common but, on the whole, successful in securing 
acquittals.31 Secondly, the continued refusal to allow those accused of felony the 
right to a full legal defence meant the accused had to answer the charges against him 
directly.  
By the eighteenth century the criminal jury trial’s mode of representing 
reality was firmly established as the ‘old accused speaks’ model. In this model the 
accused was required to tell his story in his own words, offering himself, his words 
and his character up to the full and direct scrutiny of the court. This model of 
representation arose out of a legal system which had for many centuries remained, 
for the most part, free from lawyers. In such a system, criminal trial proceedings 
were viewed as an opportunity for the accused to answer the charges against him in 
person, and to establish his innocence to the jury through his own words and 
manner.32  Consequently, criminal trials remained focused on the accused’s character 
long after the jury ceased to have personal knowledge, first or second hand, of this 
themselves.  
Before the eighteenth century it was not uncommon for lawyers to be 
employed in the prosecution and defence of civil wrongs and misdemeanours (minor 
criminal offences). In contrast, those on trial for felony were not permitted to employ 
defence counsel to address the jury on their behalf. In 1836 this was to change with 
the introduction of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, and it is this change which forms the 
focal point of this thesis. However, it has been important to chart the development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hostettler, Criminal Law Reform, p. 44. 
32 See further Langbein, Origins.	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the criminal jury trial in order to demonstrate the fundamental importance of the idea 
of character to the epistemology underlying the old ‘accused speaks’ model, an 
epistemology in which the primary way of understanding the world was through the 
knowledge of the characters of others, and through which the character-focused 
novels of the nineteenth century become intimately connected with the pre-1836 
‘accused speaks’ trial model.33 
 
An Appropriate Trial Model? The Accused Speaks in Changing Times 
Until 1836 felony counsel restriction prevented defence counsel from addressing the 
jury on behalf of the defendant. The original reason for this restriction can be dated 
back to the reign of Edward I, where the appearance of the King’s name on the 
indictment for felony was given as justification for the denial of defence counsel.34 
Until the end of the seventeenth century it was uncommon for criminal proceedings 
to involve any lawyers at all and so felony counsel restriction appears not to have 
caused too many problems.35 However, as the prosecution of crimes fell increasingly 
into the hands of professional advocates during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, the problems of denying the accused full legal representation 
began to emerge. It became common practice, for instance, for the prosecution to 
offer large rewards to witnesses willing to give evidence against the accused, or to 
offer exemptions from prosecution to those suspects who were willing to turn 
evidence against the main culprits, and so perjured testimony became an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For further reading on the history of the criminal jury trial see: Baker, Introduction; Forsyth, 
History; Langbein, Origins; Green, Verdict; and David J. A. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the 
Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
34 The argument was that no counsel could be admitted against the monarch. Legal treatises of the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries refer to the well-established rule that the accused is not 
allowed defence as to the fact. It would seem that by the later middle-ages defence counsel was 
readily admitted to argue on points of law. See Cairns, Advocacy, p. 26. 
35 The employment of lawyers was more common in civil trials where private persons instituted 
proceedings.  
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overwhelming problem. The extent to which perjury vitiated criminal trials was 
publicly exposed in a number of treason trials which took place during the reign of 
the late Stuarts, including the Popish Plot (1678-80), the Rye House Plot (1683) and 
the Bloody Assizes (1685). In each of these cases it was later revealed that perjured 
testimony had been used to secure the convictions. Following the public outrage 
which resulted, the Treason Trials Act 1696 was passed, permitting those accused of 
treason to have recourse to a full defence. 
The Treason Trials Act created an anomaly in criminal law. As felony 
counsel restriction still remained for all other felonies, the situation arose that those 
accused of the least and most serious crimes were permitted a degree of legal 
representation which was denied to those who fell in between. Nevertheless, as 
further problems with felony counsel restriction began to make themselves more 
clearly known, judges began to use their discretion to relax the rules, permitting 
prisoners accused of felony to employ defence advocates to examine and cross-
examine witnesses on their behalf.36 However, the continued restriction on defence 
counsel in felony trials, and the consequent form trial proceedings took, ensured the 
focus of criminal trial proceedings for felony still remained on the accused and his 
character.  
In felony cases before 1836 the prisoner was firstly arraigned and pleaded, 
then prosecution counsel would make their submissions and witnesses would be 
examined and cross-examined. Finally the accused would address the court directly, 
telling his story in his own words, following which the judge would sum up before 
the jury considered and then delivered its verdict. This order of proceedings ensured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For a discussion on the increasing use of prosecution and defence advocates in criminal trials during 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see J. M. Beattie, 'Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and 
the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', Law and History Review 9 
(1991), 221-67, and John H. Langbein, 'The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers', University of Chicago 
Law Review 45 (1978), 263-316. 
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that the criminal trial’s model for representing reality maintained its emphasis on the 
accused in two ways. Firstly, it ensured that the accused was given the ‘last word’, 
the final opportunity to address the jury directly. The final address to the jury 
provided the last chance for anyone to impress his or her particular interpretation of 
events upon the jurors and so the ‘last word’ was highly valued by counsel in civil 
trials, where the prosecution possessed this final right of address.37 Secondly, 
emphasis also remained on the accused’s character due to the requirement that he 
address the court directly himself. The requirement that the accused speak on his 
own behalf meant that he remained a major testimonial source and so provided the 
jury with the opportunity not only to hear his version of events, but also to observe 
his behaviour and so to discern what sort of ‘character’ he appeared to possess.38  
From its primitive origins through to the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the criminal jury trial’s mode of representing reality was one which closely focused 
on the character of the accused. After centuries of using this model for uncovering 
and making representations about truth and reality, the question is why in the 
nineteenth century the decision was taken to adopt alternative means for the making 
of such representations? The decision to make such a change in the way truth and 
reality were represented in felony trial proceedings cannot be attributed to any one 
cause, but changes in the social structure of England appear to have been a 
fundamental factor in this decision. Legal historians John Hostettler and W. R. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 During the major debates surrounding the question of whether or not to remove felony counsel 
restriction entirely, the issue of who should be given the last word proved highly contentious. Indeed, 
the Bill which was to eventually become the Prisoners' Counsel Act nearly failed at the final stage for 
the very reason that it could not be agreed which side should be given the final speech. In the end it 
was decided the prosecution should have the last right of reply and so the final chance to discredit the 
defence and convince the jury of their interpretation of events. So highly valued was this final 
opportunity to address the jury, that in some cases the defence chose to close their case after their 
opening speech, for by not producing any evidence they were able to deny the prosecution the last 
word. In 1854 this decision as reversed by the Common Law Procedure Act which gave the final right 
of reply to the defence. This decision allowed adversarialism to expand and thrive even further in 
criminal trials after mid-century. See Cairns, Advocacy, pp. 107-109. 
38 Cairns, Advocacy, p. 49.  
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Cornish have highlighted that the traditional basis of English society was always 
agricultural, structured upon feudal values which placed the aristocracy at the top of 
the social structure and above those who farmed and laboured on the land.39 Wealth 
and power were therefore traditionally tied up with the ownership of land, creating 
what Robin Gilmour has termed an ‘interdependent hierarchy’ which was based on 
the exercise of responsibility and patronage downwards and deference upwards.40 
This structure of society, coupled with factors such as limited migration and the 
hereditary nature of land ownership, which required that it be passed from father to 
son, ensured that agriculturally based societies remained relatively stable.41 Such a 
social structure meant that there always remained the opportunity for knowing the 
characters of others within a given community: that of your squire, your tenant, your 
clergyman, your neighbour. Consequently, whilst by the eighteenth century the self-
informing days of the jury had long been a thing of the past, the criminal jury trial 
was able to maintain its use of a model focused on knowledge of the accused’s 
character precisely because the idea of being able to know an accused’s character 
was still a comprehensible concept in an England dominated by agriculture.  
One of the most common arguments in favour of maintaining felony counsel 
restriction during the nineteenth century was the idea that an innocent man had the 
power to exonerate himself through the simplicity and innocence of his answers, and 
through the honesty of his countenance. The argument is presented in Coke’s Third 
Institute (1644) and it suggested that no man needs counsel to speak honestly, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hostettler, Criminal Law Reform, p. vii. See also Crime and Law in Nineteenth Century Britain, ed. 
by W. R. Cornish and others (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1978), p. 19.  
40 Robin Gilmour, The Idea of the Gentleman in the Nineteenth Century Novel (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1981), p. 8. See also F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 1-24. 
41 The tenure of land also tended to pass down the generations in this way, either by virtue of long 
leases or, in the cases of short hold leases, through a sense of duty and responsibility felt to the tenant 
farmers and their families. Farmers would also show responsibility to their labourers and farm 
workers, often providing them with places to live. See further G. E. Mingay, The Gentry: The Rise 
and Fall of a Ruling Class (London: Longman, 1976), pp. 190-191.  
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that no amount of evidence could obscure the truth. The argument was famously 
stated by the Earl of Nottingham, acting as Lord High Steward in the trial of Lord 
Cornwallis in 1678: 
No other good reason can be given why the law refuseth to allow the prisoner 
at the Bar counsel on matters of fact, in the result of which his life may be 
concerned, but only this, because the evidence by which he is condemned 
ought to be so very evident, and so plain, that all counsel in the world should 
not be able to answer it.42 
 
It was also well established that the purpose of the accused’s statement to the court 
was that he should clear himself or hang himself, for it was widely believed that a 
jury would be able to identify guilt or innocence through a prisoner’s words and 
conduct. This view was perhaps most clearly articulated by William Hawkins in 
1724 when he argued that, as it ‘requires no manner of skill to make a plain and 
honest defence’: 
The simplicity and innocence, artless and ingenuous behaviour of one whose 
conscience acquits him, [has] something in it more moving and convincing 
than the highest eloquence of persons speaking in a cause not their own […] 
On the other side, the very speech, gesture and countenance, and manner of 
defence of those who are guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often 
help to disclose the Truth, which probably would not so well be discovered 
from the artificial defence of others speaking for them.43  
 
Hawkins’s reasoning presupposes that the outward show of a person corresponds to 
the inner truth, and in a society where it appeared at least possible to have some 
knowledge of the characters of others, such an assumption appears to have gone 
largely unchallenged. 
By the nineteenth century, however, the traditional agricultural basis of 
society was, as Hostettler argues, ‘crumbling’.44 Urbanisation, industrialisation, 
geographical migration (especially to concentrated urban centres), new money from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The Trial of Lord Cornwallis (1687), in Howell’s State Trials 21 vols (London: Hansard, 1816), 
VII, cols 143-158 (col. 149). 
43 Hawkins, Pleas, Bk. 2, p. 400. 
44 Hostettler, Criminal Law Reform, p. vii.  
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industry, trade and finance rather than land, and the consequent increase in social 
mobility, all challenged the traditional foundations of landed society.45 Such social 
developments provided many people with the opportunity to place themselves, 
financially at least, on a level with the landed gentry or even the aristocracy. In the 
nineteenth century we therefore see the ‘emergence and consolidation’ of the middle 
classes.46 The deferential social hierarchy dependent upon land ownership gave way 
to new social relationships which grew out of alternative forms of wealth, founded 
on interests in ‘merchandise and money, rather than land and game’, thereby uniting 
social groups through common economic interests, rather than through responsibility 
and patronage, deference and loyalty.47 
This shift in the structural foundations of society resulted in an increasing 
upset to the traditional intimacy and interconnectedness of landed agricultural 
society. The increase in geographical and social mobility that such alterations in 
society’s structure entailed, brought with it reduced opportunities to know one’s 
neighbours, tenants, landlords, even friends. During the nineteenth century the 
growing awareness that this was the case had a large impact on felony trial 
proceedings, which had long relied on the assumption that it was possible to know 
and pass judgements on the characters of others. The alteration in both legal and 
political thought which brought about the enactment of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act in 
1836 therefore denotes a recognition that a legal model for representing reality which 
had grown out of a traditional landed social structure, was no longer appropriate in 
modern nineteenth-century society. This is evident from the Second Report of His 
Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law, which openly discredited the well-
established view that a man would be able to clear himself by the ‘simplicity’ and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See Mingay, The Gentry, and also Thompson, English Landed Society. 
46 Gilmour, Idea of the Gentleman, p. 2.  
47Crime and Law, ed. by Cornish and others, p. 19. See also Gilmour, Idea of the Gentleman, p. 8.  
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‘innocence’ of his answers. The Commissioners argued that in criminal cases the 
complexity of facts and evidence are often such that it requires a skilled advocate to 
reveal the truth. The Commissioners highlighted the very inability to comprehend the 
characters of others, stating plainly that an innocent man accused of a crime might 
often appear guilty through a natural ‘sense of the disgrace and danger to which he is 
exposed’.48 The Commissioners argued from experience that: 
It frequently happens that hardened villains possess more coolness and 
composure than the innocent; and that the latter, instead of having even their 
ordinary reason and speech at command, are deprived of their usual presence 
of mind, and exhibit a degree of confusion which might seem to indicate 
guilt.49   
 
In their report, the Commissioners emphasised the difficulty of relying on the 
accurate assessment of the characters of others and pressed the view that in a modern 
society some alternative model was needed to elicit truth in criminal trials, one which 
offered all the available evidence up to the full scrutiny of the court: the adversarial-
evidentiary model. 
 
‘There is a real truth in his words’: Trollope’s Preference for the ‘Accused 
Speaks’ Model 
The change in the law represented an acceptance in legal (and political) thought that 
the ‘accused speaks’ model was no longer an appropriate way of making 
representations about reality and ascertaining the truth in nineteenth-century society. 
As I argued in my introduction, literature, like the law, was equally interested in 
creating accurate accounts of reality and the novel, like the trial, was also developing 
in a rapidly changing nineteenth-century society, and likewise responding to those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Second Report From His Majesty’s Commissioners on Criminal Law Parliamentary Papers, in 
Parliamentary Papers: Reports from Commissioners: Church, Education, Law etc, 36 (London, 1836) 
pp. 183-314, (p. 189). 
49 Ibid. 
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changes. In the early years of the century, as the Prisoners’ Counsel Act was being 
debated, the novel was rapidly emerging as a popular form of entertainment. Unlike 
the law, however, the character-focused novel demonstrates a continued commitment 
to the ‘accused speaks’ representational model. One of the ways in which this 
commitment manifests itself is through the ways in which the characters within these 
novels themselves search for and uncover the truth of disputed facts, especially in 
cases where criminal liability is concerned. The demonstration of the novelist’s 
preference for an ‘accused speaks’ model in this manner is most evident in the novels 
of Anthony Trollope. 
Despite declaring his belief that all good novels should be both ‘realistic’ and 
‘sensational’, it is clear, from both his novels and his autobiography, that Anthony 
Trollope was a writer of character-focused novels.50 Trollope’s passion for creating 
believable characters is articulated in his autobiography, where he argues that a 
primary ‘desire’ of the novelist is ‘to make his readers so intimately acquainted with 
his characters that the creations of his brain should be to them speaking, moving, 
living human creatures’ (p. 232). Trollope firmly believed that the creation of such 
characters was the key to his success: ‘it is so that I have lived with my characters, 
and thence has come whatever success I have attained’ (Autobiography, p. 233).  
Throughout his work Trollope is interested in creating characters which are true to 
life; for him it is not a question of creating ‘true’ or ‘false’ characters but rather ‘how 
far true, and how far false’ (Autobiography, p.233). Through the creation of 
imperfect characters of varying shades of grey, Trollope invites his readers to 
reassess how they judge the actions of others both in his novels and in life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For a thorough examination of Trollope’s use of character see Stephen Wall, Trollope and 
Character (London: Faber and Faber, 1988). 	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Trollope’s commanding narrator continually cautions the reader against judging too 
hastily, and is always disposed to highlight the good along with the bad. For 
example, in The Warden (1855), the narrator ensures that the reader’s harsh 
judgement of Archdeacon Grantly is tempered before the novel’s close: 
We fear that he is represented in these pages as being worse than he is; but 
we have had to do with his foibles, and not with his virtues. We have seen the 
weak side of the man, and have lacked the opportunity of bringing him 
forward on his strong ground [….] On the whole, the Archdeacon of 
Barchester is a man doing more good than harm – a man to be furthered and 
supported, though perhaps also to be controlled; and it is a matter of regret to 
us that the course of our narrative has required that we should see more of his 
weakness than his strength.51 
 
A major aim of Trollope’s novels is to educate readers in the art of judging others 
fairly, sympathetically, and accurately. This aim is one to which characterisation is 
crucial, and to be successful Trollope recognised his characters had to appear as 
‘speaking, moving, living, human creatures’ (Autobiography, p. 232). Trollope 
achieves this by providing the reader with access to the thoughts and feelings of his 
characters, usually through the privileged insight of the narrator. In this way the 
characters in a Trollope novel are given the opportunity to tell their story in their 
own words, rather like a prisoner in a criminal trial for felony pre-1836.  
Trollope’s preference for an ‘accused speaks’ model of representing reality 
can most clearly be seen in Orley Farm (1861-2), a novel in which he takes issue 
with the replacement of the ‘accused speaks’ model of trial with adversarial 
practices.  Orley Farm tells the story of Lady Mason, who has forged a codicil to her 
husband’s will to ensure that her son inherits Orley Farm. The codicil is initially 
contested by her husband’s first-born child, but unsuccessfully. Twenty years later, 
when Lady Mason’s son comes of age, fresh evidence comes to light which suggests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Anthony Trollope, The Warden, ed. by Robin Gilmour (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984 [1855]) p. 
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that the codicil was forged. Consequently, Lady Mason is charged with perjury and 
so commences ‘The Great Orley Farm Case’.52  
A novel which centres around criminal jury trial proceedings, as this one 
does, presents Trollope with the opportunity to examine the methods and techniques 
employed in courts of law in the interests of uncovering and determining the truth of 
disputed facts. The efficacy of such methods is brought into question at the outset by 
the fact that Trollope makes no secret of Lady Mason’s guilt, not only in respect of 
perjury, but also forgery: 
I venture to think, I may almost say to hope, that Lady Mason’s confession at 
the end of the last chapter will not have taken anybody by surprise. If such 
surprise be felt I must have told my tale very badly. (Bk. 2, Ch. 45, p. 42) 
 
The legal system is therefore guilty of a double failure, firstly of failing to find Lady 
Mason guilty in the original hearing, and then in the jury finding her innocent for a 
second time during the course of the novel. It is made clear to the reader that the 
blame lies (in the second trial at least) in the post-1836 adversarial practices 
employed in the courts. Trollope’s portrayal of Lady Mason’s trial manifests the 
concerns voiced by the Attorney General John Copley in 1826, when he warned that 
the use of defence counsel would transform courts into adversarial ‘arenas’ where, 
‘instead of endeavouring to elicit the truth by a reference to plain fact, or the real 
merits of the case’, the defence would instead resort to rhetorical devices and so 
frustrate the true aims of the criminal jury trial.53 
Lady Mason’s defence team consists of four lawyers: Mr Chaffanbrass, Mr 
Aram, Mr Furnival and Mr Graham, and (with the exception of Felix Graham) all of 
these men are guilty of placing their client’s interests above the truth seeking aim of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Anthony Trollope, Orley Farm, ed. by David Skilton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985 
[1862]), Bk. 1, Ch. 1, p. 2. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
53 From his speech on 25 April 1826, recorded in Parliamentary Debates, 20 March 1826 – 31 May 
1826, 15 (London: Hansard, 1827), cols. 598-599. 
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the jury trial. Mr Chaffanbrass, a barrister, appears as the most extreme example of 
this kind of lawyer. It is made clear that Mr Chaffanbrass’s specialty is securing ‘not 
guilty’ verdicts for guilty clients, a somewhat disconcerting notion when it is 
revealed that he spends most of his days in the Old Bailey dealing with criminal 
clients: 
if any man in England could secure the acquittal of a guilty person under 
extraordinary circumstances, it would be Mr. Chaffanbrass. This had been his 
special line of work for the last thirty years. (Bk. I, Ch. 34, pp. 342-343) 
 
The most disturbing thing about Chaffanbrass is the fact that he is a brilliant 
advocate. During the trial Chaffanbrass is successful in getting the calculating Mr. 
Dockwrath to betray his true mercenary motives in encouraging Joseph Mason to 
pursue his claim and, even more impressively, manages to make Bridget Bolster’s 
truthful testimony ‘look like falsehood’ (Bk. 2, Ch. 71, p. 323). Furthermore, it is 
made clear to the reader that Chaffanbrass is part of a general barristerial trend. It is 
in fact Felix Graham who is the exception to the rule when he speaks out against 
such practices: ‘let every lawyer go into court with a mind resolved to make 
conspicuous to the light of day that which seems to him to be the truth’ (Bk. 1, Ch. 
18, p. 179). Yet against such idealism, which reflects the true aims of the jury trial, is 
set a general view that Graham will never succeed at the bar. Indeed, the prevailing 
legal opinion is that a lawyer’s duty is to his client and not the truth, as Chaffanbrass 
says of Graham: ‘he does not understand the nature and duty which a professional 
man owes to his client’ (Bk. 1, Ch. 34, p. 345). 
In Orley Farm this prevailing professional ethos appears as the result of the 
introduction of the new adversarial-evidentiary model of trial which silenced the 
prisoner and allowed lawyers to dominate the criminal jury trial process. Even Mr 
Furnival, who apparently agonises for a large portion of the novel over the rights and 
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wrongs of defending a client he knows to be guilty, finds himself ultimately able to 
stand up in court and eloquently persuade a jury of Lady Mason’s innocence, all the 
time knowing: ‘that she had been guilty! […] That those witnesses had spoken the 
truth’ (Bk. 2, Ch. 72, p. 331). In the end, the reader too is left with that sense of 
shame which Mr Furnival himself feels, that:  
more than this, stronger than this, worse than this, – when the legal world 
knew – as the legal world soon did know – that all of this had been so, the 
legal world found no fault with Mr. Furnival, conceiving that he had done his 
duty by his client in a manner becoming an English barrister and an English 
gentleman. (Bk. 2, Ch. 72, p. 331) 
 
Orley Farm is in effect an indictment of the procedures of the post-1836 felony jury 
trial which Trollope shows not only to be ineffective in eliciting the truth, but 
effective in obscuring it. Sir Peregrine Orme is presented as naïve, and ultimately 
misguided, in his faith in such proceedings to reveal the truth. Instead the trial is 
revealed to be a sham, a set of proceedings where lawyers like Chaffanbrass can 
indeed make truth look like falsehood.  
The failure of the trial in Orley Farm enables Trollope to explore alternative 
avenues of eliciting the truth and doing justice, and in so doing he returns to an 
‘accused speaks’ model. Trollope’s solution lies in placing faith in the social 
structure which exists in the world of the novel, a social structure based on an 
interdependent, landed hierarchy, where those within it show responsibility and 
patronage downwards and deference and loyalty upwards. In Orley Farm justice is 
eventually done when Lady Mason, touched by the patronage and kindness shown to 
her by Sir Peregrine Orme, confesses her guilt in order to save him from the disgrace 
of marrying her. Her tale, told in her own words, is one which evokes such sympathy 
and compassion, that those around her are able to go someway to understanding her 
actions and that fundamentally she possesses a good character. The result is that 
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through their patronage the Ormes are able to save Lady Mason from conviction 
whilst at the same time ensuring that justice is rightly done through the private 
restitution of the land. Where the legal system fails, the system of patronage 
succeeds, and shows itself able to uncover the truth and restore the rightful order of 
things. This system of society, out of which the ‘old accused speaks’ model of the 
trial itself grew is, Trollope’s novel suggests, the more effective means of 
administering justice within communities. 
In The Last Chronicle of Barset (1867), the legal procedures employed in 
trying to establish the truth of disputed facts are again placed under the microscope 
and again are revealed to be inadequate for the uncovering of truth. In The Last 
Chronicle the Reverend Josiah Crawley is accused of stealing a cheque for twenty 
pounds. Although Crawley is himself unable to account for the cheque, it is made 
clear to the reader that – whilst there has been some kind of error – Crawley is not 
guilty of theft. Throughout the novel Trollope reveals the difficulty in which 
contemporary legal practice places Crawley, for the prevailing legal opinion is that 
Crawley should be made to have legal representation, and his refusal to accept this is 
treated as some kind of madness. Yet Crawley’s own view, ‘Why should I want a 
lawyer? I have done nothing wrong’ (Ch. 8, p.72), is presented to the reader as more 
consistent with his innocence. 
Crawley’s view on the matter (consistent with the justifications for the old 
‘accused speaks’ model of trial) is ultimately that which the novel supports, and in 
the end it is this approach to the establishment of the truth that wins through. During 
his appearance at the magistrates court in Silverbridge, Crawley is pressed with 
questions and soon becomes confused. The magistrates also appear more concerned 
with the form of proceedings and the issue that Crawley has no legal representation. 
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As a result, by the end of the hearing some magistrates may well be convinced that 
Crawley had no intention to steal the cheque, but no one is any wiser as to what the 
‘truth’ of the matter is (Ch. 8). By contrast, when Crawley is given the opportunity to 
tell his story in his own words, the truth is ultimately revealed. On a visit to his 
wife’s cousin, the barrister Mr Toogood, Crawley is given the chance to narrate 
without interruption and – through the ‘simplicity and innocence’ of his answers – 
convinces Toogood of his innocence: 
Perhaps, after all, this scheme of Mr Crawley’s – or rather the mode of 
defence on which he had resolved without any scheme – might be the best of 
which the case admitted. It might be well that he should go into court without 
a lawyer. “He has convinced me of his innocence,” Mr Toogood said to 
himself, “and why should he not convince a jury? He has convinced me, not 
because I am specially soft, or because I love the man – for as to that I dislike 
him rather than otherwise – but because there is a real truth in his words […] 
I think it is true. By George, I think he did get the twenty pounds honestly, 
and that he does not this moment know where he got it.” (Ch. 32, p. 320, my 
emphasis) 
 
In convincing Toogood of his innocence, by telling his story in his own words (as the 
‘accused speaks’ model of trial would have allowed him to do) Crawley sets in 
motion a train of events which ultimately lead to the discovery of the truth.54 
Yet Crawley is living in that close rural community of Barsetshire which, like 
the society depicted in Orley Farm, is one founded on a social hierarchy which 
encourages an interconnectedness of lives through the exercise of patronage, 
responsibility, loyalty and deference. It is perhaps natural therefore that these novels 
should find these old methods of uncovering the truth more apt than the new. The 
county of Barsetshire is especially appropriate to this old model of justice being, as it 
is, ruled over by the ‘county squirearchy’: 
There is a county in the west of England not so full of life, nor so widely 
spoken of as some of its manufacturing leviathan brethren in the north, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Mr. Toogood, compelled by Crawley’s tale, enlists the help of Johnny Eames who manages to track 
down the one person who is able to shed light on the mystery, Mrs Arabin whose testimony clears 
Crawley’s name. 
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which is, nevertheless, very dear to those who know it well. Its green 
pastures, its waving wheat, its deep and shady and – let us add – dirty lanes, 
its paths and stiles, its tawny-coloured, well-built rural churches, its avenues 
of beeches, and frequent Tudor mansions, its constant county hunt, its social 
graces, and the general air of clanship which pervades it, has made it to its 
own inhabitants a favoured land of Goshen. It is purely agricultural; 
agricultural in its produce, agricultural in its poor, and agricultural in its 
pleasures […][the clergy] do make up a society sufficiently powerful to be 
counted as something by the county squirearchy. In other respects the 
greatness of Barsetshire depends wholly on the landed powers. (my 
emphasis)55  
 
Barsetshire society, structured as it is on traditional, landed social values, provides 
the perfect environment for that knowledge of others and their ‘characters’ which 
played such a significant role in the early development of the jury trial. 
Earlier in this chapter I examined how the idea of character remained central 
to pre-1836 criminal trials for felony, and how this was largely a result of the trial’s 
roots in Anglo-Saxon and Norman England. By the nineteenth century the trial 
procedure itself may well have changed beyond all recognition from its early 
beginnings, yet the idea that the establishment of truth in some way rested upon 
determining whether or not the accused person possessed a good or bad character 
survived. As noted earlier, this was largely because the trial process developed out of 
community justice, with the guilt or innocence of the accused being determined by 
local members of the community who knew the defendant personally, or had the 
opportunity of learning about the defendant and what sort of character they 
possessed. Even when this ceased to be the case, the idea that it was possible to judge 
the characters of others accurately in this way appears to have gone largely 
unchallenged. This was due in part to the traditional agricultural foundations of 
landed society remaining largely intact through the centuries, as limited social and 
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  Anthony Trollope, Dr. Thorne, ed. by Ruth Rendell (London: Penguin, 2004 [1858]), Ch.1, pp. 5-
6. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text.	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geographical migration ensured that (especially in rural areas) communities remained 
relatively stable.56 
Throughout The Chronicles of Barsetshire we see this structure in action, a 
structure which makes it the perfect society for the functioning of the ‘accused 
speaks’ model. Barsetshire is a paradigm example of what Raymond Williams calls a 
‘knowable community’, that is, a community in which it is possible ‘to show people 
and their relationships in essentially knowable and communicable ways’.57 Williams 
himself identifies Barsetshire as a key example of a knowable community, noting 
how the ease of the narrative tone is anchored by a confidence in a traditional landed 
social structure which requires ‘minimum searching analysis’.58 
Throughout the Chronicles the reader is presented with a variety of individual 
communities which make up the county of Barsetshire as a whole: the town of 
Barchester itself, Plumbstead Episcopi, Puddingdale, Hogglestock, Greshamsbury, 
Ullathorne, and so on. Within each of these individual communities the lives of the 
inhabitants are intimately connected; moreover, this intimacy extends beyond 
individual parishes and connects the lives of all those who live within the county. 
One could create a map connecting all the lives of Barsetshire dwellers, from Dan 
Morris the brick-maker in Crawley’s Hogglestock parish, to Farmer Greenacre of 
Ullathorne, right up to the County Squires, Lords and Earls. Throughout Barsetshire 
lives overlap and collide and, regardless of which chronicle we pick up, we are 
continually reminded of the existence of other Barsetshire dwellers beyond those 
immediately presented on the page.59 What is more, this interconnectedness of lives 
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57 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 165. 
58 Ibid., pp. 174-175. 
59 Mary Poovey offers an interesting account of how the narrative strategies Trollope employs in The 
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has a real intimacy, for the connections between people are long standing familial 
and social bonds with their roots firmly in the traditional values of landed society. 
Rooted in old systems of patronage and loyalty, where the ownership and tenure of 
land is passed from father to son, so that tenants and landlords have for generations 
known each other well, Barsetshire offers the chance for its inhabitants to gain some 
knowledge of the characters of those around them. It is for this reason that Miss 
Thorne is able to trust, ‘as her ancestors had done before her, to the thews and sinews 
of native Ullathorne growth’.60 
This last quotation nicely illustrates a crucial feature of what a knowable 
community means for Williams. It is both a visible and a stable social structure, but 
also one that is ‘a matter of consciousness, and of continuity as well as day-to-day 
experience’.61 The structure is crucial for making the community a knowable one, 
because the landed hierarchy in Barsetshire provides an easily understandable 
framework within which people are ‘more easily identified and connected within 
it’.62 The structure works to impose a sense of order and meaning on the world and, 
as Williams suggests, creates a collective consciousness amongst those within it, a 
feeling of organic unity, of individuals connected together as parts of a whole.63 
Crawley’s crisis in The Last Chronicle therefore becomes all of Barsetshire’s crisis, 
and is experienced collectively as the entire community searches for an answer to the 
question of what happened. The answer to the question of whether Crawley stole the 
cheque for twenty pounds is one which will have serious implications for the 	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community at large, and which does materially impact the dynamics of the 
relationships within Crawley’s community: the relationships between Mrs Proudie 
and her husband, between Grace Crawley and Major Grantly, between Lily Dale and 
Johnny Eames are amongst those which feel the shockwaves of the accusation. The 
struggle of Reverend Josiah Crawley becomes the struggle of a community to resolve 
and move forwards.64  
A similar examination into the efficacy of the ‘accused speaks’ model for 
finding the truth of disputed facts can be identified in George Eliot’s Felix Holt: The 
Radical (1866). In this novel Eliot has her hero stand trial for manslaughter and in 
doing so, like Trollope, explores the extent to which the role of character can be 
useful in the representational process. The novel is set before the removal of felony 
counsel restriction in 1832, though it was written much later. Eliot’s interest in the 
trial scene is primarily with how Felix’s innocent state of mind can be demonstrated 
to a panel of jurors who have no real knowledge of him or his character. In this way 
Eliot’s novel neatly captures the problems which jurors faced relating to the 
assessment of the defendant’s character and actions once they ceased to have first 
hand knowledge of this themselves. In her portrayal of Felix Holt, Eliot is able to 
reveal the fundamental problem which the ‘accused speaks’ jury trial faced: the 
accurate assessment of the character and motivations of a defendant by a panel of 
jurors who had no prior knowledge of that defendant. Eliot brings this issue of the 	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pre-1836 jury trial to the fore by creating a protagonist with whom it is necessary to 
have an intimate acquaintance to know that he is fundamentally good and honest.  
When Esther, the daughter of local minister Reverend Lyon, first meets Felix 
she is unimpressed by his demeanour, finding him ‘very coarse and rude’. 65  
However, as Esther spends more time with Felix, she comes to fully understand his 
character and falls in love with him. A crucial question in Felix’s trial is whether or 
not he was a ringleader in the riots which led to the manslaughter charge. Esther’s 
father makes the point that those who truly know Felix’s character know that he was 
an ‘enemy to the riot’ and not a ringleader: ‘in our ears, who know him, it sounds 
strangely that aught else should be credible’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 44, p. 427). Those who 
speak for Felix at his trial, including Esther and her father, are those who are 
‘intimately acquainted with his character and views of life’, and who ‘know [him] 
well’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 46, p. 443 and p. 448). These are the persons who have the correct 
view of the matter, unlike the jury who,  not being acquainted with Felix, find him 
guilty of manslaughter. Eliot’s novel, therefore, recognises the limitations of a 
character-focused model of representation. Yet, rather than reject this model as 
ineffective, Eliot instead seeks to identify the conditions under which it can function 
efficiently. These conditions Eliot finds within the knowable community outside the 
courtroom.  
After Felix’s trial the influential Harold Transome, trusting to Esther’s 
assessment of a man of whose character she has first hand knowledge – ‘you saw a 
great deal of him, I suppose; and your testimony to anyone is enough for me’ (Vol. 3, 
Ch. 43, p. 418) – effects a meeting of the magistracy and gentlemen of the local 
community in which they decide to seek a pardon (ultimately granted) for Felix. In 	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this meeting of influential local persons we see the ‘accused speaks’ model working 
efficiently. Like Transome, others within the local community have been moved by 
Esther’s testimony, which, described by the narrator as ‘naïve and beautiful’ (Vol. 3, 
Ch. 46, p. 449) has that ‘simplicity and innocence’ which Sergeant Hawkins 
suggested would persuade the listener of its truth: ‘Hang it! The fellow’s a good 
fellow if she thinks so’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 47, p. 452). In the end, Felix Holt: The Radical, 
whilst acknowledging the difficulties inherent in the ‘accused-speaks’ model, 
ultimately demonstrates that when it is employed in the right context it can be an 
effective means of eliciting the truth. 
 
Jane Austen’s ‘Knowable Communities’ and the Knowledge of Others Therein 
The highly visible social structure of Barsetshire, with its continuous day-to-day 
interactions, creates a collective consciousness that allows the community to be a 
knowable one in the way that Williams suggests. The knowable communities which 
we find in Trollope can equally be identified in the novels of Jane Austen. Williams 
singles Austen out as a classic example of an author whose novels present us with 
knowable communities.66 For Williams, Austen’s communities are ‘wholly known’ 
through a network of the families and neighbours of local respectable houses.67 This 
network provides a social structure which, like Trollope’s Barsetshire, enables 
characters within the world of the novel to understand both their place in society and 
how they are connected to others. This social structure provides a framework through 
which knowledge can be disseminated and also unquestionably trusted: 
‘My dear Mr Bennet,’ said his lady to him one day, ‘have you heard 
that Netherfield Park is let at last?’ 
Mr Bennet replied that he had not. 	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‘But it is,’ returned she; ‘for Mrs Long has just been here, and she told 
me all about it.’68  
 
For Williams, part of what makes Austen’s communities so knowable is the 
‘outstandingly face-to-face’ nature of them, and how all the ‘crises physically and 
spiritually’ are played out exactly in these terms through ‘a look, a gesture, a stare, a 
confrontation’.69 Austen’s characters are often able to read one another through looks 
and gestures because these are communities in which the characters of others can be 
known, and so their actions, thoughts, feelings, meanings are often easily interpreted 
by others within their community. Mrs Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility (1811) for 
example, instantly understands her daughter-in-law’s meaning when she alludes to 
her brother Edward and ‘the danger attending to any young woman who attempted to 
draw him in’: ‘Mrs Dashwood could neither pretend to be unconscious, nor 
endeavour to be calm’.70 
In Austen’s novels the way in which characters come to know and understand 
the world is through their knowledge and understanding of the characters of others, 
and their relationships with them. This way of knowing within an Austen novel 
fundamentally relies on it being possible to know the characters of others, and the 
traditional hierarchical structure of Austen’s societies provides for this. However, 
Austen’s approach to representing reality, which relies on the presentation of 
knowable characters, is also called into question in those same narratives. In this way 
Austen offers an interesting exploration of the effectiveness of the ‘accused speaks’ 
model. This questioning occurs in Austen’s narratives when an outsider is brought 	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into the social milieu and throws doubt on the assumption that it is possible to have 
knowledge of the characters of others.  
This question is explicitly explored, for example, in Sense and Sensibility 
through the character of Willoughby. Whilst Marianne feels she is easily able to 
gauge Willoughby’s character and so have confidence in his intentions, Marianne’s 
counterbalance, Elinor, is more cautious. Sir John is only able to say that he 
‘believes’ Willoughby to be ‘a good kind of fellow’ because he is a keen rider and 
has a fine ‘black pointer bitch’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 9, p. 34), prompting Elinor to remark ‘is 
that all you can say for him’ and to ask who he is (Vol. 1, Ch. 9, p. 34). Elinor draws 
attention to the fact that Willoughby is not part of that knowable community which 
provides for the knowledge of others in the same way that, say, Colonel Brandon is. 
When Willoughby finally deserts Marianne, a good deal of the pain she suffers 
derives from the realisation that she did not know Willoughby’s character as well as 
she thought. Early in the novel Marianne claims that ‘seven years would be 
insufficient to make some people acquainted with each other, and seven days more 
than enough for others’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 12, p. 45). Marianne is ultimately proved wrong 
in her belief, and it becomes clear that her misjudgement stems from her lack of any 
long standing knowledge of Willoughby. In the end it is the deserving Colonel 
Brandon whose ‘excellent’ character is ‘well established’ in the knowable 
community, who proves himself worthy of Marianne’s love through his long-lasting 
and continuous relationship with the Dashwoods and their extended family 
(quotation at Vol. 3, Ch. 9, p. 255).  
In Sense and Sensibility Austen makes it clear that, as Williams argues, 
something more is needed for the knowledge of the characters of others than mere 
face-to-face relationships; it requires also the continuity of that relationship maturing 
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over time. Austen makes it clear that both these elements are necessary for the 
knowledge of others to be achieved, as shown in Elinor’s final meeting with 
Willoughby. In this face-to-face encounter Willoughby is able to convince Elinor of 
the genuineness of his feelings for Marianne: ‘you have proved yourself, on the 
whole, less faulty than I believed you. You have proved your heart less wicked, 
much less wicked’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 8, p. 250). Part of the reason that Elinor is so 
persuaded echoes the justification for felony counsel restriction, that through the 
simplicity and innocence of Willoughby’s own words, Elinor can see and feel truth 
of them: ‘had Mrs Dashwood, like her daughter, heard Willoughby’s story from 
himself – had she witnessed his distress, and been under the influence of his 
countenance and manner, it is probable that her compassion would have been 
greater’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 11, p. 264).  Sense and Sensibility in the end reinforces the view 
that it is possible to have knowledge of the characters of others, but highlights that 
this possibility may only be realised under the right conditions, which the knowable 
community provides.  
In Pride and Prejudice (1813) the question of whether or not it is possible to 
have knowledge of the characters of others is once again called into question and 
dramatised more fully and carefully through the development of Elizabeth Bennet’s 
relationship with Mr Darcy. At the start of the novel Elizabeth subscribes to the 
novel’s primary mode of knowing: through character. Indeed, Elizabeth takes it for 
granted that that she has been able to assess accurately the nature of Darcy’s 
character. So confident is she, in fact, that she feels able to rebuke Darcy in these 
terms:  
From the very beginning, from the first moment I may almost say, of my 
acquaintance with you, your manners impressing me with the fullest belief of 
your arrogance, your conceit, and your selfish disdain for others, were such 
as to form that ground work of disapprobation, on which succeeding events 
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have built so immovable dislike; and I had not known you a month before I 
felt that you were the last man in the world whom I could ever marry. (Vol. 2, 
Ch. 11, p. 148) 
 
Elizabeth feels equally well placed to judge the character of Mr Wickham after just 
one conversation with him, and is quickly persuaded of the goodness of his character 
after he tells his story in his own words (Vol. 1, Ch. 16). Elizabeth’s reasons for 
believing in the truth of his tale once again echo those given for justifying the old 
‘accused speaks’ model. Elizabeth notes how Wickham’s ‘very countenance may 
vouch for [his] being amiable’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 16, p. 61), how he is able to provide 
‘names; facts, everything mentioned without ceremony’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 17, p. 65), and 
to Jane she argues ‘there was truth in his looks’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 17, p. 65). It would 
seem, then, that Austen’s novel questions the efficacy of the ‘accused speaks’ model 
by using the justification on which is rests to explain Elizabeth’s faulty judgement.  
Similarly, the revelation that Darcy is a much better man than Elizabeth 
initially believes, at first might persuade us that the accused speaks model is flawed. 
However, Elizabeth is prejudiced against Mr Darcy because of his initial behaviour 
towards her, and so we know that her judgement is impaired. It is not long before it 
becomes clear that it is Elizabeth’s own prejudices and not the ‘accused speaks’ 
model which is to blame for her inability to correctly judge the characters of 
Wickham and Darcy. Our first hint that this is the case comes from Elizabeth herself 
when she remarks on how strange it is that a man as charming as Bingley should be 
friends with a man such as Darcy if all Wickham tells her is true (Vol. 1, Ch. 16, p. 
62). This is a point which Jane is also quick to note: ‘can his most intimate friends be 
so excessively deceived in him? Oh! No’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 17, p. 65). The significance of 
this point is clear, it is Bingley and not Elizabeth who is best placed to judge the 
character of Darcy because of the long standing and continuous nature of their 
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friendship. Once again in Pride and Prejudice, as in Sense and Sensibility, Austen’s 
narrative works to explore the conditions which are needed to provide for the correct 
knowledge of others in order for the ‘accused speaks’ model to function effectively 
and so allow for the accurate representation and understanding of reality. Once again 
Austen is led back to the knowable community, which requires not only that 
relationships be face-to-face but also of a continuous and long standing nature. 
Nevertheless, Austen’s narratives ultimately work as a vindication of the ‘accused 
speaks’ model of representing reality and revealing truth, as shown through the 
presentation of the character of Mr Darcy.  
This vindication of the ‘accused speaks’ model begins with Darcy’s letter to 
Elizabeth where he personally answers the charges laid against him, just as a prisoner 
might have done in a pre-1836 felony trial. Darcy writes, ‘I can only refute it by 
laying before you the whole of his connection with my family […] but the truth of 
what I shall relate, I can summon more than one witness of undoubted veracity’ (Vol. 
2, Ch. 17, p.153, my emphasis). Darcy writes of ‘unfolding [Wickham’s] real 
character’ (Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p.153), something he is able to do because of both the 
long-standing and face-to-face nature of their relationship:  
the vicious propensities – the want of principle which he was careful to guard 
from the knowledge of his best friend, could not escape the observation of a 
young man of nearly the same age with himself, who had opportunities of 
seeing him in unguarded moments (Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p. 153).  
 
Darcy’s letter is candid, he writes frankly and openly about his part in the separation 
of Jane and Bingley and even tells of his own sister’s near disgrace. The letter is 
compelling, and through the artless ingenuousness of one ‘whose conscience acquits 
him’ Darcy is able to persuade Elizabeth, as Sergeant William Hawkins suggested he 
would, that this is indeed a ‘faithful narrative’ (Vol. 2, Ch. 17, p. 155).  
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Once Elizabeth is persuaded of the truth of Darcy’s account we find she is 
able to better assess the nature of Wickham’s own declarations. Elizabeth reflects 
that ‘she had never heard of [Wickham] before his entrance into the –shire Militia’, 
and moreover that ‘of his former life, nothing had been known in Hertfordshire but 
what he told himself. As to his real character […] his countenance, voice, and 
manner had established him at once in the possession of every virtue’, but she is 
unable to recollect ‘some instance of goodness, some distinguished trait of integrity 
or benevolence’(Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 157). As Elizabeth reflects she is ‘struck with the 
impropriety’ of his communications to her regarding Darcy:  
she saw the indelicacy of putting himself forward as he had done and the 
inconsistency of his professions with his conduct. She remembered that he 
had boasted of having no fear of seeing Mr Darcy – that Mr Darcy might 
leave the country but that he should stand his ground; yet he had avoided the 
Netherfield ball the very next week. She remembered also, that till the 
Netherfield family had quitted the country, he had told his story to no one but 
herself; but after their removal, it had been everywhere discussed; that he had 
then no reserves, no scruples in sinking Mr Darcy’s character, though he had 
assured her that respect for the father, would always prevent his exposing the 
son. (Vol. 2, Ch. 18, p. 158) 
 
Elizabeth is faced with the realisation that she had no knowledge of Mr Wickham’s 
character, and as a result she misjudged both him and Mr Darcy. The suggestion is 
that a lack of knowledge of the characters of others prevents the discovery of truth 
and allows for false representations of reality.  
It is very telling that that Elizabeth’s (correct) reassessment of Darcy comes 
after she gains real knowledge of his character at his country estate Pemberly. On her 
first visit to Pemberly, Elizabeth is given a glowing report of Darcy from his 
housekeeper Mrs Reynolds who describes him as a model landlord, master, brother, 
son: ‘every idea that had been brought forward by the housekeeper was favourable to 
his character’ (Vol. 3, Ch. 1, p. 189). It quickly becomes apparent that for Darcy to 
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be understood, to be known, he needs to be within his own knowable community 
where the conditions are right for true knowledge of his character. As Case and Shaw 
suggest, the true character of Darcy can only be ‘revealed’ once he is placed in his 
‘proper, ideal setting’.71 In the end Pride and Prejudice champions the ‘accused 
speaks’ model through its implicit questioning of it. However, like Sense and 
Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice recognises that for this model to be a viable means 
of representing reality and revealing truth, it is necessary that it be employed within a 
knowable community.  
 
Telling the Accused’s Story: The Omniscient Narrator and the Revelation of 
Character 
As in Trollope’s novels, the way in which Austen’s characters know the world is 
through their knowledge and understanding of others within their knowable 
community. In this way the epistemology underlying these novels is the same as that 
which underpins the ‘accused speaks’ trial, a trial which grew out of early legal 
practice in which guilt or innocence would be determined by a group of jurors who 
had personal knowledge (or access to personal knowledge) of the accused and their 
character. What is more is that character-focused novels do not just share the same 
epistemology as the ‘accused speaks’ model, they actually employ that model in their 
attempts to represent reality accurately. This section will examine the way in which 
the character-focused novel can be seen to be employing an ‘accused speaks’ 
representational model through its the use of a third person omniscient narrator.  
In the character-focused novel the story is most commonly told through a 
narrator who has access to the inner thoughts and feelings of the protagonists. In this 	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way the use of an omniscient narrator ensures that, as in the ‘accused speaks’ trial, 
the focus of the novel remains on the accused’s story. Moreover, this omniscience 
ensures that the protagonist’s voice remains central to the representational process: 
they are allowed to tell their story in their own words because the narrator has access 
to their thoughts. Schramm argues that in this way late eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century character-focused novels are narratives of innocence, which seek to establish 
the guiltlessness or inherent worthiness of the protagonists they represent. 
Consequently these novels become: 
a forum for the construction of an accused’s story in their ‘own words’ and as 
such reveal the novelist’s reluctance to abandon the view of the accused as a 
testimonial resource and insist the discovery of truth is dependent on 
defendants telling their story in their own words.72  
 
For Schramm, the importance of characters telling their stories in their own 
words becomes crucial to the novel’s mode of representing reality during the 
nineteenth century, with characters rarely being ‘subject to judgement’ without the 
reader being provided with ‘their personal testimony of guilt or innocence’.73 
However, the reluctance of character-focused novelists to abandon the ‘accused 
speaks’ model creates for Schramm a tension, as she views the use of a third person 
narrator as an ‘imaginative imitation of the lawyers’ skills in the manipulation of 
evidence’.74 This tension is stretched to its limits in the nineteenth century, as literary 
representations strained between an imitation of courtroom strategies of 
representation (which subordinated facts and testimony to the making of an 
argument), and a preference for a model in which the accused had an opportunity to 
tell his story in his own words. 
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In 1836 the Prisoners’ Counsel Act was passed. This Act allowed all 
prisoners the right to a full legal defence in which an advocate could address the jury 
directly on the defendant’s behalf. The implications of this Act are considered more 
fully in the next chapter, but it is important to note here that, as Langbein has shown, 
the increased activities of defence counsel following the 1836 Act threatened the 
accused’s status as an important testimonial resource.75 The threat came from the fact 
that the adversarial-evidentiary trial had the effect of largely silencing the defendant 
in criminal trials, as following the 1836 Act the defendant or his advocate could 
address the jury, but not both. The silencing of the accused following the 1836 Act 
and the replacement of his central testimony with a speech by an advocate was one 
part of the new trial procedures that attracted fierce criticism from some of the most 
successful nineteenth-century novelists. The key concern of the novelists appears to 
have been the same as that of the opponents to the Prisoners’ Counsel Bill, who 
argued that the ‘trial of truth’ would be ‘converted into a war of wit, ingenuity and 
eloquence’ that would tend to obscure rather than elicit the truth.76 This concern can 
be discerned in the work of novelists such as Dickens, Trollope, and Gaskell. In their 
work these novelists would, through the fictional representation of trials, express 
their concern over adversarial practices which drew focus away from the accused’s 
own story and relied on the advocate’s skill to achieve a favourable verdict 
regardless of the truth. As already noted earlier in this chapter, this concern is made 
explicit in Trollope’s portrayal of the barrister Mr Chaffanbrass in Orley Farm: 
Mr. Chaffanbrass knew well enough that she had spoken nothing but the 
truth. But had he so managed that the truth might be made to look like 
falsehood, – or at any rate to have a doubtful air? If he had done that, he had 
succeeded in the occupation of his life. (Bk. 2, Ch. 71, p. 323) 
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The same concern is also articulated in Gaskell’s portrayal of the prosecution counsel 
in Mary Barton (1848): 
the counsellor for the prosecution prepared himself by folding his arms, 
elevating his eyebrows, and putting his lips in the form in which they might 
best whistle down the wind such evidence as might be produced by a 
suborned witness, who dared to perjure himself. For, of course, it is etiquette 
to suppose that such evidence as may be given against the opinion which 
lawyers are paid to uphold, is anything but based on truth; and ‘perjury’, 
‘conspiracy’, and ‘peril of your immortal soul’, are light expressions to throw 
at the heads of those who may prove (not the speaker, there would then be 
some excuse for the hasty words of personal anger, but) the hirer of the 
speaker to be wrong, or mistaken.77 
 
 
In Bleak House (1852-3), George Rouncewell’s innocence is linked to his reluctance 
to hire a lawyer: 
I should have got a lawyer, and he would have said (as I have often read in 
the newspapers), ‘My client says nothing, my client reserves his defence’: my 
client this, that, and t’other. Well, ’tis not the custom of that breed to go 
straight, according to my opinion, or to think that other men do. Say I am 
innocent and I get a lawyer. He would be as likely to believe me guilty as not; 
perhaps more. What would he do, whether or not? Act as if I was – shut my 
mouth up, tell me not to commit myself, keep circumstances back, chop the 
evidence small, quibble, and get me off perhaps! (Ch. 52, p. 737) 
 
George’s stance echoes that of Josiah Crawley in The Last Chronicle of Barset, who 
also views the employment of a lawyer to speak on his behalf as being inconsistent 
with his innocence:  
In this country a man is to be punished or not, according to his ability to fee a 
lawyer! […] And presuming an innocent man to have the ability and not the 
will to do so, he is to be punished, to be ruined root and branch, self and 
family, character and pocket, simply because, knowing his own innocence, he 
does not choose to depend on the mercenary skill of a man whose trade he 
abhors for the establishment of that which should be as clear as the sun at 
noonday! You say I am innocent, and yet you tell me I am to be condemned 
as a guilty man […] because I will not fee an attorney to fee another man to 
come and lie on my behalf, to browbeat witnesses, to make false appeals, and 
perhaps shed false tears in defending me. (Ch. 21, p. 207) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Elizabeth Gaskell, Mary Barton, ed. by Shirley Foster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 
[1848]), Ch. 32, p. 318. The issue of the licence of counsel is also taken up in Dickens’s portrayal of 
Sergeant Buzfuz’s adversarial practices in The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club, ed. by James 
Kinsley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 [1837]), Ch. 34. 
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The fear that by diminishing the role of the defendant as a testimonial 
resource, and that by filling that space with the carefully constructed speech of an 
advocate, the course of justice would be obstructed, was not a fear without 
foundation. In 1840 Francois Benjamin Courvoisier was tried for the murder of Lord 
William Russell. During the trial Courvoisier confessed to his defence counsel, but 
still demanded he be defended as an innocent man. Courvoisier’s leading counsel, 
Charles Phillips, complied with this request and in so doing attracted criticism.78 In 
defending a man he knew to be guilty, Phillips apparently showed no scruples: he 
attempted to implicate others, he accused the police of negligence, conspiracy, 
corruption and planting evidence, he criticised the large reward the police offered in 
connection with the case, he attacked the credibility of Sarah Mancer (one of the 
leading prosecution witnesses), and in his address to the jury Phillips warned of the 
gravity of the duty they had to perform, telling them that ‘the life of a fellow-creature 
was intrusted [sic] to their keeping; and so surely as they dealt with that life unjustly, 
so surely would they have to answer for it to the God who made them’.79 
Dickens followed the Courvoisier case with interest and in two letters printed 
under the title ‘The License of Counsel’ in The Morning Chronicle following the 
trial in June 1840, Dickens voiced his outrage with what he perceived as a gross 
violation of an advocate’s public duty and a disgraceful attempt to ‘get his client off’ 
at whatever cost.80 Such concerns and anxieties over the licence of counsel were 
echoed by other novelists and can be seen in their direct engagement with such issues 
through the direct representation of trial procedures.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 After the trial Phillips publicly admitted that Courvoisier had made such a confession. 
79 Reported in The Times, 22 June 1840. Reproduced in full in Cairns, Advocacy, pp. 186-200, 
quotation at p. 187. For an account of the effect of this case on the Bar’s reputation see J. R. Lewis, 
The Victorian Bar (London: Robert Hale, 1982).  
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been attributed to Dickens. See Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, pp. 115-116. 
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On the one hand for Schramm the character-focused novel’s preference for an 
‘accused speaks’ model suggests a naïve acceptance of the belief that innocence 
speaks for itself, a belief which for centuries underpinned this model of 
representation. However, the novelist’s adoption of a narrative style of literary 
advocacy represents a tacit acknowledgement that this innocence is not self-evident 
and requires representation, for ‘if true innocence can “speak for itself”, then the 
services of authors are […] redundant’.81 Consequently Schramm reads the 
character-focused novel’s effort to represent reality as one which ‘adhered to an 
“accused speaks” model of trial whilst at the same rejecting the epistemology that 
had initially given rise to it’.82 Schramm’s argument is persuasive but unlike 
Schramm I do not view the character-focused novel as simultaneously seeking to 
adhere to an ‘accused speaks’ model of representation and epistemologically 
distancing itself from it through the adoption of literary advocacy. Rather, the 
character-focused novel’s endeavours to represent reality should be read as both 
methodologically and epistemologically aligning the character-focused mode with 
the ‘accused speaks’ model of trial.  
Alexander Welsh has argued that in the late-eighteenth century and until the 
mid-nineteenth century, representations in both the courtroom and in literature were 
dominated by circumstantial narratives, in which circumstantial evidence was held 
up as being a more reliable form of evidence than testimony.83 Welsh offers Henry 
Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749) as a prime example of how narratives from the late 
eighteenth century onwards display a preference for circumstantial evidence and are 
often scornful of testimony. For Welsh, Tom Jones continually works to undermine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Ibid., p.122. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
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the reader’s faith in testimony and champions the preference for relying on 
circumstances which do not lie as the ‘evidence that holds up in Tom Jones is nearly 
all indirect and the evidence which misleads is mostly direct’.84 Welsh argues that 
Tom Jones is ‘closely patterned on the forensic debate’ and that because the 
‘representation of facts is carefully managed by a narrator’, this novel becomes a 
narrative of strong representation.85 Schramm however, disagrees with Welsh and 
argues instead that what Tom Jones reveals is an ambivalence towards testimonial 
veracity and not a simple rejection of it.86 Schramm argues that whilst Tom Jones no 
doubt contains many passages in which testimony proves either false or unreliable, 
the novel also reveals this to be true of circumstantial evidence. Instead, Schramm 
argues, the novel reveals that (just like testimony) ‘facts do not “speak for 
themselves” and, depending on their purposeful arrangement, may condemn or 
acquit’.87 For Schramm, the narrative of Tom Jones actually works in the opposite 
way to how Welsh suggests, and finally reveals the superiority of testimony as this is 
the evidence on which Tom is acquitted in the end: ‘ultimately the narrator discloses 
all, and adjudicates justly on the basis of narratives of innocence, confessions and on 
evidence of good character’.88 
In her acknowledgement that Tom’s final acquittal is partly bound up with 
evidence of the goodness of his character, Schramm identifies, but does not fully 
explore, the crucial basis upon which Tom’s narrative of innocence rests: his 
character. Welsh notes that Tom Jones reads as a trial of Jones’s character, a trial in 
which he is eventually acquitted.89 However, whilst Welsh argues that this acquittal 
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85 Ibid., p. 57. 
86 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 77. 
87 Ibid., p. 78. 
88 Ibid., p. 77. 
89 Welsh, Strong Representations, pp. 47-48. 
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is achieved through the careful presentation of circumstantial evidence, this is not 
quite the case and Tom Jones in fact reveals that circumstantial evidence can at times 
be as misleading as testimony. However, neither Welsh nor Schramm appear to fully 
recognise the extent to which the narrative’s success is tied in with its focus on 
portraying and revealing the innate goodness of Tom’s character. Tellingly perhaps, 
after his lengthy examination of the ways in which the success of the narrative of 
Tom Jones depends on the careful presentation of circumstantial evidence, Welsh 
concludes that it is: 
upon character the trial of Tom ultimately turns. The hero’s good nature, his 
spontaneous sympathy, friendship, and good will, his loyalty and truth telling, 
high spirits and courage – even his impudence, insofar as it signifies 
disregard of his own interests – are qualities amply illustrated in the 
narrative.90 
 
As Schramm suggests, Tom Jones reveals the problems with both testimony and 
circumstantial evidence in a manner which anticipates the debates over evidence and 
the matter of representation in the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel debates. Ultimately, 
however, as Welsh himself suggests, it is ‘upon character that the trial of Tom Jones 
ultimately turns’ and it is through the representation and observation of his words 
and deeds that Tom is vindicated and so the novel succeeds. 
The argument that Tom Jones, through its vindication of Tom’s character, 
represents an alignment with the ‘accused speaks’ model and its epistemology is lent 
support by Henry Fielding’s ‘An Essay on the Knowledge of the Characters of Men’ 
(1735) which was written before Tom Jones but which demonstrates Fielding’s ideas 
about the notion of character. In the essay, Fielding reveals his view that the 
character of a person is something which is fixed, stable and also knowable: ‘some 
unacquired original distinction, in the nature or soul of one man from that of another 	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[…] that can be penetrated only by study and observation of actions’.91 What 
Fielding reveals is the belief that through study and observation it is possible to 
know, and then accurately judge the characters of others: Tom Jones becomes an 
example of how this is achievable in practice and as such demonstrates the efficacy 
of the ‘accused speaks’ model.  
The way in which we come to know Tom and judge his character is through 
the omniscient narrator’s telling of his individual story. This not only ensures Tom’s 
personal story remains at the centre of the narrative, it assures us that judgement of 
Tom is possible through coming to know and understand his character. I noted at the 
start of this section that the use of an omniscient narrator aligns character-focused 
novels with the ‘accused speaks’ trial model because the narrator’s access to the 
protagonist’s thoughts allows them to tell their story in their own words. Lisa 
Rodensky has highlighted how the use of the term ‘omniscient’ can vary from critic 
to critic.92 J. Hillis Miller uses the term, for example, to mean a narrator who has full 
and perfect knowledge of the minds of the characters he narrates. This is a step too 
far for Rodensky, who identifies a tension within the role of the omniscient narrator 
who she views as unable to make the minds of characters known without 
ambiguity.93 Rodensky’s discussion of the narrator is in relation to nineteenth-
century views on criminal responsibility, but her questioning of the limits of the 
omniscient narrator’s vision is relevant here too. The omniscient narrator may not be 
able to read the minds of characters perfectly, as Rodensky suggests, but they are still 
nonetheless able to read those minds in some way. This still suggests that knowledge 
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of the characters of others is both a possible and a viable way of gaining and 
communicating knowledge.  
If one takes texts which centre around knowable communities such as 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice or Eliot’s Adam Bede (1859), then the use of the 
omniscient narrator is largely unproblematic. In these texts the narrator’s powers to 
read and judge the characters of others and their inner thoughts and feelings is 
arguably reflective of the ability of the characters within the novel to do the same. 
Case and Shaw have noted how it is possible that the power of Jane Austen’s 
narrator to read the internal thoughts of people (aside from the heroine) could be 
explained in terms of the keen observation of external signs.94 Arguably Trollope’s 
novels produce a similar effect. Trollope claimed he ‘lived’ with his characters ‘in 
the full reality of established intimacy’: 
There is a gallery of them, and of all in that gallery I may say that I know the 
tone of voice, and the colour of the hair, every flame of the eye, and the very 
clothes they wear. Of each man I could assert whether he would have said 
these or the other words; of every woman, whether she would have smiled or 
so have frowned. (Autobiography, p. 233) 
 
Trollope’s ‘intimacy’ with his characters is reflected in the ease with which the 
narrator is able to access the inner thoughts of the characters. Furthermore, because 
Trollope’s characters are so vividly realised, and because Trollope often used 
recurring characters, the reader also begins to feel that they too have some 
knowledge of the characters in the text. As Trollope himself claimed, one of his chief 
concerns as a novelist was ‘to make his readers so intimately acquainted with his 
characters that the creations of his brain should be to them speaking, moving living, 
human creatures’ (Autobiography, p. 232). In the Barsetshire series, for example, we 
come to know Mrs Proudie so well we hardly doubt what her reaction will be to the 	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news that Crawley has allegedly stolen a cheque for twenty pounds. In fact a good 
deal of our enjoyment of that novel derives from our anticipation of Mrs Proudie’s 
(predictable) reaction.  
In Trollope, as in Austen, the narration largely proceeds from external 
observation, with the narrator moving into the minds of characters to narrate their 
inner monologues in response to some conversation or event. The use of free indirect 
discourse in particular tends to emphasise this trend, with the third person narration 
of what is essentially (or purports to be) a first person account drawing attention to 
the fact that the narration is proceeding from the external to the internal. The narrator 
in Eliot’s Adam Bede nicely illustrates this point. In chapter seventeen Eliot’s 
narrator famously describes their role as that of a ‘witness in a trial narrating [their] 
experiences on oath’ and so giving a ‘faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves in [their] mind’ (Ch. 17, p. 159). By comparing the narrator to a 
witness narrating events they have observed, Eliot suggests that this is both an 
adequate and possible way of narrating reality. It also highlights that the narration 
proceeds from an external vantage point. The externality of the narrator’s stance is 
also alluded to in the text itself: ‘we will enter very softly, and stand still in the open 
doorway’ (Ch. 4, p. 49). Furthermore, it is often suggested by the narrator that 
conjectures are being made from external signs about the internal thoughts, feelings 
and motivations of the characters so observed: ‘her dark eyes are somewhat dim now 
– perhaps from too much crying’ (Ch. 4, p. 36). The suggestion is that other 
observers too may have surmised the same.  
In chapter fifteen we see Hetty in her bed-chamber, imagining her future by 
the side of Arthur Donnithorne. Although the narrator appears to be able to access 
Hetty’s inner thoughts with ease, occasional phrases such as ‘I think she had no 
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feeling at all towards the old house’ (Ch. 15, p. 140), suddenly draws attention to a 
potential limitation in the narrator’s perspective. Indeed, other characters besides the 
narrator are well aware of Hetty’s character, Mr Irwine explicitly warns Arthur not to 
‘feed her vanity’ (Ch. 9, p. 92), and Mrs Poyser ‘with her keenness and abundant 
opportunity for observation’ is well aware Hetty is ‘no better than a peacock’ (Ch. 
15, p. 141). Adam too is quickly able to guess, after finding Hetty and Arthur 
together in the woods, that Hetty has ‘been fixing her heart on [Arthur]’ (Ch. 28, p. 
278). The implication is that if Mr Irwine, Mrs Poyser or Adam, with their 
knowledge of Hetty’s character, had been in full possession of the facts then they too 
might equally well have been able to ‘read’ Hetty’s thoughts as the narrator does.  
One might go as far as to suggest that the narrator’s ability to access the 
internal thoughts of the characters derives from the fact that they are narrating a 
knowable community of knowable characters, and not from any omniscient vision 
into the hearts and minds of those characters. Adam Bede is set in 1799 in the rural 
community of Hayslope, where the inhabitants know their place within the long-
established landed hierarchy. The novel, which focuses on the relationships between 
the landed gentry and their tenants, once again presents the reader with an entirely 
knowable community and with knowable characters who are easily able to identify 
their place within their highly visible social structure, a structure which provides 
them with a framework for understanding reality. The young squire Arthur 
Donnithorne thinks of the world entirely in these terms:  
He was nothing, if not good natured; and all his pictures of the future, when 
he should come into the estate, were made up of a prosperous, contented 
tenantry, adoring their landlord, who would be the model of an English 
gentleman.95  
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Arthur’s way of thinking about the world is mirrored, lower down the social scale, by 
the artisan Adam Bede, who speaks of ‘not forgettin’ myself so far as to be wise 
above my betters’ (Ch. 5, p. 52). Hayslope is another example of a community where 
the interactions are ‘strikingly’ face-to-face; landlord and tenants interact on a 
regular interpersonal basis, but we are also made aware of the continuing nature of 
such relationships which creates the perfect conditions for a knowable community. 
Adam, for example, has known Arthur since childhood and had taken ‘quite a pride 
in the little squire in those early days’ (Ch. 16, p. 148). The inhabitants of Hayslope 
appear to be, as Dinah claims for herself and the community of Snowfield: ‘grown 
deep into [Hayslope], like the small grass on the hill-top’ (Ch. 8, p. 81). Characters 
within these novels understand reality and find value and meaning therein through 
their understanding of their relationships with other people and the knowledge of 
their characters. However, whether we view the omniscient narrator as having 
unfettered access to the minds of the characters he claims to narrate, or if we believe 
such access is more restricted and made possible by the existence of the conditions 
which make knowledge of others possible, the use of the omniscient narrator in the 
character-focused novel methodologically aligns these novels with the ‘accused 
speaks’ trial. 
Schramm herself provides extensive evidence of the preference novelists 
displayed for an ‘accused speaks’ model of representing reality, providing examples 
(both fictional and non-fictional) of where this preference can be seen, some of 
which have been discussed in this chapter. Schramm argues that it is the mediating 
effect of the act of writing which leads her to the conclusion that character-focused 
novelists were epistemologically distancing themselves from the ‘accused speaks’ 
model. For Schramm, in the very act of narration itself, novelists (like lawyers in 
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felony trials from 1836 onwards) were assuming the right to narrate the accused’s 
story, and in so doing were recognising that innocence does not speak for itself but 
instead requires the advocacy of the author to demonstrate it. Schramm moves from 
the proposition that ‘what the Prisoners’ Counsel Act conferred was the right to 
narrate a suspected felon’s thoughts or intentions’, to identifying the novelistic 
method of narrating a character’s thoughts and intentions through the use of free 
indirect discourse as the literary imitation of this legal strategy.96 However, Schramm 
focuses too much on the idea of the advocate having the power to narrate a 
defendant’s inner thoughts and intentions, for the advocate also had the power to do 
a good many other things besides, such as examine all the evidence and connect it 
into a coherent narrative of innocence. In the adversarial-evidentiary trial model, the 
inner thoughts and feelings of the accused are narrated only to the extent that they 
aid this larger narrative of innocence. Furthermore, the character-focused novel’s use 
of free indirect discourse actually minimises the sense that a character’s thoughts and 
feelings are being mediated through an outside narrative voice which seeks to 
subordinate them to a final narrative end, and instead works to provide the sense that 
the character in question is telling the story in their own words. Rather than 
representing an advocate’s claim to the right to narrate the inner thoughts and 
feelings of individual characters, free indirect discourse works to provide the effect 
of direct and unmediated access to those internal thoughts. The ease with which the 
narrative voice can move from external events to the internal thoughts of individual 
characters (as Rodensky has shown) suggests that the character-focused novel 
remained committed to the epistemology of the ‘accused speaks’ model, in that it 
suggests that it is possible to have knowledge of the characters of others and base our 
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judgements of them and their actions upon that knowledge. Schramm argues that 
through the very act of narrating a story the novelist is effecting a movement away 
from this epistemology, but the narrative focus of the nineteenth-century novel on 
the character of the protagonist both provides the assurance that he or she will be 
given the opportunity to tell their story in their own words, and that it will be 
possible to come to know and so accurately judge his or her story. Moreover, the 
narrator’s use of free indirect discourse places the accused’s (or protagonist’s) story 
at the centre of the representational process, and so ensures the character-focused 
novel’s commitment to an ‘accused speaks’ model. 
As Levine argues in The Realistic Imagination, there exists in the nineteenth-
century novelists’ work discussed in this chapter a desire to depict ‘a world beyond 
words’ but more than that, a desire that this world be ‘meaningful’ and ‘good’ in the 
face of a fear that it might merely be ‘mechanical, monstrous’ or worse still, ‘beyond 
human control’.97 In the face of a rapidly changing society many novelists of the 
nineteenth century remained committed to a model of representing reality which 
centred around the presentation of character. In the law, however, a break with these 
representational practices occurred with the passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, 
and a different model of representing reality and uncovering truth came to dominate 
the criminal trial. The adversarial-evidentiary model, which focused on the careful 
presentation and scrutiny of all the available evidence by advocates for both sides, 
presented an alternative way in which reality might be represented, an alternative 
which, after mid-century, writers of the emerging genre of sensation fiction began to 
embrace.  
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Through an analysis of character-focused fiction within the context of the 
development of the criminal jury trial, this chapter has revealed the affinity between 
the ‘accused speaks’ trial model and character-focused narratives. In doing so this 
chapter has demonstrated how nineteenth-century narratives which are based on the 
presentation and revelation of character do not just display a preference for the 
‘accused speaks’ model of representation, as Schramm suggests, but actually employ 
the same method in their own attempts at representing reality.  The next two chapters 
will explore the ways in which a similar relationship emerges between the 
adversarial-evidentiary trial model and the sensation novel. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Making a Case: The Prisoners’ Counsel Act and the Rise of 
Sensation Fiction 
In 1836 the Prisoners’ Counsel Act was passed. This Act of Parliament effected a 
change in the way criminal jury trials for felony were conducted, sidelining the 
hitherto central significance of the idea of character and replacing it with a model for 
representing reality and uncovering truth which focused on the forensic scrutiny of 
all the available evidence.1 A central argument in this thesis is that the change in 
felony trial procedures introduced by the 1836 Act had a profound influence on the 
narrative structure and techniques employed in the sensation novel, and as such the 
relationship between post-1836 felony trial practices and the sensation novel’s 
attempts at representing reality is one which merits critical attention it has not yet 
received. It is my purpose to fill this critical gap by offering new readings of 
sensation novels in locating them within this important legal context. The focus of 
this chapter will be on the Prisoners’ Counsel Act debates and the issues they raised, 
not least how they challenged the efficacy of the ‘accused speaks’ trial model. The 
chapter will then explore how the reliability of character-focused representations in 
literature were also called into question, and will begin to explore how the rise of 
sensation fiction can be read, in part, as a response to such a challenge.  By 
examining the rise of the sensation novel in the context of the 1836 Act, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Legal historian John H. Langbein has shown how the introduction of the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act had the effect of turning the felony trial away from an ‘accused speaks’ model and towards an 
adversarial model based on the prosecution’s ‘case’ being tested by skilled advocacy: The Origins of 
Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). During the eighteenth century the 
trial had been becoming increasingly adversarial, with the rising prevalence of defence counsel as they 
began to be increasingly permitted to cross-examine witnesses in felony trials. However, until the 
1836 Act, as defence lawyers were unable to address the jury directly, they were unable to fully ‘test’ 
the prosecution’s case by providing their own interpretation of events and suggesting weaknesses or 
inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. 
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changes it brought to legal representational practices, I hope to show how such 
fiction can and should be read as an engaged response to the challenges faced by 
both novelists and lawyers when making representations about reality. In order to 
achieve this, it will first be necessary to give some detail of the background to the 
passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act and the surrounding debates. 
 
The 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act 
In chapter one I left off my account of the criminal jury trial at the end of the 
eighteenth century, by which time the felony trial’s mode of representing reality was 
firmly established as the ‘accused speaks’ model. However, in the late seventeenth 
century and throughout the eighteenth century, the engagement of lawyers to 
investigate and manage criminal prosecutions gave rise to the question of whether or 
not a suspected felon should also have recourse to full legal representation, as the 
problems of denying the accused full legal representation began to emerge.2 In 
response to these problems, judges began to use their discretion to relax the rules, 
permitting prisoners accused of felonies to employ defence advocates to examine and 
cross-examine witnesses on their behalf. 3 Langbein views this move as being 
instrumental in turning the criminal jury trial into the adversarial proceedings we 
recognise today.4  
This was not the end of the imbalance, however, for felony counsel restriction 
remained in place, despite it having been somewhat relaxed by the judiciary. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As noted in chapter one, the major problem was that of perjury as the prosecution commonly offered 
large rewards for those willing to give evidence against the accused.  
3 For a discussion on the increasing use of prosecution and defence advocates in criminal trials during 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see J. M. Beattie, 'Scales of Justice: ‘Defense Counsel 
and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', Law and History Review 9 
(1991), pp. 221-67; and John H. Langbein, 'The Criminal Trial Before Lawyers', University of 
Chicago Law Review 45 (1978), pp. 263-316. 
4 Langbein, Origins, p. 2. 
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Crucially, prior to the 1836 Act, defence lawyers continued to be denied the right to 
address the jury directly, unlike the counsel for the prosecution. Whilst criminal trial 
proceedings became increasingly combative in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, the restriction on defence counsel ensured that the 
emphasis of the trial remained largely focused on the defendant’s character: because 
the defendant remained a primary testimonial resource, the jury were afforded the 
opportunity not only to hear the prisoner’s version of events, but also to observe his 
behaviour, and so to discern what sort of character he appeared to possess.5 The 
continued imposition of felony counsel restriction into the nineteenth century 
benefited the prosecution in one major respect: it allowed the prosecution (but not 
the defence) to address the jury directly and put forth their ‘case’ against the accused. 
Unlike a defendant, prosecution lawyers were professional advocates and their 
opening and closing speeches to the jury gave them the chance to connect all the 
facts into one coherent narrative of guilt. During the early years of the nineteenth 
century the undesirability of permitting one side but not the other to address the jury 
directly began to emerge in a number of trials.  
In theory, because the prisoner was not permitted to have a lawyer to address 
the jury on his behalf, the prosecution counsel was required to exercise a duty of 
restraint. This duty required that prosecution counsel were only supposed to present 
the facts of the case in such a manner so that the jury would be able to follow the 
case. The prosecution, therefore, was not permitted to allude to any questionable 
facts, confessions or hearsay evidence, nor were they supposed to reason on the facts 
they presented, or to anticipate and argue against any defence which might be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Langbein, Origins, p. 49.  
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offered, or to appeal to the jury’s emotions and prejudices.6 In practice, adherence to 
this duty was oftentimes scant at best. Cairns has shown how a number of cases in 
the early nineteenth century caused concern that the right of prosecution counsel to 
address the jury directly gave rise to much inequality if (as often happened) the duty 
of restraint was ignored.7 In R v Patch (1806) the prosecution’s case was opened by 
William Garrow, a leading practitioner at the bar. In his opening address Garrow 
failed to show any duty of restraint at all: he presented all manner of dubious facts 
and evidence, he reasoned on the facts and argued that they were suggestive of guilt, 
he speculated, raised suspicions, talked in probabilistic terms, referred to how a 
hypothetical reasonable man would have acted, alluded to his personal experience 
and observations, all the while employing highly eloquent and emotive rhetoric.8 The 
dangers of such speeches caused much concern, and Garrow’s opening was even 
alluded to as a ‘hanging speech’ in parliamentary debates concerning the 
introduction of full defence counsel for prisoners.9  
The question of whether prisoners charged with felonies should have recourse 
to full defence counsel was first raised in the House of Commons in 1821 in the form 
of the Capital Crimes Defence Bill, where its proposer, Richard Martin, gave a short 
speech on the injustices of such a restriction.10 At this time, the move to remove 
felony counsel restriction was dropped from the Bill. The issue was raised again in 
1824 and 1826 but on both occasions met with fierce opposition and did not pass the 
House. Supporters of a full defence for all prisoners maintained that equal 
representation for both sides was necessary to the discovery of truth, arguing that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 David J. A. Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 39. 
7 Cairns, Advocacy, pp. 40-46. 
8 Cairns, Advocacy, pp. 41-42.	  
9 Parliamentary Debates, 13 March 1824 – 25 June 1824, 11 (London: Hansard, 1825), col. 210.     
10 Parliamentary Debates, 23 January 1821 – 2 April 1821, 4 (London: Hansard, 1821), col. 1512. 
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felony counsel restriction led to an imbalance in the system that was prejudiced 
against the prisoner, and that an adversarial trial would lead to the discovery of the 
truth by ensuring that all possible interpretations of the facts and evidence were 
presented to the jury. However, the arguments of those who opposed the Bill 
ultimately held sway, and in both 1824 and 1826 the supporters of the Prisoners' 
Counsel Bill were defeated. The issue was raised once again in the House of 
Commons in 1833 and a new phase of debates began. This time the idea was 
received more favourably. The cause had gained a strong new ally in the form of 
Lord Lyndhurst (formerly John Copley), who had altered his position on the Bill and, 
as Cairns suggests, the 1830 election of a new Whig government committed to 
reform helped encourage increased support for change.11 The strengthened cause 
ultimately ensured that (after another couple of failed attempts) the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Bill was enacted into law in 1836 and finally removed felony counsel 
restriction so that all prisoners were permitted to have a full defence. 12   
Post-1836, felony trials now operated on a more adversarial basis which not 
only provided for a fuller investigation of all the facts and evidence, but also ensured 
the jury were presented with the different possible interpretations of those facts and 
that evidence. As Langbein has shown, this shift in the nature of trial proceedings 
also had the effect of greatly diminishing the role of the accused.13 Following the 
enactment of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, the rules which developed relating to the 
defence’s right to address the jury had the effect of, in most cases, silencing the 
accused, as it was soon established by legal precedent that either defence counsel or 
the accused could address the jury directly, but not both. In the majority of cases the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cairns, Advocacy, p. 70. 
12 In 1834 a Bill to remove felony counsel restriction passed the House of Commons only to be 
defeated in the House of Lords. In 1835 a similar Bill once again passed the Commons but appears to 
have disappeared after being referred to a Select Committee. 
13 See Langbein, Origins, pp. 6-7 and Ch. 5.  
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decision was taken to allow counsel, rather than the accused, to address the jury. 
Consequently the accused could no longer tell his story, and the opportunity for a 
prisoner to acquit himself through his own words and demeanour was removed from 
criminal trial proceedings.14 The felony trial’s pre-1836 model of representing reality 
was therefore replaced by the adversarial-evidentiary model which was based on 
putting the prosecution’s case fully to the test.15 
 
A Superior Model for Establishing the Truth? Advocacy and the Problems with 
Evidence. 
In chapter one I sought to demonstrate how even after centuries of the jury trial’s 
development, the idea of character remained central to the felony trial process. In the 
nineteenth century, years of tradition were broken with when the decision was taken 
to adopt an alternative means for the making of such representations by the passing 
of the 1836 Act. The decision to make such a change in the way truth and reality 
were represented in felony trial proceedings cannot be attributed to any one cause 
but, as noted in chapter one, changes in the social structure of England appear to 
have been an influential factor. Legal historian John Hostettler has pointed out that 
by the nineteenth century the traditional basis of society was ‘crumbling’ as new 
relationships based on economic interests alone began to dominate, resulting in an 
increasing upset to the traditional intimacy and interconnectedness of landed 
agricultural society, and a decline of the knowable community.16  
The alteration in both legal and political thought which brought about the 
enactment of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act in part reflected a recognition that the 
‘accused speaks’ model of trial was no longer appropriate in modern nineteenth-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Cairns, Advocacy, p. 49.  
15 Langbein, Origins, pp. 6-7.  
16 John Hostettler, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform in the Nineteenth Century (Chichester: Barry 
Rose Law Publishers, 1992) p. vii.  
	  	  
93 
century society. This thinking is demonstrated by the Second Report of His Majesty’s 
Commissioners, which openly discredited the well-established view that a man 
would be able to clear himself by the ‘simplicity’ and ‘innocence’ of his words.17 
The Second Report, produced in 1836, was instrumental to the passing of the 
Prisoners’ Counsel Act. The Commissioners were appointed by Henry Brougham in 
1833 for the purpose of codifying all criminal law, both statute and common. In their 
report the Commissioners highlighted the inability to comprehend the characters of 
others, stating plainly that an innocent man accused of a crime might often appear 
guilty through a natural ‘sense of the disgrace and danger to which he is exposed’.18  
In their report, the Commissioners worked to dispel the myth that it was easy to 
judge the characters of others and pressed the view that in a modern society some 
alternative model was needed to elicit truth in criminal trials. The model suggested 
was one based on advocacy, where both sides would have an opportunity to present 
their interpretation of events to a panel of jurors.  
During the first round of debates over the matter of counsel for prisoners 
during the 1820s one of the most prominent opponents to the Bill was Sir John 
Copley (later Lord Lyndhurst).19 Copley spoke out strongly against the introduction 
of full defence counsel in the major debates of 1824 and 1826, basing his opposition 
on the premise that it would interfere with the trial as an ‘investigation of truth’.20 
Copley argued that the truth-seeking aim of the criminal jury trial would be 
compromised by such an alteration in procedure, which would see the ‘trial of truth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This argument was articulated by Sergeant William Hawkins, see chapter one, p. 46 for the full 
quotation. 
18 Second Report From His Majesty’s Commissioners on Criminal Law Parliamentary Papers, in 
Parliamentary Papers: Reports from Commissioners: Church, Education, Law etc, 36 (London, 1836) 
pp. 183-314, (p. 189). 
19 Copley had established himself as a respected defence counsel, was made Solicitor General in 1818, 
was promoted to Attorney General in 1824, and was eventually elevated to the peerage in 1827 as 
Lord Lyndhurst, before being made Lord Chancellor. 
20 See Copley's speeches in Parliamentary Debates, (London: Hansard, 1827), 11, cols. 206-208, and 
Parliamentary Debates, 15, cols. 596-601. 
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[…] converted into a war of wit, ingenuity and eloquence’.21 For Copley, the 
introduction of full defence counsel would turn the court into an adversarial ‘arena, 
where opposing advocates might meet in professional conflict’, and so, ‘instead of 
endeavouring to elicit the truth by reference to plain facts, or the real merits of the 
case’, advocates would seek to win the ‘contest’ with counsel on the other side by 
whatever means necessary.22 
What the debates leading up to and surrounding the passing of the 1836 Act 
reveal is a deep concern in legal and political thought with establishing the most 
effective means of representing the facts in order to discover the truth of disputed 
acts. However, the view that advocacy would lead to the court being turned into an 
adversarial arena which would tend to obscure truth, was not one shared by the 
Criminal Law Commissioners. The Second Report explored in detail the question of 
whether or not a full defence counsel should be permitted in all criminal trials, with 
one hundred and thirty two pages of the report being dedicated to this issue. In their 
report the Commissioners took the view that allowing advocates to speak on behalf 
of the defence ‘tends, generally, to the discovery of truth’ and recommended that a 
full defence counsel should be permitted in all criminal trials.23 The report carried 
much weight, and the second reading of the 1836 Bill was even delayed in the House 
of Lords for the very purpose of reading it. In the end, the recommendations of the 
Commissioners were accepted and the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act passed into law. 
The debates of the early nineteenth century demonstrate the controversy 
which existed in legal and political thought regarding how best to uncover truth and 
represent it as reality to a panel of jurors. As Jan-Melissa Schramm has noted, 
another crucial matter at the heart of the debates was ‘the extent to which facts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Parliamentary Debates, 11, col. 205. 
22 Parliamentary Debates, 15, cols. 598-9, quotations at col. 599.  
23 Second Report, pp. 183-314, (p. 189). 
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required interpretation and arrangement by a trained mind in order to serve as 
evidence’.24 This question brought front and centre the problems pertaining to 
different types of evidence which the legal world had been increasingly struggling 
with since the late seventeenth century.  By the sixteenth century the trial jury had 
ceased to be made up of jurors who had personal knowledge of the crime or 
defendant in question, and from this time the jury came to be understood and 
accepted as a panel of persons who passed judgement on the evidence presented to 
them. As Barbara Shapiro has highlighted in ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ and 
‘Probable Cause’: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, 
this shift in the juror’s role raised the question of how jurors could be sure that they 
had made the right decision.25 In her study, Shapiro shows how the rise of the jury, 
understood as a body of persons deciding upon the effect of evidence, coincides with 
the rise of probabilistic thinking in the seventeenth century. In Probability and 
Certainty in Seventeenth Century England, Shapiro examines how the rise of 
probabilistic thinking during the seventeenth century reflected an increasing 
acceptance that in a large proportion of human thought and endeavour there was no 
access to certain knowledge.26 The criminal trial process was one area of thought 
where this was true, and legal treatises and cases during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries clearly demonstrate that, by this time, it was commonly 
accepted that jurors could not hope to obtain any sort of mathematical, absolute 
certainty, but instead had to be satisfied with attaining the highest level of probability 
possible, that of moral certainty. This can be seen in what Shapiro has termed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 105. 
25 Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ and ‘Probable Cause’: Historical Perspectives on 
the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991), Ch. 1.  
26 Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth Century England (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983).  
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‘first real treatise on evidence’, written by judge and jurist Sir Geoffrey Gilbert in the 
early eighteenth century.27 In The Law of Evidence Gilbert notes how ‘there are 
several degrees from perfect certainty and demonstration quite down to improbability 
and unlikeness […] now what is to be done in all Trials of Right is to range all 
matters in the scale of probability’.28 Gilbert recognises that trials depended upon the 
narration of past events retrieved from human memory and so trials had, out of 
necessity, to be determined by probability and not absolute demonstration.  
By the nineteenth century the standard of probability required for conviction 
was well established as that of beyond reasonable doubt. Shapiro has identified the 
first use of this term in 1770 in the Boston Massacre trials, but argues that the terms 
in which it is used suggest that it was not an innovation in these cases.29 In the 
nineteenth century one of the leading and most influential legal treatises on evidence 
was Thomas Starkie’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence (1824). Starkie, like 
Gilbert, noted how in matters of fact (which legal trials necessarily had to determine) 
there could be no absolutes but merely ‘moral certainty’. In his discussions Starkie 
explicitly equates the attainment of moral certainty with the idea of conviction 
beyond any reasonable doubt: 
Evidence which satisfied the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in 
dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full 
proof of the fact […] even the most direct evidence can produce nothing 
more than such a high degree of probability as amounts to moral certainty.30 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, p. 26. Shapiro refers to Gilbert’s treatise as the ‘first real 
treatise on evidence’ because he was attempting a systematisation of the law of evidence rather than a 
more abstract philosophical analysis like Hawkins or Hale. Gilbert’s treatise was first published in 
1754, but Shapiro notes that it was most probably completed before 1726. See Shapiro, Historical 
Perspectives, p. 22 and p. 225. 
28 Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence (London: [n. pub.], 1756 [1754]), pp. 1-2. 
29 Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, p. 22.  
30 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, and Digest of Proofs in Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings 2nd edn, 3 vols (London: J & W. T. Clarke, 1833 [1824]), I, p. 478. 
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The English evidence treatise tradition beginning with Gilbert and followed by 
Starkie is, as Shapiro has shown, heavily rooted in the epistemological formulations 
found in Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.31 These treatises 
follow Lockean formulations in their acknowledgements that outside of the realm of 
mathematical certainty (which is capable of absolute demonstration) there is the 
sphere of empirical events where such certainty is simply not achievable. However, it 
was also recognised that this did not mean that it was not possible to achieve 
anything approaching certainty. In Locke we see the acceptance of the idea of 
differing levels of certainty, and the idea that as the quantity and the quality of the 
evidence increases so too does the level of certainty arrived at.32 By the nineteenth 
century, it was commonly accepted that jurors should feel morally certain of a 
defendant’s guilt before they could convict, and this meant feeling certain of guilt 
beyond any reasonable doubt.33  
The development of the beyond reasonable doubt principle was, of course, 
caught up with the problems that were increasingly being recognised as pertaining to 
evidence.  As the self-informing jury declined, the usefulness and reliability of 
evidence came under increasing scrutiny.34 As Shapiro has noted, before the late 
seventeenth century, criminal trials were not well documented, but a number of 
notable trials in the latter years of that century increased public interest in the 
standard of proof required to secure convictions. As reports of high profile trials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, pp. 179-193. 
32 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 
[1690]), Bk. 4, Ch. 15, pp. 423-426. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the 
text. 
33 Starkie, Law of Evidence, I, p. 478. 
34	  The trial jury which emerged in the early thirteenth century was ‘self-informing’ in that the jurors 
were expected to perform an investigative function by making enquiries in the local neighbourhood 
about the defendant and the allegations against him. See chapter one of this thesis, pp. 41-42. 
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(usually for treason) began to be produced in pamphlet form, the public were alerted 
to evidentiary problems, not least the problem of perjured testimony.35  
At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to note that from this period jurists were 
already differentiating between two different types of evidence. The first type is that 
of testimonial evidence (often termed ‘direct evidence’), which was considered to 
constitute direct proof. The other species of evidence was circumstantial, which 
offered only indirect proof. Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which 
inferences could be drawn, and as such in some instances gives rise to presumptions 
of fact; for example if someone is found standing over a stabbed body with a bloody 
sword then this would amount to a strong presumption that they had committed the 
deed.36 For a long time in English legal history direct testimonial evidence was 
favoured over circumstantial evidence. In criminal law during the medieval era, only 
a confession or the testimony of two witnesses amounted to ‘full proof’ which 
required no further evidence of guilt. By contrast, circumstantial evidence was 
treated with suspicion and was mainly reserved for use in exceptional cases and 
‘secret crimes’, crimes which by their nature were unlikely to have any direct 
witnesses, such as rape or witchcraft. As Shapiro has shown, throughout the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there appears to have been a good deal of 
uncertainty over the extent to which circumstantial evidence should be used in trials 
and under what circumstances it could be legitimately employed.37 But by the second 
half of the seventeenth century the use of circumstantial evidence in trials appears to 
be common. In the 1663 Trial of Dover, Brewster, and Brooks, for example, Lord 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See also Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, pp. 18-21.  
36 This example of circumstantial evidence giving rise to a strong (or ‘violent’) presumption can be 
found in the works of Quintilian and is also used in Bracton, and in Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the 
Lawes of England, 4 vols (London: E. and R. Brooke, 1797 [1628-1644]). 
37 See Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, Ch. 4.  
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Chief justice Hyde told the jury: ‘pregnant, strong, undeniable circumstances are 
good evidence’.38  
By the eighteenth century there is no doubt that testimonial and 
circumstantial evidence were both being used to secure convictions in criminal trials 
and that both species of evidence were duly considered by juries when making a 
decision about whether a defendant was guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, by this time the preference for direct testimonial evidence over 
circumstantial evidence was being re-evaluated, and debates were emerging over the 
relative merits of both species of evidence. The debates were probably the result of a 
number of factors, including the development of a scholarly treatise tradition, the 
printing of case reports, and high profile cases where problems with evidence 
became a major issue.39  Whatever the causes, the result was that the long established 
preference for direct testimony was reversed in the eighteenth century and 
circumstantial evidence was elevated to the position of the preferred form of proof.  
It is clear from the work of noted jurist and judge Sir Matthew Hale that by 
the late seventeenth century there were two categories of witnesses, ‘legal witnesses’ 
(those deemed competent to testify) and ‘credible witnesses’ (those whose testimony 
could be considered trustworthy).40 So already by this time there existed the notion 
that any testimony from anyone was not sufficient in and of itself. In Primitive 
Origination of Mankind (1677) Hale discusses (in relation to the scriptures) the 
reliability of witness testimony and states that it is possible to discern whether or not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The Trial of Dover, Brewster, and Brooks (1663), in Howell’s State Trials, 21 vols (London: 
Hansard, 1816), VI, cols 539-564 (col. 559). 
39 In her incredibly detailed and well researched study, Shapiro is unable to identify any specific 
trigger: Historical Perspectives, Ch. 4.  
40 A number of groups of persons were precluded from testifying, such as those with previous 
convictions and those unwilling to take an oath on religious grounds (Quakers for example). See 
further, Christopher Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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a witness speaks the truth from his manner of giving his testimony. Hale expresses 
not only the possibility but the necessity of weighing testimonial evidence given. 41 
This suggestion is also found in Locke’s Essay, which informed so much of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurisprudential thinking on the matter of 
evidence. In Locke’s Essay we can identify a perception that testimonial evidence 
was crucial to the achievement of the highest possible standard of certainty. Locke 
notes that probabilistic knowledge required observation, experience and also the 
testimony of others to vouch for those observations and experiences. For Locke, 
when determining what weight to give to the testimony of others it was important to 
consider: (1) the number of witnesses; (2) the integrity of those witnesses; (3) the 
skill of those witnesses; (4) the design of the author (when dealing with testimony 
cited from books); (5) the consistency of the testimony and the circumstances of how 
it was related; and (6) any existing testimonies to the contrary (Essay, Bk. 4, Ch. 15, 
p. 425). It is clear that the probability of a proposition rested largely on testimony but 
the Essay also reveals that testimony was not to be considered reliable simply by 
virtue of its being direct evidence, but rather the more corroborating testimony that 
exists, the more consistent a testimony is, and the more reliable the witnesses 
themselves are perceived as being, the more likely a proposition becomes. Locke’s 
thinking on testimony informs Gilbert’s treatise on evidence, which notes that the 
credibility of a witness may be called into question if there is evidence and 
experience which contradicts his statements or if he fails to state ‘the reasons and 
causes of his knowledge’, and that the more witnesses there are, the more credible 
that testimony becomes.42 Nevertheless, as both Shapiro and Alexander Welsh have 
shown, during the eighteenth century testimony came to be increasingly distrusted, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Sir Matthew Hale, Primitive Origination of Mankind (1677), cited in Shapiro, Historical 
Perspectives, pp. 194 – 195.  
42 Gilbert, Evidence, pp. 150-151. 
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the point where its privileged position was usurped by circumstantial evidence which 
became the favoured type of proof.43 This sea change can be discerned in a number 
of famous trials during the eighteenth century.  
In 1752 Mary Blandy was tried for poisoning her father. In his charge to the 
jury, the judge, Mr Baron Legge, noted that this was a case which had to proved on 
circumstantial evidence alone but that it was possible for a ‘violent presumption’ to 
arise from such circumstances which was ‘more convincing and satisfactory than any 
other kind of evidence because facts cannot lie’, and that to believe anything to the 
contrary ‘where circumstances speak so strongly would be absurd’.44 A similar 
argument is to be found in a case which closely followed that of Mary Blandy. In the 
trial of John Barbot, the Solicitor-General asserted that the most trustworthy sort of 
evidence was circumstantial evidence as it was ‘the least likely to deceive and 
mislead’.45 The Judge presiding over the case agreed. Thirty years later in R. v 
Donellan (1781), this view was again echoed by the judge who argued that 
circumstantial evidence was a preferable type of evidence because: 
a presumption, which necessarily arises from circumstances, is often more 
convincing and more satisfactory than any other kind of evidence, because it 
is not within the reach and compass of human abilities to invent a train of 
circumstances which shall be so connected together as to amount to a proof 
of guilt.46 
 
What is clear from these seventeenth century cases is that increasingly 
circumstantial evidence was being favoured over testimony based on the view that 
circumstances were free from human error or perjury; as William Paley stated in The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See further Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, Ch. 4, and Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: 
Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992).  
44 The Trial of Mary Blandy (1752), in Notable English Trials, ed. by William Roughead (London and 
Edinburgh: William Hodge, 1914), p. 132. 
45 The Trial of John Barbot (1753), in Howell’s State Trials, 21 vols (London: Hansard, 1816), XVIII, 
cols 1230-1322 (col. 1292). 
46 Joseph Gurney, Trial of John Donellan (London: [n. pub.], 1781), p. 52.  
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Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785): ‘a concurrence of well 
authenticated circumstances composes a stronger ground of assurance […] than 
positive testimony, unconfirmed by circumstances, usually affords. Circumstances 
cannot lie’ (my emphasis).47 Such sentiments were also echoed in the work of noted 
jurist Edmund Burke: ‘when circumstantial proof is in its greatest perfection, that is, 
when it is most abundant in circumstances, it is much superior to positive proof’.48  
Welsh argues in his study Strong Representations that this preference for 
circumstantial evidence remained unshaken until the mid-nineteenth century. 
However, in an alternative assessment of the relationship between legal evidence and 
literary narratives, Schramm locates a weakening faith in circumstances in the 
debates surrounding the passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act. Schramm notes that a 
central point of debate was the extent to which facts did ‘speak for themselves’ and 
how much they depended upon the skill of an advocate to make it appear as though 
they were speaking for themselves.49  Schramm’s point here nicely brings us back to 
the Prisoners’ Counsel Act and highlights the importance of those debates. As noted 
earlier, these debates were a crucial part of not just legal but also contemporary 
popular discourse surrounding the matter of representation, and brought together a 
number of key questions and issues surrounding the problems of representing reality 
and revealing the truth, most importantly those surrounding the nature of evidence. 
Such questions struck at the very heart of the literary critical debate also, for both the 
legal trial and the novel were interested in finding an answer to the question: what 
was the best and most effective means of narrating reality and thereby revealing 
truth?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (London: Baldwyn, 1812 [1785]), 
p. 428.  
48 Edmund Burke, The Works and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 8 vols 
(London: Francis & John Rivington, 1852), II, p. 623. 
49 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 20. 
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As we have seen, the passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act was largely aided 
by the influential report of His Majesty’s Law Commissioners, a report which 
expressly recognised the complexity of assessing the value of both circumstantial 
and testimonial evidence. To the Commissioners it was clear that it was often the 
case that the skill of an advocate was required to interpret evidence and present it in 
such a way so as to reveal the truth, not least when circumstantial evidence was 
involved. The Commissioners reasoned that, especially where the charge is false, 
justice required the skill of an experienced advocate: 
It much more frequently happens that an innocent person is surprised and 
confused by false evidence, and rendered incapable of making an efficient 
defence by a forcible exposition of the improbabilities and discrepancies 
arising on a nice comparison of facts, which may be the only means of 
discovering the truth and rescuing an innocent man.50 
 
Following the recommendations of the Criminal Law Commissioners, the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act was passed and introduced into all criminal trials a model of 
representing reality and uncovering truth based on advocacy which tested the 
prosecution’s case. Crucially, what this model allowed for, and the Criminal Law 
Commissioners recognised it was needed for, was the forensic scrutiny of all 
evidence (both testimonial and circumstantial) by two opposing sides who could 
ensure that all possible interpretations of that evidence were suggested to the minds 
of the jury. In the debates surrounding the passing of the 1836 Act, and also in the 
cases and treatises dealing with matters of evidence in the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and in the debates concerning the efficacy of trial 
proceedings which continued long after the passing of the Act, it is possible to 
discern a deep-seated and continued anxiety over how to attain that moral certainty 
which was required to deliver a verdict beyond reasonable doubt. The Parliamentary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Second Report, p. 189.  
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debates and the Law Commissioners’ report relating to the passing of the 1836 Act 
also demonstrate this anxiety, but they represent a consensus that a better trial model 
was needed to represent reality and uncover truth, one which had regard to all the 
evidence and every possible interpretation of it. Whilst not perhaps perfect, it was 
decided that a model based on advocacy and thorough assessment of all the evidence 
would be a more effective means of achieving this aim and so the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act passed into law. 
 
Evidentiary Issues: The Problem of Defining, Assessing and Interpreting 
Evidence. 
Once the criminal jury trial came to be understood as a process which required jurors 
to determine the truth of disputed facts based on the effect of evidence, the question 
of how evidence should be assessed and, more fundamentally, what even constituted 
evidence, became increasingly important in jurisprudence. Once felony counsel 
restriction was removed, such questions gained an added significance as the jury 
found themselves presented with two alternative interpretations of that evidence: 
both the prosecution and defence putting forward contrasting ‘cases’, subordinating 
the evidence to their particular narrative of guilt or innocence, and each claiming 
their representation was the truth. In a trial model based on the interpretation of all 
the evidence by opposing sides, the difficulties attendant upon such a task were 
thrown increasingly into focus.  
In their studies, both Schramm and Welsh examine how evidentiary issues 
affected representations in both the courtroom and literary narratives. One 
evidentiary problem which the two studies reveal is the problem of definition. In her 
critique of Welsh’s study, Schramm questions the premise upon which Welsh’s 
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thesis depends, namely, that from the eighteenth century until the second half of the 
nineteenth century circumstantial evidence became the favoured form of proof in 
both legal and literary narratives. For Schramm, Welsh’s argument is flawed as it 
rests on making what she sees as a false distinction between testimonial and 
circumstantial evidence: 
Welsh seems to ignore the fact that most circumstantial evidence is presented 
to the court in testimonial form. If ‘I saw a crime committed’ is direct eye-
witness evidence, then telling the jury ‘I saw a footprint outside the house’ 
remains an oral assertion, even though it relates only to a subsidiary fact in 
issue from which the existence of the main fact (the crime) may be inferred.51 
 
Schramm’s criticism of Welsh here is one that illuminates a wider problem with 
terminology, a problem that stems from a lack of precision employed by nineteenth-
century commentators when attempting to differentiate between different species of 
evidence.  
Schramm is right to question the validity of Welsh’s distinction, as during the 
nineteenth century the two opposing types of evidence were understood as being 
either direct or indirect (circumstantial) in nature.52 Both species of evidence could 
take testimonial, documentary or physical form: 
All judicial evidence is either direct or circumstantial. By “direct evidence” 
is meant where the principal fact or factum probandum is attested directly by 
witnesses, things, or documents. To all other forms the term “circumstantial 
evidence” is applied, which may be defined, that modification of indirect 
evidence, either by witnesses, things or documents, which the law deems 
sufficiently proximate to be receivable as evidentiary of a principal fact or 
factum probandum.53  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 20. 
52 This is still true today. 
53 William Mawdesley Best, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence and Practice as to Proofs in 
Courts of Common Law; with Elementary Rules for Conducting the Examination and Cross-
Examination of Witnesses, 2nd ed., (London: Hodges and Smith, 1854), Bk. 2, Ch. 1, p. 365. 
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However, the distinction which Welsh draws between testimony and circumstantial 
evidence is perhaps inherited from his source materials, in which terms were not 
always applied with precision. 
From the sixteenth century onwards, once juries were understood to be 
deciding upon the effect of evidence, legal cases and treatises begin to clearly 
distinguish between direct evidence and indirect evidence. Direct evidence is 
evidence which is immediate proof of the guilt of the accused; in terms of testimony, 
direct testimony would therefore be where a witness can testify that they directly saw 
or heard the crime committed, for example they saw X stab Y. Indirect evidence 
(also called circumstantial evidence) is any evidence from which inferences can be 
made about the guilt of the accused. Indirect testimony would be where Z could 
testify that though they didn’t directly see X stab Y, they saw X running away from 
the scene with a bloody knife.54 However, a general lack of precision when applying 
these terms can give rise to the misconception that a distinction is being made 
between testimony and circumstantial evidence, as the term ‘testimony’ occasionally 
appears to be applied in a manner synonymous with ‘direct evidence’, when in actual 
fact this is not the case.  
In An Essay on the Rationale of Circumstantial Evidence (1838), William 
Wills notes that ‘the epithets DIRECT and INDIRECT or CIRCUMSTANTIAL, as 
applied to testimonial evidence, […] have frequently been very indiscriminately 
applied’.55 Wills goes on to point out that the misapplication of these terms stems 
from the fact that circumstantial evidence is as ‘equally direct in its nature’ as direct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Legal cases and treatises generally talk about indirect evidence giving rise to presumptions which 
can have a varying degree of force. The example of a person running away from a murder scene with 
a bloody sword is an example of ‘violent presumption’ which appears in English legal treatises from 
the thirteenth century onwards. 
55 William Wills, An Essay on the Rationale of Circumstantial Evidence; Illustrated by Numerous 
Cases (London: Longman, Orem, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1838), Ch. 2, p. 23. 
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evidence.56 Circumstantial evidence is, after all, just ‘direct evidence of a minor fact 
or facts’, from which ‘some other fact is therefore inferred’.57 The terms ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ or ‘circumstantial’ therefore apply to the facts themselves, but as Wills 
points out, ‘the evidence of these facts is direct’. However, the application of these 
terms is complicated by a repeated use of the term ‘direct testimony’ to mean 
testimony of direct facts (‘I saw X stab Y’) when, in reality, all testimony is direct: 
nonetheless, throughout the nineteenth century the term ‘direct testimony’ is 
frequently used to signify ‘testimonial evidence of direct facts’.58 
This trend may have its roots in the fact that before the seventeenth century 
circumstantial evidence was viewed so sceptically that its use was reserved for the 
‘secret’ crimes of rape and witchcraft, where there was no direct evidence available 
at all. In medieval England ‘full proof’ of a crime meant the presentation of two eye-
witnesses who could testify to having witnessed the crime directly, and so 
testimonial evidence naturally came to be associated with direct evidence. As the 
legal process came to include more and more evidence of an indirect nature, judges, 
lawyers and jurists did increasingly pre-fix the term ‘testimony’ with ‘direct’ or 
‘positive’ in order to distinguish it from indirect evidence which may have been 
provided in testimonial form. However, it is rarely made clear in the source materials 
that circumstantial evidence and ‘indirect evidence’ are synonymous, and that 
circumstantial evidence is usually provided in testimonial form. Consequently, 
terminological opacity frequently results. In the three most influential nineteenth-
century treatises on judicial evidence all three jurists – Thomas Starkie, William 
Wills and William Best – employ their terms in an inconsistent manner, one which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid,. p. 24. 
57 Ibid. 
58 The term ‘positive testimony’ is also commonly used.
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can easily lead to the conclusion that the distinction is to be made between testimony 
and circumstantial evidence, rather than direct and indirect evidence.  
Barbara Shapiro has identified the dominant legal treatise of the nineteenth 
century as Thomas Starkie’s A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence (1824), in 
which Starkie appears to place evidence into the two opposing categories of 
testimony and circumstantial evidence: ‘evidence to be weighed by a jury consists 
either in, 1st, the direct testimony of witnesses; or 2ndly, indirect or circumstantial 
evidence’.59 Starkie then goes on to discuss the ‘direct testimony of witnesses’ in 
terms which imply testimony is a species of evidence in and of itself, wholly 
unrelated to the category of circumstantial evidence. At other points Starkie makes 
clear the distinction is really to be made between direct and indirect evidence, 
writing of direct evidence being used to ‘prove a disputed fact by the aid of 
testimony’ (my emphasis).60 And yet Starkie’s insistence on writing about 
circumstantial evidence in contrast to the direct testimony of witnesses, is less than 
clear. Like Starkie, Wills and Best also largely centre their discussions of direct 
evidence around testimony. Yet, rather than discussing the means of bringing 
indirect evidence forth (including testimony), the jurists tend to focus on how 
individual circumstances might form chains, or raise presumptions, which can 
indicate where guilt lies, despite a lack of direct evidence. As direct evidence 
requires (in theory) no inferences to be drawn, discussions naturally focus on the 
mode of providing that evidence; and so the term testimony comes to be more 
associated with evidence that is direct rather than circumstantial. 
The complex signifying web of terms in the law of evidence is also apparent 
in modern studies. Shapiro’s Beyond Reasonable Doubt is a good example of this, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Thomas Starkie, Law of Evidence, I, p. 480. 
60 Ibid., I, p. 48. 
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for in her discussion of the changing conceptions of different types of evidence, 
Shapiro, at moments, appears to be aligning testimony with direct evidence alone.61 
Yet Shapiro obviously understands that the real distinction is between direct and 
indirect evidence, acknowledging in the conclusion to her final chapter that ‘a central 
problem to the jury’s fact-finding’ was that circumstantial evidence was presented in 
testimonial form. 62 A similar ambiguity over terminology is present in Alexander 
Welsh’s Strong Representations. Throughout his study Welsh appears to treat 
circumstantial and testimonial evidence as though they are entirely separable and 
distinct species of evidence. There is a moment in his preface when Welsh appears to 
make the distinction between direct testimony (‘I saw X commit the crime’) and 
circumstantial evidence (whether introduced by testimony or otherwise).63 
Unfortunately, through the rest of his study Welsh lapses into simply using the term 
‘testimony’, as in his analysis of Tom Jones, where he argues that the whole narrative 
is ‘against testimony in one form or another’ and an ‘onslaught upon testimony’.64 
By continually referring to an opposition between circumstantial and testimonial 
evidence and not clarifying fully what he means by testimonial evidence, Welsh’s 
analysis comes to rest on a distinction which, as Schramm quite rightly points out, 
does not exist, because ‘testimony serves as the vehicle by which all [circumstantial] 
evidence is presented to the court’.65 Welsh’s study, and Schramm’s criticism of it, 
therefore demonstrate the care needed when applying terms. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The problem for Shapiro appears to be the same issue which nineteenth-century jurists faced: as 
direct evidence does not require careful interpretation in the same way which indirect evidence does, 
discussions centering on direct evidence tend to focus on the mode in which it is brought into court, 
that is, via testimony. As such, ‘testimony’ comes to be used as a synonym for ‘direct evidence’, 
which is confusing as testimony is also the means by which indirect evidence is introduced into court. 
62 Shapiro, Historical Perspectives, p. 242. 
63 Welsh, Strong Representations, p. ix. 
64 Welsh, quotations at p. 57 and p. 61. Welsh does at various points in the text use the full term 
‘direct testimony’, but inconsistently and it is nowhere made clear that he is using the term 
‘testimony’ as a short hand for ‘direct testimony’. 
65 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 19.  
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Another important criticism which Schramm levels at Welsh is that he locates 
a declining faith in circumstantial evidence in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when in actual fact a distrust of circumstantial evidence emerged much 
earlier. Welsh’s argument proceeds from the view that from the late eighteenth 
century until the mid-nineteenth century, circumstantial evidence became the 
favoured type of proof: a preference rooted in the maxim ‘circumstances cannot lie’. 
Welsh notes how during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries:  
narrative[s] consisting of carefully managed circumstantial evidence, highly 
conclusive in itself and often scornful of direct testimony, flourished 
everywhere – not only in literature but in criminal jurisprudence, natural 
science, natural religion, and history writing itself.66 
 
Yet Schramm has shown how central to the Prisoners’ Counsel debate was the 
question over the extent to which ‘facts’ required interpretation by a skilled advocate 
in order to function effectively as evidence in the minds of the jurors. In contrast to 
Welsh, Schramm argues that the debates over this central issue dates the weakening 
of legal, political and public opinion regarding the reliability of circumstantial 
evidence much earlier :  
The late eighteenth-century idea of ‘facts speaking for themselves’ became 
increasingly discredited as both lawyers and authors realised that professional 
representations were required to render ‘facts’ effective as pieces of 
evidence.67 
 
Schramm takes issue with what she sees as a failure in Welsh’s argument to 
recognise ‘a genuine paradigmatic shift in the representation of fact itself in courts of 
law in the early decades of the nineteenth century’.68 For Schramm, a major driving 
force behind the passing of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act was the recognition that the 
‘complicated construction of inferential argument’ was a necessary part of 	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uncovering the truth.69 Schramm’s issue with Welsh’s argument is that whilst he 
acknowledges ‘the rhetorical effort involved in making “facts speak for themselves”’ 
he ‘seems to posit something of a seamless continuity between the eighteenth century 
notion that “circumstances cannot lie” and the complicated construction of inferential 
argument which both lawyers and authors demonstrated as the nineteenth century 
began’.70 Schramm therefore identifies in Welsh’s analysis a missing link, a failure 
to fully explore by what it means for narratives to ‘explain’ what was supposed to be 
self-evident. By placing the decline in the faith in circumstantial evidence after mid-
century, what Welsh’s analysis misses, Schramm claims, is the fact that the much 
earlier recognition of the complexity of circumstances opened the way ‘for legal and 
literary feats of analysis and rhetorical power’.71  
Contemporary newspaper and magazine articles also bear out Schramm’s 
claim. In one 1820 article ‘On Circumstantial Evidence’, two cases are offered up as 
examples ‘of wrongful conviction on circumstantial evidence’, though the reader is 
warned that these are just two instances among many.72 In 1828, a front-page article 
in The Kaleidoscope laments the fact that ‘many of our fellow-creatures have been 
judicially condemned, and executed, upon presumptive or circumstantial evidence, 
which was discovered to be fallacious after the execution of the presumed 
criminal’.73 Again an example case is given, demonstrating how misleading such 
evidence can be no matter how ‘plausible and connected’ it appears.74 Such articles 
are not rare and continue into the 1830s and 40s, typically giving examples of cases 
where circumstantial evidence has been misleading, or manipulated in order to make 	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72 ‘On Circumstantial Evidence’ Newcastle Magazine, 1 (1 September 1820), 78-87 (p. 79). 
73 ‘Circumstantial Evidence’, The Kaleidoscope or, Literary and Scientific Mirror, 8 (20 May 1828), 
385-386 (p. 385). 
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the innocent appear guilty.75 However, such articles do not simply demonstrate an 
increasing distrust of circumstantial evidence, but also a growing awareness of the 
difficult task of assessing evidence in general. Increasingly, the validity of the 
popular eighteenth-century maxim ‘circumstances cannot lie’ was questioned during 
the nineteenth century, as such articles demonstrate. However, this was not replaced 
by a renewed preference for direct evidence alone, but rather an understanding that 
all evidence whether direct or indirect (testimonial or not) should be treated with 
caution. This is clear from the article in The Kaleidoscope which both warns of the 
dangers of circumstantial evidence and notes that such evidence ‘is often more to be 
depended upon than what is called direct evidence’, highlighting only that it might be 
as ‘equally deceptive’.76 What such articles demonstrate is a concern with evidence 
in general, and the question of whether it is possible (and if so, how far possible), to 
be sure that the truth has been uncovered.   
The difficulty of this task, and the extent to which this was part of popular 
debate, is reflected in a letter published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in May 
1842. The letter is entitled ‘Who is the Murderer?: A Problem in the Law of 
Circumstantial Evidence, in a Letter to Christopher North’. The author of the letter, 
the lawyer Samuel Warren, takes twenty-six pages to consider a recent trial for 
murder at the spring assizes, one which he considers to be of ‘peculiar interest and 
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difficulty’.77 The public anxiety with which this letter deals is made clear to the 
reader:  
Who indeed, here or elsewhere, can fail to be profoundly interested on behalf 
of justice when in quest of a great criminal, and endeavouring, spite of a long 
lapse of time, to frustrate all his devices for secrecy and concealment;  – and 
in ascertaining that neither the innocent has been condemned, nor the guilty 
acquitted?78 
 
The letter goes through the evidence of the case (an old unsolved murder), as Warren 
demonstrates the enormous effort required to correctly interpret evidence. Warren 
discusses the details of the case in great detail and demonstrates how all the various 
circumstances of the case might be explained in a variety of different ways, some of 
which indicate the innocence, some the guilt, of the accused, and all of which are 
perfectly reasonable and believable explanations of the evidence: 
Now, in the present case, here is a man suddenly missing, known to have 
been possessed of a considerable sum of money – the prisoner to have been 
aware of it – to have been seen in his company up to almost the last moment 
before his disappearance – to become suddenly enriched, having previously 
been a pauper – and in possession of very many articles of clothing belonging 
to the missing man. All these circumstances point one way; but then, on the 
other hand, no attempt is made to conceal his possession of either money or 
clothes, nor to escape or quit the neighbourhood during the time when 
suspicion was the hottest. Then he certainly gives contradictory answers 
concerning the way in which he became possessed of these matters – bit all 
may be reconciled with the story he tells […] is this not indeed a striking 
specimen of the importance of, and the difficulties attending, circumstantial 
evidence?79 
 
In the end, Warren requires his readers to imagine themselves in the position of the 
jurors and asks, based on the evidence, what their verdict would have been. In this 
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way, Warren draws the reader’s attention to the evidentiary issues which the trial 
process faces, and how these problems should be a matter of public concern.80  
The difficulty of interpreting evidence was something that was keenly 
recognised in the Prisoners’ Counsel debates. The fundamental importance of 
allowing all evidence to be fully scrutinised by skilled advocacy on both sides, and 
the deficiencies in evidence which were barriers to determining the truth, were key 
discussion points. In calling for a change in the law in 1824, Mr George Lamb (who 
proposed the Bill), urged that counsel for both sides should be fully allowed in order 
that the evidence be ‘sifted and examined thoroughly’.81 Lamb argued that prisoners 
were simply not up to the job of defending themselves in the manner of an attorney, 
often ‘too absorbed in the difficulties of [their] unhappy circumstances’ or of an 
‘inferior mind and talent’ to ‘skilful and able advocates’.82 Sir James Mackintosh put 
forth a similar argument in his support of the Bill, highlighting the disadvantage a 
prisoner had in not being aware of the rules of evidence, arguing that ‘the best mode 
of reaching the truth’ was to employ ‘learning and talent’ on both sides.83 The 
importance of ensuring that both sides were equally put forward through the skilful 
management and presentation of evidence was best summed up by Dr Lushington in 
his reflection on Garrow’s notorious ‘hanging speech’ in  R v. Patch: 
Take the case of Patch, which had already been referred to. He well 
remembered that celebrated trial, and he also remembered that, when the 
leading counsel for the prosecution had concluded his address, the 
observation made upon it was, “that is one of his hanging speeches.” Not that 
he had tried to rouse the jury – that would not have been permitted; on the 
contrary it was a most cool and connected statement of facts. It was a case of 
circumstantial evidence merely, and the proof of the guilt of the prisoner 
depended upon the skilful dove-tailing of the various circumstances, so as to 
render the case a whole and consistent piece of ingenuity. The jury were led 	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step by step to a persuasion of guilt of the party accused; hence it was called a 
“hanging speech,” and the result confirmed the opinion. On the other hand, 
the prisoner, whose life was at stake, who had never addressed a court before, 
was called upon to meet this able statement without the slightest preparation; 
he was to follow an ingenious counsel through an address of an hour and 
twenty minutes, to point out its inconsistencies, to unravel the web, to avail 
himself of doubts, and to convince the jury of his innocence. Not one prisoner 
in five thousand could be competent to such an undertaking.84  
 
Lushington’s reflection on the Patch case highlights the fact that a good deal of the 
force of evidence stems from the way in which it is presented, and reveals the 
importance of the advocate’s role in using evidence to create what Welsh terms a 
‘strong representation’. But more than that, it stresses the importance of both sides 
having an opportunity to put forward their own strong representation, so the jury can 
fairly decide upon the effect of evidence.  
Both Schramm’s and Welsh’s studies are invaluable in illuminating the 
complex nature of the intersections which occur during the nineteenth century 
between law and literature over the matter of representation. In particular they are 
both central to establishing how the increasing awareness of evidentiary problems 
became a crucial issue which representations in both novels and the courtroom had to 
face and try to resolve. For Welsh, these evidentiary issues were overcome by a 
distrust of testimony and a faith in circumstantial evidence but, as Schramm has 
pointed out, Welsh misses the significance of the Prisoners’ Counsel debates and so 
largely ignores the issues pertaining to a reliance on circumstances which were 
surfacing in the early nineteenth century. Conversely, Schramm’s focus on one of the 
debate’s key questions – the extent to which facts could be said to speak for 
themselves or needed skilled representation by an advocate – leads her to focus on 
how testimonial evidence emerged at the end of these debates as central to the 
criminal jury trial’s model of representing reality, albeit that it would now be 	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appropriated by advocates and subordinated to the representations which they made. 
As a result, Schramm’s focus is largely on the negative impact of adversarialism and 
the ethical questions it raised. This leads her to identify a competition emerging 
during the nineteenth century between law and literature over the matter of 
representation. What Schramm does not give sufficient attention to, however, and 
what Welsh overlooks in his focus on the opposition of testimony and circumstantial 
evidence, is that an important effect of the introduction of the adversarial-evidentiary 
model into felony trials was that it provided for the close scrutiny of all the available 
evidence so that different possible interpretations of that evidence suggested 
themselves to the minds of the jury. This was a significant advantage of the 
adversarial-evidentiary model in the minds of the Criminal Law Commissioners, and 
its importance should not be overlooked. 
It is true that Welsh’s study is misleading in that it appears to maintain a 
distinction between circumstantial evidence and testimony which links the careful 
arrangement and narration of circumstances to a preference for circumstantial 
evidence. Nevertheless, one thing Welsh’s study does show is the fundamental 
importance in legal cases of creating a connected narrative which subordinates 
evidence to the story being told. This is what adversarialism (fully introduced by the 
1836 Act) provided for, so that all the evidence could be weighed and connected 
together as a narrative that persuades us of its truth. The continued imposition of 
felony counsel restriction provided the prosecution with an advantage over the 
defence team, for in their address to the jury the prosecution were able to piece 
together all the facts and evidence of the case in a connected and comprehensible 
narrative. The advantage of this was highlighted during the eighteenth century by the 
noted jurist Edmund Burke who advocated such an approach to the presentation of 
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evidence, arguing that through a connected narrative, the ‘multitude’, ‘combination’ 
and ‘relation’ of facts may reveal the truth through their ‘collective effect’.85 By 
contrast, counsel for the defence had to rely upon the examination of witnesses as the 
primary means of suggesting an alternative interpretation of events to the jurors. 
Prominent judge and jurist Sir James Fitzjames Stephen noted in his A History of the 
Criminal Law of England that, before the introduction of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, 
when a defendant’s counsel was not permitted to speak on their behalf, ‘the cross-
examination tended to become a speech thrown into the form of questions’.86 Indeed, 
supporters of a full defence counsel argued that the prosecution’s address to the jury 
provided them with an unfair advantage precisely because by presenting the facts and 
evidence in a coherent structure, they were able to put forward a particular 
interpretation of events suggestive of guilt, and that by denying the defence a similar 
right, alternative interpretations might not suggest themselves to the jury. As the 
Criminal Law Commissioners suggested: ‘the giving order and connexion to a mass 
of facts tends to impress the Jury with their materiality and to impart greater force to 
the evidence than it would otherwise possess’.87 This is what the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act provided for, and ensured that all evidence became equally important to the 
narrative of innocence.  
Schramm argues that character-focused narratives become in the nineteenth 
century narratives of innocence, as authors become preoccupied with establishing the 
innocence and goodness of their protagonists. I have posited the view that by 
providing the space to hear the protagonist’s story in their own words, the character-
focused novel represents a rejection of those adversarial, forensic methods of 	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representation which were coming to dominate the criminal court post-1836. Yet this 
is not to say that all nineteenth-century novels were doing the same. As the century 
drew on, the ‘accused speaks’ model of representation became increasingly difficult 
to sustain, and as the character-focused novel’s mode of representation moved 
evermore into the interior life of the individual, a new genre of fiction would emerge, 
and would engage openly with the problems of evidence and representation which 
led to a rejection of the ‘accused speaks’ model of criminal trial in 1836. This genre 
was that of sensation fiction, and it would seek an alternative model of representation 
to that of the character-focused novel, and in so doing fully embrace adversarial-
evidentiary methods in its representations of truth and reality.  
 
From Adam Bede to Middlemarch: Eliot’s Narrators and the Decline of the 
Knowable Community 
As nineteenth-century society progressed and evolved, the knowable community fell 
into decline. Increased opportunities for social advancement and geographical 
migration brought with them reduced opportunities to know one’s neighbours, 
tenants, landlords, even friends, and so the nineteenth century saw a decline in the 
faith in our ability to accurately know and judge those around us. This reassessment 
of social ties was in part responsible for the introduction of the 1836 Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act, as can be seen from the influential Second Report from His Majesty’s 
Criminal Law Commissioners who stressed the difficulty in correctly judging the 
characters of others, and the dangers of seeking to do so.88  
Unlike in the felony trial, novelists were not required to abandon a character-
focused mode of representing reality, but the challenges which presented themselves 
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to the justification of such a model can also be identified in the development of 
nineteenth-century novel narratives, especially in the use and development of the 
omniscient narrator. This development can be seen quite clearly in the works of 
George Eliot: as Lisa Rodensky has noted, the ‘narrative method that proceeds from 
the outside in’ in Adam Bede, shifts to a ‘narrative method that proceeds from inside 
out’ by the time Eliot is writing Middlemarch (1871-2).89 The subtle shifting of the 
narrator’s vantage point in her later fiction reveals that, whilst character-focused 
novelists may well have favoured the ‘accused speaks’ model for their 
representations of reality, the continued use of a model reliant on the possibility of 
having accurate knowledge of the characters of others becomes problematic when 
the knowable community begins to disappear. 
During the nineteenth century, the inner life of the individual becomes 
increasingly a source of interest. J. Hillis Miller has noted how ‘the rise of the novel 
is associated with a new discovery of the autonomy of the private mind’.90 This new 
sense of the interior becomes ever more central in fiction as the reality which the 
novel seeks to represent becomes increasingly alien and isolating. As Raymond 
Williams has pointed out, the isolation of the individual is especially striking in 
writing which dealt with the disorientating experience of the modern city. He cites 
Engels (writing in 1844): 
The very turmoil of the streets has something repulsive, something against 
which human nature rebels […] all ranks crowding past each other, are they 
not all human beings with the same qualities […] And still they crowd by one 
another, as though they had nothing in common, nothing to do with one 
another […] The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his 
private interest.91  	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Often in the nineteenth century the city is contrasted with the countryside, but again 
as Williams highlights, by the time Thomas Hardy is writing in the late nineteenth 
century, it is clear that the formation of the modern city has similarly impacted rural 
life and forced the decline of the knowable community:  
The village had formerly contained, side by side with the agricultural 
labourers, an interesting and better-informed class, ranking distinctly above 
the former – the class to which Tess’s father and mother had belonged – and 
including the carpenter, the smith, the shoemaker, the huckster, together with 
nondescript workers other than farm-labourers; a set of people who owed a 
certain stability of aim and conduct to the fact of their being life-holders like 
Tess’s father, or copy-holders, or, occasionally small free-holders. […] These 
families who had formed the backbone of village life in the past, who were 
the depositories of the village traditions, had to seek refuge in the larger 
centres; the process, humorously designated by statisticians as “the tendency 
of the rural population towards the large towns” being really the tendency of 
water to flow uphill when forced by machinery.92 
 
 
In chapter one I noted the ease with which Eliot’s narrator in Adam Bede tells 
her tale. If one contrasts this with the narrative voice in Middlemarch, it becomes 
clear that the task of narrating reality through an omniscient narrator has become 
more complex in this later novel. The action in Middlemarch takes place between 
1829-32, and is the study of a provincial town on the cusp of change. Unlike Adam 
Bede, Middlemarch is set in a recent past, in a more complicated nineteenth-century 
social structure undergoing reformulation: gone were the days when ‘summer 
afternoons were spacious, and the clock ticked slowly in winter evenings’.93 
Middlemarch represents the knowable community in decline, in which the conditions 
are no longer ripe for the knowledge of others. This is noticeably seen in the extent 	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to which characters misunderstand and misread each other, interpreting the actions or 
words of others in a way that corresponds to their own, limited, world-view. The lack 
of insight into the minds of others leads to two disastrous marriages during the 
course of the novel simply because those involved have no real knowledge of the 
character of the other: ‘she was as blind to his inward troubles as he to hers […] she 
had not yet listened patiently to his heart-beats, but only felt that her own was 
beating violently’ (Bk. 2, Ch. 20, p. 188). 
This inability to judge and assess accurately the characters of others is also 
reflected in the role of the omniscient narrator, which in a novel like Middlemarch is 
much more complex. Rodensky’s identification of the decline of the narrator’s ability 
to move seamlessly from external observation to the internal thoughts of the 
characters is important to note again here, for it demonstrates the difficulty of 
accessing the thoughts of others and so reveals an increasing awareness of the 
difficulty of attempting to make sense of a reality in terms of understanding the 
characters of others and their relationships.94 The textual strains which begin to 
emerge through the continued use of a narrator who claims to have unfettered access 
to the minds of characters so tragically cut off from one another, therefore 
demonstrates the struggle with which novelists were faced when trying to represent 
(and so make sense of) a reality no longer underpinned by a knowable community. 
Such textual strains are observed by J. Hillis Miller in his essay ‘Optic and Semiotic 
in Middlemarch’. In his reading, Miller uncovers the unreliability and contradictions 
in Eliot’s use of metaphor in the novel. For example, the narrator appears able to 
transcend all human limitations by employing ‘all the light that [she] can command’ 
in order to reveal universal truths by offering the reader a series of interlinking 	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metaphors to demonstrate how Middlemarch (and by extension all societies) 
operate.95 At the same time, the narrator also argues that individuals are only able to 
see the ‘whole picture’ subjectively, as distorted by their own egos. So, as the candle 
placed in front of the mirror makes the random scratches on it appear as concentric 
circles, so ‘Rosamond interprets what happens around her as being governed by her 
private providence’.96 Miller questions how it is that a narrator who claims such 
things as being universal in their application, can then be exempt and maintain an 
objective vision. For Miller, the narrator cannot be so exempt, and so all the light she 
claims to command becomes a subjective light, and so the reality represented is 
revealed as one which is necessarily distorted by the narrator’s own unique 
standpoint.  
Miller’s analysis draws attention to the struggle of the narrator to narrate 
reality in an objective manner through the consciousness of characters whose 
cognisance of that reality can only ever be subjective. As such, the novelist can be 
seen to be engaging with the same issues confronting the criminal jury trial, 
especially the recognition that the accurate assessment of the characters of others was 
far from a straightforward matter. This issue in particular is implicitly touched upon 
in Eliot’s work through her characters’ increasing isolation from one another. 
Through the evolution of her omniscient narrator, Eliot seeks to adapt her 
representational methods to come to terms with this fact. Yet her continued 
employment of the omniscient narrator in her novels despite the increasing problem 
of doing so, demonstrates a sustained commitment to this character-based model of 
representation and reveals the struggle to find the most effective means of employing 
it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 J. Hillis Miller, ‘Optic and Semiotic in Middlemarch’, in Middlemarch: New Casebooks, ed. by J. 
Peck (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp.65-83 (p. 69).  
96 Ibid., p. 77. 
	  	  
123 
As Levine has suggested, the continued attempts of authors like Eliot to 
represent ‘a reality that appears increasingly unnameable’ demonstrate an ‘intense 
commitment’ to ‘speaking the truth’ and reflect a ‘need to reorganise experience and 
re-invest it with value for a new audience reading from a new base of economic 
power’.97 What Levine draws attention to here is the underlying desire of the novelist 
to make sense of a world which is becoming ‘increasingly unnameable’ and derive 
from it some sense of order and meaning. As Peter Brooks’s study Realist Vision 
implies, the novel represents, as much as anything else, an attempt to prove that this 
is possible.98 This purpose of the novel can be identified in Dickens’s Bleak House 
(1852-3), where the text itself becomes an act of interpretation and piecing together 
of a (fictional) reality in order to invest the experience of reality with value and 
meaning. This project is one in which both the readers and the characters within the 
novel are engaged. A large proportion of the characters in the novel seek to discover 
who they are and their place in the world. The various attempts by the characters to 
unravel the mysteries of their own lives reflects a desire to find meaning and value in 
the personal experience of an overwhelming reality. This meaning, in the end, is 
located in the characters coming to understand who they are and who others are in 
relation to them. Like the fog that appears to seep out of the Court of Chancery, there 
is a pervasive fear in Bleak House that, just as in the case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, 
the challenge of interpreting, understanding and representing reality is so complex 
that value and meaning will forever elude not only the characters, but the reader as 
well. The success of a character like Esther in mastering her own reality in the end, 
provides the reader with the hope that the same is possible for them.  
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I have argued that the character-focused novel of the nineteenth century 
adopted an ‘accused speaks’ model of representation. The decline of the knowable 
community, however, complicated the character-focused novel’s attempts at 
representing reality, not least in its use of an omniscient narrator. The character-
focused novel’s representational mode was then frustrated further as people’s 
understanding of the stability of character began to change.  In many nineteenth-
century character-focused novels the characters appear knowable because they do not 
really change. In The Last Chronicle of Barset, the reader knows how Mrs Proudie 
will react in every circumstance because the nature of her character is immutable. 
Characters may err, they may make poor choices, but we know that despite Johnny 
Eames’s mistakes he will always love Lily Dale. Similarly, in Pride and Prejudice, it 
is not so much a case of Darcy’s character changing but rather of Elizabeth coming 
to know his true character, just as in Persuasion (1818) it is a case of Captain 
Wentworth and Anne Eliot discovering that the other has not fundamentally changed 
in character or affection. Likewise, Adam may learn to extend his sympathy by the 
end of Adam Bede, but the essential nature of his character, that he is good, does not 
alter. As Levine concludes, there is something about these characters which gives 
them an ‘artificial clarity that is dramatically unconvincing. Even as Eliot tries to 
complicate our sense of their moral rigidities, their characters seem too close to being 
fixed in marble’.99 By contrast, Levine notes how the more authentic portrayal of 
character comes in Eliot’s later works such as Daniel Deronda (1878) because 
characters like Daniel are ‘not quite’ dramatically successful.100  
What Levine touches on here is explored in greater detail in the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin. In ‘Epic and Novel’, Bakhtin argues that the nineteenth century 	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novel ‘reflects more deeply, more essentially, more sensitively and rapidly, reality 
itself in the process of unfolding’ because it is a ‘developing genre’.101 A key reason 
for the success of the nineteenth-century novel’s representations of reality is because 
the ‘transferral of the image of an individual from the distanced plane to the zone of 
contact with the inconclusive events of the present (and consequently the future) 
result in the radical re-structuring of the image of the individual in the novel’.102 This 
‘radical re-structuring of the image of the individual in the novel’ undergoes further 
examination in Bakhtin’s work on the Bildungsroman. Bakhtin examines how the 
formulation of the hero and heroine in the Bildungsroman is crucial to the 
development of the novel’s realistic effect. Bakhtin explores how during the 
nineteenth century there developed a type of Bildungsroman which he terms the 
‘realistic novel of emergence’ in which the hero or heroine emerges alongside the 
changing world. For Bakhtin, the heroes and heroines of the nineteenth-century 
novel become more real, more convincing as people, because their characters change 
and develop in response to a changing world around them.103  
The recognition that characters change and develop had implications for the 
character-focused novel’s use of an ‘accused speaks’ model of representation which 
rested on the assumption that it was possible to have knowledge of the characters of 
others; an assumption which itself rested on the implied assumption that the 
characters of others could be known because they did not change. Once the 
nineteenth-century novel began to explore the development of character, the matter 
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of representation became increasingly complicated, for once it was accepted that 
people’s characters are not fixed, the assumption that it is possible to have 
knowledge of the characters of others was thrown further into question. As Rodensky 
suggests, we see in the later novels of George Eliot the retreat of the narrator into the 
subjective private mind of the individual, a retreat which further stretches and 
challenges the ‘accused speaks’ model of representation because it suggests that the 
minds of these characters can no longer be fully known by those acquainted with 
them. 
In a novel like Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1837-9), written in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the matter of representing reality is relatively straight-forward. 
That Oliver is a good, honest, middle-class boy is plain for all to see. Indeed, Mr 
Brownlow goes so far as to declare that he would be willing to ‘answer for that boy’s 
truth with [his] life’ (Ch. 14, p. 108), the reader may well feel the same. Oliver’s 
story is that of one boy’s struggle to find his true place in the world. This is the same 
challenge that Pip faces in Great Expectations (1860-1), yet Pip’s struggles are made 
more complex by the use of a first person narrative which demonstrates the 
subjective nature of Pip’s experience of reality. What we see in Pip’s development in 
Great Expectations – in particular in his projection of his fantasies regarding Estella 
onto reality, which lead him to conclude Miss Havisham is his benefactress – is the 
extent to which Pip’s mind distorts reality through his own subjective vision. We see 
a similar pattern in the work of other novelists too, even in the work of Anthony 
Trollope, who relied so heavily on the presentation of character for his success. J. 
Hillis Miller has pointed out that throughout Trollope’s novels his characters ‘are as 
transparent to one another as they are to the inward vision of the narrator’, and Miller 
suggests that this transparency is a product of Trollope’s ‘faith in the permanence of 
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each man’s character’ within small, stable and ultimately knowable communities.104 
However, Miller identifies one of Trollope’s last novels, The Way We Live Now 
(1875), as a text which ‘denies all laws of [his] earlier works’.105 Unlike his previous 
novels, The Way We Live Now shows the disappearance of the knowable community 
and its replacement with a new way of life, epitomised by city living and capitalism, 
in which ‘cash payment’ has become ‘the universal sole nexus of man to man’.106  As 
Miller neatly summarises:  
The Way We Live Now also lacks the transparency normal in Trollope’s 
novels. It is full of mysteries and opacities. The characters are again and 
again said not to be able to understand one another. Melmotte is the centre of 
fascinated attention just because nobody knows whether he is a scoundrel or a 
great financier, as in The Last Chronicle the blank place of the Reverend 
Crawley’s loss of memory is the centre of concern for the community. In The 
Last Chronicle the blank place is opened at last to everyone’s gaze and what 
is found ensures Trollope’s world. In The Way We Live Now the opposite is 
the case. Melmotte is a great thief as most people come to suspect, but in his 
suicide he takes his secrets to the grave and remains a mystery to the end.107 
 
As the ‘accused speaks’ model is increasingly thrown into question during the 
nineteenth century we see characters within novels ever more cut off from one 
another, and novelists increasingly exploring the idea of reality as a subjective 
experience. By the end of the century this exploration has, in some cases, led to 
representations of reality being made in radically subjective ways: the impressionism 
of Joseph Conrad in works such as Heart of Darkness (1898-9) and Lord Jim (1899-
1900), for example.108 In the 1860s, the sensation novel responds to this challenge by 
turning towards those methods employed in the criminal courtroom post-1836 in 
order to achieve more accurate representations of reality. 	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Engaging in the Debate: Sensation Fiction and the Representation of Reality 	  
Schramm’s examination of the impact of the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act on literary 
representations of reality centres on the character-focused novel. However, her 
identification of the ‘competition’ which emerged between law and literature during 
the nineteenth century over the matter of representation raised the question of what 
other types of novels might be implicated in this competition over how to achieve the 
most accurate representation of the real. Not long after reading Schramm’s study, I 
was struck by the distinction Anthony Trollope makes in his autobiography between 
character-focused (in Trollope’s terms, ‘realistic’) novels and ‘sensational’ novels, 
which is worth citing again in full here: 
Among English novels of the present day, and among English novelists, a 
great division is made. There are sensational novels and anti-sensational; 
sensational readers and anti-sensational. The novelists who are considered to 
be anti-sensational are generally called realistic. […] The readers who prefer 
the one are supposed to take delight in the elucidation of character. They who 
hold the other are charmed by the gradual construction of the plot.109  
 
The distinction which Trollope makes prompted me to think about the construction 
of the sensation novel, and whether or not its narrative strategies – which, as 
Trollope tells us, focus on plot construction – could be related to the narrative 
strategies employed in courts in post-1836 felony trials.110  
John Sutherland has noted how sensation novels were so named for two 
reasons. Firstly, because of the physical stimulation they produced on the body, 
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creating ‘sensations’ through their narrative strategies of shock and suspense; and 
secondly, because their subject matter was frequently drawn from the sensational 
newspaper headlines of the day, which by the 1860s (when sensation fiction was at 
its most popular) often related to white collar crime.111 During the late 1850s a 
number of high profile cases gripped the nation and embedded into public 
consciousness a new fear, a fear of middle-class criminals. Legal scholar Martin 
Wiener has suggested that during the first half of the nineteenth century crime was 
generally seen as a ‘class problem’, one which, whilst threatening to middle-class 
domestic harmony, was also identifiable as lying outside that social strata.112 A 
survey of The Times Archive from 1820-1830 bears out Wiener’s claim. The Times 
during this period contains numerous reports of recent crimes perpetrated, along with 
reports of criminal trials themselves, and the vast majority of the crimes reported are 
what can be considered as ‘lower-class’ crimes. Murders reported during this period, 
for example, mostly occur among the working classes and are associated with 
poverty, often motivated by desperate personal circumstances. In these cases the 
murder has often followed a burglary, a drunken brawl or domestic violence (again, 
frequently fuelled by alcohol). More often than not, the murderers are identified as 	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‘labourers’. However, Wiener argues that by the second half of the nineteenth 
century the public consciousness was gripped by a concern over a perceived increase 
in crimes committed by apparently respectable members of society.113 Lyn Pykett 
has also drawn attention to this point: 
Whereas in the first half of the century criminality was regarded as 
antithetical to respectability, some of the new crimes which seized public 
attention in the 1860s – such as fraud, embezzlement, poisoning, blackmail – 
actually depended upon the appearance of respectability.114 
 
Judith Flanders’s recent study The Invention of Murder also reveals this trend. 
Interested in how the Victorian imagination was fascinated with murder throughout 
the century, Flanders discusses some of the ‘crimes of the century’. Interestingly the 
causes célèbre which she discusses in the earlier part of the century, such as those of 
John Williams, William Corder, and James Greenacre, tend to have occurred lower 
down the social scale. However, those Flanders discusses from mid-century onwards 
begin to have distinctly middle-class settings and actors.115 
In the late 1850s there occurred a number of high profile cases which sparked 
public anxiety over middle-class crime and created the perception that it was an 
increasingly widespread problem. The first of these was the trial of the doctor 
William Palmer in 1856 for the murder of John Parsons Cook by poisoning.116 This 
trial attracted an unprecedented amount of press attention.117 The extensive press 
coverage of such cases became common in daily papers and, as Richard Altick has 	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highlighted, the Daily Telegraph became a leader in this regard: ‘by the early 
seventies the Daily Telegraph was boasting that its circulation, then two hundred 
thousand, was the largest in the world; and mainly because of the exhaustiveness of 
its crime coverage’.118 The sensation caused by the Palmer trial was followed in 1857 
by the case of Madeleine Smith, the respectable daughter of a wealthy business man 
who was suspected of poisoning her lover. In 1859 another sensational poisoning 
case hit the headlines. This time another doctor was suspected of poisoning his 
second wife, whom he had married bigamously. And in July1860, the unsolved 
crime of that decade was first reported: the body of a little boy was discovered in an 
outside privy with its throat cut at his respectable middle-class family home in the 
quiet Wiltshire village of Road.  
This last case provides another illuminating example of the sensational nature 
of crime reporting during this period and the interest which it generated. On 
Wednesday July 11th The Times reported the murder ‘just committed’ at Road Hill 
House.119 The following day the same paper offered readers an update and reported 
on the meetings which had taken place between the magistrates and the police and 
gave news of the interviews with witnesses.120 Five days later a further update is 
provided by The Times, stating that the Home Secretary had ‘despatched Inspector 
Whicher of the metropolitan detective police, to Road, for the purposes of 
endeavouring to dissipate the mystery’.121 On July 21st, the apprehension of 
Constance Kent is reported, followed by a lengthy report of the magistrate 
proceedings which discharged her on the 28th.122 Regular updates of this case 
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appeared in this manner in The Times and other newspapers throughout the 
investigation, and in 1865 when Constance Kent was examined by magistrates after 
her confession, over thirty reporters were present from both London and the 
provinces.123  
Richard Altick has argued that cases such as these, and the hysteria which 
surrounded them, set the mood of sensationalism of the 1860s. In Evil Encounters: 
Two Victorian Sensations, Altick examines how two simultaneously reported, high-
profile cases of July 1861 set the tone for the 1860s as ‘the age of sensation’. The 
two cases in question were that of the French Aristocrat Baron de Vidil who 
attempted to bludgeon his son to death on a secluded country lane, and that of Major 
Murray, a retired military man who was left with bullet wounds to his neck and head 
following a violent altercation with William Roberts in the respectable 
Northumberland Street, London. These two cases were shrouded in mystery, but as 
the facts began to emerge in the press they caused a sensational media storm as dark 
secrets such as blackmail, sexual obsession and murderous greed for a son’s 
inheritance began to emerge. The press speculation in both cases as to facts and 
motives, together with its dissection of evidence reported and the printing of every 
rumour whispered, was the epitome of the sensational reportage which typified the 
next decade and, as Richard Altick argues, ‘usher[ed] in what soon came to be called 
the Age of Sensation’.124 
Such sensational cases were reported exhaustively in popular middle-class 
newspapers such as The Times, Daily Telegraph and The Illustrated London News, 
all of which attracted a vast readership. Crime was clearly a popular subject that sold 
copy, and it is not surprising therefore that authors would soon exploit the national 	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mood of sensation for themselves with the creation of the sensational novel, which 
gained widespread popularity by drawing on ‘real life crimes’ and exploiting the 
newly pervasive middle-class anxiety (fuelled by these sensational reports of middle-
class crime) that anyone, including your neighbours or even family members, might 
be harbouring a dark and dangerous secret. Indeed, many of the new sensation 
novelists drew facts directly from such cases.125 
As Lyn Pykett has observed, ‘the sensation novel of the 1860s was one 
expression of and response to’ the development of middle-class crime seizing the 
public consciousness during that period.126 For Pykett, crucial to our understanding 
of the sensation genre is a grasp of the social context out of which it grew. Pykett has 
noted that sensation fiction was in many ways responding to a variety of social 
factors: developments in literary production, distribution and mediation, the abolition 
of stamp duty, the increase in rail travel, for instance. In a contemporary review in 
1863, H. L. Mansel makes the same point: 
The railway stall, like the circulating library, consists partly of books written 
expressly for its use […] The exigencies of railway travelling do not allow 
much time for examining the merits of a book before purchasing it; and 
keepers of bookstalls, as well as of refreshment-rooms, find an advantage in 
offering their customers something hot and strong, something that may catch 
the eye of the hurried passenger, and promise temporary excitement to relieve 
the dullness of a journey. These circumstances of production necessarily have 
their effect on the quality of the articles produced. Written to meet an 
ephemeral demand, aspiring only to an ephemeral existence, it is natural that 
they should have recourse the rapid and ephemeral methods of awakening the 
interest of their readers, striving to act as the dram or the dose, rather than as 
the solid food, because the effect is more immediately perceptible.127 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The missing nightgown in Wilkie Collins’s The Moonstone, for example, was inspired by the 
missing nightgown in the murder case at Road Hill House, and the character of Sergeant Cuff, was 
inspired by the lead detective in the case, Jonathan Whicher. In the Road Hill Murder case Jonathan 
Whicher’s suspicions that the sister, Constance Kent, had committed the murder were unable to be 
proved because a crucial piece of evidence, a blood stained nightgown, was burnt. See further: Sue 
Lonoff, Wilkie Collins and his Victorian Readers: A Study in the Rhetoric of Authorship (New York: 
AMS Press, 1982), pp. 179-180. For a full account of the Road murder see Kate Summerscale, The 
Suspicions of Mr Whicher or The Murder at Road Hill House (London: Bloomsbury, 2008). 
126 Pykett, Wilkie Collins, p. 45.  
127 H. L. Mansel, ‘Sensation Novels’, Quarterly Review, 113 (April 1863), 482-514 (p. 485). 
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Yet one of the most crucial social contexts for Pykett’s readings of sensation fiction 
is the increasing perception, during the second half of the nineteenth century among 
the middle-classes, that crime from within had become a real, prevalent and 
proximate threat. For Pykett, this anxiety played a key role in shaping the genre of 
sensation fiction. Pykett reads the sensation novel as both the embodiment of, and an 
exploration of, the hopes and fears of the Victorian middle-classes which were 
‘generated by interconnected anxieties arising from contemporary social changes and 
the attendant challenging of the social and moral status quo’.128 As Pykett suggests, it 
is possible to link these anxieties to the changes which were occurring in nineteenth-
century social structures, including the decline of the knowable community.  
As Pykett has suggested, the transformation of ‘knowable communities’ 
meant that during the nineteenth century individuals increasingly felt a sense of 
alienation from those around them.129 Pykett relates the decline of the knowable 
community to a mid-century crisis in narrative authority, arguing that the increased 
social complexity of the nineteenth century offered a challenge to the totalising view 
of eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century novels.130 Pykett’s argument 
echoes that of Raymond Williams, who claims that by the mid-nineteenth century the 
social structure, and so the social experience, had shifted in such a way as to 
profoundly alter the nature of the novel: 
This is a period in which what it means to live in a community is more 
uncertain, more critical, more disturbing as a question put both to societies 
and to persons than ever before in history. The underlying experiences of this 
powerful and transforming urban and industrial civilisation are of rapid and 
inescapable social change; of a newly visible and conscious history but at the 
same time, in most actual communities and in most actual lives, of a newly 
complicated and often newly obscure immediate process. These are not 
opposite poles: they are the defining characteristics of the change itself. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Lyn Pykett, The Sensation Novel: From The Woman in White to The Moonstone (Plymouth: 
Northcote House, 1994), pp. 9-10. 
129 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
130 Ibid., p. 38. 
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People become more aware of the great social and historical changes which 
altered not only outward forms – institutions and landscapes – but also 
inward feelings, experiences, self-definitions.131 
 
Williams argues here, and more fully in The Country and the City, how the 
inescapable experience of social change brought with it not only a shift in people’s 
perception of their own existence, but also a challenge to the idea that communities 
were, in some sense, ‘knowable’, and for Williams, ‘these facts of change can be 
seen lying deep in almost every imagination’.132 Pykett, following Williams, sees 
these changes as giving rise to a crisis in narrative authority, and in particular 
bringing a challenge to the totalising vision of the omniscient narrator. For Pykett, 
the dispersal of narrative authority which occurs in sensation fiction is symptomatic 
of this crisis in narrative authority and as such can be related to the decline of 
Williams’s knowable community. To an extent, Pykett reads sensation fiction as the 
antithesis of any totalising realism and as representative of a search for a more 
convincing verisimilitude and actuality in fictional writing; a search for an 
alternative means of accurately representing reality.133 
The narrative crisis experienced by sensation novelists echoes the crisis over 
the matter of representation in legal thought which fully emerged in the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act debates. Sensation novelists were no less interested than their 
contemporaries in finding an effective means of representing reality. For example, 
Wilkie Collins, one of the most celebrated sensation novelists of the nineteenth 
century, appears to have been consistently concerned that his stories appeared as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Raymond Williams, The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence (London: Hogarth, 1984), Ch. 1, 
quotation at p. 12.  
132 Ibid., p. 12. See also Williams, Country. 
133 Pykett, The Sensation Novel, pp. 37-38. For an account of how sensation fiction was a response the 
middle-classes’ confrontation with technology and modernity see Nicholas Daly, Literature, 
Technology, Modernity 1860-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Louise Lee, 
‘How does she do it? Sensation Fiction’s Technologically Minded Villainesses’, in Sensation Fiction, 
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believable accounts of real life to his reading public. This is clear from the use 
Collins made of his prefaces to defend or illuminate certain plot points that had 
attracted criticism. In his preface to the 1861 edition of The Woman in White, for 
example, Collins took the opportunity to dispel the ‘doubts’ which had arisen in 
‘certain capacious quarters, about the correct presentation of the legal “points” 
incidental to the story’, by reassuring his readers that: 
I spared no pains – in this instance, as in all others – to preserve myself from 
unintentionally misleading my readers. A solicitor of great experience in his 
profession most kindly and carefully guided my steps, whenever the course of 
the narrative led me into the labyrinth of the law.134 
 
 
Sensation novelists were also keen to defend their works against claims that the 
sensational nature of their subject matter made them unrealistic. In response to such 
criticism, George Augustus Sala argued that sensation novels were ‘realistic novels 
of human passion, weakness and error’ and he listed numerous high-profile, real-life 
sensational cases to make his point: 
If we read the newspaper; if we read the police reports; if we can laugh at 
such a case as that of the “Honourable Mrs. Geraldine Maurice”, or weep 
over such a one as that of “Augustus Mitchell”; if we have ever troubled 
ourselves about a Yelverton marriage, a Titchbourne conspiracy, a 
Thellusson will, a Road Murder, a Cornhill burglary, a gold-dust robbery, a 
Roupell forgery, a Simba court-marshall, we shall take no great harm by 
reading realistic novels of human passion, weakness and error.135 
 
Mary Elizabeth Braddon, another popular sensation novelist of the time made the 
same point in an interview with the Daily Telegraph: ‘I undoubtedly believe that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134Wilkie Collins, ‘Preface’, in The Woman in White, ed. by John Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008 [1860]), p. 3. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the 
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135 George Augustus Sala, ‘The Cant of Modern Criticism’, cited in Jennifer Carnell, The Literary 
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[newspapers] give the best picture of the events of the day. They really are, as they 
profess to be, mirrors reflecting the life and views of the period’.136 
As noted in the introduction, Peter Brooks has argued that the novel offers 
readers (or seeks to offer readers) a sense of mastery over reality, and so provides 
them with the feeling that the complex and confusing reality outside them is readily 
understandable and knowable in communicable ways.137 With this in mind, the crisis 
in narrative authority at mid-century which Williams and Pykett identify, and the 
consequent search for an alternative means of representation, becomes especially 
significant for the sensation novel given its subject matter. During the first part of the 
nineteenth century the threat posed by crime to the security of the middle classes, 
whilst present, was nonetheless clearly defined as a threat from the outside and so 
both identifiable and containable. However, the newly formed perception that 
middle-class crime was a real and prevalent threat, posed a different sort of challenge 
altogether, as it presented a threat from within. The newly emerging anxiety over 
middle-class crime is one which is played out in the sensation fiction of this period. 
This anxiety becomes especially significant in the sensation novel’s attempts at 
representing reality because it initiates an exploration by such novels of the key 
issues which were so crucial to the Prisoners’ Counsel Act debates. The fears and 
questions to which the perceived increase in middle-class crime gave rise, were 
underpinned by the question of how this ‘new’ sort of criminal was to be identified. 
In 1864 the Archbishop of York preached a sermon against sensation novels, 
claiming they sought to ‘persuade people that in almost every one of the well-
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137 See chapter one of this thesis, and Brooks, Realist Vision, Ch. 1.  
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ordered houses of their neighbours there is a skeleton shut up in some cupboard’.138 
The Archbishop’s sermon demonstrates a concern that sensation novels were tapping 
into a genuine public fear that amongst one’s neighbours with ‘well-ordered’ houses 
there was the real possibility that one of them could be concealing a dark secret. 
Again and again the sensation novel vividly dramatises this fear, with Baronets, 
Ladies, Counts, charitable gentlemen, Governesses, often turning out to be 
murderers, poisoners, fraudsters, blackmailers, thieves.  
One threat which the hypothetical middle-class criminal posed to the 
Victorian middle classes was the undermining of the social values which formed the 
basis of their understanding of the world. By taking middle-class crime as its subject 
matter, the sensation novel, in its search for an alternative means of representing 
reality that would provide its reader with a sense of order and meaning, directly 
engages with and explores the difficulties inherent in that project. Consequently, 
through its representation of sensational crimes, the sensation novel presents an 
engaged response to the difficulty of representation, and so emerges at the centre of 
popular debate regarding the efficacy of legal and literary models employed in the 
representation of truth and reality. 
In The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family Magazine, Deborah Wynne 
undertakes a study of a number of Victorian family magazines and examines how the 
novel and the periodical worked together to engage in the major social and cultural 
debates of the day. Wynne highlights how during the 1860s there emerged an 
‘unprecedented new range’ of magazines and how many of these established 
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further: Anthea Trodd, Domestic Crime in the Victorian Novel (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), and 
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themselves through the serialisation of popular sensation novels, ‘a genre based on 
the disruptive forces of crime and secrets upon genteel domestic life’.139 Through her 
study, Wynne reveals how these novels offered more than mere ‘titillation’ and 
‘constituted an important response to the issues of the day’.140 Wynne advocates the 
adoption of an inter-textual approach to the study of sensation novels, reading them 
in conjunction with the other texts which surrounded them in the magazines. This 
was the approach, Wynne argues, that editors of such magazines encouraged 
contemporary readers to adopt, inviting the public to ‘make thematic connections 
between the serial novel and other features through the power of juxtaposition’.141 
Wynne’s approach is both illuminating and fruitful, and will inform some of my 
readings of sensation novels in the next chapter; the questions concerning 
circumstantial evidence raised by Braddon’s Aurora Floyd for example, take on an 
extra significance when considered together with the articles on the value of such 
evidence which appeared alongside that novel’s serialisation in Temple Bar. What 
Wynne’s approach provides for is an understanding of sensation fiction as an 
important response to, and engagement with, serious cultural and social issues and 
anxieties of the period.  
Once public fear was alerted to the possibility that the middle-class family 
might be under threat from those within, the question of how the criminal might be 
detected took on an added significance. The processes in place for determining guilt, 
in particular the interpretation of evidence in the investigation of truth, thus came to 
be a much addressed topic in popular literature and journalism. As such, the efficacy 
of the legal and literary models which were employed for creating what purported to 	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be truthful accounts of reality became a matter of popular as well as professional 
debate. These debates in particular centred around the effect of and utilisation of 
evidence, and especially on the difficulties of interpretation. As noted earlier, the 
topic of the correct interpretation of evidence and the attendant anxiety over whether 
and how this is possible, recurs in periodical articles printed throughout the 1820s, 
1830s and 1840s. From the mid 1850s, however, this topic is addressed with an 
unprecedented vigour as high profile, sensational cases begin to take hold of the 
public’s imagination. If one reads the sensation fiction which emerged during this 
period alongside such articles, it is possible to see not only the sensation novel’s 
engagement with this topic, but also how the sensation novel’s own representational 
methods are affected.  
That sensation novelists, just like their character-focused counterparts, were 
interested in creating accurate accounts of real life is clear. However, as Pykett 
suggests, the sensation novelist sought an alternative means of achieving such 
accurate representations. As to what this alternative means of representing reality 
might be, we are given some clue by Trollope’s brief discussion of the opposition 
between realist and sensation fiction. Sensation fiction’s method, Trollope tells us, is 
based on ‘the construction and gradual development of the plot’ (Autobiography, p. 
227). The careful construction of the plot in sensation novels is something that still 
strikes critics today: Winifred Hughes, for example, notes how in sensation fiction 
‘plot and incident predominate’.142 
This apparent foregrounding of plot takes on an added significance when read 
in the context of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act debates and the questions which they 
raised over the matter of representing reality, in particular the issues pertaining to the 	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interpretation of evidence. The sense which the sensation novel evokes –  that the 
plot has been carefully thought out, planned and constructed –  demonstrates that the 
sensation novelist was concerned with creating an internal connectedness, coherence 
and chronology in  their narratives in a manner which bears a marked similarity to 
those representations being made by advocates in criminal trials. Viewed in this way, 
the foregrounding of plot and structure becomes the careful arrangement of all the 
story’s elements to into one coherent and connected narrative that convinces the 
reader of its truth and actuality. Indeed, in his autobiography, Trollope describes the 
method of Wilkie Collins in terms which could equally be applied to the work of an 
advocate constructing his ‘case’ before he presents it as a representation of the truth 
to a jury:  
Wilkie Collins seems to construct his [novels] that he not only, before 
writing, plans everything on, down to the minutest detail, from the beginning 
to the end; but then plots it all back again, to see that there is no piece of 
necessary dove-tailing which does not dove-tail with absolute accuracy. The 
construction is most minute and wonderful. (p. 257)143 
 
The link between the methods of the adversarial-evidentiary trial model and the 
methods of the sensation novel generally can, therefore, be seen in the sensation 
genre’s focus on plotting. Furthermore, close examination of some of the most 
popular nineteenth-century sensation novels reveal a deeper connection, as leaders in 	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the genre consciously embraced the adversarial-evidentiary model of representation, 
and held it up as a more effective means of representation. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Engaging in the Debate: Evidence, Advocacy, and the Sensation 
Novel’s Response 
  
‘Lady Audley, did you ever study the theory of circumstantial evidence?’ 
‘How can you ask a poor little woman about such horrid things?’ exclaimed 
my lady. ‘Circumstantial evidence,’ continued the young man, as if he 
scarcely heard Lady Audley’s interruption, ‘that wonderful fabric which is 
built on straws collected at every point of the compass, and which is yet 
strong enough to hang a man. Upon what infinitesimal trifles may sometimes 
hang the whole secret of some wicked mystery, inexplicable heretofore to the 
wisest upon the earth! A scrap of paper; a shred of some torn garment; the 
button off a coat; a word dropped incautiously from the over-cautious lips of 
guilt; the fragment of a letter; the shutting of a door; a shadow on a window-
blind; the accuracy of a moment; a thousand circumstances so slight as to be 
forgotten by the criminal, but links of steel in the wonderful chain forged by 
the science of the detective officer; and lo! The gallows is built up; the 
solemn bell tolls through the dismal grey of the early morning; the drop 
creaks under the guilty feet; and the penalty of crime is paid.’1 
 
In an attempt to unsettle the controlled demeanour of the suspected bigamist and 
murderess in Lady Audley’s Secret, Robert Audley confronts his suspect with the 
‘theory of circumstantial evidence’, stressing how even the slightest of circumstances 
can be enough to betray the guilty. Robert Audley might credit the forging of the 
‘wonderful chain’ of circumstantial evidence to ‘the science of the detective officer’, 
but the chain imagery he employs also recalls, and is more appropriate to, the work 
of the advocate. The Prisoners’ Counsel debates and the related discussions on 
evidence addressed the question of how much reliance could be placed on 
circumstantial evidence, a question that would be addressed repeatedly throughout 
the nineteenth century. In legal thought the idea that circumstances could be pieced 
together so that they created a ‘chain’ of evidence strong enough to reveal guilt was 
generally accepted. Yet, whilst the work of a detective was often necessary to 	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uncover the circumstantial evidence needed to prove guilt, the skill of the 
professional advocate was widely credited with turning those ‘trifles’ into Robert 
Audley’s ‘links of steel’. As the Criminal Law Commissioners noted in their Second 
Report, when an advocate gives ‘order and connexion [sic] to a mass of facts’ it 
tends to ‘impart greater force to the evidence than it would otherwise possess’.2 
Whilst it is true, therefore, that Robert Audley’s success depends in part upon his 
detective work, one must not ignore the significance of the manner in which Robert 
presents the evidence he uncovers during the course of the novel. As Robert Audley 
weaves this evidence skillfully together into one coherent narrative of guilt,  he does 
not merely expound the ‘theory of circumstantial evidence’, he also describes his 
own narrative method: that of the professional advocate.  
In the character-focused novels discussed in chapter one, the emphasis on 
character is maintained by placing the protagonist’s individual story at the centre of 
the narrative. By allowing the protagonist to tell their story in their own words – 
either through first person narration or an omniscient narrator who (ostensibly) has 
access to their inner thoughts and feelings – the protagonist’s character remains at 
the centre of the judgement process, and so aligns such novels with the ‘accused 
speaks’ trial model. After 1836, the focus of the felony trial shifted towards the 
careful sifting, analysing and piecing together of all the evidence by skilled 
advocates for both sides. The continued reliance of some novelists on the 
presentation of character as the primary means of representing reality seemingly 
created a division between law and literature over the matter of representation, as 
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Jan-Melissa Schramm has pointed out.3 It is my contention, however, that the 
introduction of an adversarial-evidentiary trial model offered novelists an alternative 
means of representing reality. Through a series of case studies, this chapter examines 
how through a direct engagement with the matter of representation in criminal trials, 
in particular issues pertaining to evidence, sensation novelists began to develop their 
own evidence based methods for representing reality, creating an alliance with 
adversarial-evidentiary courtroom representational practices, and thereby upholding 
that model as an effective representational mode. 
 
Will the Truth Out? Sensational Criminals and the Unreliability of Evidence 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, public attention was alerted to an 
apparent alarming growth in the number of middle-class domestic crimes. The 
perception of the increase in this sort of crime was in part generated by the increased 
reporting of such crimes, but the perception existed nonetheless, and one particular 
case in 1856 became an archetypal example of the ‘sensational case’ that held such 
fascination for the Victorian reading public. This was a case which epitomised 
middle-class fears about social infiltration, the unidentifiable criminal, and accurate 
detection. In 1856 William Palmer, an apparently respectable middle-class doctor, 
was tried for the murder by poisoning of John Parsons Cook. 
The prosecution in this case claimed that William Palmer had first weakened 
his friend John Parsons Cook with antimony and then poisoned him with strychnine. 
William Palmer was a surgeon who had neglected his profession and wasted his 
talent and finances, largely through gambling. Before the death of his friend Cook, 
Palmer was known to be in desperate financial straights as his creditors were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 192. 
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pressing for their debts to be paid, and many of the bills bore signatures forged by 
Palmer (typically his mother’s). Palmer was also suspected of having poisoned his 
wife and his brother, both of whom he had taken out a life insurance policy on for 
£13,000 not long before their deaths.4 At the time of Cook’s death, Palmer found 
himself unable to hold off his creditors any longer. Cook owned a racehorse called 
Polestar, which won at the Shrewsbury races, an event which Cook had attended 
with Palmer. Cook found himself possessed of £800 in winnings and a valuable 
brood mare. On the night of his win, Cook was celebrating his success with Palmer, 
at a local hotel, when he became violently ill after ingesting some strange-tasting 
drink. Cook was then taken to the Talbot Arms Hotel in Rugeley, Staffordshire, 
where Palmer attended him. A week later he died. It was proved that Palmer had 
prepared for Cook some morphine pills and some broth, and that he had procured 
some strychnine two days before Cook’s death.5 Not long after Cook’s death Palmer 
was paying his debts in cash. On purely circumstantial evidence, including some 
highly questionable medical evidence, Palmer was found guilty.6 
The Palmer trial was a huge sensation, to the extent that an Act of Parliament 
was passed in order to move his trial from Staffordshire to the Central Criminal 
Court, which underwent alterations in order that it might have enough room for those 
who wished to attend.7 The case proceedings were reported in all the major 
newspapers, and many more besides, as well as in journals and magazines, which, 
like the newspapers, also provided editorials and printed readers’ letters on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In December 1855, after a post-mortem inquiry on the bodies of Cook, and Palmer’s wife and 
brother (whose bodies had been exhumed), the coroner found that all had been poisoned by Palmer, 
but the charges regarding his wife and brother were dropped for reasons of insufficient evidence.  
5 Palmer admitted to buying the poison but claimed it was on a different date. 
6 The facts here have been taken from George Knott, The Trial of William Palmer, ed. by Eric R. 
Watson, 2nd edn (London: William Hodge & Co. Ltd, 1923). See also, John Sutherland’s detailed 
summary of the case: John Sutherland, Victorian Fiction: Writers, Publishers, Readers (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 35-39. 
7 See Eric R. Watson, ‘Preface’, in Knott, Trial of William Palmer, p. xii, and 19 & 20 Vict., c. 16:  
Trial of Offences Act 1856.	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subject. The Palmer case seemed to perfectly encapsulate all that the middle-classes 
feared most in respect of crime. Here was a member of their class, a seemingly 
respectable doctor, who had abused his position as a medical practitioner and trusted 
friend, in order to carry out a cold-blooded murder for financial gain. Moreover, as 
the lack of hard evidence in the trial proved, Palmer represented Count Fosco’s 
‘clever criminal’, the criminal who might have avoided suspicion or whose guilt 
might not be proven (The Woman in White, p. 236).  
The evidence against Palmer, as John Sutherland has pointed out, was not 
especially convincing.8 It was not even satisfactorily proven that Cook had definitely 
died of strychnine poisoning, as contradictory medical evidence was given for both 
sides and the leading expert of the prosecution, Alfred Swaine Taylor, had given 
inconsistent testimonies at different times.9 Yet Palmer was found guilty nonetheless 
and, as Sutherland has suggested, this verdict was needed to provide the public with 
a sense of reassurance: ‘everyone knew that [Palmer] was a killer, and quite probably 
a mass murderer. For him to have escaped justice because he was cleverer than the 
forces of law would have been intolerable’.10 
William Palmer represented the middle-class fear of infiltration from 
criminality which might go undetected. The overwhelming interest in the case, as 
demonstrated by the sheer volume and detail of the reports of the trial, reflects the 
anxiety of which the Palmer case was a realisation.11 Yet, even after he was found 
guilty and sentenced to death, the anxiety which Palmer caused was not removed, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In particular Palmer arguably had little motive for the murder, apart from some immediate cash, 
Cook’s death gave him little other than increased debt through joint liability. See Sutherland, 
Victorian Fiction, p. 39. 
9 Palmer was accused of weakening Cook by giving him antimony and then killing him with 
strychnine. However, no trace of strychnine was found in Cook’s body and only small traces of 
antimony were found, not even enough to harm a child. See Sutherland, Victorian Fiction, p. 39. 
10 Sutherland, Victorian Fiction, p. 39. 
11 In the second edition of George’s Knott’s published transcript of the trial, Eric Watson’s preface 
notes how ‘no trial ever created greater public interest’: Trial of William Palmer, p. x. 
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only raised further questions and apparently perpetuated the anxiety. One of the key 
reasons for this was Palmer’s insistence that he did not poison Cook by strychnine. 
After the trial the newspapers discussed the case at length, in particular the attempts 
made to solicit a confession.12 The Examiner lamented such attempts, ‘for the 
assumption should always be that the crime has been proved beyond a doubt by the 
process of law […] To solicit [a confession] is to imply that the verdict of guilty 
wants verification’.13 Yet, as a number of reports demonstrate, there was a feeling 
amongst some that such verification was needed, reflecting a desire to know 
absolutely that the truth had been discovered.  
A number of articles on Palmer attempted to offer their readers this comfort. 
The Examiner’s stance, as noted above, was to deny that such verification was 
needed and that the verdict of a jury was enough to convince the public of its truth. 
The Leader printed an article on the phrenological examination conducted after 
Palmer’s death, which found that ‘the worst part of his conformation was his head. 
The animal organs were excessively large. […] It was physically impossible for him 
to have been a good man’.14 Charles Dickens’s journal Household Words also chose 
to address the issue in a piece entitled ‘A Criminal Trial’, in which it was vehemently 
argued that the truth had been discovered and Palmer rightly convicted:  
never before was a criminal case so argued, or summed up with such masterly 
elaboration. But the just and perfect statement of it tended – as, being the 
whole truth, it could only tend – to the complete assurance that the prisoner 
was guilty.15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Journal of Mental Science reported how ‘from the time of his sentence to the very moment 
when he ascended the scaffold […] Palmer was persuaded, entreated, implored day by day, almost 
hour by hour, to confess his crimes, not to God, but to man’: ‘The Trial and Execution of William 
Palmer’, Journal of Mental Science 2 (1856), 513. Cited in Burney, ‘A Poisoning of No Substance’, 
59. 
13 ‘Palmer’s End’, The Examiner, 21 June 1856, p. 386.  
14 ‘The Execution of William Palmer’, The Leader, 21 June 1856, p. 583. 
15 [Henry Morley], ‘A Criminal Trial’, Household Words 13 (June 1856), 529. 
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One of the reasons that the Palmer case produced so much hysteria was that it was a 
case of poisoning. Poisoning, as a crime, reflected most acutely the middle-class 
fears about criminality because it required not only intimacy of connection but was 
also a crime which could potentially go undetected and so the criminal unsuspected. 
An article in The Leader entitled ‘The Poisoner in the House’, explored this fear, 
beginning with the following passage: 
If you feel a deadly sensation within, and grow gradually weaker, how do you 
know that you are not poisoned? If your hands tingle, do you not fancy that it 
is arsenic? How can you be sure that it is not? Your household, perhaps, is a 
“well-regulated family;” your friends and relations all smile kindly upon you; 
the meal at each period of the day is punctual and looks correct; but how can 
you possibly tell there is not arsenic in the curry?16 
 
According to the article, ‘it literally, without exaggeration, is impossible to tell’.17 
The article goes on to both confirm and exacerbate fears that such crime is 
ubiquitous, by noting how people may die with no one ever suspecting that they have 
been poisoned, and how even if  (as ‘shown in courts’) ‘poison may be detected’, the 
murderer ‘shall escape detection’.18 The article goes even further, suggesting that in 
some cases innocent people may be ‘sacrificed’ whilst the real perpetrator remains 
undetected.19 The William Palmer case encapsulated all these fears, with Palmer 
himself appearing as the epitome of the clever poisoner who had ‘a greater cunning 
for concealment’.20 The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art also 
noted the ‘peculiar atrocities’ of secret poisoning in another article concerning this 
crime, noting how ‘public feeling has been shocked, and the national character 
disgraced, by no fewer than three most fearful cases of poisoning’. The article then 
considered how many were now beginning to question whether these cases were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘The Poisoner in the House’, The Leader, 15 December 1855, p.1199. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
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‘typical’.21 The Saturday Review article, like that in The Leader, reflects the growing 
public anxiety over such crimes and the fear that this sort of crime, reliant on the 
murderer maintaining a show of respectability and a relationship of trust with the 
victim, might go undetected. 
Both of the articles cited above were written and published in December 
1855, and were a response to a number of high profile poisoning cases, all of which 
offered a disconcerting lack of closure. Both articles consider the case of Mr Wooler, 
who was found not guilty of poisoning his wife. The Saturday Review described the 
fate of Mrs Wooler as ‘mysterious’, and ‘enveloped’ in a ‘deep shroud of horror’ 
which, ‘disturbed even the serene impassibility of the Bench’.22 The Leader noted 
that whilst this was the correct verdict, ‘when the evidence was imperfectly stated, 
his guilt looked almost established’.23 This again raises the question of ensuring all 
the evidence is heard, but also raises the disturbing possibility that the real murderer 
of Mrs Wooler had gone undetected. Both articles also discuss a Scottish case where 
a son was accused of murdering his father with arsenic in order to gain his 
inheritance. The verdict was one of ‘not proven’ (peculiar to Scotland), once again 
cementing the idea that clever criminals might not only exist within one’s own home, 
but also might never be discovered; as The Saturday Review noted in its analysis of 
the Scottish case: ‘the chief result of the trial is to show the extreme difficulty of 
obtaining judicial evidence of this class of domestic atrocities’.24 Finally, in The 
Saturday Review, the writer alludes to the Palmer case, the news of which was just 
emerging, and which was suggestive of ‘diabolical malice’.25 Such cases as these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21‘Poisoning in England’, The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, 22 December 
1855, p. 134. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ‘Poisoner in the House’, p.1199. 
24 ‘Poisoning in England’, p. 134. 
25 Ibid. 
	  	  
151 
struck at the heart of middle-class sensibilities: ‘Father and son – wife and husband – 
patient and physician – these, the closest and most sacred relations of domestic and 
civil life, are said to have been violated by the drugged draught’.26 Already in 1855, 
newspapers and journals were noting the ‘present temper of the public mind, so 
nervously sensitive’ with regard to such crimes, with the sensational trial of Palmer 
in 1856 adding to the frenzy.27 
Not long after the Palmer case had ended, two more sensational poisoning 
cases hit the headlines, and this time involved the added excitement of sexual 
transgression. In 1857 Madeleine Smith was accused of poisoning her lover, Emile 
L’Angelier, with arsenic. Smith, like Palmer, was part of ‘respectable’ society as the 
daughter of a successful architect and member of the upper-middle class. In 1855 she 
had begun a relationship with L’Angelier, a shipping clerk from Jersey. Madeleine 
Smith’s diary and the letters exchanged between the pair testify to a passionate 
relationship, and hinted at what were considered unnatural passions in a young lady. 
In 1857, Madeleine tried to break off the affair but L’Angelier threatened to go to her 
father with her letters. Two months later, and in the same month that Madeleine’s 
engagement to another suitor (acceptable to her family) was announced, L’Angelier 
was found dead from arsenic poisoning. There was some circumstantial evidence 
against Smith: she had written love letters to L’Angelier, she had tried to break off 
their affair, she had met with him in secret, she had given him hot chocolate after 
drinking which he had been taken ill with a gastric attack, and she had been seen 
purchasing arsenic. Yet, there were a number of gaps in the evidentiary chain. In 
particular it could not be proved that Smith had met L’Angelier just before his death, 
as her letters only proved an intention to meet. In addition, the handling of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.	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evidence had been mismanaged, with letters collected and placed in the incorrect 
envelopes which meant dates could not be firmly established. The verdict 
pronounced was that of ‘not proven’, signaling again that justice had not been done 
and that a murderer had, perhaps, escaped detection once again.28 
The Smith case was another sensational trial which raised again all those 
questions, fears and anxieties which Palmer’s case had raised, and it was not long 
before the case of Thomas Smethurst was doing the exact same thing again. 
Smethurst was, like Palmer, a respectable doctor. He was accused of poisoning 
Isabella Banks, his second wife, whom he had married bigamously. Smethurst was, 
in the first instance, found guilty of murder, but the verdict was overturned after a 
strong public outcry led to a review of the evidence. The difficulty here was the lack 
of evidence, as it was not absolutely proved that the victim had been poisoned. 
Alfred Swaine Taylor, once again a medical expert in this case, had made a mistake 
in his chemical testing and inadvertently had introduced arsenic into the results 
himself. Moreover, Smethurst appeared to have had little motive for the crime, as 
Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine pointed out.29 After his sentence was quashed, Smethurst 
was arrested for bigamy, found guilty and sentenced to one year in prison.  
Such cases were widely reported and extensively commentated upon in 
newspapers, journals and magazines. As Deborah Wynne has shown, the printing of 
fiction alongside non-fiction allowed a dialogue to occur between the various articles 
appearing in the same issue and in subsequent issues, and thus implicitly encouraged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Many believed Madeleine to be guilty. Both George Eliot and her partner G. H. Lewes expressed 
their belief in her guilt in letters to John Blackwood. See Judith Flanders, The Invention of Murder: 
How the Victorians Revelled in Death and Detection and Created Modern Crime (London: Harper 
Press, 2011), p. 284. The unsatisfactory nature of the Scottish verdict of ‘not proven’, which left a 
question mark over the guilt of the defendant is taken up in Wilkie Collins’s The Law and the Lady 
(1875). For a detailed examination of the case see Eleanor Gordon and Gwyneth Nair, Murder and 
Morality in Victorian Britain: The Story of Madeleine Smith (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2009). 
29 ‘Circumstantial Evidence: The Smethurst Case’, Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine (September 1859), 548 
– 553. 
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readers to adopt an inter-textual approach to their reading.30 Publishing novels in this 
way enabled authors to directly engage with contemporary debates through their 
fiction in an effective manner, as readers would access their fiction in conjunction 
with other articles touching upon the same topics. The extensive coverage of 
sensational trials which raised evidentiary concerns, provided novelists with a chance 
to engage with the concerns and issues that sensational cases such as Palmer, Smith 
and Smethurst were raising. 
 
Beware the Maxim ‘circumstances cannot lie’: Misleading evidence in East 
Lynne and Aurora Floyd.  
East Lynne was one of the most popular sensation novels of the Victorian period.31 
Written by Ellen Wood and serialised in the New Monthly Magazine from January 
1860 to September 1861, East Lynne tells the story of Lady Isabel Vane, who, after 
being left penniless on the death of her titled father, marries the upwardly mobile 
country lawyer, Archibald Carlyle. During the course of the novel Isabel enters into 
an illicit affair with the rakish Francis Levison, abandons her husband (who divorces 
her), and is involved in a train crash that leaves her crippled and unrecognisably 
altered facially. The rest of the novel sees Isabel return to her family home disguised 
as a governess to her own children. Were this plot line not complicated or sensational 
enough, the sub-plot of East Lynne follows Archibald Carlyle and Barbara Hare’s 
(Carlyle’s second wife) attempts to clear the name of Barbara’s brother, Richard, 
who is suspected of murdering the father of his romantic attachment, Afy Hallijohn.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Deborah Wynne, The Sensation Novel and the Victorian Family Magazine (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), Ch. 1. 
31 Richard Altick lists East Lynne as a best seller. It sold 430,000 copies from 1861-1898: see Richard 
D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public 1800-1900 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 385. See also Marlene Tromp, ‘Mrs Henry Wood, 
East Lynne’, in A Companion to Sensation Fiction, ed. by Pamela Gilbert (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011), pp. 257-268.	  
	  	  
154 
At the opening of the novel Richard Hare is widely believed to be the 
murderer of Hallijohn, the circumstances appearing to tell strongly against him: he 
was known to be a suitor to Hallijohn’s daughter and Hallijohn was known to 
disapprove of his visits, his gun was identified as the murder weapon, he was 
witnessed running away from the murder scene shortly after the gun shot was fired 
with the gun in his hand, he was then witnessed disposing of the gun, after the 
murder both he and Afy disappeared, and he had lied about his whereabouts on that 
evening to his father. Yet, as it turns out, Richard Hare is an innocent man. The sub-
plot of East Lynne thus brings into focus all the typical concerns which real life 
murders were raising in middle-class society, and which were being discussed in the 
pages of popular periodicals: an unsolved murder, misleading evidence, an innocent 
man believed to be guilty, an undetected killer going by an assumed name. 
  The evidence in the case against Richard Hare is purely circumstantial, there 
being no direct witnesses to the murder itself. However, the circumstances 
surrounding the murder appear to form a chain of evidence so strong that even 
Richard’s own father believes him to be guilty. Through the murder plot, then, East 
Lynne explores the problematic nature of the truth-seeking process in criminal cases 
which have to be made on purely circumstantial evidence. In doing so, Wood’s text 
directly engages with the contemporary debate over evidence and the question of 
whether the adversarial-evidentiary jury trial was the most effective means of 
overcoming evidentiary issues and revealing the truth.  
In East Lynne the reader is presented with a society in which narratives of 
circumstantial evidence are privileged over direct individual testimonies to the truth; 
Richard’s Hare’s statement of events weighs little against the circumstances against 
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him, as Barbara puts it: ‘nobody would believe him against the evidence’.32 The 
question addressed in East Lynne’s murder plot is how the truth of disputed facts can 
emerge from such misleading circumstances. By the end of the novel, the answer to 
that dilemma appears to be that the truth will emerge through a trial process that 
enables all the evidence to be heard so that it may be interpreted correctly. After his 
identification of Francis Levison as the impostor Captain Thorn (who had been 
present at the murder scene), Richard Hare is able to come out of hiding and be 
proved innocent by a court of law. The trial process enables all the facts to emerge, 
including Levison’s bribery of Otway Bethel (who had seen him leaving Hallijohn’s 
cottage just after the murder in a state of agitation), and Afy Hallijohn’s testimony 
under oath (until then she had been happy to lie). As a result of this trial process, all 
the evidence emerges and is fully scrutinised, and consequently a coherent narrative 
of Francis Levison’s guilt emerges which persuades the jury, and the reader, of its 
truth.   
A similar, but far more substantial intervention in the contemporary debate on 
legal evidence is to be found in Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Aurora Floyd (serialised 
in 1862 in Temple Bar; A London Magazine for Town and Country Reader.) Temple 
Bar, which was aimed at a middle-class audience, had commenced in 1860, and like 
its rival publications featured serialised novels (as well as poetry and short stories) 
alongside topical non-fiction articles, ranging from social essays to articles on travel 
and literary reviews. At the time of Temple Bar’s inception, the topic of the efficacy 
of the criminal trial process – in particular the usefulness and pitfalls of evidence – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ellen Wood, East Lynne, ed. by Elisabeth Jay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [1861]), Ch. 
5, p. 42. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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was ubiquitous, and the magazine lost no time in contributing to the contemporary 
discourse in its pages.  
In Temple Bar’s inaugural issue in December 1860, an article entitled ‘Notes 
on Circumstantial Evidence’ appeared. Written by professional lawyer W. S. Austin, 
this article is the first in a series of three which directly addresses the difficulty of 
correctly interpreting circumstantial evidence, and interrogates the maxim 
‘circumstances cannot lie’.33 Austin argues that ‘circumstantial evidence cannot 
always be strictly relied on’, as proved by the ‘melancholy fact that innocent men 
and women have been legally murdered in England’.34 Austin considers how 
convincing circumstantial evidence can be, especially when in the hands of skilled 
advocates, but he also notes how such evidence can mislead and can leave question 
marks over guilt: Austin cites the Palmer, Smith and Smethurst cases as instances of 
this, thus reminding the reader of the alarming ambiguity of the evidence in those 
high profile cases.35  ‘The fact is,’ Austin tells his readers,  ‘circumstantial evidence 
is the most difficult evidence to deal with and to value what it is worth’, so difficult 
in fact that ‘your “plain, blunt man” is very likely to be misled by it’.36  
Austin resumes his discussion of circumstantial evidence in Temple Bar with 
‘Some Curious Cases’.37 In this article, Austin illuminates his assertion that such 
evidence is ‘in its nature so difficult, so likely to mislead’, by providing example 
cases where circumstantial evidence has been so misleading so as to make innocence 
look like guilt.38 Austin concludes by once again warning against the ‘great dangers 
of circumstantial evidence’ and by concurring with J. Pitt Taylor’s assessment that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 [W. S. Austin], ‘Notes on Circumstantial Evidence’, Temple Bar, 1 (December 1860), 91-98. 
34 Ibid., p. 91. 
35 Ibid., p. 94. 
36 Ibid. 
37 [W. S. Austin], ‘Some Curious Cases’, Temple Bar, 2 (April 1861), 131-140. 
38 Ibid., p. 133. 
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‘circumstances not only can but constantly do, lie’.39 Austin’s first two articles 
articulate the prevailing sense of unease regarding the use of circumstantial evidence 
in criminal cases, a sense which also finds expression within the fiction printed in 
Temple Bar’s pages. The contemporary concern over the efficacy of criminal trial 
procedure to elicit truth in the face of evidentiary shortcomings (especially in relation 
to circumstantial evidence) was a widely addressed topic in the 1860s, and Austin’s 
articles in Temple Bar provided the starting point for the writers of fiction within its 
pages to begin engaging with this important and pervasive topic.  
The theme of undetected and secret crimes is one which pervades Temple 
Bar’s literary offerings, in both prose and poetry. In a poem entitled ‘Death Bed 
Secrets’, a dying wife confesses her adultery to her devoted husband, only to 
discover she will have died by his hand: ‘I knew / Your love and your guilt – and I 
poisoned you’.40 Whilst highly sensational, the poem’s subject matter reflects the 
contemporary anxiety that within any respectable home, family members such as 
husbands and wives may harbour secrets from one another and that they may murder 
undetected. The figure of the respectable member of society with a dark secret is one 
which recurs in  the fiction found in Temple Bar. A short story entitled ‘Shot in the 
Back’, for instance, tells the story of a dying military man who wishes to confess to a 
murder he committed many years ago, noting how at the time, ‘no one suspected me, 
on the contrary, on the contrary’.41  
The recurring figure of the undetected, respectable criminal enables the 
authors of such fiction to engage in fictional form with contemporary concerns over 
the fallibility of evidence in criminal trials. ‘Tried for His Life’ is a short story about 
a man named Arthur, who is wrongly suspected of murdering his adulterous wife 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., p. 140. 
40 Edward Wilberforce, ‘Death-bed Secrets’, Temple Bar, 1 (March 1861), 544. 
41 ‘Shot in the Back’, Temple Bar, 3 (November 1861), 473-482 (p. 481). 
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with poison. The narrator of the tale describes how the evidence ‘told against’ Arthur 
after his wife ‘died suddenly, with symptoms of poison’ and an autopsy reveals 
arsenic in her body.42 The narrator details how a series of small circumstances built 
up against Arthur: Arthur had quarreled with his wife, he was jealous, he had bought 
arsenic shortly before his wife’s death and some was found to be in his possession, 
when his wife had been taken ill he had insisted on nursing her.43 
Stories such as this, together with the Austin articles on circumstantial 
evidence, reflect the pervading mood of scepticism regarding circumstantial evidence 
which, following sensational cases like those of Palmer, Smith and Smethurst, gained 
a new vigour during the second half of the nineteenth century. Such stories and 
articles in Temple Bar, therefore form part of the wider debates concerning the 
criminal trial process (above all the value of evidence) which was taking place across 
magazines, journals and newspapers during the period. However, the debate 
sustained within Temple Bar’s pages was not a simple attack on the value of 
circumstantial evidence, but rather a more nuanced interrogation which prompted 
readers to think more critically about the value of evidence. This can be seen in the 
third essay on circumstantial evidence which Austin writes, entitled ‘Secret 
Poisoning’.  
In ‘Secret Poisoning’ Austin discusses the case of Catherine Wilson, a 
woman found guilty of poisoning on purely circumstantial evidence. In this instance, 
however, Austin argues that the verdict is sound, and that the weight of the 
circumstantial evidence was such as to produce absolute conviction of her guilt. The 
aim of Austin’s previous two articles was to ‘shake the accuracy of the doctrine that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ‘Tried for His Life’, Temple Bar, 7 (December 1862), 131-140 (p. 134).  
43 Ibid., p. 134. Other stories printed in Temple Bar’s pages similarly cast doubt on circumstantial 
evidence. See, for example, [Robert W. Buchanan], ‘A Heart Struggle’, Temple Bar, 4 (January 1862) 
in which a lady falsely suspects her lover of murder after seeing a man (who turns out to be her 
lover’s mentally ill brother) dressed in his clothes commit the deed. 
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“circumstances cannot lie”’, but in ‘Secret Poisoning’ Austin concedes that when 
evidence forms ‘a chain that lack[s] no single link’, despite being ‘purely that of 
circumstances’ it can be strong enough to produce a conviction of guilt.44 In claiming 
to both not contradict his earlier articles, whilst at the same time expounding the 
merits of circumstantial evidence, ‘Secret Poisoning’ reveals a tension that can be 
traced through the discourse on evidence during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Cases such as Palmer, Smith, and Smethurst (amongst others) created a 
fervent interrogation of the value of evidence (especially circumstantial evidence) 
and its utility in criminal trials. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, cases 
such as Palmer’s were also followed with various articles which sought to reassure 
the reader that the truth had been uncovered, despite evidentiary short comings.  
A tension therefore emerges within the discourse on evidence, between a 
movement towards more critical evaluations of the legal process for determining the 
truth of disputed facts, and a desire to reassure the public that the process in place is, 
in fact, functioning effectively. Austin’s three-part series on circumstantial evidence 
is demonstrative of this tension at play. Whilst ‘Notes on Circumstantial Evidence’ 
and ‘Some Curious Cases’ seek to question the reader’s faith in circumstances, 
‘Secret Poisoning’ works as a counterbalance so that the final import of the series is 
that circumstantial evidence must be treated with the upmost care and scrutiny, but 
where there is ‘no link wanting’ it can be capable of leading to the truth.45  
Wynne has noted how many of the new magazines which were emerging in 
the 1860s gained much popularity by serialising sensation novels, but that these 
novels did not merely offer cheap thrills, they also engaged with contemporary issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 [W. S. Austin], ‘Secret Poisoning’, Temple Bar, 6 (November 1862), 579-584 (p. 579 and p.  581). 
45 Ibid., p. 584. 
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of the day.46 Temple Bar was one such magazine, and as we have seen, published 
sensational poetry and short stories which tapped into the public alarm over secret 
crimes, and middle-class criminality, and in doing so provided for an engagement 
with the evidence debate. The serialisation of a full novel, however, provided authors 
with a more extensive opportunity to engage with the conversation that was 
occurring within the magazine’s own pages and beyond. In Temple Bar the fullest 
exploration of the problems of evidence, specifically circumstantial evidence, came 
with the publication of Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Aurora Floyd. 
Aurora Floyd tells the story of its eponymous heroine with a dark secret. 
Aurora is the only daughter of a wealthy banker (Archibald Floyd) and when she 
strikes up a relationship with her groom (James Conyers), her father intervenes and 
she is sent away to school on the continent. After Conyers is dismissed by Archibald 
Floyd, he pursues Aurora and persuades her to marry him. The marriage is an 
unhappy one, and after discovering she has grounds for divorce (as Conyers is both 
abusive and adulterous), she leaves him, although Aurora does not pursue divorce as 
an option. Not long after her return home Aurora receives news that James Conyers 
has been killed in a racing accident and she marries the good hearted John Mellish. 
The report of Conyers’s death is, however, discovered to be erroneous when Conyers 
is employed as Mellish’s new horse trainer. After blackmailing his wife, Conyers is 
eventually found murdered, having been shot with one of Mellish’s pistols. The final 
portion of the novel is spent trying to unravel the mystery of who shot Conyers, and 
it is here where the novel’s narrative is able to engage with Temple Bar’s discussion 
on circumstantial evidence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Wynne, Sensation Novel, Ch. 1. 
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As Julie Bizzotto has pointed out, Braddon’s exploration of problems 
pertaining to the interpretation of circumstantial evidence is enabled by the use of a 
narrative voice which is denied the traditional omniscience that third person narrators 
often enjoy.47 The narrator has information and knowledge of the characters but does 
not have unlimited access to their thoughts, most crucially the protagonist’s. The 
narrator is instead forced to describe events, dialogue and characters’ responses from 
the outside, leaving the reader to draw inferences about the character of Aurora and 
her motivations. For example, no explanation is offered as to why Aurora is sent 
away to school by her doting father. Instead the reader is left to guess the reason 
from the facts stated, from the ‘long’ rides Aurora takes with her new groom, and the 
servants’ identification of a ‘terrible breach between the father and child’ (Bk. I, Ch. 
3, p. 22) for instance. Yet the reason for Aurora’s departure is never explicitly stated 
by the narrator who, like the reader, is shut out from Aurora and her father’s 
conversation as they are ‘closeted together for upwards of an hour’ in Archibald 
Floyd’s room before Aurora leaves for Paris.48 Similarly, on her return, Aurora 
encounters a dog-fancier and the narrator, like the other characters present, is not 
privy to the private conversation which ‘reached no ears but those of Aurora herself’ 
(Ch. 3, p. 28). Even when the narrator views Aurora on her own, access is still 
denied to her inner thoughts: after meeting the dog-fancier, she mysteriously 
packages up her diamond bracelet to send to ‘J. C.’, the only insight the reader gains 
is through the reporting of direct speech: ‘“The tears were in my father’s eyes when 
he clasped that bracelet on my arm”, she said, as she reseated herself at the desk. “If 
he could see me now!”’ (Ch. 3, p. 37). The use of quotation marks to signify that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Julie Bizzotto, ‘Serializing Sensation: The Dynamics of Genre in Victorian Popular Fiction’ 
(Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of London, Royal Holloway, 2012), pp. 85-86. 
48 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Aurora Floyd, ed. by P. D. Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008 [1862]), Ch. 2, pp. 22-23. Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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Aurora has exclaimed these thoughts out loud is significant because it highlights the 
narrator’s apparent inability to access the character’s inner thoughts. One result of 
not being able to access Aurora’s inner thoughts and feelings, is that the narrator and 
the reader must build up a picture of her character and account for her actions 
through external evidence, a task which becomes crucial in establishing who killed 
Conyers. Throughout the narrative, Braddon builds a web of circumstances which 
must be interpreted by the various characters and the reader alike, and through the 
character of Aurora, Braddon is, like Austin, able to demonstrate just how difficult 
the interpretation of evidence can be. 
The novel builds up a strong chain of circumstantial evidence against Aurora, 
despite her innocence, highlighting the difficulties of the act of interpretation. This is 
dramatised particularly well through Mellish’s attempts to interpret the evidence, 
which lead him to believe in Aurora’s guilt. The circumstances tell against Aurora: 
she is a bigamist (albeit an unknowing one), her first husband is blackmailing her, 
she attempts to pay him off with a large sum of cash, she is witnessed (by Captain 
Prodder) meeting Conyers on the night of his death, when Conyers asks if she would 
like to ‘stab [him], or shoot [him], or strangle [him]’, Aurora is overheard (again by 
Prodder) to reply, ‘yes […] I would!”’ (Ch. 24, p. 283). Finally, it turns out that 
Conyers has been shot with a pistol taken from Mellish’s gun room, a room which 
‘was only entered by privileged persons – the room which [Aurora] had busied 
herself with the re-arrangement of [Mellish’s] guns upon the day of the murder’ (Ch. 
34, p. 398).49 It is following this final realisation that Mellish believes his suspicions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 As Bizzotto has also pointed out, the question of whether Aurora is guilty of the murder is more 
ambiguous in the serialised version of the text. Aurora enters John’s gun room on the day of the 
murder to find Stephen Hargraves there. Stephen had been handling the pistol before Aurora’s 
entrance, and the original version of the text in Temple Bar read ‘He had this pistol still in his hand 
when the door suddenly opened, and Aurora Mellish stood upon the threshold. She spoke as she 
opened the door, almost before she was in the room’: Aurora Floyd, Temple Bar, 6 (Aug. 1862), 80.  
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are confirmed. Through Mellish’s agony Aurora Floyd demonstrates the dangers of 
circumstantial evidence in a manner reminiscent of Austin’s two articles. However, 
Braddon’s approach to the evidence debate, like Austin’s, is more subtle than 
perhaps might be realised, for after the train of circumstances appears to damn 
Aurora, John’s interpretation of the evidence is rebutted by an alternative 
interpretation, offered by Mellish’s friend, Talbot Bulstrode.  
Through the character of John Mellish Aurora Floyd is able to expose the 
way in which circumstantial evidence can mislead, as Austin put it, the ‘plain, blunt 
man’.50 However, by contrasting Mellish with Talbot Bulstrode’s more critical 
examination of the evidence, Braddon is able to show, as Austin did in ‘Secret 
Poisoning’, that despite the difficult nature of interpreting the evidence, when viewed 
in the right way, it can lead to the truth. What Bulstrode realises on examining the 
evidence is that ‘there is a link missing in the chain, and we are all at sea’ (Ch. 36, p. 
414). As Bulstrode points out, Mellish has not taken the trouble to ‘investigate the 
evidence’ thoroughly (Ch. 35, p. 410). In his interrogations of the narrative of guilt 
John has represented to himself, Bulstrode reveals the flaws in John’s interpretation:  
“Aurora had been setting my guns in order.” 
“You argue, therefore, that your wife took the pistol?” 
John looked piteously at his friend; but Talbot’s grave smile reassured him.	  
“No	  one	  else	  had	  permission	  to	  go	  into	  the room,” he answered. 
“I keep my papers and accounts there, you know; and it’s	  an	  understood	  thing	  that	  none	  of	  the	  servants	  are	  allowed	  to	  go	  there,	  except	  when	  they	  clean	  the	  room.”	  
“To be sure! But the room is not locked, I suppose?” 
“Locked! Of course not!” 
“And the windows – which open to the ground – are sometimes left open I 
daresay?” 
“Almost always in weather such as this.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In the volume version of the text this paragraph was amended to the less ambiguous: ‘He had this 
pistol still in his hand when the door suddenly opened, and Aurora Mellish stood upon the threshold. 
The intruder dropped his pistol into the capacious pocket of his fustian jacket as the door opened’ (Ch. 
22, p. 260). See Bizzotto, ‘Serializing Sensation’, p. 94.  
50[Austin], ‘Notes on Circumstantial Evidence’, p. 94. 
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“Then my dear John, it may just be possible that some one who had not 
permission to enter the room did, nevertheless, enter it for the purpose of 
abstracting the pistol. Have you asked Aurora why she took upon herself to 
rearrange your guns? – she had never done such a thing before, I suppose?” 
“Oh, yes, very often. I’m rather in the habit of leaving them about after 
cleaning them; and my darling understands all about them as well as I do. She 
has often put them away for me.” 
“Then there was nothing particular in her doing so upon the day of the 
murder.” (Ch. 35, p. 410) 
 
Bulstrode’s more critical approach to the evaluation of evidence reveals to the reader 
the dangers of circumstantial evidence by showing how someone like Mellish can so 
easily misinterpret them. This more interrogative approach reveals that there is a 
‘link missing in the chain’ (Ch. 36, p. 410). Crucially Bulstrode identifies that what 
is lacking is Aurora’s testimony, when he demands if Mellish has asked his wife 
‘how long she was in [his] room’ (Ch. 36, p. 410). John Mellish’s response that he 
has not spoken to his wife of his suspicions leads to Bulstrode’s examination of 
Aurora, where he elicits her version of events. During his questioning of Aurora two 
new pieces of evidence are revealed; firstly, that Aurora had met with James Conyers 
and handed over two thousand pounds in cash (cash which had not been discovered 
after the murder), and that Stephen Hargraves had been alone in her husband’s gun 
room on the day of the murder. The revelation of all the relevant facts in this way, 
together with the discovery of a blood-stained button from Stephen’s waistcoat, 
enables the chain of evidence to be completed so that the truth can emerge.  
The return to the testimony of the accused in Aurora Floyd may at first seem 
to suggest that Braddon’s novel works as a warning against the reliance on 
circumstantial evidence. In the end, however, it is the chain of circumstantial 
evidence against Hargraves which leads to his conviction, the jury finding it 
‘conclusive’ (Ch. 39, p. 457). Braddon’s analysis of the utility of circumstantial 
evidence, like Austin’s, is more nuanced than a mere indictment of it. Aurora Floyd 
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teaches that circumstantial evidence must be interrogated thoroughly, and that all 
witness accounts (of direct and indirect evidence) must be heard to ensure that all the 
relevant facts emerge. Braddon’s novel concludes that once all the evidence is made 
available and examined rigorously, and if, as Austin concludes in ‘Secret Poisoning’, 
‘there is no link wanting in the chain of evidence’, then the adversarial-evidentiary 
approach to the truth will lead to a ‘right result’ and ‘righteous retribution’.51 
 
From Talbot Bulstrode to Robert Audley: The Figure of the Advocate in the 
Search for Truth 
Jennifer Hayward has argued that through the act of reading serialised fiction, 
‘readers learn to get all the facts before arriving at an interpretation; the genre 
teaches the impossibility of absolute interpretation before all the voices are heard’.52 
In Aurora Floyd this aspect of serial fiction takes on an added significance through 
its engagement with the contemporary debate concerning the interpretation of 
evidence in legal trials. By building up a web of circumstantial evidence which 
appears to implicate Aurora, Braddon teaches her reader to defer judgement until all 
the evidence has come to light. Moreover, through the character of Talbot Bulstrode, 
Braddon demonstrates the importance of the careful scrutiny of all the available 
evidence. In fact, Bulstrode’s role is crucial to Braddon’s response to the evidence 
debate, and in situating Aurora Floyd more broadly in the discussions surrounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 [Austin], ‘Secret Poisoning’, p. 584. As Bizzotto has noted, this article was published at the same 
time as the installment which saw the discovery of the murder weapon, and the interplay of articles 
would have prompted readers to think critically about Aurora’s guilt. Bizzotto reads the doubt which 
Braddon casts over Aurora’s guilt in the novel’s serial form as confirmation that Braddon was 
involved in an interplay with surrounding articles which were similarly engaging with contemporary 
concern over the reliability of evidence. See Bizzotto, ‘Serialising Sensation’, pp. 97-98. Like 
Bizzotto I have been arguing that Aurora Floyd was actively engaging in contemporary debates on 
evidence through a critical interrogation of its worth. In contrast to Bizzotto, I view Aurora Floyd as 
ultimately reinforcing the value of circumstantial evidence, providing it is interrogated thoroughly, as 
Bulstrode demonstrates. 
52 Jennifer Hayward, Consuming Pleasures: Active Audiences and Serial Fiction from Dickens to 
Soap Opera (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), pp. 76-77. 
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the efficacy of trial procedures. Bulstrode’s interrogation of the evidence, his desire 
to ensure that all the evidence is heard from all sources, his careful questioning of 
Aurora, denotes him as a figure analogous to that of an advocate in a court of law. 
This is particularly evident when Bulstrode challenges Mellish’s interpretation of the 
evidence, which reads like a defence lawyer testing the prosecution’s case. As noted 
above, Aurora Floyd does not simply dismiss circumstantial evidence as misleading, 
despite exposing the ways in which it can mislead. Instead, through the character of 
Bulstrode, the novel argues that when all the evidence is brought forward for close 
and careful scrutiny, when the prosecution’s interpretation is interrogated, and the 
opportunity for an alternative interpretation of the evidence brought forth, then the 
truth can and will be uncovered. Aurora Floyd thus becomes a novel which 
reinforces the efficacy of adversarial-evidentiary legal trial process.  What Aurora 
Floyd demonstrates is the need for a figure to interrogate and present an 
interpretation of the evidence which will reveal the truth, the need for an advocate. 
The emergence of the advocate figure as the reader’s guide to correct interpretation 
is more fully developed in another of Braddon’s novels: Lady Audley’s Secret.   
Lady Audley’s Secret had begun its serialisation in the short-lived publication 
Robin Goodfellow, from July to September 1861. After that magazine was 
discontinued, publication began again (from the beginning) in the Sixpenny 
Magazine from January to December 1862, being published, therefore, concurrently 
with Aurora Floyd.53 Lady Audley’s Secret tells the story of the mysterious 
disappearance of Robert Audley’s friend, George Talboys. The novel follows Robert 
Audley’s attempts to prove that his friend has been murdered by his uncle’s wife, 
Lady Audley, whose real identity is that of George Talboys’s first wife, Helen.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Lady Audley’s Secret was phenomenally successful. In 1863 it went through no less than nine 
volume editions and was re-serialised in the London Journal in 1863.  
	  	  
167 
The fear that those close to us might be harbouring a dangerous secret is 
dramatically realised in the character of Lady Audley who, unlike the unwitting 
Aurora, is a knowing bigamist and would-be murderess. In Lady Audley’s Secret 
Braddon once again tackles the question of how such crime is to be uncovered. As 
the story unfolds it is revealed that after her husband goes abroad to seek their 
fortune, Helen Talboys assumes the identity of Lucy Graham, a governess, and in 
this disguise she is able to win the affections of, and marry, Sir Michael Audley. 
When Helen (now Lady Audley) discovers her first husband has returned to England, 
she fakes her own death (as Helen Talboys) to prevent discovery. When George is 
taken to Audley Court by his friend Robert, who happens to be nephew to Sir 
Michael Audley, Lady Audley tries to avoid a meeting with her first husband. Not 
long after his arrival at Audley Court, George disappears. It is later revealed that 
Lady Audley had made an attempt on George’s life by pushing him down a well. 
Lady Audley appears as the epitome of the villain whose outward appearance of 
respectability might enable her to go undetected. As the narrator of Lady Audley’s 
Secret warns: ‘we may look into the smiling face of a murderer, and admire its 
tranquil beauty’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 18, p. 141). Through Robert Audley’s attempts to prove 
that the beautiful Lady Audley, who ‘everyone loved, admired and praised’ (Vol. 1, 
Ch. 1., p. 6), is a bigamist and murderess, Braddon’s novel becomes intimately 
concerned with the question of how reality might be most effectively represented in 
order that the truth be uncovered.  
Though ‘he had never had a brief, or tried to get a brief, or even wished to 
have a brief’ (Vol. 1, Ch. 4, p. 32), Robert Audley is a barrister by profession and the 
majority of the novel’s narrative is told from his perspective. The reader, therefore, is 
largely cut off from knowing the inner thoughts and motivations of other characters 
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and must ascertain the truth through Robert’s presentation of the evidence. This truth 
is revealed gradually by Robert, who carefully collects the evidence piece by piece 
and connects it together into a narrative of Lady Audley’s guilt. In short, Robert 
Audley is making what Alexander Welsh would term a ‘strong representation’ of 
Lady Audley’s guilt, and because the narrative is told predominantly from Robert’s 
viewpoint, it begins to read like a prosecution’s address to the jury. Indeed, the skills 
and tricks which Robert employs in order to uncover the truth are those of the 
professional advocate. Firstly, Robert carefully collects and interprets the physical 
and documentary circumstantial evidence available, from labels on old hatboxes 
which reveal the use of different names, to samples of handwriting which mark 
Helen Talboys’s and Lady Audley’s hand as the same. Robert’s interpretation of 
such evidence is persuasive, and as he reasons his way to the truth, so too he 
persuades the reader. Secondly, Robert employs the advocate’s skill of witness 
examination to elicit truth and to fill the gaps which the physical and documentary 
evidence leaves: 
“When I was last in this house, Mr. Maldon, you told me that George Talboys 
had sailed for Australia.” 
“Yes, yes – I know,”… 
“Mr. Maldon,” [Robert Audley] said, slowly, watching the effect of every 
syllable as he spoke, “George Talboys  never sailed for Australia – that I 
know. More than this, he never came to Southampton; and the lie you told me 
on the 8th of last September was dictated to you by the telegraphic message 
which you received on that day [.…] The lie was dictated to you, and you 
repeated your lesson. But you saw no more of George Talboys here on the 7th 
of September than I see him in this room now. You thought you had burnt the 
telegraphic message, but you had only burnt a part of it – the remainder is in 
my possession.” 
Lieutenant Maldon was quite sober now. 
“What have I done?” he murmured, helplessly. “O, my God! What have I 
done?” 
“At two o’clock on the 7th of September last,” continued the pitiless, accusing 
voice, “George Talboys was seen, alive and well, at a house in Essex [….] At 
two o’clock on that day [...] my poor friend was seen, alive and well […] 
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From that hour to this I have never been able to hear that he has been seen by 
any living creature. I have taken such steps as must have resulted in procuring 
the information of his whereabouts, were he alive. I have done this patiently 
and carefully – at first even hopefully. Now I know that he is dead.” 
Robert Audley had been prepared to witness some considerable agitation in 
the old man’s manner, but he was not prepared for the terrible anguish, the 
ghastly terror, which convulsed Mr. Maldon’s haggard face as he uttered the 
last word. 
 
“No, no, no, no,” reiterated the lieutenant, in a shrill, half-screaming voice; 
“no, no! for God’s sake, don’t say that!” (Vol. 2, Ch. 3, pp. 168-170). 
 
The passage above demonstrates how Robert Audley is able to supplement the 
physical clue of the half-burnt telegraphic message with the testimony of a witness to 
begin to draw the truth to the surface. Like a skilled advocate, Robert is very astute at 
knowing which witnesses he is able to press information out of, and often adopts the 
common stance of hostility towards difficult witnesses as the passage above 
demonstrates. Likewise, he also has a keen perception of when his skills are wasted: 
of Phoebe Marks, for example, Robert recognises that ‘this woman would be good in 
a witness box’ and that counsel for the prosecution ‘would get very little out of her’ 
(Vol. 1, Ch.17, pp. 132-133). And yet Robert is also adept at recognising tell-tale 
signs that lies are being told: ‘the eyes […] shifted away as she spoke, […] [she] was 
obliged to moisten her […] lips […] before she [spoke]’ (Vol. 2, Ch. 3, p. 174). 
As in Aurora Floyd, the collection and interpretation of evidence is far from 
straightforward. Lady Audley is cunning and manipulative and has worked hard to 
destroy evidence and manufacture circumstances which lie: she arranges for the 
death of Helen Talboys to be reported in The Times, and the body of another woman 
is buried in her place. Braddon also explores the problems pertaining to testimonial 
evidence as Robert’s enquiries are frequently frustrated by those who seek to help 
Lady Audley in her deception and perjure themselves: her maid Phoebe, her father, 
Mrs Plowson (the mother of the girl who really dies), and Lady Audley herself.  In 
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the face of such perjury and misleading circumstantial evidence, Robert Audley 
enacts the power of advocacy to reveal the truth through a rigorous examination of 
the evidence and the careful presentation of that evidence as one compelling and 
coherent narrative, connecting together those small circumstances to forge ‘links of 
steel’ against the criminal (Vol. 1, Ch. 15, pp. 119-120). Robert’s chain may be 
formed slowly with ‘very slight links’ (Vol. 2, Ch. 10, p. 259), but the skill with 
which Robert connects them transforms them into ‘links of steel’ which forces a 
confession from Lady Audley who admits defeat in the face of Audley’s powerful 
advocacy: ‘You have used your cool, calculating, frigid, luminous intellect to a noble 
purpose. You have conquered – a MADWOMAN’(Vol.3, Ch. 3, p. 345).54  
 
The Adversarial-Evidentiary Model Fully Realised: Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White and The Moonstone. 
East Lynne, Aurora Floyd and Lady Audley’s Secret are examples of how nineteenth-
century novelists were using their fiction to contribute to contemporary debates 
concerning the efficacy of the criminal trial process in the wake of sensational trials 
which raised uncomfortable questions, particularly about the reliability of evidence. 
Whilst all three of these novels provide the space for both the author and the reader 
to be critically reflexive about evidentiary issues, the final conclusion ultimately 
affirms the efficacy of the truth-seeking methods of the adversarial-evidentiary 
criminal jury trial. In Aurora Floyd, and to a greater extent in Lady Audley’s Secret, 
this affirmation is achieved through the figure of the advocate, who actively employs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For an examination into the presentation of madness and women in sensation novels see Andrew 
Mangham, Crime, Medicine and Victorian Popular Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
A number of useful works have also been produced on the presentation and role of women in 
sensation fiction, see, for example, Lyn Pykett, The Improper Feminine: The Women’s Sensation 
Novel and the New Woman Writing (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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professional advocacy techniques to reveal the truth. As the reader is increasingly cut 
off from knowing the thoughts of the characters within the novel, so the process of 
interpretation comes to rely less and less on the assessment of character and more on 
the assessment of the direct and circumstantial evidence surrounding the novel’s 
events. Meaning thus begins to emerge from the piecing together of the clues offered 
to the reader by the narrator and the characters, all of whom have a limited 
perspective. Consequently the sensation novel, especially in the work of Braddon, 
begins to align itself methodologically with the techniques employed in criminal jury 
trials for the uncovering of truth. This mode of representation, its merits and 
deficiencies is further explored in two of the most enduringly popular sensation 
novels ever written: Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White (serialised in All the Year 
Round 1859 – 1860) and The Moonstone (serialised in All the Year Round 1868). As 
the next two sections of this chapter will focus on the analysis of these two novels, it 
will be useful to give a brief summary of both novels’ plots at the outset.  
In The Woman in White, wealthy heiress Laura Fairlie enters into an arranged 
marriage, only to have her identity stolen by her husband, Sir Percival Glyde. Sir 
Percival and his friend Count Fosco are in need of money and, after failing to obtain 
Laura’s consent to release trust fund monies, the two villains of the tale conceive and 
carry out an elaborate fraud in which they fake Laura’s death. Laura is stripped of 
her identity and placed into an insane asylum as Anne Catherick, Laura’s 
doppelganger and, as it turns out, half-sister. Fosco and Glyde are aware that Anne is 
seriously ill and they take advantage of this fact by kidnapping her and passing her 
off as Laura so that her imminent death, when it arrives, can be recorded as that of 
Lady Glyde. The plot follows the attempts of Laura’s other half-sister, Marian 
Halcombe, and their drawing master Walter Hartright to re-establish Laura’s true 
	  	  
172 
identity. The plot of The Moonstone centres around the unsolved theft of the 
Moonstone, a large Indian diamond. This diamond is inherited by Rachel Verinder 
on her eighteenth birthday, but after the birthday celebrations, the Moonstone is 
stolen from her room. The story tells of her cousin (and suitor) Franklin Blake’s 
attempts to discover the thief. In his preface to the 1860 edition of The Woman in 
White, Collins tells his readers: 
An experiment is attempted in this novel, which has not (so far as I know) 
been hitherto tried in fiction. The story of the book is told throughout by the 
characters of the book. They are all placed in different positions along the 
chain of events; and they all take up the chain in turn, and carry it on to the 
end. (p. 644) 
 
As John Sutherland has stressed, contemporary critics who were quick to note the 
unoriginality of Collins’s narrative style rather missed the point, for  
what Wilkie Collins primarily stresses in his opening remarks is the analogy 
of The Woman in White’s narrative to the process of law, as it is ritually 
played out in the English criminal court. The novel’s technique is forensic, 
not historical.55 
 
In fact, Collins claimed to have originally stumbled upon the idea for his 
‘experiment’ after attending an actual criminal trial:  
One day about 1856 [Collins] had found himself at a criminal trial in London. 
He was struck by the way each witness rose in turn to contribute a personal 
fragment to the chain of evidence. “It came to me then […] that a series of 
events in a novel would lend themselves well to an exposition like this […] 
one could impart to the reader that acceptance, that sense of belief, which was 
produced here by the succession of testimonies […] The more I thought of it, 
the more an effort of this kind struck me as bound to succeed. Consequently 
when the case was over I went home determined to make the effort.56 
 
It is clear, as Sutherland suggests, that Collins’s claim to originality rests on his 
adoption of the criminal trial model for the form of his novel, something which The 
Woman in White makes clear to the reader from the start: 
The story here presented will be told by more than one pen, as the story of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Sutherland, ‘Introduction’, The Woman in White, p. xv. 
56 Nuel P. Davis, The Life of Wilkie Collins (Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 211. 
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offence against the laws is told in court by more than one witness – with the 
same object, in both cases, to present the truth always in its most direct and 
intelligible aspect; and to trace the course of one complete series of events, by 
making the persons who have been most closely connected with them, at each 
successive stage, relate their own experience, word for word. (pp. 5-6) 
 
The novel’s reader is thus made aware at the narrative’s opening that they are to 
assume the role of juror: they will ‘hear’ the story as a court might have heard it, a 
series of first person narratives (which function as witness statements) will be offered 
to them in order ‘to present the truth’ (p. 5). Furthermore, the characters who offer 
their version of events are conscious of their role as witnesses: one witness begins by 
telling the reader his words are offered ‘at the request of my friend, Mr. Walter 
Hartright. They are intended to convey a description of certain events […] which 
took place’ (p. 127), another remarks: ‘my testimony is wanted in the interests of 
truth’ (p. 364), and the reader soon comes to feel that ‘the events which fill these 
pages might have claimed their share of public attention in a Court of Justice’ (p. 5). 
Collins’s ‘experiment’ is repeated in The Moonstone where the reader is once more 
presented with a series of witness statements, this time collected by Franklin Blake in  
‘the interests of truth’ (The Moonstone, p. 7). As in The Woman in White, the 
characters who contribute their personal narratives to the novel have full cognisance 
of their witness function: ‘I am to help [Franklin Blake] by writing the account of 
what I myself witnessed’ (The Moonstone, p. 192). 
As is customary with sensation fiction, The Woman in White and The 
Moonstone present the reader with a mystery which needs solving, and the witness 
statements offered to the reader function as an attempt to reconstruct reality through 
evidentiary narratives in order to reveal the truth of disputed facts. Throughout both 
novels the reader is continually reminded of the ultimate aim of truth-discovery, as 
characters persistently speak of ‘knowing’, ‘telling’, ‘speaking’ and ‘owning’ the 
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truth.57 Like Wood and Braddon, Collins uses his novels to offer his readers a critical 
evaluation of the effectiveness of legal forensic methods. However, by explicitly 
adopting an adversarial-evidentiary model as the form of the novel in its own quest 
for the truth of disputed facts, Collins is able to go further than his counterparts in 
answering the question of whether the adversarial-evidentiary trial model really was 
the most effective means of representing reality and thereby revealing truth. 
The analogy which Collins makes between his narrative mode and the 
criminal trial process immediately locates The Woman in White (and later, The 
Moonstone) within the debates on evidence which surrounded the trial process. 
Through the use of plots which revolve around uncovering a mystery, both novels 
actively engage with the question of the reliability of evidence. As the nineteenth-
century legal treatises demonstrate, jurists were keenly aware of the problems which 
surrounded witness testimony, and not just that humans could lie, but also that they 
could be mistaken. The anxiety over the reliability of witness testimony can be seen 
in the strict rules which governed the eligibility of testimonial witnesses during the 
nineteenth century. As Christopher Allen highlights in his study The Law of 
Evidence in Victorian England, a striking feature of nineteenth-century law was the 
degree to which potential witnesses were precluded from giving statements.58 The 
highly prescriptive nature of the rules governing who was competent to give 
evidence reveal a deeply embedded concern to ensure that witnesses were reliable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Sue Lonoff has noted how in both The Woman in White and The Moonstone the obsession with 
discovering the truth is shown through the repetition of the word and its derivatives, which occurs 
several dozen times in both those novels: ‘Multiple Narratives and Relative Truths: A Study of The 
Ring and the Book, The Woman in White and The Moonstone’, Browning Institute Studies 10 (1982), 
143-161 (p. 145). 
58 Children, for example were unable to give evidence unless they could prove they fully understood 
the significance of the oath, persons with previous convictions were also precluded from testifying 
and certain religious groups (such as Quakers) were unable to give evidence as they would not swear 
the oath on religious grounds, though alternative oaths and exceptions were made as the nineteenth 
century progressed. See further Christopher Allen, The Law of Evidence in Victorian England, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1999).  
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and could be trusted to speak the truth. Collins explores this concern in The Woman 
in White and The Moonstone.  
The most widely recognised problem with testimony was that it could be 
perjured. The problem of perjury was in part responsible for the increasing reliance 
on circumstantial evidence over direct testimony from eyewitnesses that emerged 
during the eighteenth century. Throughout The Woman in White, the problem of 
perjury is foregrounded, the reader being made continually aware of how easily 
people may be duped by the lies of others. At Blackwater Park, for instance, both 
Laura and the housekeeper, Eliza Michelson, are fooled by Fosco into believing that 
Marian has gone to London when she has just been hidden away in a secret corner of 
the house. Both Anne Catherick and Mrs Clements are likewise tricked by Count and 
Countess Fosco into being separated on the false promise of a meeting with Lady 
Glyde. The extent to which lies pervade the novel’s narrative alerts the reader to be 
cautious, if not entirely distrustful, of direct testimony. 
Another reason to be wary of testimony examined in The Woman in White is 
the extent to which it becomes devalued by the limited nature of human memory and 
perception. As Hartright struggles to confirm the actual date of Laura’s arrival in 
London, he is met at every turn with witnesses who simply cannot remember: ‘I 
made no memorandum at the time, and I cannot therefore be sure to a day, of the 
date’ Eliza Michelson tells him (p. 365), and Hester Pinhorn (cook to the Foscos) 
similarly warns, ‘whatever you do, don’t trust my memory in the matter’ (p. 408). 
Even when witnesses themselves are desperate for the truth to emerge, their 
testimony still cannot always be relied on: ‘[Laura’s] recollections were found to be 
confused, fragmentary, and difficult to reconcile with any reasonable probability’ (p. 
435).  
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The Woman in White also explores how human perception is necessarily 
limited because reality is always filtered through a subjective consciousness. Early 
on in the novel, Hartright draws the reader’s attention to this flaw in testimonial 
evidence as he struggles to articulate his first encounter with Laura: ‘How can I 
describe her? How can I separate her from my own sensations, and from all that has 
happened in the later time?’ (p. 48). It is clear throughout Hartright’s narrative that 
his perception is shaped by his feelings for Laura, as seen in his interpretation of 
Anne Catherick’s prophetic dream, which warns Laura against trusting Sir Percival 
Glyde. Whilst Marian’s rational interpretation dismisses Anne’s letter, Hartright 
acknowledges that the letter ‘had influenced’ him (p. 83). Other characters are 
similarly influenced by their own subjective responses, not least Sir Percival, whose 
paranoia that his ‘secret’ will be revealed fuels his delusion that Anne Catherick can 
expose him, driving him to place her in an asylum.  
After Laura is rescued from the asylum it is made clear that the direct 
testimony of Marian and Hartright who claim that Laura is Laura, falls short of the 
level of proof needed to establish, legally, Laura’s true identity: ‘as a lawyer’, Mr 
Kyrle explains, ‘it is my duty to tell you, Mr. Hartright, that you have no shadow of a 
case’(p. 450). Kyrle points out that Marian and Hartright’s testimonial evidence 
amounts to little more than a ‘declaration on [their] side that the person who died and 
was buried was not Lady Glyde’ (p. 450), and that they have no evidence to ‘support 
the declaration’ (p. 450). In Hartright’s concession that  ‘there can be no doubt […] 
that the facts […] appear to tell against us’ (p. 451), the reader is presented with one 
further difficulty facing those seeking the truth, namely, that circumstances can lie. 
As with the Wood and Braddon novels discussed earlier, The Woman in 
White explores the issues facing those whose task it is to interpret circumstantial 
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evidence in the search for truth. If one believes the maxim that ‘circumstances cannot 
lie’, the facts on the face of it appear conclusive: Lady Glyde is witnessed leaving 
Blackwater Park, a lady answering her description (and introduced as Laura Glyde) 
arrives in London unwell and soon passes away. The death is certified and recorded 
by a professional doctor as being that of Laura Glyde. The death certificate is 
matched by a tombstone erected in Laura’s memory. During this same period, a 
woman who resembles and is dressed in the clothes of Anne Catherick is returned to 
the institution from which that lady escaped, with no suspicions being awakened. All 
the circumstances appear to confirm Fosco and Glyde’s story, and as Mr Kyrle puts 
it: ‘when an English jury has to choose between a plain fact, on the surface, and a 
long explanation under the surface, it always takes the fact, in preference to the 
explanation’ (p. 452). Yet Laura is the victim of an elaborate fraud, and so The 
Woman in White reveals how circumstances can be made to lie, in this case through 
the careful management and arrangement of events by Fosco and Glyde. The death 
certificate, the dressing of Laura in Anne’s clothes, Laura’s tombstone, all of these 
are circumstances which are not only misleading (as was the case in Aurora Floyd) 
but have been skillfully managed so that they lie.59  
The issues which surround the use of evidence in legal trials is a subject 
which Collins takes up again in The Moonstone where he once again adopts the 
advocacy-based, evidentiary-trial model to frame his narrative. The Moonstone, 
however, offers a more probing analysis of evidentiary problems, as the text reveals 
a deeper understanding that circumstantial evidence is further complicated by the 
fact that it is usually provided through subjective testimony. In chapter two, I 
discussed the terminology issues which plagued the debate over evidence. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The marriage register which apparently offers plain evidence of the marriage of Sir Percival’s 
parents is also a fabrication, a circumstance which lies. 
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debunking the myth that ‘circumstances cannot lie’, J. Pitt Taylor cited the reason 
that: 
Circumstances must be proved, like direct facts, by witnesses who are equally 
capable with others of deceiving or being deceived. So that in no sense is it 
possible to say that a conclusion drawn from circumstantial evidence can 
amount to absolute certainty, or in other words, that circumstances cannot 
lie.60 
 
In The Moonstone the role of interpretation in the representative process is explored 
in more detail than in The Woman in White. The significant role that interpretation 
plays in assessing evidence is initially brought to the reader’s attention through 
Betteredge and Franklin Blake’s discussion of John Herncastle’s motive for 
bequeathing his niece an extraordinarily expensive diamond that he is rumored to 
have stolen. The contrasting interpretations of Herncastle’s actions – one, that he was 
motivated by contrition and two, that he was motivated by malice – demonstrate the 
difficulties inherent in any act of interpretation for, as Blake concludes: ‘one 
interpretation is just as likely to be right as the other’.61 The act of interpretation 
then, is frustrated by the fact that different, and even opposing interpretations, may 
seem similarly rational and well reasoned. 
The radically different interpretations which can emerge from one set of 
events is most strikingly shown by Sergeant Cuff’s suspicions that Rachel Verinder 
is the thief of her own jewel. Cuff explains Rachel’s behaviour in a way which 
accords with his own interactions with Rachel and with similar young women, and so 
he construes as guilt her determined hindrance of his investigation. Yet in spite of 
Cuff’s well-reasoned arguments, Betteredge, who has known Rachel all her life, 
finds himself unable to draw the same conclusion: ‘with all her secrecy and self-will, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 J. Pitt Taylor, cited in [Austin],‘Some Curious Cases’, p. 140. 
61 Wilkie Collins, The Moonstone, ed. by John Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 
[1868]), p. 42. For future citations from this novel, references to this edition will be given in the text. 
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there was not so much as the shadow of anything false in her. I never remember her 
breaking her word; I never remember her saying No, and meaning Yes [….] Nobody 
ever knew her to lie’ (p. 53). In this way the text demonstrates how individuals are 
unavoidably influenced by their own personal experiences, and so reveals how 
different interpretations can emerge of the same events. Franklin Blake recognises 
there are objective and subjective interpretations of all events, and yet, as all the 
narratives of The Moonstone reveal, all testimony is shaped by a subjective vision, 
even when objectivity is being striven for. The result is misinterpretation. 
A number of characters in The Moonstone misconstrue events and 
circumstances due to personal prejudice. Godfrey Ablewhite’s father, having been 
the subject of Verinder family snobbery when he married into the family, incorrectly 
believes this prejudice to be the cause of Rachel breaking off her engagement with 
his son: 
I know your motive, Miss Verinder, for breaking your promise to my son! I 
know it as certainly as if you had confessed it in so many words. Your cursed 
family pride is insulting Godfrey as it insulted me when I married your aunt. 
(p. 257) 
 
Rosanna Spearman similarly misconstrues the paint smear on Franklin Blake’s 
nightgown as conclusive evidence of his guilt, simply because her infatuation with 
him makes her want to believe in his guilt:   
In the case of any other gentleman, I believe I should have been ashamed of 
suspecting him of theft […] But the bare thought that YOU had let yourself 
down to my level […] seemed to open such a chance of winning your good 
will. (p. 316) 
Early on in The Moonstone’s narrative the reader is warned to be on their guard 
against coming to conclusions about circumstantial evidence. In the ‘Prologue’, the 
story of how John Herncastle came to possess the Moonstone is related. The reader is 
told how Herncastle had boasted that ‘we should see the Diamond on his finger’ 
	  	  
180 
(p.3) and how he was discovered during the storming of the Seringapatam holding a 
bloodied knife over a dying man who exclaimed: ‘The Moonstone will have its 
vengeance yet on you and yours!’ (p. 4). This chain of circumstantial evidence 
produces a strong conviction in the mind of the onlooker (a cousin of Herncastle) of 
Herncastle’s guilt, but the reader is quickly alerted to the fact that such an 
interpretation is simply that, an interpretation: 
 
I have no evidence but moral evidence to bring forward. I have not only no 
proof that he killed the two men at the door; I cannot even declare that he 
killed the third man inside – for I cannot say that my own eyes saw the deed 
committed. It is true that I heard the dying Indian’s words; but if those words 
were pronounced to be the ravings of delirium, how could I contradict the 
assertion from my own knowledge? (p. 6) 
 
Throughout the text characters continue to misconstrue events and despite the 
early warning to be on our guard, the reader is often drawn into making the same 
mistakes, especially when presented with the well-reasoned arguments of Sergeant 
Cuff  who reveals not only how easy it is to be led to a false conclusion by evidence, 
but also how forceful such a conclusion can appear: 
I observe three suspicious appearances in that young lady. She is still violently 
agitated, though more than four-and-twenty hours have passed since the Diamond 
was lost. She treats me, as she has already treated Superintendent Seegrave. And 
she is mortally offended with Mr. Franklin Blake. Very good again. Here (I say to 
myself) is a young lady who has lost a valuable jewel – a young lady, also, as my 
own eyes and ears inform me, who is of an impetuous temperament. Under these 
circumstances, and with that character, what does she do? She betrays an 
incomprehensible resentment against Mr. Blake, Mr. Superintendent, and myself 
– otherwise, the very three people who have all, in their different ways, been 
trying to help her to recover her lost jewel. (pp. 164-165) 
 
Sergeant Cuff then refers to his own knowledge and experience to explain such 
‘incomprehensible conduct’ (p. 165), and concludes that Rachel must have taken the 
stone herself to pay some debts. Rachel’s repeated refusal to aid his investigations 
provides Cuff with further evidence of her guilt. As the detective adduces ‘proof 
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after proof against Miss Rachel’, Betteredge himself is forced to admit that ‘there 
was no disputing the truth of what he said’ (p. 166). Cuff believes that his 
explanation of events is underpinned by ‘plain facts’ (p. 165), but as it turns out, ‘the 
circumstances, in this case, have fatally misled him’ (p. 175). Cuff is not the only 
character to misinterpret the evidence before him. Rachel, having seen Blake take the 
Moonstone, feels ‘sure’ (p. 349) that he has used it pay off his debts but she too has 
been ‘fatally misled’ by the circumstances. The problem that both Cuff and Rachel 
face is that they do not have possession of all the facts and so are forced to draw 
conclusions from the fragmentary evidence on offer, interpreted through their own 
subjective experiences. The Moonstone, like The Woman in White, offers an 
exploration of the deficiencies of the adversarial-evidentiary model of representation 
employed in felony trials post-1836, and this exploration leads both novels to 
examine alternative ideas of how the truth might best be represented. 
 
Leaving the Law Behind: Beyond the Evidentiary Model? 
Hartright in The Woman in White and Blake in The Moonstone are frustrated at every 
turn by misleading evidence, whether that be because it has been deliberately 
manipulated to mislead, or more simply because there is a missing piece of evidence 
which will make everything make sense as a whole.  This latter situation occurs, for 
example, when Franklin Blake is faced with evidence of his guilt (his paint-stained 
nightgown), and Dr Candy’s missing testimony prevents a complete understanding 
of Blake’s role.62 According to strict legal standards, Hartright and Blake are failed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Although Blake took the diamond, he did so unconsciously and in order to protect it. Blake did not 
wish to deprive Rachel of the jewel permanently, which does not make him a thief in the technical 
sense of the word. It is Godfrey Ablewhite who is the real thief, as he steals the diamond from Blake 
after witnessing him take the diamond unconsciously. 
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by the evidence available and must begin to operate outside the law in order to 
uncover the truth. After acknowledging that ‘the legal remedy lies, in every sense of 
the word, beyond [his] means’ (The Woman in White, p. 455), Hartright begins to 
pursue alternative avenues for arriving at the truth, and decides Count Fosco and Sir 
Percival must be ‘forced’ to confess. (p. 459). Blake is likewise pushed beyond rigid 
legal boundaries once it is revealed that the proof of his innocence lies in a bizarre 
physiological experiment.63  
Given that legal rules of evidence appear unhelpful to Hartright and Blake 
and their consequent extra-legal investigations, it is unsurprising that a number of 
critics have ultimately dismissed the analogy Collins makes between his narrative 
mode and the legal trial as one which dissipates not long after the narrative begins. 
D. A. Miller puts forward a persuasive argument that the parallel which Hartright 
draws between the narrative mode and the presentation of evidence in a courtroom 
has ‘limited pertinence’ in The Woman in White, which ultimately ‘aligns itself with 
extra-, infra- and supralegal modern discipline’.64 U. C. Knoepflmacher has likewise 
contended that, notwithstanding Hartright’s designs, the ‘analogy between legal truth 
and his narrative truth […] is subverted as soon as we are drawn into the story’s 
incidents’.65 John Sutherland has drawn the same conclusion, and despite his 
recognition of the poignancy of the legal analogy, argues that once Hartright is failed 
by the law he becomes something of a vigilante, needing to go beyond the remit of 
the law in order to enforce it.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The experiment demands that he be drugged with opium to demonstrate how he took the diamond 
while sleep-walking. 
64 D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 156-
157. 
65 U. C. Knoepflmacher, ‘The Counterworld of Victorian Fiction and The Woman in White’, in New 
Casebooks: Wilkie Collins, ed. by Lyn Pykett (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 58-69  (p. 62).  
66 John Sutherland, ‘Wilkie Collins and the Origins of the Sensation Novel’, Dickens Studies Annual, 
20 (1991), 243-256 (p. 256).  
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It is easy to see why critics question the validity of Collins’s legal analogy, 
for in many ways the individual narratives draw the reader into the story in a way 
that a juror in court would not be so drawn in the hearing of a case, as 
Knoepflmacher suggests: 
The narrative strips that Hartright has assembled draw us into the same time 
scheme of characters wholly unaware of their future; for a long time we share 
their ignorance of the offence alluded to in the ‘Preamble’ and adopt their 
false surmises, their uncertainties, their surprise.67 
 
In her contemporary review of The Woman in White, Mrs Oliphant was struck by 
how ‘the reader’s nerves are affected like the hero’s’, and Collins’s narrative 
technique certainly appears designed to induce such physical reactions.68 In the 
passage where Hartright comes face to face with the woman in white for the first 
time he is situated on a deserted road late at night, and he describes his physiological 
response to the meeting, how he feels that ‘every drop of blood in [his] body was 
brought to a stop by the touch of a hand laid lightly on [his] shoulder from behind’ 
(p. 20). The reader is made aware of the woman’s presence at the point of Hartright’s 
recognition he is not alone, and they learn, only by degrees (as Hartright learns) that 
this is the touch of ‘a solitary woman’ (p. 20). The mystery generated by this 
encounter is slowly developed by the ensuing description, and on its apparent 
resolution Hartright and the reader are all at once forced into the realisation that this 
woman had ‘escaped from [an] asylum’ (p. 28). With understanding of the narrative 
power of the cliff-hanger, Collins chose to end the first installment at this juncture 
and, as D. A. Miller argues, suspenseful passages such as these force the reader to 
inhabit a ‘“sensationalised” body where the blood curdles, the heart beats violently, 
the breath comes short and thick, the flesh creeps, the cheeks lose their colour’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Knoepflmacher, ‘Counterworld’, p. 62. 
68 Margaret Oliphant, ‘Sensation Novels’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 91 (May 1862), 564-
584, reprinted in Wilkie Collins: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Norman Page (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 118-119. 
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mirroring the nervous responses of the protagonists.69 The result for Miller is that, 
rather than legal justice being the reason the reader searches for knowledge of the 
truth, their motivation stems from a need ‘to uncover the grounds for being 
nervous’.70  
Both Miller’s and Knoepflmacher’s readings of The Woman in White (and by 
extension The Moonstone) are persuasive, and both indicate that it is the reader’s 
emotional investment in the story’s outcome that prevents the reader from truly 
coming to occupy the promised position of juror. Instead of being able to remain an 
impartial judge of the facts, the reader becomes, Knoepflmacher argues, a ‘subjective 
participant’, guided as the protagonists are by their intuition and emotional 
responses.71 Miller posits the argument that ‘characters who rely on utterly unlegal 
standards of evidence like intuition, coincidence, literary connotation get closer to 
what will eventually be revealed as the truth’.72 Those who steadfastly maintain 
within the rigid boundaries of legal proof will simply fail to uncover the truth, as is 
the case with Mr. Gilmore’s legalistic assessment of Sir Percival which has him 
concluding that ‘the probabilities, on Sir Percival’s own showing […] were plainly 
with him’ (The Woman in White, p. 133). Miller’s argument can be applied with 
equal force to The Moonstone where readers and characters alike are guided by 
intuition in the same manner: when it is discovered that Franklin Blake is the owner 
of the incriminating nightgown the reader nonetheless believes, as Betteredge 
believes, that Blake ‘will be cleared […] beyond all doubt’ (p. 309). 
Schramm’s reading of the nineteenth-century novel leads her to identify a 
competition between novelists and jurists over the creation of ‘the most truthful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Miller, Police, p. 149. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Knoepflmacher, ‘Counterworld’, p. 62. 
72 Miller, Police, p. 159. 
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representation of the “real”’, as both professions sought to ‘justify its model of 
reality by accusing the other of ‘misrepresentation’, or a failure to present evidence 
responsibly’.73 For Schramm, the fundamental difference between the lawyer’s and 
the novelist’s approach can be located in the privileging of emotional responses in 
literature. In contrast to the law, novels are able to recognise the importance of, and 
so provide the space for, emotional responses to narrative representations and so, 
Schramm argues, authors believed they could create more accurate representations of 
reality.74 In both The Woman in White and The Moonstone Hartright and Blake, 
driven by their love for Laura and Rachel respectively, reach beyond rational, legal 
approaches and follow their intuition. The legal analogies are therefore arguably 
rendered redundant in novels where protagonists are forced to devise their own 
methods for uncovering the truth.75  
Both The Woman in White and The Moonstone reveal the inadequacies of the 
legal process, the aims of which can be frustrated by the complex matter of 
interpreting evidence, much of which can be misleading. In Hartright and Blake’s 
recourse to non-legal truth-seeking methods appears to lie an implicit recognition 
that the legal processes are not necessarily sufficient to uncover the truth. In this way 
both novels suggest that a sympathetic understanding of the complex and relative 
nature of reality and truth – and the consequent difficulties inherent in representing 
them – is needed. Collins’s treatment of the representations of reality in the interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 23. Schramm, for example, notes how novels such as 
Dickens’s The Pickwick Papers drew attention to the problems of legal representations of the truth 
(see Ch. 3), and how lawyers charged authors with gross misrepresentation, as Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen did in an article entitled: ‘The Licence of Modern Novelists’, Edinburgh Review, 106 (1857), 
124-156. 
74 Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy, p. 15. 
75 For both Hartright and Blake this requires they place their trust in others. In The Woman in White, 
Hartright must rely on Pesca who turns out to be a member of ‘The Brotherhood’, a secret 
organization which Fosco has betrayed, information which enables Hartright to force Fosco into 
confessing. Blake must similarly trust Ezra Jennings and permit himself to be drugged with opium to 
re-create events leading to the theft of the diamond. 
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of truth therefore finds common ground with Robert Browning’s The Ring and the 
Book (1868-69). This narrative poem retells the story of a real seventeenth-century 
Roman murder trial through a series of dramatic monologues. Through these 
monologues The Ring and the Book explores how the truth-seeking aim of the trial is 
threatened by the knowledge that everyone ‘lies, it is the method of a man’.76 In spite 
of this, the poem ultimately argues that truth is capable of revelation as the Pope 
(who acts as judge) is able to reach a verdict after rejecting legal argument in favour 
of empathy and intuition.77 Arguably, it is towards this model of truth-seeking that 
Hartright and Blake turn. 
Certainly in The Woman in White and The Moonstone it is the characters who 
allow themselves to be emotionally guided to the truth that are ultimately the most 
successful in uncovering it, as D. A. Miller suggests. As Mark Hennelly Jr. has 
pointed out, in The Moonstone Ezra Jennings emerges as the most successful 
detective because his tragic back story has imbued in him an imaginative sympathy 
that enables him to reach beyond the surface of circumstances and solve the 
mystery.78 As already noted, Mr Kyrle is swift to point out to Hartright that ‘when an 
English jury has to choose between a plain fact, on the surface, and a long 
explanation under the surface, it always takes the fact, in preference to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Robert Browning, The Ring and the Book, ed. by Richard D. Altick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1981), X.369. For future citations from this poem references to this edition will be given in the text.  
77 Mary Rose Sullivan has argued that the sympathetic understanding which the Pope brings to his 
role as judge, based upon a ‘deep rooted love of his fellow creatures’ allows him to instinctively feel 
what the truth is: Mary Rose Sullivan, Browning’s Voices in ‘The Ring and the Book’: A Study of 
Method and Meaning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 132-133. For further analysis 
of the Pope’s judgement process see also: Adam Roberts, Robert Browning Revisited (New York: 
Twayne, 1996), Ch. 7, and Richard D. Altick and James F. Loucks, Browning’s Roman Murder Story: 
A Reading of  ‘The Ring and the Book’ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
78 Mark Hennelly Jr., ‘Reading Detection in The Woman in White’, in Wilkie Collins, ed. by Pykett, 
pp. 88-108. Jennings’s knowledge, experience and imaginative insight enable him to piece together a 
comprehensible narrative from Dr Candy’s fevered ramblings, and so uncover the mystery of how and 
why Blake took the diamond. W. David Shaw also identifies Jennings as the novel’s ‘true detective’: 
W. David Shaw, Victorians and Mystery: Crises of Representation (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), p. 289. 
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explanation’ (The Woman in White, p. 452).79 Yet one of the messages of The 
Woman in White and The Moonstone appears to be that in its failure to penetrate 
‘under the surface’, the law lacks the emotional response which is oftentimes 
essential to the recovery of truth. Yet, if the legal analogy set up in both The Woman 
in White and The Moonstone fails, as Miller and Knoepflmacher suggest, then the 
reader may be left feeling the same sense of unease which the cases of Palmer, Smith 
and Smethurst generated, an unease brilliantly articulated by Fosco that ‘there are 
foolish criminals who are discovered and clever criminals who escape’ (The Woman 
in White, p. 236). As D. A. Miller has argued though, sensation fiction will always 
seek to assuage the alarm it initially gives rise to, as by the novel’s close ‘the 
grotesque aberrations of character and situation that have typified its representation’ 
have been discarded and replaced with Victorian norms.80 This is true of Collins’s 
novels and, by the end of The Woman in White and The Moonstone, the reader is 
assured that ‘clever criminals’ such as Fosco, Glyde and Ablewhite can be, and will 
be, caught and punished. Crucially, this sense of reassurance is achieved in a very 
particular way, namely through the use of the adversarial-evidentiary jury trial 
model. Indeed, it is precisely because Collins’s legal analogy does not break down 
that Collins is able to restore his reader’s confidence that truth is always ultimately 
capable of revelation. 
For all its concern with relativism, Browning’s The Ring and the Book leaves 
the reader with no doubt over the Pope’s final verdict. Fundamental to this is the 
Pope himself, who emerges as a guiding judicial authority, pointing the reader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See p. 176 of this thesis. 
80 Miller, Police, pp. 165-166. 
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towards the correct judgement.81 In both The Woman in White and The Moonstone 
such a guiding judicial hand is absent, and yet in the end readers are no less able to 
identify who the guilty and innocent are. When Fosco, Sir Percival and Ablewhite 
meet their deaths, there is a sense that justice has been done, and this effect is 
achieved through the skilled presentation of the evidence to the reader. In a criminal 
jury trial, skilled advocates are able to present evidence through the making of what 
Alexander Welsh terms ‘strong representations’.82As discussed in chapter two, 
‘strong representations’ are representations which use the evidence by subordinating 
to the argument (or ‘case’) being put forward. Eighteenth-century jurist Edmund 
Burke suggested that from the ‘multitude’, ‘combination’ and ‘relation’ of facts told, 
some revelation of truth may occur from the ‘collective effect’, and Welsh views 
lawyers as making strong representations in precisely this way.83 In The Woman in 
White and The Moonstone it is through the skillful presentation of evidence as one 
coherent narrative that both Hartright and Blake are able to persuade the reader of its 
truth. Whilst it is true that within their individual narratives, Hartright and Blake 
decide to pursue their own alternative (non-legal) paths to the truth, these individual 
narratives are just one part of the total testimonial evidence on offer, one piece of 
evidence to be placed and read alongside all the rest. Outside their individual 
narratives and ‘in the interests of truth’ (The Moonstone, p. 7), both protagonists take 
control of collecting and piecing together all the evidence into one cohesive and 
chronological narrative of past events and, in so doing, fulfill the function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 For example, the Pope repeatedly associates Pompilia with whiteness and innocence, and Guido 
with blackness and guilt: ‘Such I find Guido, midmost blotch of black’ (X.868); ‘Such I pronounce 
Pompilia, then as now/ Perfect in whiteness’ (X.1004-1005). 
82 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. ix. 
83 Edmund Burke in a report from the Committee of the House of Commons on 30th April 1794, in 
The Works and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 8 vols (London: Francis & 
John Rivington, 1852), VIII, 96. 
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advocates in a court of law. 
In both novels, it is evident from the manner in which Blake and Hartright set 
about collecting the evidence, from the way in which they address the reader, and 
from the manner in which they issue instructions to witnesses, that not only are they 
acting as advocates would in a trial, but also that they both understand their role in 
these terms. At the opening of The Woman in White, Walter Hartright addresses his 
readers directly like a barrister in a court of law: 
As the Judge might once have heard it, so the reader shall hear it now. No 
circumstance of importance, from the beginning to the end of this disclosure, 
shall be related on hearsay evidence. When the writer of these introductory 
lines (Walter Hartright, by name) happens to be more closely connected than 
others with the incidents reordered, he will describe them in his own person. 
When his experience fails, he will retire from the position of narrator; and his 
task will be continued, from the point at which he has left off, by other 
persons who can speak to circumstances under notice from their own 
knowledge, just as clearly and positively as he has spoken before them.  
Thus, the story here presented will be told by more than one pen, as the story 
of an offence against the laws is told in Court by more than one witness – 
with the same object, in both cases, to present the truth always in its most 
direct and most intelligible aspect; and to trace the course of  one complete 
series of events, by making the persons who have been most closely 
connected with them, at each successive stage, relate their own experience, 
word for word. (pp. 5-6) 
 
Hartright tells the reader they are to hear the story as though it were a legal trial: ‘as 
the judge might once have heard it’ (p. 5). The reader is then assured that ‘no 
circumstance of importance, from the beginning to the end of this disclosure, shall be 
related on hearsay evidence’ (p. 5), and that the story will be told by actual witnesses 
to events, just as they would be in a criminal jury trial. The reader is further told that 
the purpose of this is to ‘present the truth’ by tracing ‘the course of one complete 
series of events’ (p. 5). Hartright’s ‘opening speech’ to the reader, therefore, is 
reminiscent of a barrister’s opening speech to a jury in a court of law.  
In the analysis that follows I will compare Hartright and Blake’s advocacy to 
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the advocacy of a real nineteenth-century prosecutorial team: that employed in the 
trial of William Palmer in 1859. There are two reasons why this particular case is 
appropriate as a comparison: firstly, because John Sutherland has persuasively 
argued that the Palmer case was probably the source of Collins’s inspiration for The 
Woman in White’s narrative technique; and secondly because the skill of the 
prosecution advocates (one of whom was the Attorney-General, Alexander 
Cockburn), was widely praised and they managed to secure a conviction on very 
little, and entirely circumstantial, evidence.84 After hearing the verdict, Palmer 
reportedly said to his counsel that it was the strength of the prosecution’s advocacy 
that had convicted him, rather than the actual evidence against him.85  
Lead counsel for the crown was the Attorney-General, whose opening and 
closing speeches were both eloquent and persuasive. In his opening speech the 
Attorney-General first stressed the important nature of what the jury was about to 
hear: ‘Gentlemen of the jury, the duty which you are called upon to discharge is the 
most solemn which a man can by possibility have to perform’.86 Hartright too begins 
his ‘speech’ in The Woman in White by warning the reader of the serious nature of 
his subject matter, telling his readers that the events which will be related should 
have ‘claimed their share of the public attention in a Court of Justice’ (p. 5). 
Cockburn also informed the jurors in the Palmer case that his ‘duty’ was: 
to lay before you the facts on which the prosecution is based, and in doing so I 
must ask for your most patient attention. They are of a somewhat complicated 
character; and they range over a considerable period of time, so it will be 
necessary not merely look to circumstances which are immediately connected 
with the accusation, but to go back to matters of an antecedent date.87 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Sutherland, Victorian Fiction, pp. 31-42. 
85 Ibid., p. 39.	  
86 Knott, Trial of William Palmer, p. 23. 
87 Knott, Trial of William Palmer, pp. 23-24. 
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Like the Attorney-General, Hartright in The Woman in White is required to go back 
over past events in order to make the reader understand all the relevant details of the 
case. The story does not merely begin when Laura is rescued from the asylum by 
Marian, but at a much earlier time when Hartright is first commissioned as drawing 
master at Limmeridge House. Hartright often drops in phrases such as: ‘events which 
I have to relate, make it necessary for me to mention in this place that […]’ (p. 6), in 
order to justify going back so far in time before the fraud occurs. Throughout 
Hartright’s narrative he continually stresses he is telling an ‘unfolding’ story (p. 7), 
that the novel will ‘trace the course of one complete series of events’ (p. 5). On the 
whole, Hartright’s story is chronologically presented, as he ensures that when one 
witness is unable to continue, the narration of events will be picked up ‘from the 
point at which he has left off’ by other witnesses closer to events (p. 5). Again, this 
echoes the Attorney-General’s opening speech in the Palmer case, where he narrates 
events in a story-like fashion in order to set the facts of the case before the jury, 
telling them that it is necessary that his case should ‘follow the chronological order 
of events’.88 
Throughout his opening speech the Attorney-General links all the facts of the 
case together into one connected narrative which is easy to follow and understand: 
The prisoner at the bar, William Palmer, was by profession a medical practitioner 
and he carried on that profession in the town of Rugeley, in Staffordshire, for 
several years. In later years, however, he became addicted to turf pursuits, which 
gradually drew off his attention and weaned him from his profession. Within the 
last two or three years he made over his business to a person named Thirlby, 
formerly his assistant, who now carries it on.89 
  
In a similar manner, Hartright’s introductory narrative to The Woman in White 
provides the novel reader with a connected sequence of events leading up to the 	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89 Knott, Trial of William Palmer, p. 25. 
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fraud, providing much of the background information the reader needs to make sense 
of events. However, the main events of the novel occur when Hartright is not there to 
witness them and so, after providing his introductory information, Hartright then 
hands narration over to the other witnesses. Likewise, the Attorney-General uses his 
opening narrative in the Palmer case to set the scene for the jurors. He informs them 
of Palmer’s gambling addiction, of his debts, his shady dealings and how the 
financial pressure on Palmer was mounting. After setting the scene, he too then 
introduces his witnesses. Similarly, Hartright uses his opening narrative to build a 
case up against Sir Percival, connecting him from the first with the mysterious 
circumstances of the woman in white, revealing that he locked her up in the asylum 
and alerting the reader that he has a ‘secret’ which he wishes hushed up. The effect is 
the same as the Attorney-General’s, to create an unfavourable impression before 
introducing the witnesses.  
In The Moonstone, Franklin Blake also provides the reader with an opening 
speech (this time through Betteredge, who reports it). Once again the reader is 
alerted to the important reason for why this story is being told:  
In this matter of the diamond […] the characters of innocent people have 
suffered under suspicion already – as you know. The memories of innocent 
people may suffer, hereafter, for want of a record of the facts to which those 
who come after us can appeal. (p. 7) 
 
The importance of the truth being told is therefore stressed early on by Blake, so that 
the ‘memories of innocent people’ do not suffer. Like Hartright, Blake reassures the 
reader that the story will be told in ‘the interests of truth’ (p. 7), and to that end will 
best be told by witnesses to events and not, as Hartright stressed, be reliant on 
‘hearsay evidence’: 
We have certain events to relate […] and we have certain persons concerned 
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in those events who are capable of relating them. Starting from these plain 
facts, the idea is that we should all write the story of the Moonstone in turn – 
as far as our own personal experience extends and no further (p. 8). 
 
By writing in these terms Hartright and Blake make the claim to impartiality. Of 
course both these protagonists are biased towards their particular interpretation of 
events, but barristers in criminal jury trials were similarly biased towards their client 
whilst maintaining a similar pretence of impartiality, claiming to be acting (like 
Hartright and Blake) in the interests of truth. This can be seen in Cockburn’s 
speeches in Palmer’s trial, for he frequently reminds jurors of his impartiality, 
claiming that he is like a ‘minister of justice, with no interest and no desire save that 
justice shall be done impartially’.90 Blake also ensures that all the events leading up 
to the theft of the Moonstone are told and, like Hartright and Cockburn, stretches 
back into family history in order to cast as much light on events for the reader as 
possible: 
We must begin showing how the Diamond first fell into the hands of my 
uncle Herncastle, when he was serving in India fifty years since’, before 
telling how it came to be ‘in my aunt’s house in Yorkshire, two years ago, 
and how it came to be lost in little more than twelve hours afterwards (p. 8).  
Once again the story is told in a chronological order (as far as possible), starting with 
an old family paper, then moving to Betteredge’s narration of events at the Verinder 
family home, and moving forwards in time to the end.  
Another striking similarity between Cockburn’s advocacy and that of Hartright 
and Blake is the extent to which they ensure their witnesses appear reliable and 
trustworthy. Throughout Palmer’s trial, Cockburn cleverly sets up all his witnesses 
as honest and reliable. Cockburn ensures the reliability of one witness in the eyes of 
the jury by telling them that he: 
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cannot possibly have any motive for coming here to give false evidence (which 
must be fatal to a man whom, if that evidence be not true he must believe to be 
innocent) – and to suppose that he would do so without a motive is to suppose 
human nature to be a hundred times more wicked and perverse than in the worst 
and most repulsive form experience has ever found it to be.91  
 
Of another he notes: ‘you will bear in mind that [the testimony of] Mr Roberts, on 
whom there is no taint or shadow of suspicion, is decisive.92 In Collins’s novels the 
credibility of witnesses is set up with the same amount of care. In The Woman in 
White, Mr. Gilmore (the Fairlie’s family lawyer) is soon established as a person who 
can be trusted as an independent witness: 
My function was of the purely judicial kind. I was to weigh the explanation we 
had just heard; to allow all due force to the high reputation of the gentleman who 
offered it; and to decide honestly whether the probabilities, on Sir Percival’s own 
showing, were plainly with him, or plainly against him. (p. 133) 
 
Other witness statements are offered in The Woman in White by ‘the widow of a 
clergyman of the Church of England’ who knows she must ‘place the claims of truth 
above all other considerations’ (pp. 364-365), and a ‘Christian woman’ (p. 413) who 
understands ‘that it is a sin and a wickedness to say the thing which is not’ (p. 408). 
Along with Hartright, Marian Halcombe provides a large portion of the testimony on 
offer and her statements are given an added veracity by the fact that they are taken 
from her diary, thus removing the issue of poor memory which testimony can suffer 
from.93 
The care with which witnesses are set up as reliable can once again be 
identified in The Moonstone. One of the main witnesses, Gabriel Betteredge is 
quickly established as someone who can be relied upon to furnish us with an accurate 	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93 Of course the twist after reading Marian’s diary is the discovery that Fosco has also been reading it, 
and so there may be the suggestion that he tampered with it, involving The Woman in White once 
more in the legal-forensic debate regarding the reliability of evidence.  
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account of events: he has an ‘active memory’ (p. 8), something other characters also 
notice – ‘Betteredge, your edge is better than ever’ (p. 28) – and he holds a ‘position 
of trust and honour’ (p. 10) in the Verinder family home. Another key witness is the 
evangelical Miss Clack, whose religious fervour marks her out as one with a ‘sacred 
regard for the truth’ (p. 192), notwithstanding the fun which Collins pokes at her 
(hypocritical) piety. As with Marian Halcombe, Miss Clack’s narrative is lent 
credence because she is able to refer to her well-kept diary: ‘everything was entered 
(thanks to my early training) day by day as it happened’ (p. 192).  
Advocates are also charged with the task of discrediting witnesses for the 
opposition. In the Palmer trial Cockburn did this with aplomb: not only did he use his 
cross-examinations to reveal inconsistencies in the testimony of defence witnesses, 
he also used his jury address to highlight these inconsistencies too: 
a girl named Watson, deposed that, though she had not taken any poison and 
had no wound of any kind on her body, she was attacked with a violent 
paroxysm in the month of October last year. But in cross-examination it 
appeared that she had been ill all day, was taken worse at night, had a pain in 
her stomach and cramps in her arms, was for quite a while insensible, but 
soon recovered and went about her business. That is the case that they have 
brought forward as a parallel for that mortal anguish – the spasms – the 
convulsions – the death agony of this unhappy man.94 
 
In The Woman in White and The Moonstone too, if Blake and Hartright wish us to 
view certain aspects of the witnesses testimonies with care, they achieve this by 
allowing those witnesses to betray their own prejudices and foibles. In both novels 
the textual footnotes which Hartright and Blake offer to supplement the narratives 
reveal that only relevant passages have been included: ‘the passages omitted, here 
and elsewhere, in Miss Halcombe’s Diary, are only those which bear no reference to 
Miss Fairlie or to any of the persons with whom she is associated in these pages’ 	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(Hartright, The Woman in White, p. 163). In the Moonstone, Blake claims that: 
Nothing will be added, altered, or removed, in [Miss Clack’s] manuscript, or in 
any of the other manuscripts which pass through my hands […] As genuine 
documents they are sent to me – and as genuine documents I shall preserve them; 
endorsed by the attestations of witnesses who can speak to the facts (p. 192). 
 
However, Blake has himself selected what he deems to be the relevant passages to 
include, and so both Hartright and Blake are both controlling what the reader hears 
or does not hear. There is also a good deal included which is not directly relevant to 
their case and yet despite this irrelevancy these sections have been included, but such 
passages (which often involve personal opinion of others) are useful for Blake and 
Hartright in demonstrating the prejudices and foibles of their witnesses, thus 
ensuring that certain testimonies will be treated with caution. In The Woman in 
White, Eliza Michelson’s testimony provides a good deal of useful evidence but we 
are clearly not meant to take her praise of Count Fosco seriously. This praise is 
therefore negated by the rest of her testimony which reveals that she is easily fooled, 
and by the carelessness of her own words, which reveal her to be judgmental and 
prejudiced, and so put the reader on their guard: 
I have always cultivated a feeling of humane indulgence for foreigners. They 
do not possess our blessings and advantages; and they are, for the most part, 
brought up in the blind errors of popery. It has also always been my precept 
and practice, […] to do as I would be done by. On both these accounts, I will 
not say that Mrs Rubelle struck me as being a small, wiry, sly person, of fifty 
or thereabouts, with a dark brown or Creole complexion, and watchful light 
gray eyes. (pp. 370-371) 
 
Similarly, in The Moonstone, whilst Miss Clack provides an invaluable testimony to 
events, the personality that is allowed to shine through her narrative warns us to be 
on our guard against any opinion she advances. Indeed, her own descriptions of how 
she leaves religious tracts lying around the house in the hope people might pick them 
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up, her excitement at the thought of saving her aunt’s soul before she dies, and her 
judgmental attitude towards Rachel, all mean that the reader is far from inclined to 
take seriously her personal interpretation of the events she relates, nor her admiration 
for Godfrey Ablewhite.  
In both novels care is taken to provide expert witnesses. In Palmer’s trial, 
medical and scientific experts were used by both sides in order to lend credence to 
the theories put forward. Again, the reliability and expert knowledge of these 
witnesses is stressed by Cockburn at every opportunity, telling us of their ‘enlarged 
experience and knowledge’ or of their ‘highest competency and most unquestionable 
integrity’.95 The intended effect of such witnesses is to lend authority to any theory 
advanced by the advocates. This opportunity is also taken in The Moonstone. Mr. 
Murthwaite, the ‘celebrated Indian traveler […] who, at the risk of life, had 
penetrated in disguise where no European had ever set foot before’ (p. 65), is clearly 
meant to fulfill such a function as he provides the expert knowledge required to make 
sense of the ‘Indian plot’ and its place in the larger narrative. In fact, Murthwaite 
only appears when he is needed to elucidate events and he even draws attention to 
his own expert authority: ‘I know what Indian juggling really is. All you have seen 
to-night is a very bad and clumsy imitation of it. Unless, after long experience, I am 
utterly mistaken, those are high-caste Brahmins’(p. 71). Likewise, Mr Yolland, a 
local fisherman, ‘whose knowledge was to be relied on’ (p.157), can be read as an 
expert witness introduced to convince us that Rosanna Spearman committed suicide: 
I have a word to say to you about the young woman’s death. Four foot out, 
broadwise, along the side of the spit, there’s a shelf of rock, about half a 
fathom down under the sand. My question is – why didn’t she strike that? If 
she slipped, by accident, from off the spit, she fell in where there’s a foothold 
at the bottom, at a depth that would barely cover her to the waist. She must 	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have waded out, or jumped out, into the Deeps beyond – or she wouldn’t be 
missing now. No accident sir! (p. 157) 
 
After addressing the reader with an opening speech, then allowing the 
witnesses to provide their testimonies, both Hartright and Blake return to offer 
further narratives of their own. Both return to address the reader at a crucial stage, 
when the truth is being uncovered. This gives both Hartright and Blake the 
opportunity to draw together all the fragmented pieces of the narrative and finally 
reveal the truth.  Throughout The Woman in White and The Moonstone, both 
protagonists maintain control over the narratives offered, as we can see from their 
footnotes, and they return at the end to draw all the evidence together and so reveal 
the truth, as advocates do in their closing speeches to juries. In his analysis of The 
Moonstone, D. A. Miller has drawn attention to a ‘master-voice’ which ‘in every 
crucial case,’ guides readers to ‘pass the same judgment’.96 By locating this ‘master-
voice’ in the various textual footnotes that Blake offers to supplement the narratives 
of others, Miller reveals what it is about the ‘master-voice’ which leads the reader of 
The Moonstone, and by extension The Woman in White, to ‘pass the same judgment’: 
namely, the ‘master-voice[’s]’ skilled presentation of evidence, as I have been 
arguing. Moreover, as both Hartright and Blake’s advocacy is, in the end, successful, 
both The Woman in White and The Moonstone can be read as finally endorsing 
skilled advocacy as an effective means of representing reality and revealing the truth, 
despite their exploration of the limitations the legal process faces. Jenny Bourne 
Taylor has also noted how Hartright takes on two roles in the text, that of ‘specific 
narrator’ and that of ‘general editor’. For Taylor, this produces a ‘hierarchical order’ 
of narratives with those Hartright produces as ‘general editor’ at the top of that 	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hierarchy.97 Interestingly, Taylor reads Hartright’s ‘general editor’ narratives as 
‘claiming the legally and empirically verifiable authority of the truth’, and so reveals 
the fundamental importance of the narrative authority which Hartright gains from his 
utilisation of adversarial-evidentiary representational practices, from his function as 
an advocate.98    
Whilst D. A. Miller persuasively argues that the legal analogy made by 
Collins has ‘limited pertinence’, the advocacy of Hartright and Blake ensures this 
analogy remains significant throughout both The Woman in White and The 
Moonstone.99 The identification of Hartright’s and Blake’s roles at this meta-textual 
level transforms the narrative as a whole into a strong representation of their 
particular version of the truth. Within the novel’s plot these characters go in search 
of the evidence they need for the truth to emerge, but in their role as advocates they 
carefully piece together and arrange all the evidence into a connected narrative that 
persuades the reader of its truth. As such, these narratives do not just mimic the 
adversarial-evidentiary truth-seeking model, they embrace it, and in so doing 
ultimately affirm that model as the most effective means of establishing the truth of 
disputed facts and, in literature, the most effective way of representing reality. In her 
study In the Secret Theatre of the Home, Jenny Bourne Taylor examines the ways in 
which Collins’s narratives explore the subjective processes of the conscious mind. 
Not unlike Miller and Knoepflmacher, Taylor also views the reader as being drawn 
into the subjective interpretive process, experiencing, as the ‘subjective narrating 
consciousness’ does, the struggle ‘to separate thoughts, to distinguish between valid 	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and delusory perceptions, to doubt whether one can trust the evidence of the 
senses’.100 The focus of Taylor’s study is on the relationship between nineteenth-
century psychology and Collins’s sensation narratives, and how they exploit the 
tenuous balance between mid-nineteenth-century psychology’s simultaneous 
‘fascination with the apparently irrational workings of the mind and the urge to 
regulate and control them’.101 A major focus of Taylor’s study is the ways in which 
Collins’s narratives highlight ‘the truth’s subjective construction even as [they] prove 
it’, and as such engage with nineteenth-century psychological theories, experiments 
and ideas.102 For Taylor, the interest in Collins’s work therefore lies in the ways in 
which narratives like The Moonstone ‘highlight the shifting and provisional nature of 
evidence and the arbitrary and unreliable nature of memory’ and the ‘relative 
inaccessibility of the past’.103 However, whilst Collins’s narratives no doubt do 
underscore the ‘truth’s subjective construction’, they nonetheless still attempt to 
reconstruct that truth, as Taylor herself notes.104 The question which Collins’s 
narratives often pose is: given the subjective and often dubious nature of perception, 
interpretation, and memory, can the truth be recovered in any meaningful way? The 
Woman in White and The Moonstone both emphatically suggest that through the 
adversarial-evidentiary trial model, it can be.  
 
The Adversarial-Evidentiary Model: A More Effective Novelistic 
Representational Mode? 
If, as Peter Brooks suggests, what is so appealing about the nineteenth-century novel 
is that it offers readers a sense of mastery over reality, then any such sense must in 	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part be derived from the very fact that representation is even possible in the first 
place. Within the pages of a novel, the reader is given a version of reality which they 
can, as Brooks puts it, ‘hold up to inspection, understand’, and which therefore 
provides them with a sense that the often confusing reality around them is capable of 
comprehension: as Raymond Williams puts it, that their reality is ‘essentially 
knowable in communicable ways’.105 In its attempts to represent reality, the 
nineteenth-century novel becomes a part of wider contemporary discussions 
concerning the effectiveness of representational methods which seek to communicate 
information to others, something with which the criminal jury trial was equally 
concerned.   
For Lyn Pykett, there is a connection to be drawn between the development 
of the sensation genre and a crisis in narrative authority at mid-century due to a 
decline of the knowable community.106 As the traditional signifiers through which 
people interpret the world and gain an understanding of themselves and others within 
it shift and change (class boundaries, for example, become more fluid), so the act of 
representation becomes increasingly difficult. Within a knowable community it made 
sense to base representational practices on a model of knowing that privileged the 
revelation and judgement of character. Such representational methods become 
increasingly difficult to maintain once that type of community begins to decline in 
the face of rapid and unavoidable social change and, as Raymond Williams puts it, 
‘what it means to live in a community’ becomes less and less certain.107 
Throughout Collins’s novels, for example, characters are quite easily able to 
conceal secrets about themselves from others, and not only the villains but the heroes 	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as well. In Armadale (1866) for example, Ozias Midwinter conceals his true name 
from his friend Allan; in No Name (1862) the Vanstones are able to conceal from 
their own children the fact they are unmarried, and in The Law and the Lady (1875), 
Eustace Woodville hides his real name from his wife to prevent her finding out he 
has been tried for murder. As Winifred Hughes has suggested, Collins’s fiction is 
representative of that isolating modern existence where concealment and secrets are 
the norm.108 Such fiction appears a long way from Austen’s knowable communities, 
or the organic unity and functionality of Trollope’s Barsetshire. Whilst there may 
exist pockets of meaningful familial and social ties, such ties are easily torn apart by 
events outside the control of individual characters. In The Moonstone, Rachel 
becomes totally cut off from both her mother and her lover after the events of the 
novel place her in a situation in which she feels unable to confide in them. The 
alienation of characters from one another is mirrored in their surroundings: 
Our house is high up on the Yorkshire Coast, and close by the sea. We have 
got beautiful walks all around us, in every direction but one […] The sand-
hills here run down to the sea, and end in two spits of rock jutting out 
opposite each other. […] Between the two, shifting backwards and forwards 
at certain seasons of the year, lies the most horrible quicksand on the shores 
of Yorkshire. At the turn of the tide, something goes on in the unknown deeps 
below […] A lonesome and horrid retreat I tell you! No boat ever ventures 
into the bay. No children from our fishing village, called Cobb’s Hole, ever 
come to play here. The very birds of the air, as it seems to me, give the 
Shivering Sand a wide berth. (The Moonstone, pp. 22-23) 
 
On one side, an archway, broken through a wall, led into the fruit-garden. On 
the other, a terrace of turf led to ground on a lower level, laid out as an Italian 
garden. Wandering past the fountains and statues, Allan reached another 
shrubbery, winding its way apparently to some remote part of the grounds. 
Thus far, not a human creature had been visible or audible anywhere.109 
 
At Aldborough, as elsewhere on this coast, local traditions are, for the most 	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part, traditions which has been literally drowned. The site of the old town, 
once a populous and thriving port, has almost entirely disappeared in the sea. 
[…] Thrust back year after year by the advancing waves, the inhabitants have 
receded, in the past century, to the last morsel of land which is firm enough to 
be built on – a strip of ground hemmed in between marsh on one side and the 
sea on the other.110 
 
This last quotation from No Name in particular evokes the idea of the knowable 
community having declined, as it is literally forced to retreat by the changing world 
around it. As Pykett suggests, then, the sensation genre responds to the crisis in 
narrative authority which this decline in the knowable community creates, and 
represents a search for an alternative mode of representation. 
Sensation novelists, like other nineteenth-century novelists, still sought to 
create accurate representations of reality. I have already noted how Collins, for 
instance, like Dickens and Gaskell, would use his prefaces in order to authenticate 
certain plot points. The nineteenth-century preoccupation with creating accurate 
accounts of reality can also be seen in the magazine articles which were published 
alongside these novels. The articles in these magazines demonstrate a recognition 
and acceptance that the nineteenth century is one of rapid and inescapable social 
development. In an article entitled ‘Our Social Progression’ which appeared in the 
New Monthly Magazine during East Lynne’s publication, the extent and rate of the 
progression is made clear: ‘In mechanics, chemistry, and manufactures, our 
improvements ever marked progress, not regeneration. In engineering […] the 
English people stand prominent’.111 Further articles attempted to make sense of this 
new emerging social reality. Throughout East Lynne’s serialisation the New Monthly 
Magazine printed a whole series of articles on travel and exploration which aimed to 
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show the reader that reality was capable of being represented and understood. The 
desire to understand the world, to gain some total vision of reality which might be 
comprehended, is expressed neatly in an article entitled ‘A Holiday Tour in Spain By 
a Physician’, where the writer seeks to map the cities he visits for his reader and 
suggests that a full understanding of them is possible:  
When strangers visit any locality for the first time, in order to obtain a correct 
notion of its general outline, they cannot take a more judicious step than to 
mount some high building, or an adjacent elevation, from whence a bird’s eye 
view of the entire neighbourhood may be at once obtained.112 
 
The writer continues to provide a description of the city from the top of a cathedral 
tower. During the publication of The Woman in White and then The Moonstone, All 
The Year Round likewise published a variety of articles which aimed to illuminate 
and explain aspects of the reader’s world, from ‘Animal Intelligence’ to detailed 
scientific explanations of the solar eclipse.113  
Like the writers of these articles, sensation novelists were also responding to 
a desire for a means of representation that would be accurate and truthful. Sue 
Lonoff has noted how, in The Woman in White and The Moonstone, Collins was 
seeking ‘a structural solution to a problem in epistemology’ and tried to demonstrate 
that the multiple narrative technique would disclose ‘a knowledge of “the Truth”’.114 
The search for an alternative model of representation takes on added significance in 
novels which deal with mysteries and crime, for this subject matter raises questions 
about the process of representation, questions which involve such texts in the 
contemporary debate over the matter of representation in the courtroom. In the 
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sensation novels discussed here, the mystery plot exposes the problematic nature of 
representation, in particular the evidence-based representational practices employed 
in the courtroom. However, through this exploration the figure of the advocate 
emerges as the location of the most effective representations, and so the adversarial-
evidentiary trial model is upheld as the most effective representational mode. In The 
Woman in White and The Moonstone, this is taken further and the adversarial-
evidentiary model becomes the narrative method. The sensation novel, then, in its 
search for an alternative means of representing reality, moves away from traditional 
character-based approaches and towards one based on the careful presentation and 
scrutiny of evidence. 
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Chapter Four 
 
‘The Perfect Reasoning Machine’: The Advocacy of the Detective 
	  
There is an innate desire in all men to view the earth and its cities and planes 
from “exceeding high places,” since even the least imaginative can feel the 
pleasure of beholding some broad landscape spread out like a bright-coloured 
carpet at their feet, and of looking down upon the world, as though they 
scanned it with an eagle’s eye. For it is an exquisite treat to all minds to find 
that they have the power, by mere vision, of extending their consciousness to 
scenes and objects that are miles away; and as the intellect experiences a 
special delight in being able to comprehend all the minute particulars of a 
subject under one associate whole, and to perceive the previous confusion of 
the diverse details assume the form and order of a perspicuous unity; so does 
the eye love to see the country, or the town, which it usually knows only as a 
series of disjointed parts – as abstract fields, hills, rivers, parks, streets, 
gardens, or churches – become all combined, like the coloured fragments of a 
kaleidoscope, into one varied and harmonious scene.1 
 
Floating over London in a hot air balloon in 1862, Henry Mayhew reflects on the 
‘special delight’ the mind experiences when it is able to ‘comprehend all the minute 
particulars of a subject under one associate whole’.2 As Mayhew observes the vast 
cityscape from the air, he promises to render the ‘Great Metropolis’ comprehensible 
‘at one single glance’, creating from the ‘previous confusion of the diverse details’ a 
‘form and order of a perspicuous unity’.3 Throughout the piece, entitled ‘A Balloon 
View of London’, Mayhew’s descriptions impose a sense of order onto the sprawling 
city, ostensibly bringing this ‘strange conglomeration’ under control as he writes of a 
‘harmonious […] scene’ emerging from the ‘fragments of the kaleidoscope’.4  
Invoking the metaphor of London as a ‘monster’, Mayhew casts the city as a 
frightening, unfamiliar thing of chaos.5 Yet the piece as a whole works to subdue this 
threat, to tame this monster by demystifying it through the demonstration that, given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Henry	  Mayhew,	  ‘A	  Balloon	  View	  of	  London’,	  in	  Henry	  Mayhew	  and	  John	  Binny,	  The	  Criminal	  
Prisons	  of	  London,	  and	  Scenes	  of	  Prison	  Life	  (London:	  Griffin,	  Bohn,	  and	  Company,	  1862),	  pp.	  7-­‐10	  (	  p.	  7).	  2	  Ibid.	  3	  Ibid.	  pp.	  7-­‐9.	  4	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9	  and	  p.	  7.	  5	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	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the right vantage point, it is capable of being viewed and understood as ‘one 
associate whole’.6 Take, for instance, the following passage: 
the earth, with its tiny hills and plains and streams, assumed the appearance 
of the little coloured plaster models of countries. The bridges over the 
Thames were positively like planks; and the tiny black barges […] seemed no 
bigger than summer insects on the water. The largest meadows were about 
the size of green-baize table covers; and across these we could see the line of 
the South-Western Railway, with the little whiff of white steam issuing from 
some passing engine, and no greater in volume than the jet of vapour from an 
ordinary tea-kettle.7 
 
The description of the London landscape in familiar and domestic terms such as 
‘planks’, ‘table covers’, and ‘tea-kettles’ instantly makes the cityscape familiar and 
unimposing, something which is comprehensible and communicable in everyday 
terms. On reading this passage one is reminded of Peter Brooks’s analysis of how the 
novel functions to provide the reader with a sense of mastery over their world, 
Mayhew’s descriptions recalling the analogy Brooks makes between the novel and 
the scale model which allows us to ‘bind and organize the complex and at times 
overwhelming energies of the world outside us’.8 Like the scale model, Mayhew’s 
piece offers readers a coherent picture of a city otherwise a ‘confusion’ of ‘diverse 
details’.9 
The position of Mayhew in the basket of the hot air balloon provides him 
with a privileged vantage point not unlike that of the omniscient narrator, who offers 
to show the reader their world in understandable terms. At one point, Mayhew 
describes his viewpoint as that of an ‘angel’, and ‘A Balloon View of London’ 
culminates with the suggestion that above the confusing ‘hubbub’ of everyday ‘petty 
jealousies and heart-burnings, small ambitions and vain parade of “polite society”’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid.,	  p.7.	  7	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  8-­‐9.	  8	  8 Peter Brooks, Realist Vision (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p.1.	  9	  Mayhew,	  ‘A	  Balloon	  View’,	  p.	  7.	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there exists an ‘Elysian destiny’: Mayhew not only offers to show the reader their 
world in understandable terms, he hints that it might be meaningful too.10 In this 
way, Mayhew’s design mirrors that of the Victorian novelist who ‘offers to show 
people and their relationships’ (and so by extension the world in which they live), ‘in 
essentially knowable and communicable ways’ as Raymond Williams and Peter 
Brooks suggest.11  
Both Raymond Williams and Lyn Pykett have linked the decline of the 
knowable community to a crisis in narrative authority which occurs at mid-century, a 
crisis which Pykett has identified as crucial to the development of sensation fiction 
and its alternative mode of representation.12 As chapter three argued, the alternative 
representational methods employed in a number of sensation narratives mirror those 
adversarial-evidentiary methods used in felony trials post-1836. In contrast to texts 
which continued to rely upon a character-based model of representation when its 
epistemological foundation was being called increasingly into question, the sensation 
narratives discussed in this thesis demonstrate that an alternative mode of 
representation – one which moved away from relying on the knowledge and 
revelation of character – could still provide readers with the sense that contemporary 
reality, however confusing it might appear, was still understandable in ‘essentially 
knowable and communicable ways’.  
It has been my intention to show that the introduction of the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act in 1836 not only had a deep impact on the shape and nature of the 
criminal trial but that it was also deeply influential in the development of sensation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	  
11 See Brooks, Realist Vision, Ch. 1, and Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), quotation at p. 165. 
12 See Raymond Williams, The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence (London: Hogarth, 1984), 
Ch. 1, and Lyn Pykett, The Sensation Novel: From The Woman in White to The Moonstone 
(Plymouth: Northcote House, 1994), p. 39. 
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fiction’s narrative style. I included in my discussions of sensation fiction Wilkie 
Collins’s The Moonstone, a novel that is often referred to and discussed as a 
detective novel.13 Criticism of detective fiction will often include a chapter or section 
on sensation narratives, and many novels typically classified as sensational could 
arguably be categorised as examples of detective fiction: Robert Audley’s 
investigations in Lady Audley’s Secret or Valeria Woodville’s detective work in The 
Law and the Lady, for example, could easily identify these novels as detective 
stories. The fact is that a good deal of sensation fiction contains a detective element. 
The protagonists usually carry out this detective work, but sometimes an official 
detecting agent (like Cuff in The Moonstone) is introduced to search for clues. Such 
detective work tends to perform a supplementary role, functioning to provide the 
evidence that can then be interpreted and presented in a coherent narrative that 
purports to be a representation of the truth.14 However, as some evidence can only be 
unearthed through the act of detection, this act becomes fundamental to the final 
representation made. In terms of this thesis, this is significant because, as the 
representational methods of sensation narratives were influenced by adversarial-
evidentiary trial practices, and as the detective element of the sensation novel marks 
it out as forming part of the detective story’s history, then the influence of the 
Prisoner’s Counsel Act on nineteenth-century fiction may well extend beyond the 
sensation novel and to the detective stories which flourished in the late nineteenth 
century. It is this impact of the 1836 Act that I will be exploring in this chapter, with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Genre boundaries are never rigid and hard and fast categorisation of novels is often difficult. I chose 
to include The Moonstone in my discussion of sensation fiction as its construction matched that of The 
Woman in White and so its analysis was best suited to that chapter. Also, whilst the detective element 
is prominent in this novel, it still bears the hallmarks of the sensation genre: a mystery at the heart of 
the middle-class home, a middle-class villain with a secret, as well as sensational details such as a 
legendary cursed diamond. 
14 In The Woman in White and The Moonstone this is more patently done through the provision of the 
various witness testimonies that are controlled by Hartright and Blake, but in the other instances the 
narratives themselves, as I argued I chapter three, functioned as what Welsh terms ‘strong 
representations’.  
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particular emphasis on how the rise of adversarial advocacy following its enactment 
helped both to shape the Sherlock Holmes formula and to secure its success.  
 
Crime, the Criminal, and the Threat to Narrative Order and Meaning 
Throughout the nineteenth century, crime remained a popular and recurring theme in 
fiction. In novels that purported to be accurate representations of reality which 
promised the reader that the world in which they lived was capable of being narrated 
in comprehensible and meaningful ways, the portrayal of crime takes on an added 
significance because it challenges the value system that provides the framework 
within which the reader interprets the text. The rise of the novel in the nineteenth 
century is closely linked to the rise and consolidation of the middle-classes, who 
became its predominant audience.15 The traditional nineteenth-century novel is 
consequently underpinned by a value system which coincides with that of the typical 
reader. As such the novel appears to that reader as an accurate representation of the 
world in which they live because it inscribes reality with meaning in terms they 
understand, as epitomised by the usual concluding marital or familial tableau. By the 
novel’s close, therefore, the readers feel reassured that the world is ordered in terms 
they understand.  
Crime represents a challenge to the middle-class norms endorsed by such 
novels and so threatens to disrupt the hermeneutic process if it is not successfully 
circumvented. During the first half of the nineteenth century, crime in novels was 
typically presented as a class problem. The threat of crime in such novels was one 
that, whilst very real, was nonetheless a challenge from outside the middle-class 
social milieu and so could be both identified and conceptually contained. Novels of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is the argument Ian Watt makes in The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and 
Fielding (London: Hogarth Press, 1987 [1957]). 
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the period which deal with working-class crime tend to be primarily interested in 
examining the conditions which produced that criminality in the first place, rather 
than addressing questions such as how the criminal might be identified and brought 
to justice. In Oliver Twist (1837-9), for example, the concern is not with how the 
guilt of Fagin, Sikes or Dodger might be proven but instead with providing the space 
for Dickens to explore social issues. Similarly in Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1848), the 
main emphasis of the murder storyline is not an exploration of how one might best 
identify the real killer, but rather an examination into the desperate social and 
working conditions that can lead to such actions, and how this might be remedied.16 
By writing in these terms, the novelist makes sense of crime in terms the middle-
class reader understands: crime is essentially a working-class problem created by 
poverty, immorality, idleness, social ills, poor environment and so on. If crime can 
be explained in a way which chimes with a worldview that the reader recognises and 
subscribes to, then its threat to the reader’s interpretive framework is neutralised, and 
the reality which the novel presents continues to appear as one that is accurately 
represented.  
In contrast to this portrayal of crime, the sensation novel (which reached the 
height of its popularity in the 1860s) concentrated its interest on the criminal who 
either belonged to, or had infiltrated, the ranks of the middle and sometimes upper 
classes.17 The focus on crimes and mysteries that occurred within the middle-class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The drawing of lots to decide on who is to become the killer of Carson Junior serves to highlight the 
total erosion of any meaningful relationships between master and servant. The final deathbed tableau 
of John Barton dying in the arms of the father of his victim, suggests that only through the 
establishment of meaningful working relationships built on responsibility, understanding and mutual 
respect, can suffering such as that depicted in the novel be remedied.  
17 As discussed in chapter two, the growing interest in the middle-class criminal can be explained by 
an increased awareness of their existence due to newspaper reporting of high-profile and sensational 
cases which involved this class of criminals, and also because, as Martin Wiener has suggested, the 
success of the measures introduced to deal with the problem of low-class crime during the first half of 
the century, such as the introduction of the metropolitan police force, threw middle-class criminality 
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Victorian home presented a more complex problem for novels dealing with crime to 
address, for suddenly the criminal threatened to remain unidentified and so 
unexplained. A recurring concern in sensation fiction is how the identity of the 
criminal is to be ascertained and exposed. On one level, the sensation novel’s 
engagement with the question of how criminals can be identified when they no 
longer conform to class stereotypes simply reflects contemporary fears relating to an 
increased public focus on crimes committed within middle-class and family settings. 
Understood in this sense, the final exposure and punishment of the villains (and the 
subsequent re-establishment of Victorian middle-class norms at the end of the 
narrative) functions to reassure the reader that no matter who the criminal is, they 
can and always will be exposed and punished.18 That said, the focus on the middle-
class criminal has a wider significance when the sensation novel is read, as Pykett 
reads it, as a response to a crisis in narrative authority.  
In novels that deal with crime – especially those which, like sensation fiction, 
have a crime or mystery at their centre – the identification of the criminal becomes 
crucial not only because it enables punishment and the restoration of social order, but 
also because it re-establishes the reader’s sense that the world is reliably knowable, 
as the criminal and their behaviour is decoded in terms the reader understands.19 
Heather Worthington has noted how nineteenth-century literature demonstrates an 
increasing interest in motive.20 This increasing interest in motive is a symptom of the 
wider desire to restore and maintain a sense of order through understanding. If the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
into focus as the new concern. See Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and 
Policy in England, 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 6. 
18 D. A. Miller has read the exposure and punishment of the criminal and the restoration of order as 
performing a disciplinary function on the body of the reader. See, D. A. Miller, The Novel and the 
Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
19 Lady Audley is labelled as ‘mad’ for example, thus containing her threat by marking her as an 
anomaly. 
20 Heather Worthington, The Rise of the Detective in Early Nineteenth-Century Popular Fiction 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 19-20. 
	  	  
213 
motive of a criminal can be ascertained, if they can be understood as being motivated 
by greed, jealousy, or driven to desperation by cruelty or neglect, if they can be 
identified as being ‘mad’ as is Lady Audley, then they immediately become less 
threatening because the seeming chaos which is caused by their actions becomes 
capable of being explained in understandable terms, and so order and meaning 
become capable of recovery.21 
My contention here is lent support by Vicky Greenaway’s illuminating 
analysis of The Woman in White in her essay ‘The Italian, The Risorgimento, and 
Romanticism in Little Dorrit and The Woman in White’.22 Greenaway examines how 
the opening of The Woman in White presents a world of ‘dislocated meanings’ and 
epistemological disruption, strikingly portrayed in Walter’s encounter with the 
woman in white on the lonely highway; Anne Catherick at this point appears as a 
‘released signified un-anchored by a signifier’, her whiteness indicating a ‘lack of 
inscribed meaning’.23 Greenaway notes how the novel’s crime (the theft of Laura’s 
identity) results in hermeneutic chaos caused by the separation of the signifier from 
its signified, and how the plot therefore follows the attempts to reunite the rightful 
owner with their rightful name so that order and meaning can be restored by the 
novel’s end. In particular, Greenaway’s analysis reveals just how significant the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 A number of critics have noted the order the detective is able to offer in the face of a chaotic world 
of seeming unrest. See, for example, G. K. Chesterton, ‘A Defence of Detective Stories’, in The Art of 
the Mystery Story, ed. by Howard Haycraft (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1983 [1946]), pp. 3-6; Ian A. 
Bell, ‘Eighteenth-Century Crime Writing’, in The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by 
Martin Priestman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 7-18; Rosemary Jann, The 
Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: Detecting Social Order (New York: Twayne, 1995); and Joseph A. 
Kestner, Sherlock’s Men: Masculinity, Conan Doyle and Cultural History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 
where Kestner notes how the first two Holmes stories appeared during a time of ‘stark unrest’ (p. 40); 
and Judith Walkowitz has noted how the stories which circulated about the ‘Jack the Ripper’ killings 
focused not only on the identity of the murderer but also on the ‘meanings of his murders’: Judith R. 
Walkowitz, City of Dreadful delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late Victorian London (London: 
Virago Press, 1992), p. 3 (my emphasis). 
22 Vicky Greenaway, ‘The Italian, The Risorgimento, and Romanticism in Little Dorrit and The 
Woman in White’, Browning Society Notes, 33 (2008), 40-59. 
<http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.8820003&xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=lion&rft_
id=xri:lion:ft:abell:R04057061:0> [accessed 3 July 2012] 
23 Ibid., (para. 6 of 44). 
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identification of the criminal is to this process, especially the identification of Fosco 
who ‘evades hermeneutically in order to evade moral and legal closures of criminal 
meaning’.24 The identification of Fosco with his crimes becomes crucial in order that 
he might be punished so that he and his ‘associated sphere of criminality’ might be 
‘brought into order and control’.25 Only once this is achieved can the novel be 
brought to a resolution, and Victorian norms and values be re-established so that, as 
Greenaway puts it, Walter can emerge as an ‘effective [agent] of meaning in relation 
to [his] society’ as a husband and father.26 The Woman in White, and other sensation 
novels that focus on the identification of the criminal, microcosmically reflect a 
wider concern with accurately representing reality in understandable and meaningful 
ways. The difficulty of the task of identifying the criminal, and so bringing him into 
‘order and control’, mirrors the problems the author faces when attempting to bring 
reality into order and control within the text.27 
As I argued in chapters two and three, the sensation novel’s means of 
bringing about narrative control and so providing textual meaning was by employing 
those representational methods used in adversarial-evidentiary criminal trials. As 
noted above, a number of sensation novels are often cited and analysed as examples 
of detective fiction. In fact Greenaway’s analysis of The Woman in White focuses on 
what she terms its ‘detective plot’, drawing on Tzvetan Todorov’s ‘The Typology of 
Detective Fiction’ where he analyses the detective story’s narrative construction in 
terms of fabula and sjuzet.28 Todorov’s analysis identifies in detective fiction the 
telling of two different tales, firstly the tale of the crime which he equates to fabula 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., (para. 28 of 44). 
25 Ibid., (para. 33 of 44). 
26 Ibid., (para. 14 of 44). 
27 For Greenaway, the novel’s crime mirrors The Woman in White’s larger concern with aesthetic 
separation.  
28 Ibid. 
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(often translated as ‘story’, and referring to the order of events as they 
chronologically occurred), and secondly, the tale of the investigation process which 
Todorov equates to sjuzet (often translated as ‘plot’ and referring to the order in 
which the events are narrated). The detective story’s sjuzet is therefore concerned 
with the process of reconstruction, of piecing together clues to past events so that the 
detective fabula might be revealed.29 The analysis of detective fiction in these terms 
demonstrates just how closely allied this sort of fiction is with the criminal trial 
process, which similarly seeks to reconstruct a narrative of past events so that the 
truth might be uncovered. This, taken together with the fact that the sensation novel 
played a significant role in the detective genre’s development, indicates that the 
popular late nineteenth-century detective stories which were included in many 
middle-class magazines (perhaps most famously The Strand) were also significantly 
influenced by the adversarial-evidentiary model of narration which was introduced 
into felony trials by the Prisoner’s Counsel Act.30  
Whenever one thinks of nineteenth-century detective fiction, one name 
immediately springs to mind: Sherlock Holmes. In Crime Fiction 1800-2000 Stephen 
Knight claims that ‘intriguing and memorable as some of the nineteenth-century 
detectives were, there is only one great detective’.31 There are many who would 
agree with Knight, and as he points out, Ian Ousby even postulated that Holmes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Tzvetan Todorov, ‘The Typology of Detective Fiction’, in The Poetics of Prose (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1977), pp. 42-53. 
30 Stephen Knight, for example, in Crime Fiction 1800-2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), includes a section on sensation fiction in chapter two ‘The Development of Detection’. See 
also LeRoy Lad Panek, Before Sherlock Holmes: How Magazines and Newspapers Invented the 
Detective Story (London: McFarland, 2011); Heather Milton, ‘Sensation and Detection’, in A 
Companion to Sensation Fiction, ed. by Pamela Gilbert (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), pp. 516-
527; and Robert P. Ashley, ‘Wilkie Collins and the Detective Story’, Nineteenth-Century Literature, 6 
(June 1951), 47-60. 
31 Knight, Crime Fiction, p. 55. 
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might be ‘the most famous character in English literature’.32 The enduring popularity 
of Holmes is clear from his repeated adaptation onto stage and screen.33 Throughout 
the nineteenth century there were many fictional detectives created and some, like 
Holmes, enjoyed investigating serial cases, from William Russell’s police officer 
Thomas Waters in Recollections of a Detective Police-Officer (1849-1853) to C. L. 
Pirkis’s The Experiences of Loveday Brooke, Lady Detective (1893-1894).34 Whilst 
this chapter will examine a number of nineteenth-century detectives, the 
overwhelming popularity of Sherlock Holmes in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century (and beyond) merits particular attention and so a discussion of the Holmes 
canon will conclude this chapter. A good deal of careful and illuminating critical 
analysis has already gone into examining just why Holmes was, and still is, such a 
popular and memorable detective hero. What is lacking from this criticism, however, 
is an assessment of how the success of the Holmes formula is in part attributable to 
the influence of the 1836 Prisoner’s Counsel Act and surrounding debates. An 
examination of the Sherlock Holmes stories within this context sheds further light on 
our understanding of the appeal of this iconic detective.  
Linking detective fiction to the aims of ‘realism’, John M. Reilly notes how 
in focusing on crime ‘which due to the economic conditions and social relations in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid. Quotation taken from Ian Ousby, Bloodhounds of Heaven: The Detective in English Fiction 
from Goodwin to Doyle (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 140. 
33 The latest BBC adaptation Sherlock (2010-2012), starring Benedict Cumberbatch as the famous 
private consulting detective, sees Holmes transported to modern day London, and the show’s 
popularity clearly demonstrates that Holmes’s appeal remains unabated for contemporary audiences. 
The idea of a modern day Holmes has also found success in CBS’s Elementary (2012) with Jonny Lee 
Miller taking the role of the detective. Also, the films Sherlock Holmes (2009) and Sherlock Holmes: 
A Game of Shadows (2011), starring Robert Downey Jr. as Holmes were box office hits. 
34 Recollections of a Detective Police-Officer by ‘Waters’ is attributed to journalist William Russell, 
the stories were first published in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal from July 1849 – September 1853 
under the title Recollections of a Police-Officer. It was later made available in volume form under the 
title Recollections of a Detective Police-Officer in 1856.Whilst the stories were written post the 1842 
creation of the detective police force, the tales are set at an earlier time and Waters is just a plain 
metropolitan police officer. Loveday Brooke’s experiences were first serialised in the Ludgate 
Monthly from February to July 1893, with one final story being published under the magazine’s new 
title The Ludgate Illustrated Magazine in March 1894. The series was published as a collection in 
1894. 
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industrial cities’ became a ‘new, modern problem’, the detective story ‘represented 
an effort to comprehend a problem that demanded new routes to understanding and 
control’.35 Here Reilly identifies in detective fiction, as Pykett identifies in sensation 
fiction, a new awareness that for ‘understanding and control’ to be created by 
narratives ‘new routes’ were needed which were suitable for a rapidly changing and 
increasingly complex society. As I argued in chapter three, sensation novels which 
employed an adversarial-evidentiary narrative method presented an alternative 
representational mode to the character-focused representational practices that had 
traditionally been employed in novels. However, despite the success of this 
alternative narrative mode, the sensation novel in a number of cases leaves two 
unsatisfactorily resolved issues which threaten to disrupt the text’s final affirmation 
of the efficacy of the adversarial-evidentiary model. These two issues, I will argue, 
are finally resolved satisfactorily by the Sherlock Holmes stories, which affirm once 
more the efficacy of the adversarial-evidentiary model. In order to fully understand 
the context in which the creation of Holmes occurred it will be necessary to trace the 
development of literary detection through the nineteenth century. 
 
Providential Detection and The Newgate Calendar 
Sherlock Holmes did not emerge in a vacuum; his creation was the result of a 
century’s worth of evolution. It is not my intention to provide a full history of the 
intricate and complex development of detective fiction during the nineteenth century: 
such a task would be a thesis in itself.36 Nevertheless, it is necessary that some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 John M. Reilly, ‘Conventions of Realism’, in The Oxford Companion to Crime and Mystery 
Writing, ed. by Catherine Aird and John. M. Rielly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 375. 
36 For a full account of the development of detective fiction in the early nineteenth century, see 
Worthington’s Rise of the Detective. For a sense of the range of critical approaches that have been 
applied to detective fiction see, for example, The Poetics of Murder: Detective Fiction and Literary 
Theory, ed. by Glenn W Most and William W. Stowe (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 
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aspects of its development be discussed in so far as they can help illuminate my 
analysis of the Holmes stories here, and nineteenth-century detective fiction more 
generally. In particular, the extent to which Divine Providence plays a role in crime 
fiction is significant here. In a good deal of nineteenth-century crime fiction a tension 
emerges between the text’s desire to reveal that the criminal is capable of exposure 
through ordinary human means (primarily the interpretation of evidence) and the 
extent to which Providence is relied upon to bring the culprit to justice.37 Through 
the nineteenth century there is a gradual erosion of this reliance on Providence to 
punish malefactors, and a growing emphasis on human agency to ensure that justice 
is done in fiction which centres on crime. This shift in emphasis demonstrates an 
increasing faith in crime fiction in the efficacy of the post-1836 felony trial process. 
The faith which the sensation novel placed in the adversarial-evidentiary trial model 
can also be identified in the detective story and, as this chapter will show, is equally 
crucial to our understanding of this genre of fiction. 
Stories about crimes and criminals had been popular long before the 
nineteenth century began. During the eighteenth century broadside accounts of the 
latest dramatic crimes, and of the punishment of the criminals who perpetrated them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Laura Marcus, ‘Detection and Literary Fiction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, 
ed. by Martin Priestman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 245-267. Other useful 
collections of critical essays include: Two Centuries of Detective Fiction: A New Comparative 
Approach, ed. by Maurizio Ascari (Cotepra: University of Bologna, 2000); Nineteenth-Century 
Suspense: From Poe to Conan Doyle, ed. by Clive Bloom and others (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1988); Detective Fiction: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Robin W. Winks (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980); The Art of the Mystery Story, ed. by Howard Haycraft (New York: Carroll & 
Graf, 1983 [1946]); The Art of Murder: New Essays on Detective Fiction, ed. by H. Gustav Klaus and 
Stephen Knight (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 1998). See also Andrew Radford, ‘Victorian Detective 
Fiction’, Literature Compass, 5 (2008), 1179-1196. 
37 Stephen Knight has noted how in the Newgate Calendar Providence often aids detection, usually 
through the awakening of a Christian conscience in the culprit. This sense of guilt causes the culprit to 
act rashly, in a way which aids detection. Knight also refers to the Calendar’s ‘unconcerned use of 
chance’ rooted in a Christian faith: Stephen Knight, ‘The Newgate Calendar’, in Two Centuries of 
Detective Fiction: A New Comparative Approach, ed. by Maurizio Ascari (Cotepra: University of 
Bologna, 2000), pp. 17-28 (pp. 19-21, quotation at p. 20). LeRoy Lad Panek has noted how this 
commitment to a ‘Providential universe’ is also to be found in the Newgate novels: Panek, Before 
Sherlock Holmes, p. 4. Panek’s study reveals the decline of Providence in crime fiction, and its 
gradual replacement with the detective figure and his increasing reliance on evidence.	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were immensely popular. Such accounts offered the reader both the excitement of 
reading about the crime itself and the symbolic assertion of state power over the 
criminal body in the violent spectacle of the scaffold. The popularity of broadside 
accounts continued into the nineteenth century and, together with other popular 
forms of literature which took crime as its subject, such as street ballads and ‘cocks’, 
they offered accounts of crime and punishment up to the public as a form of 
entertainment.38 Such literature was aimed at the working classes, but, as Richard 
Altick has observed, such accounts would also be read by the middle and upper-
classes as ‘the passion for real-life murder […] prevailed as well by the firesides of 
the middle class and […] more covertly in the stately halls of the aristocracy’.39  
The popularity of crime stories can be seen in the success of The Newgate 
Calendar. The Newgate Calendar began in the eighteenth century as a monthly 
report of executions which was put together by the Ordinary of Newgate Prison. The 
Calendar detailed both the crimes committed by those executed and the story of their 
capture. Initially these reports appeared as cheap pamphlets which would also be put 
into more expensive small collections, but eventually they would be published 
together in anthologies by publishers who were responding to the popularity of and 
demand for crime narratives. The first large collection (in five volumes) appeared in 
1773, and its popularity led to several reprints and further editions during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.40  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 ‘Cocks’ are ‘accounts which may have had their origins in fact, but over time and with repeated 
publication came to be regarded as fictional’ (Worthington, p. 12). For a more detailed account of 
early street crime literature see Worthington, Ch. 1, and Beth Kalikoff, Murder and Moral Decay in 
Victorian Popular Literature (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986). For examples of the 
Broadsides see A Collection of Miscellaneous Broadsides, Consisting Chiefly of Almanacks and 
Accounts of Criminal Trials 1801-1858, which is held in the British Library.  
39 Richard D. Altick, Victorian Studies in Scarlet: Murders and Manners in the Age of Victoria (New 
York: Norton, 1970), p. 42.  
40 See further Knight, Crime Fiction, pp. 5-6; Lyn Pykett, ‘The Newgate Novel and Sensation Fiction 
1830-1868’, in The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by Martin Priestman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 19-39 (p. 20); Panek, Before Sherlock Holmes, pp. 11-13. 
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The Newgate Calendar was aimed at a more educated reader than the 
broadside accounts, but it nonetheless fulfilled a similar policing function by warning 
the reader that criminal transgressions would be violently punished, as Knight and 
Worthington have pointed out.41 However, a large part of the appeal of the Calendar 
accounts was that they offered the reader the excitement of reading about crime 
whilst at the same time providing them with the security of knowing that the criminal 
had been successfully caught and punished. This dual function of the Calendar 
stories is demonstrated by the title page to the 1824 edition which claims to contain 
the ‘interesting memoirs of the most notorious characters’ whilst at the same time 
reassuring the reader that they have safely ‘been convicted’ for the outrages they 
perpetrated.42 Indeed, the title itself inscribes this dyad, with ‘Newgate’ as a 
synecdoche for violent crime and ‘calendar’ suggesting the idea of a conceptual grid 
for ordering our understanding of those crimes. What is striking about The Newgate 
Calendar is that there generally appears no discussion of the guilt or innocence of 
those convicted, with the emphasis remaining firmly upon the exposition of the 
capture and punishment of that individual.  
The first story in the 1824 edition is that of clergyman Thomas Hunter, who 
was executed for the murder of two pupils. Hunter murdered the children after they 
caught him in carnal relations with a serving girl, and related what they had seen to 
their parents. Throughout the narrative, the barbarity of Hunter’s crime is stressed 
through its juxtaposition with the innocence of his victims whose throats he slit 
whilst ‘they were busied in catching butterflies, and gathering wild flowers’.43 There 
is no question of Hunter’s guilt; he commits the deed in broad daylight and is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Worthington, Rise of the Detective, Ch. 1, and Knight, Crime Fiction, Ch. 1. 
42 Andrew Knapp and William Baldwin, The Newgate Calendar (London: J. Robins & Co., 1824), 
Vol. 1. Knapp and Baldwin were lawyers and their editions of The Newgate Calendar are the most 
widely known. 
43 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 2-3. Further references to this edition will be given after quotations in the text. 
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witnessed in the act by members of the public who give chase and successfully 
apprehend him. The disciplinary function of the Calendar can be seen in the detailed 
description the narrative offers of his execution: 
The Sheriff now passed sentence on the convict, which was to the following 
purpose: that, on the following day, he should be executed on a gibbet, 
erected for that purpose, on the spot where he had committed the murders; 
but that, previous to the execution, his right hand should be cut off near the 
wrist; that he then should be drawn up to the gibbet by a rope; and, when he 
was dead, hung in chains between Edinburgh and Leith: the knife with which 
he committed the murders being stuck thro’ his hand, which should be 
advanced over his head, and fixed therewith to the top of the gibbet. Mr 
Hunter was executed, in strict conformity to the above sentence, on the 22nd 
of August 1700. (Vol. 1, p. 3) 
 
The detailed description of the criminal’s execution is common to the other Calendar 
stories and offers an expression of the state’s disciplinary power which serves as a 
warning to would-be miscreants and offers comfort to the reader. Interestingly, there 
is no demonstration of skill in identifying or capturing the criminal. Instead, 
reassurance that his eventual capture is inevitable is provided by the guiding hand of 
Providence, which is the primary aid in bringing the malefactors to justice. The 
stories are underpinned by a religious rhetoric which everywhere suggests that the 
guiding hand of God will aid in the apprehension and punishment of the criminal; in 
many instances the narrator even stresses the crime as one which offends against 
both the State and God. In Hunter’s case, his criminal acts are linked to his 
blasphemous atheist assertions and his ultimate end linked to the retribution of God:  
It is a shocking part of Hunter’s story that he was one of a society of 
abandoned young fellows, who occasionally assembled to ridicule the 
scriptures, and to make a mockery of the being and attributes of God! Is it 
then to be wondered that this wretch fell an example of the exemplary justice 
of Divine Providence? Perhaps a fate no less dreadful attended many of his 
companions: but, their histories have not reached our hands. There is 
something so indescribably shocking in denying the existence of that God “in 
whom we live, move, and have our being,” that it is amazing any man who 
feels that he did not create himself can be an Atheist. (Vol. 1, p. 4) 
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The narrative tone of The Newgate Calendar is one of confidence, confidence in the 
fact that the criminal will always be apprehended and justly punished. This 
confidence stems, in large part, from a faith that Providence will play its part as God 
guides the community to bring the criminal to justice, as seen in Hunter’s story.  
The reliance on, and faith in, Providence which runs throughout the Calendar 
stories also serves to dispel any discomfort the reader may feel about those criminals 
who refuse to confess. A large proportion of the Calendar stories follow the pattern: 
crime described, criminal captured, criminal confesses, criminal is punished. The 
criminal who fails to confess is cause for alarm, raising questions over whether the 
real culprit has been found. The Calendar stories manage this potential for 
unsatisfactory endings, which disrupt the notion of certainty of punishment of the 
correct individual, by reinforcing the idea of Divine Providence. This can be seen in 
the story of Michael and Catherine Van Berghen and Dromelius. 
Michael and Catherine Van Berghen are publicans who are found guilty of 
murdering and robbing a customer with the help of an accomplice, Dromelius. 
Michael and Catherine refuse to admit their guilt, even in the face of death. But 
rather than focus on the anxiety that this refusal to confess might cause and the 
questions it potentially raises over how guilt is to be determined, the text instead 
silences such disquiet with its authoritative tone which leaves no room for doubt: 
The denial by this unhappy couple of the crime, at the very moment their 
souls must appear before the Almighty and after such clear proof, on which a 
jury, one half composed of their own country-men, without hesitation found 
guilty, greatly adds to their turpitude (Vol. 1, p. 7). 
 
The narrative voice goes further, suggesting their capture was the work of God so 
that their guilt cannot be questioned: ‘in the discovery of this murder the intervention 
of Providence is obvious’ (Vol. 1, p. 7). The use of religious rhetoric is used to 
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detract from any questions which their denial of guilt might raise, and the narrative 
voice becomes almost threatening in its warning to the reader: ‘Let the righteous 
justice executed on the malefactors above mentioned inspire in the minds of our 
readers the force of the sixth commandment: “Thou shalt do no murder”’ (Vol. 1, p. 
7). 
In the Hunter and the Van Berghen cases, as elsewhere in the series, Divine 
Providence is the guiding hand that leads to the apprehension of the criminal by the 
community. Written in a time before the establishment of the new police, the 
community takes responsibility for the apprehension of its own criminals. In the Van 
Berghen case, when the victim’s body is found in the river, ‘several of the 
neighbours went to take a view of it and endeavoured to try if they could trace any 
blood to the place where the murder might have been committed’ (Vol. 1, p. 5), 
taking direct responsibility for seeking out the criminal who has offended against 
them. Likewise, in the Hunter case, after witnessing the murder, a local member of 
the community gets aid from other community members who take charge of 
apprehending Hunter. This policing by the community is usually guided, as in the 
cases cited above, by the hand of Divine Providence. Worthington has noted how 
one of the most prominent features of The Newgate Calendar stories is their 
insistence that crime is both ‘contained and containable’.44 The reliance which the 
narratives place on community detection aided by Providence reveal the Calendar 
stories to be very much a product of the social structure out of which they emerged in 
the eighteenth century: a structure based on the idea of small, knowable, 
communities. As Worthington and Knight have noted, The Newgate Calendar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 2. 
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belongs to a ‘pre-urban, pre-capitalist’ world.45  By the nineteenth century the textual 
strains begin to show. 
Within the Newgate Calendar the criminal is usually easily and comfortingly 
identified. However, in some of the stories published in later editions of the Newgate 
Calendar, a tension emerges between the desire to be certain that the correct person 
has been punished and a growing scepticism about the reliability of evidence. One 
telling story is that of a man convicted of murder on the strength of circumstantial 
evidence alone, after he was found holding a knife over the body of a murdered man. 
It is later discovered, through a death-bed confession, that the wrong man had been 
convicted and executed. The narrative recognises the potential problems surrounding 
evidence, warning jurymen to be ‘extremely guarded in receiving circumstantial 
evidence’ (Vol. 1, p. 459) and then tries assuage the anxiety which emerges from the 
revelation that an innocent man was convicted. The text negotiates this by arguing 
that the convicted man had in fact intended to commit the murder himself, only he 
had been beaten to it, which is why he was discovered with a knife by the body. In 
this way the text seeks to reassure the reader that, whilst the wrong man was 
executed, he was nonetheless still guilty of intent and so morally just as guilty (Vol. 
1, p. 459). Nevertheless, the text’s ‘explanation’ of the convicted man’s murderous 
intention is awkward and reads as though it were added on as an afterthought in 
anticipation of difficult questions relating to why an innocent man has been 
executed.  
A similar sense of uneasy resolution is apparent in the story of John Jennings, 
who was ‘executed for a robbery of which he was innocent’ after his master, ‘in 
order to screen himself from the vengeance of the law’, plants incriminating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 2, and Knight, Crime Fiction, pp. 7-8, quotation at p. 8. 
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evidence on his innocent employee (Vol. 1, p. 455). The real truth only comes to 
light when Jennings’s employer is convicted for another robbery and confesses to 
this first crime. In this case of fabricated evidence, the narrative voice can offer no 
comforting explanation. The text is comparatively short, alongside the other stories, 
which suggests a textual unease with what the story might signify: that the 
identification and apprehension of the criminal is no longer a simple matter which 
can be dealt with easily by communities. The inclusion of such stories within The 
Newgate Calendar reveals that, by the early nineteenth century, the reliance on 
divinely assisted community detection was no longer relevant in a society which 
was, as Knight puts it, ‘socially and economically a long way from the rural religious 
feudalism where these stories originated’. 46 As Worthington has highlighted, the old 
system of the discovery of crime was increasingly seen to be failing in an ever more 
urbanised, industrialised and secular world.47 Just as the appropriateness of the old 
‘accused speaks’ model of trial was called into question in the 1820s and 1830s, in 
the early years of the nineteenth century so too was the appropriateness of the old 
system of policing communities.  
 
Providence, Police, and the Emergence of the Literary Detective Hero 
In the eighteenth century the policing system in operation in England was one which, 
like the jury trial, had evolved over the centuries. It was by no means a coherent or 
uniform system across the country but, generally speaking, it operated at a local 
level. Each parish had an unpaid Justice of the Peace who was aided in his policing 
function by a Parish Constable who was also unpaid. The Parish Constable was a 
role which rotated between local property owners, though it was not uncommon for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Knight, Crime Fiction, p. 8.  
47 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 2. 
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paid substitutes to be brought in by those wishing to avoid this mandatory duty. In 
urban areas Parish Constables were often supplemented by watch forces who 
patrolled the streets and were paid a small salary, generally paid for by a tax on those 
whose interests they were protecting.48 This rudimentary policing system, which Ian 
Ousby has noted is best characterised by ‘a belief in the amateur’, began to meet with 
some reform in the second half of the eighteenth century.49 In 1749 at the Bow Street 
Magistrate’s office, John and Henry Fielding sought to bring a structure to policing 
and set up organised street patrols, as well as creating a detecting unit in the form of 
Bow Street Runners, a group of professional thief-takers who were formally attached 
to the Bow Street office.50 The success of this system saw it rolled out to seven more 
offices in 1792 by the Middlesex Justices Act.51  
As Heather Worthington has noted, the Bow Street force occupied an 
intermediate space ‘between the old, semi-feudal systems of policing and the new 
professionalised and state-controlled metropolitan police’ that was to be created in 
1829.52 Richmond: Scenes in the Life of a Bow Street Runner, Drawn up from his 
Private Memoranda (1827) offers a professional alternative to the community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ousby, Bloodhounds, pp. 4-9, and Haia Shpayer-Makov, The Ascent of the Detective: Police 
Sleuths in Victorian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 13-26. 
49 Ousby, Bloodhounds, p. 5. 
50 Thief-takers were private individuals who worked to capture criminals for rewards and were 
available for private hire. By the late eighteenth century thief-takers had gained a poor reputation for 
providing perjured testimonies so that they might help ensure a conviction and claim a reward. This 
view of the thief-taker was compounded by Jonathan Wild, a famous thief-taker who was discovered 
to be part of the very underworld he claimed to be combating. It turned out he had supervised many of 
the robberies he investigated, controlling gangs that worked out of his ‘lost property office’, set up to 
recover stolen goods. He was also involved in other criminal activities too. See further Ousby, 
Bloodhounds, pp. 13-18. 
51 I have attempted to provide a very brief overview of the state of policing at the start of the 
nineteenth century. Detailed histories and commentaries on the police in England can be found in 
Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England 1750-1900, 4th edn.  (Harlow: Pearson, 2010 [1987]), 
and Barry Godfrey and Paul Lawrence, Crime and Justice 1750-1950 (Cullompton: Willian 
Publishing, 2005). Ian Ousby also provides a useful summary in Bloodhounds, Ch. 1.  
52 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 104. 
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detection that was relied upon in The Newgate Calendar.53 Richmond follows the 
adventures of its eponymous hero who, after running away with a travelling band of 
actors and then spending time in the company of gypsies, joins the Bow Street 
Runners. As a Runner, Richmond protects the innocent and pursues the guilty but, as 
Worthington points out, Richmond’s detective work ‘follows a simplistic pattern of 
crime, pursuit and capture of the criminal’ which is ‘closer to The Newgate Calendar 
pattern of crime followed by capture of the criminal than the Holmesian pattern of 
crime followed by solution and finally retrospective explanation’.54 Yet Richmond 
does denote a move away from the Calendar stories in its employment of a principal 
detecting figure, implicitly recognising the need for a more professional form of 
criminal detection.55  
In 1829 major reform of the Police came with the enactment of the 
Metropolitan Police Act. This Act, championed by Home Secretary Robert Peel, 
effected the replacement of the various police forces in London with one unified 
Metropolitan Police under state control.56 The General Instruction Book (1829), 
written by Commissioners Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne for the instruction of 
new constables, reveals that the primary emphasis of the new police was on the 
prevention of crime. As Godfrey and Lawrence have highlighted, this emphasis is 
notable in the common nineteenth-century practice of uniformed policemen parading 
through the streets and dropping constables off at their beats, making them highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 E. F. Bleiler has argued that whilst Richmond has been attributed by some to Thomas Gaspey, and 
by others to Thomas Surr, there is no compelling evidence to suggest either is the real author. See E. 
F. Bleiler’s ‘Introduction’ to Richmond: Scenes in the Life of a Bow Street Runner, Drawn Up from 
His Private Memoranda (New York: Dover, 1976). See also Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 
107. 
54 Ibid., p.115. 
55 As Worthington notes, Richmond primarily relies on the techniques of surveillance, disguise and 
pursuit. See Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 115.  
56 The City of London Police was an exception to this general rule and remained autonomous. See 
further Shpayer-Makov, Ascent of the Detective, p. 30. 
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visible and so reinforcing their preventative, disciplinary power.57 At its 
inauguration, the new police had no official system in place for the detection of 
crime. This was remedied in 1842 with the establishment of an official detective 
department.58 Alongside the police detective emerged his literary counterpart. 
Critics such as Ousby, Worthington, and Shpayer-Makov have drawn 
attention to how some high profile successes for the detective department, including 
the arrest of Frederick and Maria Manning for the murder of their lodger, led to its 
becoming increasingly admired and supported in the press.59 Such admiration and 
support can be identified in a number of fictional detective police memoirs which 
began to appear around mid-century. In particular, the anecdotes of a fictional 
metropolitan police officer called Waters proved very popular. The first published 
anecdote was entitled ‘Recollections of a Police-Officer’, and this was soon followed 
by others in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal between 1849-1853. The series has 
widely been attributed to William Russell.60 The narrator of these tales, Waters, is a 
gentleman fallen on hard times who joins the force. Waters is not a member of the 
detective department – Recollections is set pre-1842 – but he carries out detective 
work nonetheless and, as Ousby has highlighted, his adventures are more in keeping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Godfrey and Lawrence, Crime and Justice, p. 20. 
58 The introduction of the new police had met with opposition from some quarters, in part because 
people feared the introduction of a military police or a spy system like those that operated in France 
and which were perceived as a threat to civil liberties. The uniform of the police helped to assuage 
fears of that this was a spy system, but the need for a plain clothed detective department became 
increasingly apparent especially in the wake of a number of well publicised policing blunders, 
including one on the case of the murder of Lord William Russell. See further Shpayer-Makov, Ascent 
of the Detective, p. 32. In her study Shpayer-Makov provides an extremely lucid and informative 
account of the formation and development of the detective police force including analysis of its 
support and opposition. 
59 See Shpayer-Makov, Ascent of the Detective, Ch. 4-5; Worthington, Rise of the Detective, Ch. 3; 
and Ousby, Bloodhounds, pp. 65-66.  
60 When the first collected edition of Recollections (published with the new title of Recollections of a 
Detective Police-Officer) appeared in 1856 ‘Waters’, the narrator, also appears as the author of the 
series, but this was a pseudonym of William Russell. See Worthington, p. 141. The serial publication 
of Recollections ended in 1853 but, following its popularity, a second collected series of Recollections 
of a Detective Police-Officer appeared in 1859. 
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with the spirit of police detection subsequent to the creation of the official detective 
unit.61  
The creation of Waters seems to be a response to an apparent need for a 
designated protector of the middle-class interest.62 Throughout Waters’s exploits, we 
see him working as an agent of the propertied middle-classes and upholder of their 
values. Read in this way Recollections, rather like The Newgate Calendars, function 
as tales of reassurance that crime is being effectively dealt with and that the reader’s 
value system is being upheld. What is different in Recollections, is that there is an 
implicitly recognised need for an organised and designated detecting agent, just as 
there was in Richmond.  However, Waters’s detective techniques have hardly 
advanced from those of his Bow Street predecessor, and there is also the apparent 
influence of the memoirs of Eugène-François Vidocq. Vidocq was a real-life thief 
turned police agent who published his anecdotes in France from 1828-1829, which 
were quickly translated into English. Aside from his extensive knowledge of the 
criminal underworld, Vidocq relies heavily on disguise and bravado in order to catch 
his criminals.63 Waters makes similar use of these two detective tactics, but the 
extent to which he has to rely upon them means that chance and luck generally play a 
significant role in his success.64 For example, in the case of ‘Mark Stretton’, which 
appeared in the second collected series, Stretton appeals to Waters for help after he 
becomes entangled with the villainous Achilles Mornay. Mornay is blackmailing 
Stretton with the knowledge that he killed a man during a bar brawl in Quebec. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ousby, Bloodhounds, p. 66. 
62 Heather Worthington has noted how the new police first gained support and recognition from the 
propertied middle-classes who apparently benefited most from preventative policing: Worthington, 
Rise of the Detective, p. 149. See also Shpayer-Makov, Ascent of the Detective, Ch. 1.  
63	  See further Ousby, Bloodhounds, Ch. 3, and Knight, Crime Fiction, pp. 23-24. 
64 Ousby has highlighted how Waters’s use of disguise is often carried to absurd levels. In the series 
he masquerades as a variety of characters from a dog thief to the wife of a suspected felon: Ousby, 
Bloodhounds, pp. 67-68. 
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actual fact the evidence of the man’s death has been fabricated by Mornay to fool 
Stretton. Stretton’s appeal for aid comes after Mornay becomes engaged to his 
cousin, the heiress to their Uncle’s fortune. Waters suspects foul play and agrees to 
investigate the matter to prove Stretton’s innocence. Unfortunately Waters is unable 
to attain any firm evidence of Stretton’s innocence and finally has to rely on bravado 
to trick a confession out of Mornay by confronting him with a confident assertion of 
his guilt. Fortune always seems to favour Waters in these moments, and in some 
cases Waters even seems to be guided by a Providential hand, as in the case of ‘The 
Two Widows’. In this anecdote, in which Waters is charged with discovering which 
widow is the real mother of their deceased husband’s son and heir, the story is almost 
at its end and Waters is no nearer to discovering the truth than he was at the start of 
the narrative. At this point he is guided by a Providential dream: 
Finally, I awoke, and believed I had dreamt that Edmund Hughes, during the 
many years he had resided at Paris, had married a French lady, who was still 
alive, and that, consequently, neither the lady calling herself Mrs. Hughes, 
nor Mrs. Lister, was the true widow of the deceased owner of Stone Hall.65  
 
The dream, of course, leads Waters to the truth, but in doing so harks back to The 
Newgate Calendar. This underlying faith in the divine justice of God is also invoked 
in stories which have a less than satisfactory resolution. In the case of ‘Mark 
Stretton’ there is a suggestion made that Mornay is also a murderer, but once Mornay 
has fled the country and Mark Stretton, his cousin and her fortune are safe, this issue 
remains unresolved, Waters consoling the reader that they ‘may be sure that though 
unseen by human eyes, [the murder] was witnessed by Him who said, “Vengeance is 
mine: I will repay”’ (p. 43). 
After the success of Recollections there was a proliferation of fictional 
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65 William Russell, Recollections of a Detective Police-Officer (London: W Kent, 1859), pp. 95-96. 
Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. 
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Waters model and copied his detective methods.66 Russell followed up his success in 
1862 with the anecdotes of ‘Inspector F’ in Experiences of a Real Detective and then 
again in 1863 with Autobiography of an English Detective. In both cases the heroes 
continue to rely on luck and chance to succeed: in one Inspector F case, for example, 
a chance fire when he happens to be on duty providentially leads him to correctly 
identify the criminal, who quickly confesses.67 
As Michael Sims has noted, one of the first authors of this brand of detective 
fiction to take significant steps to diminish the role of chance and Providence in 
favour of more reliable and sophisticated detective techniques was Andrew Forrester 
Jnr., who took the detective memoir stories and, as Sims puts it, ‘transform[ed] them 
into a well-organized, plot driven narrative built around investigative methods’.68 
This is especially apparent in Forrester’s The Female Detective (1864), whose 
heroine Mrs G utilises detective techniques which appear much closer to the methods 
employed by Sherlock Holmes than those of earlier heroes of detective memoirs, in 
particular in the story ‘The Unknown Weapon’.69 In this story Mrs G’s investigations 
are led by a need to account for events in rational ways, with the result that her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In 1860 The Detective’s Notebook and The Diary of an Ex-Detective appeared edited by ‘Charles 
Martel’, widely believed to be a pseudonym for Thomas Delf (Knight, Crime Fiction, p.33, and 
Shpayer-Makov, Ascent of the Detective, p. 236). Other examples include Robert Curtis’s The Irish 
Police Officer (1861), Andrew Forrester Jnr.’s Revelations of a Private Detective (1863), Secret 
Service (1864); and The Female Detective (1864), and The Experiences of a Lady Detective, attributed 
to W. S. Hayward in the British Library catalogue and believed to have first appeared in 1864, though 
some have dated it earlier to 1861. See The Penguin Book of Victorian Women in Crime, ed. by 
Michael Sims (London: Penguin, 2011), p. 3.  
67 William Russell, ‘No. 3: The Gold Dust Robbery in Barbican’, Experiences of a Real Detective 
(London: Ward & Lock, 1862). Experiences of a Real Detective was serialised from March to 
November 1862 in The Sixpenny Magazine with this story appearing in 2:10 (April, 1862), 470-474. 
68 Michael Sims, ‘Andrew Forrester’ in Victorian Women in Crime, ed. by Sims, p. 32. Andrew 
Forrester was the nom de plume of James Redding Ware. 
69 Mrs G. notes the influence of Edgar Allan Poe’s Dupin stories on her detective methods, the 
detective whose brilliant ratiocination had a marked influence on the detecting techniques of Holmes 
also. Andrew Forrester Jnr., ‘The Unknown Weapon’, in Victorian Women in Crime, ed. by Sims, pp. 
33-101 (p. 94). For further citations from this story, references to this reprinted version will be given 
in the text. For an examination of female detectives more generally, see Maureen T. Reddy, ‘Women 
Detectives’, in Crime Fiction, ed. by Priestman, pp. 191-207. 
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detective method is primarily one which utilises material, circumstantial and 
testimonial evidence from which she can draw logical conclusions:  
Now the clothes were not damp all over, for the fluff [which covered them] 
was quite wavy, and flew about in the air. It was necessary to know what 
time it left off raining on the Monday night, or Tuesday morning.  
 
It was very evident that the clothes had not been exposed to rain between the 
time of their obtaining the fluffiness and the discovery of the body. Therefore 
ascertain at what hour the rain ceased, and I had the space of time (the hour at 
which the body was discovered being half-past five) within which the body 
had been deposited. (p. 61) 
 
Along with the dry fluff, which Mrs G later identifies as originating from a pillow, 
she examines the articles found on the body, uses medical reports and witness 
testimonies, and remarks on the great importance to be attached to footprint 
evidence. From Mrs G’s reliance on drawing inferences from the evidence available 
to her, it is evident that the increasing skill of the detective is beginning to diminish 
the role that chance and Providence play.70  
The use of forensic investigative skills in fictional detective work continues 
to increase in sophistication in the sensation novel, from Cuff’s observation of the 
paint smear on the cabinet which enables him to produce a time frame during which 
the crime must have occurred as well to identify the need to trace the paint-smeared 
night gown in The Moonstone, to the ballistics evidence used in Aurora Floyd, and 
Robert Audley’s careful examination of handwriting samples, hat box labels and 
locks of hair in Lady Audley’s Secret. And yet the help of Providence is never far 
away when it is needed, whether it be in the guise of the good-hearted Pesca in The 
Woman in White, whose affiliation with the mysterious ‘Brotherhood’ provides 
Hartright with the aid he needs in forcing a confession from Fosco, or in form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Chance does however still play a significant role, Mrs G. herself noting how the ‘most 
extraordinary chance’ discovery (p. 81) helped her to solve this case. 
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Ezra Jennings in The Moonstone, who appears in the narrative just as Franklin Blake 
is confronted with the knowledge that he (unconsciously) took Rachel’s diamond.71 
This observation must be qualified by noting that the reliance on Providence in these 
narratives is greatly diminished when compared against The Newgate Calendars, and 
the memoirs of fictional detectives such as Waters and Inspector F. In the sensation 
novel the role of Providence appears much reduced, working to supplement the role 
of actual detection rather than to supplant it once that detection has failed. Indeed, 
whilst the introduction of characters such as Pesca and Jennings can be read as 
providential, the revelation of the truth ultimately comes from the carefully 
constructed adversarial-evidentiary narrative, a narrative which often uses evidence 
supplied by the detective work. Furthermore, examples of Providence at work in 
sensation fiction often relate to the punishment of the villains, rather than the 
detection of them. This may be less to do with the need to supplement the detective 
work, and more to do with keeping the police out of the middle-class home and 
allowing that class to discipline themselves. The police and police detectives may 
have gained support from the middle-classes in so far as they protected their 
interests, but it was a different matter when it came to being policed themselves. In 
The Novel and the Police, D. A. Miller discusses the cordon sanitaire which is 
placed around the middle-class home and which prevents Sergeant Cuff from being 
able to function effectively. The representation of detectives such as Waters and 
Inspector F as essentially protectors of the propertied middle-class interest denotes a 
similar tension.72  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ousby describes the use of providence in the guise of Jennings as ‘blatant’: Ousby, Bloodhounds,  
p. 127. 
72 See D. A. Miller, Novel and the Police, Ch. 2. In the case of ‘Mark Stretton’ in Recollections of a 
Detective Police-Officer, Waters’s task is complete once he has ensured Mark, his cousin and her 
fortune are safe from the clutches of the social infiltrator Achilles Mornay, leaving unresolved the 
question of whether or not Mark’s uncle was murdered or not. The delicate balance of the relationship 
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The increasing reliance on forensic evidence and analysis in literary detection 
is closely linked to the advances in forensic science and its rising dominance in the 
courtroom in the second half of the century.73 The real life cases on which sensation 
novels were drawing were ones in which scientific and medical evidence had been 
crucial. John Sutherland has stressed the influence of the William Palmer trial on The 
Woman in White, and this was a trial that hinged on medical and scientific 
testimonies.74 Ian A. Burney has examined the importance of the Palmer trial to the 
rise of forensic medicine as a sub-discipline, and has noted the ‘culture of scientific 
proof’ that was emerging in England at this time.75 Other high profile cases too 
depended greatly on forensic analysis, such as the toxicology reports in the case of 
Dr. Smethurst, or the bloodstain analysis which helped convict Franz Müller in 1864 
of murdering Thomas Briggs in a railway car.76 Newspapers, along with popular 
journals and magazines, took up the subject within their pages, discussing the use of 
forensics in specific cases such as Palmer’s and also printing more general articles 
which discussed the advantages and problems of this branch of evidence more 
generally.77 In 1856, a piece in The Examiner entitled ‘Science in the Witness Box’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
between the middle-classes and police detectives can also be seen even in Dickens’s complimentary 
sketches of them. While Dickens’s pieces for Household Words are laudatory of the detective police, 
his descriptions of their confidence, skill and knowledge in dealing with the lower classes and the 
criminal underworld connect them to this social strata in a way which distances them from the middle-
classes. This is further emphasised by Dickens’s documenting their colloquial speech mannerisms: 
‘It’s a singler story, sir’ (Charles Dickens, ‘Three Detective Anecdotes’, Household Words 1 
(September 1850), 577-580 (p. 577). The same point can be made of Dickens’s portrayal of Inspector 
Bucket in Bleak House when one contrasts his ‘friendly behaviour’ in the Bagnet household with his 
social awkwardness in front of Sir Leicester Dedlock who he repeatedly addresses as ‘Sir Leicester 
Dedlock, Baronet’ stressing his lack of ease in this setting: Charles Dickens, Bleak House, ed. by 
Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1853]), Ch. 49, p. 704 and Ch. 54. 
73 Within the definition of forensic science I include forensic medicine. 
74 More than half the witnesses listed were medical or scientific experts. 
75 Ian A. Burney, ‘A Poisoning of No Substance: The Trials of Medico-Legal Proof in Mid-Victorian 
England’, Journal of British Studies, 38 (January 1999), 59-92 (p. 61). 
76 In the Smethurst Case Dr. Alfred Swaine Taylor unfortunately made an error in his tests by 
introducing arsenic into the samples himself with contaminated copper gauze, his mistake being a 
major blow for the prosecution.  
77 See, for example: ‘Murder and the Microscope’, Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, 
Science and Arts, 150 (November 1856), 305-307, ‘The Medical Evidence of Crime’, Cornhill 
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examined the import of forensics in the Palmer trial and concluded that this branch of 
science provided for the certain discovery of the truth because the criminal leaves 
clues which science is inevitably able to interpret.78 The emergence of forensic 
science and its increasing dominance in the courtroom offered the chance of certainty 
in a world which could no longer trust in the guiding hand of Providence to bring the 
guilty to justice. And it is in his knowledge of science and his complementary 
forensic detective methods that we partly find the key to Sherlock Holmes’s success 
as a detective, because through science Holmes is able to overcome the need to rely 
on the help of Providence to solve a case. 
The influence of earlier detective heroes on Doyle’s characterisation of 
Holmes is evident: Sherlock shows the same pluck, courage and mastery of disguise 
as the likes of Vidocq, Richmond and Waters. Yet, as Doyle noted, such detectives 
lacked ‘some scientific system’ based on ‘austere methods of observation and 
reasoning’.79 As a wide range of critics have noted, this system owes much to Edgar 
Allan Poe’s Chevalier Auguste Dupin, and Émile Gaboriau’s Monsieur Lecoq and 
his mentor Père Tabaret.80 To these detectives’ brilliant ratiocination Doyle adds 
something extra by laying primary emphasis on the scientific nature of Holmes’s 
deductive technique.81  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Magazine, 7 (March 1863), 338-348, ‘Science and Crime’, All The Year Round, 24 (March 1880), 
372-375;  
78 ‘Science in the Witness Box’, The Examiner, 19 January 1856, p. 35. 
79 Arthur Conan Doyle, 1929 ‘Preface’ to The Complete Sherlock Holmes Long Stories (London: 
Book Club Associates, 1973), p. v.  
80 Père Tabaret appears as the lead (amateur) detective in Gaboriau’s first detective novel L’Affaire 
Lerouge (1866), and acts as a mentor to a young policeman called Lecoq. However, Lecoq was to 
become the detective protagonist himself in the stories which followed, one even being named 
Monsieur Lecoq (1869). 
81 For an account of the influence which French detective fiction had on Sherlock Holmes see Sita A. 
Schütt ‘French Crime Fiction’, in Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by Priestman, pp. 59-
76; and Sita A. Schütt, ‘Rivalry and Influence: French and English Nineteenth-Century Detective 
Narratives’, in The Art of Murder: New Essays on Detective Fiction, ed. by H. Gustav Klaus and 
Stephen Knight (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 1998), pp. 38-49. 
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Throughout the Holmes canon, the detective hero is cast firmly as a scientific 
analyst. When we first meet Holmes in A Study in Scarlet he is in a chemical 
laboratory discovering ‘an infallible test for blood-stains’.82 These sorts of scientific 
endeavours are not uncommon and from the first identify Holmes as a man of 
science.83 In particular, Holmes is a man of forensic science, as Watson’s summary 
of his areas of expertise in A Study in Scarlet demonstrates. Holmes’s knowledge in 
some areas is clearly marked as that of a forensic expert: his understanding of botany 
is listed as ‘variable’ because, whilst he knows nothing of ‘practical gardening’, he is 
‘well up in belladonna, opium, and poisons generally’; it is a similar case with 
geology, his understanding of which is ‘practical’, enabling him to tell ‘at a glance 
different soils from each other’; his knowledge of chemistry is, as one would expect 
of a forensics expert, ‘profound’ (Study, pp. 21-22). This expert scientific 
knowledge, combined with his forensic observational powers, enables Holmes to 
employ his trademark scientific deduction to ‘reason back from effects to causes’.84  
An excellent example of Holmes’s technique in action is provided at the 
opening of A Study in Scarlet. First we see his skill and precision in collecting his 
data: ‘his nimble fingers were flying here, there and everywhere, feeling, pressing, 
unbuttoning, examining’ (p. 29), ‘he whipped a tape measure and a large round 
magnifying glass from his pocket […] he trotted noiselessly about the room, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (London: Vintage, 2009 
[1887]), p. 18. For further citations from this story, references to this edition will be given in the text. 
A Study in Scarlet was originally published in 1887 in Beeton’s Christmas Annual. 
83 In A Study in Scarlet we also learn, for example, that Holmes beats cadavers in order to ‘verify how 
far bruises may be produced after death’ (p. 17). The identification of Holmes as a scientist continues 
in the short stories: in ‘A Case of Identity’ Watson finds Holmes engaged in ‘the chemical work 
which was so dear to him’: Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, ed. by Richard 
Lancelyn Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 43. Further references to stories taken 
from The Adventures are taken from this edition and given after quotations in the text. ‘A Case of 
Identity’ was first published in Strand Magazine, 2 (September 1891), 248-259. 
84 Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Cardboard Box’, in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, ed. by Christopher 
Roden, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 42. For further references to stories taken from 
The Memoirs, are taken from this edition and given after quotations in the text. ‘The Cardboard Box’ 
first appeared in Strand Magazine, 5 (January 1893), 61-73. 
	  	  
237 
sometimes stopping, occasionally kneeling, and once lying flat upon his face’ (p. 31). 
From the data he collects, Holmes is then able to build a strikingly accurate picture 
of events and people. For example, Holmes tells Watson that ‘the very first thing 
which I observed on arriving there was that a cab had made two ruts with its wheels 
close to the kerb’ (p. 32). This observation, coupled with Holmes’s knowledge that 
‘up to last night, we have had no rain for a week’ means that he is able to accurately 
reason that ‘those wheels which left such a deep impression must have been there 
during the night’ (p. 32).  What we see in Holmes’s knowledge and method is that he 
has reduced ‘detection as near to an exact science as it will ever be brought to in this 
world’ (Study, p. 33). Indeed, Watson’s characterisation of Holmes as ‘the most 
perfect reasoning and observing machine that the world has seen’, and his ‘cold, 
precise […] balanced mind’, also links Holmes to the dispassionate world of science, 
(‘A Scandal in Bohemia, Adventures, p. 5).85 Holmes’s scientific disinterestedness is 
also seen in his treatment of clients as ‘a mere unit, a factor in a problem’.86 
The importance of Holmes’s scientific expertise to his huge success has been 
noted and discussed by a great many critics. Amongst others, Ronald Thomas 
identifies Holmes’s authority as scientific in nature, Martin Kayman has labeled 
Holmes as a ‘scientific detective’, Rudolph Glitz has attributed the success of the 
Holmes stories to the scientific nature of Holmes’s explanations, and Rosemary Jann 
notes how the Holmes canon makes a hero of the scientist.87 The nineteenth century 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 ‘A Scandal in Bohemia’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 2 (July 1891), 61-75. 
86 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of Four, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (London: Vintage, 2009 
[1890]). Further references to this edition are given after quotations in the text. The Sign of Four 
originally appeared in the 1890 February edition of Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine under the title of 
The Sign of the Four. In the short stories Holmes becomes more emotionally engaged with those he 
encounters in the cases he solves. Perhaps Doyle’s attempt to soften the edges and give him a wider 
appeal. However, his portrayal as a rational man of science continues throughout the canon.  
87 Ronald R. Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Martin A. Kayman, ‘The Short Story from Poe to Chesterton’, in Cambridge 
Companion to Crime Fiction, ed. by Priestman, pp. 41-58 (p. 48); Rudolph Glitz, ‘Horrifying 
Ho(l)mes: Conan Doyle’s Bachelor Detective and the Aesthetics of Domestic Realism’, in Formal 
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was one of huge scientific advancement and discovery, but the power of science was 
at once both enlightening and threatening: Charles Darwin’s theories of evolution, 
for example, challenged long held and deeply entrenched ideas about the existence of 
God. However, as Frederick L. De Naples has pointed out, Holmes is able to harness 
the power of science and restore it to the role of ‘aiding humans rather than 
threatening or betraying them’.88 This scientific method helps ban Providence and 
provide the certainty craved for and, as such, science plays a fundamental role in 
Holmes’s success and enables Watson to feel that ‘so accustomed was I to inevitable 
success that the very possibility of his failing had ceased to enter into my head’ 
(‘Scandal’, Adventures, p. 14). Science replaces the role of Providence that had 
continued to play at least some role in stories of crime, including in sensation fiction. 
The second issue which sensation fiction struggled with, the issue of how far the 
assessment of character was useful to the establishment of truth, is similarly removed 
by Holmes’s scientific method. 
 
Sherlock Holmes and ‘Character’ as Evidence 
In chapters two and three I argued that the felony trial’s turn away from the centrality 
of the idea of character in the representational process influenced the development of 
sensation narratives which were similarly seeking an alternative mode of 
representation. However, the sensation novel’s focus on the white collar criminal and 
the attendant anxieties regarding how that criminal might be identified, implicates 
such fiction in the debates interested in how the criminal character might be revealed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Investigations: Aesthetic Style in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Detective Fiction, ed. by Paul Fox 
and Koray Melikoglu (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007), pp. 1-28 (p. 21); and Jann, Detecting Social 
Order. 
88 Frederick L. De Naples, ‘Unearthing Holmes: 1890s Interpretations of the Great Detective’, in 
Transforming Genres: New Approaches to British Fiction of the 1890s, ed. by Nikki Lee Manos and 
Meri-Jane Rochelson (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 215-235 (p. 216).  
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and understood. Whilst there is a trend in sensation novels to adopt a narrative style 
modeled on the adversarial-evidentiary trial, differentiating them from character-
focused novels, there remains in such fiction a continued interest in the assessment of 
other people’s characters, and in particular the criminal’s. This interest produces an 
oppositional undercurrent to these novels’ implicit support of the post-1836 felony 
trial model, and so a tension emerges within these texts. 
This tension is seen very clearly in Collins’s The Woman in White, which 
explicitly adopts the trial model whilst at the same time maintaining its interest in the 
revelation of the criminal’s character, in particular the character of Count Fosco. 
Throughout the novel Fosco adopts a courteous, sensitive and thoughtful manner 
towards the other characters, including (and oftentimes especially) the protagonists 
he conspires against. His manner leads a number of more minor characters to 
misjudge him, including the housekeeper at Blackwater Park, Eliza Michelson, who 
describes him as ‘a most considerate nobleman’ (p. 365). On the face of it Fosco is 
charm itself, a jovial aristocrat whose flamboyant waistcoats, appreciation for opera, 
fondness of animals, and weakness for pastries submerged in cream are not traits we 
typically associate with a villain. And yet, despite this, there is always the sense that 
his true character is something which remains hidden and which ‘excites a strange 
responsive creeping’ (p. 233) in Marian’s nerves. As the novel develops, Marian and 
Hartright’s investigations become as much about the exposure of Glyde and Fosco as 
they are about reuniting Laura with her true identity. Once a confession is forced 
from Fosco, his part in the story should be finished, having provided Hartright with 
the information that will enable him legally to restore Laura to her position so she 
can marry Walter and re-establish social order and control. The reappearance of 
Fosco just before the novel’s close therefore betrays the text’s unresolved fascination 
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with his character. Even in his written confession Fosco does not fully reveal his 
character to us, keeping up his theatrical style: ‘Youths! I invoke your sympathy. 
Maidens! I claim your tears’ (p. 628). Finding him dead in a Parisian morgue 
Hartright attempts to articulate Fosco’s story in terms of his membership and 
betrayal of ‘the Brotherhood’, hoping to elucidate ‘the mystery of Count Fosco’s 
death’ (p. 640); but Hartright might as well just say ‘the mystery of Count Fosco’, 
for the attempt to provide Fosco with a narrative that makes sense of his part in the 
story (and his character) signals Hartright’s attempts to understand him and to render 
him knowable.  
Hartright’s desire to know Fosco, to unmask him and reveal his true 
character, is symbolised by Fosco’s naked body lying in the morgue, stripped of its 
disguise as a Parisian artisan and offered up to public inspection. Lying naked on the 
mortuary slab, Fosco is ostensibly stripped bare and completely exposed to the 
reader’s gaze. At this moment in the text the reader is tacitly promised that Fosco’s 
character will be fully known. This promise is never realised. In the end Hartright 
can only ‘leave others to draw their own conclusions’ (p. 640) as he has drawn his 
about Fosco. In Hartright’s final attempt to understand Fosco, the idea that it is 
possible to know and understand the characters of others is once again revealed to be 
illusory as Fosco’s lifeless body becomes nothing more than evidence to be read and 
interpreted. In this way The Woman in White can be read as a transitional text in 
which the nineteenth-century novel’s continued fascination with character is met 
with the recognition that the full understanding of character the reader desires as a 
means of interpreting the story’s events and meaning may no longer be possible. This 
recognition, dramatically realised in Hartright’s frustrated endeavours to reveal the 
true nature of Fosco’s character, poses the question of the extent to which the 
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assessment of character can be useful in the representational process, if at all. The 
interest in character and its place in the representational process was also discussed 
in the popular periodicals of the time, in particular the legal case of R v Rowton 
(1865) brought the issue to the forefront of popular debate.89 
The case of R v Rowton was to directly address the extent to which an 
assessment of a defendant’s character was useful to determining the truth of disputed 
facts in criminal trials. In 1864 schoolmaster James Rowton was in court facing the 
charge of indecent assault on a fourteen year old boy. Rowton’s sole defence was 
that he possessed a good character and his defence team introduced a whole string of 
witnesses to testify to this fact, including a local clergyman who swore to Rowton’s 
‘general reputation for purity of mind and morality of conduct’.90 The prosecution 
sought to counter this evidence by producing their own witnesses to attest to the 
defendant’s previous bad character and they called a former pupil who swore that Mr 
Rowton was capable of ‘grossest indecency and immorality’.91 Rowton was found 
guilty but he appealed his conviction on the basis that the evidence given regarding 
his bad character was inadmissible. The appeal judges in R v Rowton (1865) were 
divided, but the majority (led by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn) held that evidence of 
bad character was only admissible where it was evidence of general reputation. The 
majority decision was that the evidence given in Rowton’s initial trial had been 
based on individual knowledge of his disposition rather than his general reputation 
and so was inadmissible. The verdict was overturned.92 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See, for example, ‘Evidence as to Character’, The Examiner, 9 August 1851, p. 499; ‘Value of 
Evidence to Character’, The Examiner, 25 June 1853, pp. 402-403; ‘The Simplicity of Character’, 
Sixpenny Magazine, 4 (November 1862), 213-216; ‘Evidence as to Character’, The Examiner, 4 
February 1865, p. 67; ‘Witnesses to Character’, The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science 
and Art, 4 February 1865, pp. 132-134. 
90 ‘Evidence to Character’, The Examiner, 8 October 1864, p. 643. 
91 Ibid. 
92 The distinction between general reputation and disposition upon which the decision turned was not 
made entirely clear, especially as Cockburn LCJ failed to define what he exactly meant by 
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The Rowton case sparked commentary and raised once again the issue of the 
extent to which an assessment of character was useful in establishing guilt. The 
Examiner took the issue up and noted the limited nature of character evidence, 
especially that of good character, as ‘it must be borne in mind that no man can enter 
upon the business of roguery on a large scale with any prospect of success without 
providing himself with a good character’.93 A few years earlier The Examiner had 
made a similar point about character evidence whilst criticising judicial decisions to 
lessen a sentence if evidence of good character was brought forward:  
All evidence as to character is fallacious. How often are we mistaken for 
better or worse about persons, and how different at different stages of 
knowledge of them would be our judgements. Every hypocrite had a good 
character to the extent of the success of his duplicity.94 
  
The Examiner articles reveal a prevailing scepticism regarding the usefulness of 
character evidence, questioning the extent to which knowledge of the characters of 
others could be relied on, citing Baron Alderson who responded to a defendant who 
produced a clergyman to attest to his good and religious character that such evidence 
‘only went to show that a man might be capable of committing the most atrocious 
offences under the mask of religion’.95 However, as The Woman in White 
demonstrates, despite an acceptance that attention to all the available evidence is to 
be preferred to a primary focus on the nature of the accused’s character, there 
remains an interest in nineteenth-century literature in how far an assessment of the 
criminal’s character might be useful, and whether or not such an assessment was 
even possible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘disposition’ (see R v Rowton (1865) All ER 549). The Examiner criticised the decision which 
appeared to reject evidence which was ‘too good’ as it was ‘founded on intimate knowledge rather 
than “vague” general repute’: ‘Evidence as to Character’, The Examiner, 4 February 1865, p. 67. 
93 Ibid. 
94 ‘Evidence as to Character’, The Examiner, 9 August 1851, p. 499.  
95 The defendant was indicted for giving drugs to two women in order to induce miscarriages. See 
Ibid. 
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In large part The Woman in White deals with an anxiety relating to how the 
criminal might be identified when, as The Examiner article notes, the rogue 
understands the importance of ‘providing himself with a good character’ if he is to 
succeed.96 Nonetheless, through the intuitive negative responses that the characters 
feel for the villains, Collins’s novel tentatively suggests that there might be 
something innately, identifiably criminal about the criminal character.97 As such The 
Woman in White gestures towards the idea that the criminal’s true character might 
reveal itself to others through the criminal’s demeanour, something which Charles 
Dickens argued for in an 1856 article for Household Words. In ‘The Demeanour of 
Murderers’, Dickens responds to contemporary anxiety over William Palmer’s 
refusal to confess by arguing that his guilt was evident from his whole demeanour.98 
Palmer’s continued insistence on his innocence of poisoning Cook with strychnine 
was cause for unease in certain quarters over the soundness of the verdict, with many 
trying to elicit a confession to ease any doubt:  ‘from the time of his sentence to the 
very moment when he ascended the scaffold […] Palmer was persuaded, entreated, 
implored day by day, almost hour by hour, to confess his crimes, not to God, but to 
man’.99 Dickens’s article argues that no such confirmation was required as: ‘the 
physiognomy and conformation of the poisoner whose trial occasions these remarks, 
were exactly in accordance with his deeds; and every guilty consciousness he had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 ‘Evidence as to Character’, The Examiner, 4 February 1865, p. 67. 
97 I say ‘tentatively’ because the instinctive revulsion such characters feel is not shared by other 
characters and borders on being superstitious in nature: Laura’s dog Nina, for example, cowers away 
from Sir Percival, and Hartright is persuaded of Glyde’s villainy by a letter in which Anne Catherick 
describes a prophetic dream. Also, the novel does not explore how the protagonist’s responses might 
be accounted for in any rational way (through the study of external signs which might reveal the inner 
character), the whole narrative structure instead trusting to the careful presentation of evidence to 
expose the villains in the end. 
98 [Charles Dickens], ‘The Demeanour of Murderers’, Household Words, 13 (14 June 1856), 505-507. 
99 ‘The Trial and Execution of William Palmer’, in Journal of Mental Science, 2 (1856), 513. Cited in 
Burney, ‘A Poisoning of No Substance’, 59. 
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gone on storing up in his mind, had set its mark upon him’.100 For Dickens, Palmer’s 
actions and reactions throughout the trial could be read in terms of his guilty 
conscience and that in his whole demeanour ‘there [was nothing] at all singular’ but 
only that which ‘is always to be looked for and counted on in the case of a very 
wicked murderer’.101 What Dickens does note though, is that whilst ‘nature never 
writes a bad hand’ and whilst that bad character is ‘invariably legible’ in the human 
countenance, one has to be ‘trained to the reading of it’.102  
The idea that it is possible to read a person’s character from external signs 
was one that the practice of physiognomy and phrenology had done much to 
popularise during the first half of the nineteenth century. Physiognomy, which had 
been popular long before the century began, posited the view that a person’s inner 
character could be revealed through a study of their facial features.103 As Taylor and 
Shuttleworth have noted, John Caspar Lavater’s work on physiognomy during the 
last decades of the eighteenth century led to a renewed interest in its application.104 
Sharrona Pearl has also demonstrated the widespread popularity of physiognomy as a 
‘technology to make decisions about individual others’ during the nineteenth 
century.105 By the mid-nineteenth century the related practice of phrenology, which 
claimed that dominant character traits and propensities could be identified through 
the examination of a person’s skull,  had also become extremely popular.106 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 [Dickens], ‘The Demeanour of Murderers’, 506. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Sharrona Pearl has noted how during the nineteenth century physiognomic analysis was also 
extended by many people to the study of expressions, body types and also clothing, hairstyles, and 
self-presentation. See Sharrona Pearl, About Faces: Physiognomy in Nineteenth-Century Britain 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 6-7. 
104 Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830-1890, ed. by Jenny Bourne Taylor 
and Sally Shuttleworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 3. 
105 Pearl, About Faces, p. 1. 
106 Phrenology developed out of the Franz Joseph Gall’s work on craniology in the 1790s, and was 
made popular in Britain by the work of Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, and then by George Coombe 
whose 1829 treatise The Constitution of Man was the forth most popular book of the mid-nineteenth 
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The popularity of physiognomy and phrenology suggests a widespread 
preoccupation in the assessment of character during the nineteenth century. Indeed, 
Pearl has linked the renewed interest in physiognomy at the start of the century with 
a ‘crisis in urban interaction’:  
The scale of London changed the nature of the human interaction in dramatic 
and pressing ways. Physiognomy helped urbanites deal with the simultaneous 
overload and lack of human information by allowing people to make 
judgments on the basis of sight. The most important information 
physiognomy could provide was precisely what was lacking in the urban 
environment, namely, a system of establishing reasons to trust and, equally 
important, identifying whom not to trust. Without the lengthy timescale of 
rural life, and with the hustle and bustle of the streets, physiognomy emerged 
as a way to make sense of the city.107 
 
Nonetheless, whilst physiognomy and phrenology promised the chance to understand 
the characters of others, the question of whether this was actually possible was one 
which recurred again and again during the nineteenth century. This was especially 
the case where the criminal was concerned, as cases such as Rowton illustrate, and 
neither physiognomy nor phrenology offered a fail-safe way to understand the 
characters of others, and they were not without their critics.108  As Pearl has shown, 
physiognomy was not a settled universal system, its practices shifted and changed 
over time, and it was non-expert and subjective in nature.109 Phrenology on the other 
hand, whilst it had attempted to cast the principles of physiognomy within a more 
scientific framework, relied upon one person undertaking a physical examination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
century. See further: Embodied Selves, and Jenny Bourne Taylor In The Secret Theatre of the Home: 
Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and Nineteenth-Century Psychology (London: Routledge, 1988). 
107 Pearl, About Faces, pp. 10-11. 
108 Gall’s work which founded the practice of phrenology was particularly hostile to the practice of 
physiognomy, while writers such as William Hazlitt sought to debunk the principles of phrenology: 
see Embodied Selves, and Pearl, About Faces, Ch. 6. Writing in 1890 Havelock Ellis lamented the 
practice of both physiognomy and phrenology, see Havelock Ellis, The Criminal (New York: Scribner 
& Welford, 1890), p. 29.  
109 Sharrona Pearl has shown how the widespread popularity of physiognomy during the nineteenth 
century rested on the fact that it was a ‘technology of judgment’ accessible to all. Cheap and 
accessible pocket books were printed on physiognomy which suggested that everyone could use 
physiognomy in their assessments of others. Pearl’s study also reveals how the use of physiognomy 
relied very much on the personal subjective responses of the individual making the judgements, and 
how individual instinct was an important component of its practice. See Pearl, About Faces, especially 
‘Introduction’. 
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another person’s skull, and so, as Pearl notes, was limited in its usefulness for 
assessing the characters of others.110 By the late nineteenth century, however, the 
practices of physiognomy and phrenology appear to have been largely eclipsed by 
the emerging field of criminal anthropology which was spreading through Europe.  
Havelock Ellis’s The Criminal (1890) expounds nineteenth-century criminal 
anthropological theory, often citing uncritically the work of Italian criminal 
anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, noting his ‘importance in the development of 
criminal anthropology’.111 As Gibson and Hahn Rafter have noted, Lombroso 
emerged in the nineteenth century as ‘the leader of an international movement called 
the positivist or scientific school of criminology’.112 Lombroso’s theories set forth in 
Criminal Man (which went through five editions, the first appearing in 1876), 
marked a turn away from criminal penology which suggested that punishment should 
be proportional to the crime committed because the criminal acted of their own free 
will.113 Lombroso put forward the alternative theory of the born criminal, and argued 
that criminality could be identified by the various ‘anomalies’ that marked his or her 
features.  
Whilst no complete English translation of Criminal Man existed in the 
nineteenth century, Havelock Ellis’s The Criminal notes its significant influence on 
the field and his work. Lombroso suggested that the criminal was marked by physical 
‘anomalies’ which resembled the traits of primitive peoples and so proving 
(Lombroso claimed) the atavistic nature of the criminal. In The Criminal, Havelock 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See further, Pearl, About Faces. 
111 Ellis, The Criminal, quotation at p. 36. Ellis would become more critical of Lombroso’s work after 
the first edition of The Criminal. 
112 Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter, ‘Introduction’ to Cesare Lombroso, Criminal Man, trans. by 
Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 1-38 
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Ellis also argues that the criminal could be identified through physical 
characteristics. For example, Ellis informs his readers that ‘lack of cranial symmetry 
is one of the most marked features of the criminal skull’, that ‘there is little doubt 
that the lower jaw is often remarkably well developed in those guilty of crimes’, and 
that ‘even non-scientific observers have noted the frequency among criminals of 
projecting or of long and voluminous ears’, echoing Lombroso’s observations.114 
Ellis, like Lombroso in Criminal Man, attempted to examine and classify these 
anomalies and this suggested, as Gibson and Rafter have highlighted in relation to 
Lombroso’s work, that the identification of the criminal could be turned into an 
empirical science. Sharrona Pearl has argued that whilst the field of criminal 
anthropology was influenced by physiognomy, it also marked a shift away from the 
subjective physiognomic assessment of the individual, towards more objective group 
diagnostics. The aim of the work of Lombroso and Ellis, for example, was not to 
enable individuals to understand the character of other individuals, but rather to 
develop professional assessment standards which would enable the assessor to place 
individuals into established groupings, not least that of the criminal.115 Whilst 
physiognomy and phrenology had been concerned with enabling the assessment of 
individuals, criminal anthropology sought to classify the criminal type.116  
The influence of Lombrosian criminal anthropology on the Sherlock Holmes 
stories is evident in the canon. In ‘The Final Problem’, Holmes’s description of the 
master criminal Moriarty is markedly influenced by criminal anthropology. In the 
first edition of Criminal Man, Lombroso identifies criminals as being of greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Ellis, Criminal, quotations at p. 52, p. 63 and pp. 65-66. 
115 Pearl, About Faces, Ch. 6. 
116 For a more detailed analysis of nineteenth-century European criminal anthropology, see Daniel 
Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
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height and weight.117 In Doyle’s ‘The Final Problem’ Moriarty is described as 
‘extremely tall’ (Memoirs, p. 254), and whilst he is said to be ‘thin’ (Memoirs, p. 
254), this suggests a physical weakness which Lombroso also suggested was an 
indication of criminality.118 Other common ‘anomalies’ Lombroso identifies are 
protrusion of the jaws, sloping foreheads, and dark eyes.119 Moriarty is described as 
having eyes ‘deeply sunken into his head’ with a face that ‘protrudes forwards’ 
(Memoirs, p. 254), and whilst he does not fit every anomaly Lombroso suggests, the 
description of him having a ‘curiously reptilian fashion’ (Memoirs, p. 254) about him 
links him with idea of atavism which the whole of Lombroso’s Criminal Man 
expounds. Throughout ‘The Final Problem’ Holmes does not express an interest in 
understanding Moriarty as an individual. There is no sense for example, as there is 
with Hartright and Fosco, that Holmes wants to uncover Moriarty’s true character. 
Holmes knows that Moriarty is a criminal mastermind, and the tenets of criminal 
anthropology merely confirm this view, as he says to Watson: ‘when I saw the very 
man who had been so much in my thoughts […] his appearance was quite familiar to 
me’ (Memoirs, p. 254). In ‘The Final Problem’, as elsewhere in the Holmes stories, 
the interest is not in ascertaining or assessing an individual’s character, but rather 
with ascertaining whether that individual falls within a particular group: in 
Moriarty’s case, that of the criminal.120  
Lawrence Frank has identified the influence of Darwin’s work on Holmes’s 
method, in particular, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). In 
this work Darwin used neurological explanations alongside psychology and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Lombroso,	  Criminal	  Man,	  p.	  50	  and	  p.	  56.	  118	  Ibid.,	  p.	  56	  
119 Ibid. 
120 For a discussion of how Holmes’s ability to read the criminal body connects Doyle’s detective 
stories with wider concerns about individual and national identity, see Ronald R. Thomas, ‘The 
Fingerprint of the Foreigner: Colonizing the Criminal Body in 1890s Detective Fiction and Criminal 
Anthropology’, ELH, 61 (1994), 655-683. 
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evolutionary anthropology to produce a theory in which unconscious facial 
expressions and physical gestures of an individual could be used to interpret the state 
of mind, emotions and feelings of that person: 
An old lady with a comfortable but absorbed expression sat nearly opposite 
me […] Whilst I was looking at her, I saw that her depressors anguli oris 
became very slightly, yet decidedly, contracted; but as her countenance 
remained as placid as ever, I reflected how meaningless was this contraction, 
and how easily one might be deceived. The thought had hardly occurred to 
me when I saw that her eyes suddenly became suffused with tears almost to 
overflowing, and her whole countenance fell. There could be no doubt that 
some painful recollection, perhaps that of a long-lost child, was passing 
through her mind.121 
 
As Frank notes, this reading of people is similar to the acts of reading people Holmes 
becomes engaged in as he takes his clues from physical appearance, gestures and 
facial expressions to draw conclusions about those around him. Yet, as with his use 
of criminal anthropology, Holmes uses such conclusions to categorise people, rather 
than make judgements about individual character. In ‘A Case of Identity’ for 
example, Holmes states confidently: ‘oscillation on the pavement always means an 
affaire du coeur’ (Adventures, p. 32).122 Whilst sensation novels like The Woman in 
White adopt adversarial-evidentiary methods of representation, they still raise the 
question of the extent to which the assessment of character is useful in determining 
the truth. In the Holmes stories our detective hero moves away from the assessment 
of the individual characters of others, and towards classifying others into groups 
according to external markers which function as pieces of data that enable 
categorisation. In this way the Holmes stories remove the idea of character 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Cited in Lawrence 
Frank, Victorian Detective Fiction and the Nature of Evidence: The Scientific Investigations of Poe, 
Dickens, and Doyle (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 151. 
122 Pearl has noted how Darwin’s work in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, like 
criminal anthropology, removes the idea of the individual from the equation: ‘Darwin provided a new 
kind of legibility for the face that connected it to other faces and other kinds of faces in other places at 
other times’ but he ‘couldn’t connect this to a person’s particular experiences or explain why it is 
expressed at that moment’, as we see in the quotation Frank offers, Darwin is only able to speculate 
on the cause of the lady’s distress: Pearl, About Faces, p. 200.	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assessment from the equation entirely: there is no need to understand or reveal the 
criminal’s true character in order to unmask him, his status as a criminal is legible 
from visible signs. The criminal becomes understood in terms of categorisation, and 
so becomes identifiable, and detectable, once more. 
 
The Advocacy of Watson and Holmes  
A number of critics who have analysed the Holmes canon have attributed the 
detective’s popularity to the sense of reassurance with which he provides the reader. 
As Stephen Knight puts it: ‘the embarrassing success [of the Holmes stories] 
depended on the hero’s power to assuage the anxieties of a respectable, London-
based, middle-class audience’.123 Just as in the sensation novel, one of these anxieties 
was how crime and social transgression might be exposed and so punished. Yet, as I 
argued earlier in this chapter, this concern with neutralising potential threats to the 
middle-class status quo (in order that the social norms and values of that class be 
upheld) also reflects a wider concern with how the individual is to understand and 
derive meaning from the oftentimes confusing reality in which they find themselves. 
A large part of the appeal of the Sherlock Holmes stories therefore lies in the fact that 
they provide the reader with the sense that reality does have order and meaning. 
Through the doors of 221b Baker Street come Holmes’s clients who represent the 
anxieties and fears of the middle-class reader realised, as they find themselves 
confronted with a confusing reality which they cannot understand; as Miss Morstan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Stephen Knight, Form and Ideology in Crime Fiction (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 67. See 
also, for example, Rudolph Glitz, ‘Horrifying Ho(l)mes: Conan Doyle’s Bachelor Detective and the 
Aesthetics of Domestic Realism’, in Formal Investigations: Aesthetic Style in Late-Victorian and 
Edwardian Detective Fiction, ed. by Paul Fox and Koray Melikoglu (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007), 
pp. 1-28; Martin A. Kayman, ‘The Short Story from Poe to Chesterton’, in Cambridge Companion to 
Crime Fiction, ed. by Priestman, pp. 41-58; Christopher Clausen, ‘Sherlock Holmes, Order, and the 
Late Victorian Mind’, The Georgia Review, 38: 1 (1984), 104-123; Rosemary Jann, The Adventures of 
Sherlock Holmes: Detecting Social Order (New York: Twayne, 1995); and Martin Priestman, 
Detective Fiction and Literature: The Figure on the Carpet (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). 
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tells Holmes and Watson in The Sign of Four, ‘I can hardly imagine anything more 
strange, more utterly inexplicable, than the situation in which I find myself’ (p. 94). 
In such a world characters find themselves isolated from those around them, unable 
to know them or explain their actions, as Miss Hunter says of her employers in ‘The 
Copper Beeches’: ‘I cannot understand them, and I am not easy in my mind about 
them’ (Adventures, p. 281).124 The service Holmes provides is to make sense of his 
client’s reality for them by neutralising any potential threats and reinstating the 
middle-class norms, values, and relationships through which his clients understand 
the world. Just as Holmes tells Violet Hunter that any danger would ‘cease to be a 
danger if we could define it’ (Adventures, p. 278), so too if he can restore his client’s 
(and by extension the reader’s) reality to a pattern which reflects the worldview they 
subscribe to, he can make it appear understandable, meaningful and unthreatening 
once more. 
Rosemary Jann has also argued that the reader has a desire for order and 
meaning which is satisfied by the Holmes stories, attributing much of their success to 
the hero’s ability to give meaning to seemingly inexplicable and bizarre events: 
The power of Holmes’s inferences, as well as their appeal to his Victorian 
audience, rests on the assumption that beneath the chaotic surface of life 
exists an underlying social order to which all details can be linked by the 
trained observer. In the face of a universe that often seems incoherent and 
incomprehensible, Holmes affirms a fantasy of control by implying that all it 
takes to uncover nature’s hidden order is a sufficient exercise in human 
intellect.125  
 
Jann, like other critics, attributes the order and meaning which Holmes places on 
reality to his role as a scientist: ‘like many scientific essayists in the Victorian period, 
he demonstrates the most insignificant of everyday objects exemplify the working of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 ‘The Copper Beeches’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 3 (June 1892), 613-628. 
125 Jann, Detecting Social Order, p. 50. 
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scientific laws and thus testify to the systematic nature of reality’.126 But in focusing 
on the importance of Holmes’s scientific expertise, critics like Jann tend to neglect 
the crucial impact that courtroom representations had upon the Holmes formula. 
Before Russell’s Recollections of a Police-Officer appeared in 1849 some 
proto-detectives had emerged in a series of fictional memoirs purportedly written by 
lawyers. A series of anecdotes entitled ‘Experiences of a Barrister’ was published in 
Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal between 1849-1850 and was followed by the 
‘Confessions of an Attorney’ series, published between 1850-1852.127 Worthington 
has examined the importance of ‘Experiences’ and ‘Confessions’ to the history of the 
detective story, along with Samuel Warren’s ‘Passages from the Diary of a Late 
Physician’ (published serially in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 1830-1837), 
which she demonstrates inaugurated the case structure that later typified the detective 
story.128 In ‘Experiences of a Barrister’ we are presented with a hero whose clients 
come to him for legal aid and assistance. He is helped by an attorney, Mr Ferret, who 
acts as a prototype detective, carrying out investigations and tracking down the 
evidence which the barrister needs to solve his client’s problems by proving their 
case. In the ‘Confessions of an Attorney’ series the heroes are Messieurs Flint and 
Sharp, owners of a legal practice, who help their clients in a similar manner. 
Worthington’s analysis of these stories clearly demonstrates their importance to the 
development of the detective story, in particular how these stories introduced a case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ibid. See also, for example, Frank, Victorian Detective Fiction, and Thomas, Detective Fiction. 
127 ‘Experiences of a Barrister’ and ‘Confessions of an Attorney’ were published anonymously but 
have been attributed to Samuel Warren: see for example in the collected editions Experiences of a 
Barrister (New York: Cornish, Lamport & Co., 1852), and Confessions of an Attorney (New York: 
Cornish, Lamport & Co, 1852). However, as Heather Worthington has noted, their ‘publication in 
Chambers’s, a periodical with a socially broader target audience than that of literary magazines such 
as Blackwood’s, makes it unlikely that Samuel Warren was their author, as his work was almost 
entirely published in Blackwood’s or by Blackwood and Sons’. However, Worthington goes on to 
note, ‘his criminographic writing was paradigmatic for the later populist legal anecdotes’: see 
Worthington, Rise of the Detective, p. 74. 
128 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, Ch. 2.  
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structure and helped to ‘construct and introduce the paid investigating professional 
individual who works in the private sphere to solve problems’.129 These tales are also 
crucial, however, in revealing the significance which the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act debates had on the development of detective fiction.  
The 1836 Act opened up the debate on legal evidence in the nineteenth 
century to a public audience who could read about it in newspapers, magazines and 
journals. The ‘Experiences’ and ‘Confessions’ both actively engage with this debate. 
In ‘The March Assize’, the first of the ‘Barrister’ stories, an innocent man is found 
guilty of, and hanged for, a robbery on the basis of a ‘beautiful point of 
circumstantial evidence’ alone.130 It later turns out that the incriminating evidence 
had been planted on him by a disgruntled ex-employee. The story’s narrator, a 
barrister on his first circuit, describes how, despite there being ‘no direct evidence’ 
of his guilt, his client is found guilty on the strength of this circumstantial evidence 
alone (p. 15).131 The next anecdote, ‘The Northern Circuit’, strikes a similar tone and 
this time both direct testimonial and circumstantial evidence prove misleading, 
wrongly indicating the guilt of a landlord and his wife for murder.132 In fact, the 
servant who testifies to their guilt ‘with precision and apparent sincerity’ (p. 30) was 
herself an accomplice to the real killer. Once more the truth is only elicited by a last 
minute death-bed confession and the barrister again warns against ‘coming hastily to 
conclusions’ even when the truth appears obvious ‘upon the surface of the matter’ 
(pp. 33-34). In the ‘Confessions’ too, Messieurs Flint and Sharp face a catalogue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Ibid., p. 102.  Stephen Knight also briefly notes the significance of these stories to the genre in 
Crime Fiction, p. 32, as does LeRoy Lad Panek in more detail in Before Sherlock Holmes, Ch.3. 
130 Experiences of a Barrister (New York: Cornish, Lamport & Co., 1852), pp. 13-15. Further 
references from Experiences of a Barrister are taken from this collected edition and are given after 
quotations in the text. This story originally appeared in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, 263 (13 
January 1849), 24-28. This particular tale also offers a criticism of felony counsel restriction. 
131 The real thief later confesses after being found guilty of another crime, gloating wildly at the judge 
who sentenced the innocent man to death.  
132	  This story originally appeared in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, 268 (17 February 1849), 107-
111. 
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misleading circumstantial evidence, fabricated evidence and perjured testimony. In 
examining the potential for all kinds of evidence to mislead, these fictional legal 
anecdotes locate themselves very much within the popular debates concerning 
evidence, and so form part of the wider discussions regarding how the truth of 
disputed facts is to be established in legal trials which the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 
debates were part of. 
As noted above, Mr Ferret in ‘Experiences’ and the attorneys Flint and Sharp 
in ‘Confessions’, fulfil a detective function in their search for evidence which can 
save their client, and in this respect are important (as Worthington argues) to the 
development of the detective figure in the nineteenth century. Yet this detective role 
is useful only in so far as it provides the necessary evidence for our legal heroes to 
construct their overall narrative which proves their client’s case. In most of the 
anecdotes the lawyers find themselves confronted with a narrative constructed from 
direct testimony and circumstantial evidence which they must counter with a 
competing narrative made up of their alternative interpretation of all the evidence 
available to them. In short, these stories provide the reader with a legal narrative 
which seeks to persuade that it is the true representation of the disputed facts, 
something which is achieved through the careful presentation and scrutiny of all the 
evidence.  
Like courtroom representations, the ‘Experiences’ and ‘Confessions’ present 
their stories as ‘cases’ to be heard and become (to employ Welsh’s term) strong 
representations of their client’s story. Like their real life counterparts, the lawyers in 
these stories proceed chronologically, provide an outline of the facts of the case, 
scrutinise the evidence presented against them and counter it with their own, present 
their clients in a favourable light and attempt to discredit their opponents. Overall the 
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method of these lawyers is to present a coherent and persuasive narrative which 
discredits alternative representations of the facts; as Mr Flint tells those who oppose 
his client in ‘The Puzzle’, ‘we […] shall, I daresay, if you push us to it, be able to 
tear this ingeniously coloured cobweb of yours to shreds’.133 In fact, in a number of 
these stories, success depends on the lawyers constructing a narrative so convincing 
that it persuades the antagonists that their counter narrative will fail. In the 
‘Confessions’, the case of ‘Bigamy or no Bigamy’ sees Flint and Sharp approached 
by the Countess Seyton, who is being blackmailed by a man who claims she entered 
into her second marriage before her first husband had died.134 The case hinges on the 
lawyers being able to convince the blackmailer that their narrative of events is so 
strong, and backed by enough evidence, as to persuade a jury of its truth and see him 
convicted. Throughout the ‘Experiences’ and ‘Confessions’, it is often the case that 
the lawyers simply run out of time in trying to prove their case and have to rely on 
their advocacy skills in this way to force a confession and elicit the truth, and in 
doing so they reveal the impressive power of the advocate to reveal the truth from a 
tangled web of misleading evidence and lies. As such, these fictional legal anecdotes 
not only reveal the need for a detecting figure as Worthington suggests, but also the 
need for a figure who can present the detective’s evidence effectively: they reveal the 
need for an advocate.  
As noted above, the theme of the reliability of evidence which recurs 
throughout the ‘Experiences’ and the ‘Confessions’ places these tales firmly within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Confessions of an Attorney (New York: Cornish, Lamport & Co, 1852), p. 99.	  Further references 
from Confessions of an Attorney are taken from this collected edition and are given after quotations in 
the text. This story originally appeared in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal 401 (6 September 1851), 
146-151. By this point in its serial publication the title of the Confessions series had been altered to 
The Reminiscences of an Attorney but the protagonists remained the lawyers Flint and Sharp and these 
stories were published in a collected edition together with the ‘Confessions’ under the title 
Confessions of an Attorney. 
134 This story originally appeared in Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, 359 (16 November 1850), 307-
311.	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the context of the debate on evidence which fully emerged in the wake of the 1836 
Prisoner’s Counsel Act.135 The ‘Experiences’ and ‘Confessions’ have been attributed 
to Samuel Warren, a lawyer himself by profession, who took the matter of evidence 
up in some non-fiction articles. In ‘Who is the Murderer? A Problem in the Law of 
Circumstantial Evidence’ Warren examines the evidence of the trial of Robert 
Gouldsborough for the murder of William Huntley. In chapter two I noted how in 
this article Warren offers an analysis of the evidence given during the trial (in which 
Gouldsborough was acquitted). As Warren attempts to reconstruct the crime and lead 
the reader to conclusions about Gouldsborough’s guilt, Warren succeeds in 
demonstrating the extreme difficulty of correctly interpreting evidence.136 By taking 
the reader through the complex web of evidence in this case, Warren demonstrates 
the need for a professional, authoritative figure to guide the jury (or in  the case of 
fiction, the reader) to help them decide correctly upon the effect of the evidence. 
Worthington argues that ‘Who is the Murderer’ highlights the need for a 
‘professional investigator to seek out reliable evidence, a specialist with training and 
knowledge that would overcome the “problem in the law of circumstantial evidence” 
and ensure safe convictions and protect the innocent’ and as such creates the 
‘discursive space for the private detective’.137 For Worthington, Warren’s article 
casts him in the role of the detective and she lists the skills he uses in his analysis as 
those belonging to the detective: ‘close observation, interrogation of witnesses, the 
ascertaining of motive, and the deduction of facts from the evidence presented’.138 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, as noted in chapter two of this thesis, printed various articles and 
short stories dealing with circumstantial evidence during the time that both Experiences and 
Confessions were being published in its pages.  
136 [Samuel Warren], ‘Who is the Murderer?: A Problem in the Law of Circumstantial Evidence’, in a 
Letter to Christopher North, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 51 (1842), 553-578. See p. 111-112 
of this thesis. 
137 Worthington, Rise of the Detective, pp. 73-74. 
138 Ibid., p. 73. 
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However, these skills could equally be listed as those of an advocate, and the legal 
framework within which Warren places his readers – alluding to the fact he is a 
barrister himself, and providing the reader with the evidence produced within the 
courtroom – demonstrates the fundamental connection between the function of the 
advocate and the function of the detective. The advocate and the detective engage in 
the same practices, albeit at different stages of the criminal justice process, as both 
attempt to reconstruct past events from evidence left in the present. The casting of 
lawyers in the detective role in the ‘Experiences’ and the ‘Confessions’ therefore 
makes perfect sense, as they possess the necessary attributes to become successful 
detectives.139  
Crucial to the advocate’s success is the creation of a coherent and persuasive 
narrative. A large part of an advocate’s role is to connect facts into an ordered 
narrative so that, as Burke suggested, from the ‘multitude’, ‘combination’ and 
‘relation’ of facts the truth might emerge through their ‘collective effect’.140 The 
construction of a convincing narrative also becomes crucial to the detective project 
and can be seen in the detective stories which feature self-identified detective heroes. 
The reminiscences of police officers such as Waters and Inspector F are all narratives 
which have been constructed to persuade the reader that the police officer’s tale is 
true.141 They narrate a sequence of events which begin with a ‘case’ history, proceed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 It has also been suggested that lawyers make the perfect detective because they do not pose a threat 
to the middle classes in the way police detectives did. Police officers and detective police officers had 
the capacity to police the middle-classes as well as protect their interests, whereas a lawyer was a 
professional figure who was hired to protect the client’s interest only. See further, Worthington, Rise 
of the Detective, Ch. 2. 
140 Edmund Burke in a Report from the committee of the House of Commons on 30th of April 1794, in 
The Works and Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 8 vols (London: Francis & 
John Rivington, 1852), VIII, 96. 
141 In addition, the authors of these reminiscences claim truthfulness for their narratives by including 
in the titles words such as  ‘autobiography’, ‘recollections’, ‘experiences’ and ‘revelations’. See, for 
example, William Russell’s Recollections of  Detective Police-Officer (1856), Experiences of a Real 
Detective (1859), and Autobiography of an English Detective (1863), Andrew Forrester Jnr.’s 
Revelations of a Private Detective (1863), and Thomas Delf’s The Diary of an Ex-Detective (1860). 
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through the collection of evidence from which conclusions are drawn, ending with a 
conclusion which reveals the truth. Again this structure loosely resembles the 
structure of a barrister’s case in court where he would begin with a statement of the 
facts of the case, then offer an analysis of evidence and examination of witnesses and 
end with a concluding statement to the jury which draws all the strands of his 
narrative of events together. In later detective stories this legal argument structure 
becomes more pronounced, as can be seen in Andrew Forrester’s The Female 
Detective (1864). In ‘The Unknown Weapon’, for example, Mrs G begins with a full 
account of the case history, carefully setting out all the facts of the case and the 
initial evidence: ‘here are the exact preliminary facts of the case’ (p. 33). This is 
followed by her investigations in which she cross-examines witnesses: 
“What about the big box?” 
“Doa noa.” [This was the mode in those parts of saying “I do not know.”] 
“Where was it?” 
“In the hall.” 
“Where did it come from?” 
“Doa noa.” 
“How long had it been there?” (p. 67) 
 
 and so on. Mrs G also scrutinises the evidence – ‘It was a woman’s handkerchief. It 
was new; had apparently never been used […] and it was marked in the corner 
“Freddy”’ (p. 59) – and subordinates it to the case she wishes to make:  
This handkerchief belonged to a woman, in all probability young, whose 
Christian name was Frederica; as it was not soiled, and as it was not 
blackened by wear, it had recently been given to, or taken, by him; and as the 
handkerchief was found in the breast of his shirt, it appeared to have been 
looked upon with favour. (p. 60) 
 
Indeed Mrs G understands the importance of creating coherent narratives to the 
detective project in order that her readers will be able to follow her reasoning: ‘I will 
give the particulars, as far as I can, in the form of a narrative’ (p. 33); ‘I set out my 
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questions and his answers as closely as I can recollect them, together with a narrative 
of the actions which resulted out of both’ (p. 57). As can be seen in ‘The Unknown 
Weapon’, this adversarial-evidentiary legal framework is crucial to the detective’s 
ability to persuade the reader that the representation of events which they offer (the 
solution to the mystery) is the correct one, and read in this light this framework can 
equally be seen to be underpinning the Holmes stories. 
The Sherlock Holmes short stories began appearing in The Strand Magazine 
in July 1891. Two longer stories had already been published prior to this, A Study in 
Scarlet first in Beeton’s Christmas Annual in 1887, followed by The Sign of the Four 
(later just The Sign of Four) in 1890 in Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine. However, it 
was with the short stories that Holmes’s popularity really took off.142 The Strand was 
a magazine principally aimed at the middle-class family and commuter market and it 
contained short stories (designed to be read in one journey) alongside other articles 
of interest, from portraits of notable figures to essays on scientific developments and 
the law.143 As Ronald Thomas has noted, during the serial publication of Holmes’s 
adventures, crime, criminality and the administration of criminal justice were a 
continuing source of interest to The Strand’s writers.144 The appearance of the 
Holmes stories alongside such articles links them to legal issues which affected 
courtroom representations and in particular the reliability of evidence, a problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See Priestman, Detective Fiction and Literature, p. 97. 
143 The 1891 October issue of Strand Magazine, for example, contained (amongst other things) an 
interview with W. S. Gilbert: Harry How, ‘Illustrated Interviews: VI – Mr W S Gilbert’, Strand 
Magazine, 2 (October 1891), 332-341; ‘Portraits of Celebrities at Different Times of their Lives’, 
Strand Magazine, 2 (October 1891), 366-371; an article on ‘Smugglers’ Devices’, Strand Magazine, 2 
(October 1891), 417-425; a short story about a man who believes he has accidentally killed someone: 
George Manville Fenn, ‘Laying a Ghost’, Strand Magazine, 2 (October 1891), 385-394; and a 
Sherlock Holmes adventure: Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Boscombe Valley Mystery’, Strand Magazine, 
2 (October 1891), 401-416.	  
144 Ronald Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 75. 
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which Holmes himself faces throughout his adventures.145  Like his detective 
predecessors, Holmes often finds himself presented with faulty and misleading 
evidence. In ‘The Abbey Grange’ for example, the two principal witnesses 
deliberately lie to cover up what really happened.146 Holmes is also keenly aware of 
the ‘tricky’ nature of circumstantial evidence: in ‘The Boscombe Valley Mystery’ 
Watson remarks that ‘if ever circumstantial evidence pointed to a criminal it does so 
here’, but Holmes counters this with the warning that: 
Circumstantial evidence is a very tricky thing, […] it may seem to point very 
straight to one thing, but if you shift your own view a little, you may find it 
pointing in an equally uncompromising manner to something entirely 
different. (Adventures, p. 78)147 
 
 
By addressing issues which relate to the use of evidence to prove a case, the Holmes 
stories, like the sensation novel, become part of the wider popular debate about how 
the truth of disputed facts is to be established successfully.148  
When reading the Sherlock Holmes stories it is difficult not to be struck by 
Holmes’s scientific expertise. Throughout Sherlock’s cases we are continually 
reminded of his view of detection as a scientific discipline: in A Study in Scarlet 
Watson reads an article by Holmes, entitled ‘The Book of Life’, in which the 
detective refers to his method as ‘the Science of Deduction and Analysis’ (Study, p. 
23), and Watson notes how Holmes has reduced detection ‘as near to an exact 
science as it ever will be brought in this world’ (Study, p. 33). The importance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 From April 1891 until July 1891, a series of articles entitled ‘The State of the Law Courts’ were 
published, with ‘The State of the Law Courts IV – The Criminal Courts’, Strand Magazine, 2 (July 
1891), 84-92, appearing in the same issue as ‘A Scandal in Bohemia’.  
146 See Arthur Conan Doyle, ‘The Abbey Grange’, in The Return of Sherlock Holmes ed. by Richard 
Lancelyn Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 266-290. Further references to this 
edition are given after quotations in the text. ‘The Abbey Grange’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 
28 (September 1904), 241-256. 
147 ‘The Boscombe Valley Mystery’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 2 (October 1891), 401-416. 
148 Even into the twentieth century commentators would still be producing articles on legal evidence, 
touching upon the same issues which were being discussed throughout the previous century, see for 
example, Filson Young, ‘Circumstantial Evidence’, Saturday Review, 6 April 1912, pp. 423-424. 
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science to the Holmes stories is not to be underestimated and it is not uncommon for 
critics to stress the significance of nineteenth century science and forensics in the 
creation of one of the most enduringly popular detectives. However, sufficient 
attention has not been given to the way in which Holmes’s scientific authority 
establishes a connection between Watson’s narratives and the narratives of the 
courtroom.  
As Ronald Thomas’s study Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic 
Science has shown, the courtroom during the nineteenth century became increasingly 
dominated by forensic science. The creation of a detective whose authority derives 
largely from his forensic scientific method reflects this trend and, when read in this 
context, Watson’s continued affirmation of Holmes’s expertise reveals his narratives 
as those of the courtroom which seek to establish the expert trial witness. Despite the 
authority which scientific and medical experts appeared to possess in the witness 
stand, their expert testimony would frequently be countered by the testimony of 
experts for the opposing side. Consequently, the courtroom became a space in which 
differing narratives of medical and scientific expertise would compete for authority. 
In William Palmer’s trial, for example, over half the number of witnesses called were 
scientific or medical experts, and those called for the defence had a very different 
view of the evidence than those called for the prosecution. Trial barristers would take 
great care in establishing their experts as authoritative and the Palmer trial was no 
exception: counsel for each side was keen to stress the eminence of their toxicologist, 
doctors and chemists before they testified in order that their evidence might have the 
most impact on the jury.149  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 See George Knott, The Trial of William Palmer, ed. by Eric R. Watson, 2nd edn (London: William 
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Throughout his documenting of Holmes’s cases, Watson likewise seeks to 
establish Holmes’s authority as an expert witness before the case actually begins. 
This is largely achieved through Watson’s descriptions of Holmes’s displays of 
logical deduction, which usually occur as a prelude to the main act of detection and 
serve to demonstrate of what Holmes is capable. In The Sign of Four, for example, 
Holmes is able to tell the identity, character and habits of the previous owner of 
Watson’s watch merely by examining it: 
The watch belonged to your elder brother […] He was a man of untidy habits 
– very untidy and careless. He was left with good prospects, but he threw 
away his chances, lived for some time in poverty with occasional short 
intervals of prosperity, and finally, taking to drink, he died (p. 92) 
 
Watson confirms Holmes’s deductions are ‘absolutely correct in every particular’ (p. 
93) and then, through a few prompting questions – ‘but it was not mere guesswork?’ 
(p. 93) – Holmes is led to reveal his method and to prove his skill:  
look at the inner plate, which contains the keyhole. Look at the thousands of 
scratches all around the hole – marks where the key has slipped. What sober 
man’s key could have scored those grooves? But you will never see a 
drunkard’s without them (p. 93) 
 
Watson’s confirmation that Holmes’s deductions are correct, followed by Holmes’s 
proving that it was ‘not mere guesswork’ and Watson’s admiration at this 
demonstration of skill –  ‘I should have had more faith in your marvellous faculty’ 
(p. 93) – set up Holmes’s authority for the rest of the narrative. The short stories are 
generally also opened with similar displays of Holmes’s deductive skill, and this 
repeated pattern in Watson’s narratives enables him to condition readers to become 
(like him) so accustomed to Holmes’s ‘inevitable success’ that ‘the very possibility 
of his failing cease[s] to enter [their] head[s]’ (‘A Scandal in Bohemia’, Adventures, 
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p. 14).150 These demonstrations of Holmes’s skill of course mirror in miniature the 
later deductions that Holmes will make in solving the cases he works on. But, just as 
in a trial, Holmes’s authority as the forensic expert will be contested by competing 
interpretations of that evidence: the police, for example, sometimes offer an 
alternative explanation of the evidence at hand, as when Lestrade, in A Study in 
Scarlet, interprets the word RACHE (written in blood at the crime scene) to be the 
name ‘Rachel’ unfinished, as opposed to Holmes who reads it as the German for 
revenge (Study, pp. 30-32).151 The repeated demonstrations of Holmes’s skill 
therefore work to reinforce his authority to ensure that his interpretation is the one 
which will be accepted: Watson is taking care that his expert witness is the most 
convincing. In fact, Holmes is fully aware that his success depends on his 
interpretation of the evidence being the most plausible. Speaking about 
circumstantial evidence in ‘The Boscombe Valley Mystery’, as noted above, Holmes 
tells Watson that interpreting evidence is ‘tricky’ because if you ‘shift your own 
view a little’ (Adventures, p. 78) you can find yourself drawing totally different 
conclusions to the ones you (or others) initially had. Watson’s narratives work to 
create a shift in the reader’s perspective so that it coincides with that of Holmes. In 
‘Silver Blaze’ Holmes tells Watson that he must strip the ‘absolute, undeniable 
fact[s]’ of any existing ‘surmise, conjecture, and hypothesis’ (Memoirs, p. 4).152 
Holmes may dismiss this ‘surmise, conjecture, and hypothesis’ as the 
‘embellishments of theorists and reporters’ (Memoirs, p. 4), but in doing so he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Watson sometimes even tests his own skill against Holmes in order to demonstrate his expertise in 
relation to the layman  (himself). An example of this can be found at the opening of The Hound of the 
Baskervilles when Watson attempts to deduce information about Dr. Mortimer from his walking stick.  
151 Although Jefferson Hope (the murderer) reveals that his writing of the word ‘RACHE’ was 
intended to suggest secret societies and so meant to be a misdirection, Holmes both correctly 
recognises that it means revenge and also that it has been written as a ‘blind intended to put the police 
upon a wrong track’ (p. 33). 
152 ‘Silver Blaze’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 4 (December 1892), 645-660. 
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identifies the existence of competing narratives which resist his interpretation, and so 
too Watson’s final narrative version of events. In order for Holmes to be successful 
these competing narratives – whether they come from the police, a reporter or a 
witness – must be overcome by his own (narrated by Watson) and as such the 
Holmes stories mimic the adversarial nature of the post-1836 felony trial which 
focuses on the scrutiny of all the evidence by both sides. 
I have drawn attention to the representation of Holmes as the expert witness, 
and how Watson’s role in relation to this function of Holmes is similar to that of an 
advocate at trial, in that he goes to lengths to ensure that Holmes’s expertise is 
established. Critical analysis of Watson’s purpose in the Holmes stories quite often 
focuses on how he functions as a representative of the middle-class reader, 
embodying their values, sharing their hopes and their fears.153 Whilst Watson is 
important in this respect, reading these stories within their legal context reveals that 
Watson is also performing the role of an advocate, a role which becomes pivotal to 
the success of the stories. Watson’s advocacy reveals itself in his taking 
responsibility for crafting the narrative itself. As noted earlier in this chapter, this 
part of the advocate’s role was key to his success. Watson’s cases often begin with 
an address to the reader which consciously notes how he is taking personal 
responsibility for taking the various cases of Holmes and shaping them into a 
narrative: deciding which cases are related, what information to leave in and take 
out, and the order in which it should be presented. Indeed Watson’s organisation of 
the material mirrors that of a barrister in a trial: he begins by providing the reader 
with the circumstances of the case and so recognises that, as Attorney-General 
Cockburn noted in the Palmer trial, it would be ‘impossible’ for a juryman to 
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‘understand thoroughly [a] case in all its bearings without those circumstances being 
laid before [them]’. 154 This is followed, as it would be in a trial, by the introduction 
and scrutiny of the evidence, and finally Watson draws his narrative to a close by 
setting up a closing address to the reader (rather like an address to a jury) in which 
Holmes ties together all the different strands of the case into a final explanation of 
events which Watson’s tacit acceptance of urges the reader to likewise accept. 
Throughout the stories Holmes is wont to complain that Watson embellishes and 
romanticises his cases by turning them into stories rather than scientific 
demonstrations. In The Sign of Four, for example, Holmes complains that in his 
account of ‘the Jefferson Hope case’ Watson ‘attempted to tinge it with romanticism, 
which produces much the same effect as if [he had] worked a love-story or an 
elopement into the fifth proposition of Euclid’ (p. 90). Again, in ‘The Copper 
Beeches’, Holmes claims that Watson has ‘erred’ in his attempts ‘to put color and 
life into each of [his] statements, instead of confining [himself] to the task of placing 
upon record that severe reasoning from cause to effect’ (Adventures, p. 270). Yet this 
criticism of Holmes belies what Watson is able to achieve by this, the significance of 
which Watson does not miss himself:  
The story has, I believe, been told more than once in the newspapers, but, like 
all such narratives, its effect is much less striking when set forth en bloc in a 
single half-column of print than when the facts slowly evolve before your 
own eyes and the mystery clears gradually away as each new discovery 
furnishes a step which leads on to the complete truth (‘The Engineer’s 
Thumb’, Adventures, p. 198).155 
 
In ‘A Case of Identity’ Holmes notes how ‘a certain selection and discretion must be 
used in producing a realistic effect’ (Adventures, p. 30), and a large part of this task 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Trial of William Palmer,  p. 24. In Holmes’s cases the initial exposition of facts is provided usually 
by the client and sometimes by Holmes.  
155 ‘The Engineer’s Thumb’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 3 (March 1892), 276-288.	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falls to Watson who must employ the skill of the advocate in his selection and 
discretion in order to create a narrative which will produce the most realistic effect. 
  Sherlock Holmes is first and foremost a detective. Much of his authority as a 
detective derives from his scientific expertise, expertise which (as I have already 
argued) is that of the expert witness in a criminal trial. Yet the success of Holmes’s 
detection also depends on his interpretation of all the evidence being sufficiently 
persuasive. This is partly achieved by the overall narrative of events which Watson 
provides and which marks the doctor out as an advocate, but this is a role which 
Holmes can also be seen to be assuming, and which ultimately helps to ensure his 
success as a detective. As noted earlier, Holmes is aware that the narrative space 
which he and Watson seek to occupy is a contested one, and as a result that he must 
construct a narrative version of events which provides the most plausible 
explanation. Holmes even thinks of his cases in terms of constructing a legal 
argument, wondering whether a ‘clever counsel’ would be able to ‘tear’ his case ‘all 
to rags’ (‘Silver Blaze’, Memoirs, p. 12). Like a barrister, we see Holmes ‘cross-
examining’ (‘The Naval Treaty’, Memoirs, p. 232) and ‘cross-questioning’ (‘The 
Crooked Man’, Memoirs, p. 161) witnesses; and his own expert testimony can also 
be understood in terms of the careful presentation of the available evidence by an 
advocate as we see him carefully interrogating the evidence before him in order to 
reveal the truth.156 In ‘The Abbey Grange’, for example, Holmes scrutinises the 
evidence of three wine glasses which seemingly attest to the presence of three men at 
the scene of the crime and consequently he is able persuasively to argue that the third 
glass had been planted to give this false impression (Return, p. 278). Holmes’s final 
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156 ‘The Naval Treaty’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 6 (October 1983), 392-403, and ‘The 
Crooked Man’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 6 (July 1983), 22-32. 
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functions as a kind of final address to the jury where he draws together all of the 
available evidence into one coherent explanation of events. In this denouement, 
Holmes’s role as an advocate becomes particularly evident, his concluding remarks 
even taking the form of a direct speech in which he takes all the available evidence 
and subordinates it to the narrative which he (and Watson as co-counsel) are telling.  
The creation of the overall narrative can therefore be seen as a collaborative 
process between Holmes and Watson, and as such they emerge as a formidable 
adversarial team, arguing the truth of their ‘case’. Both characters even implicitly 
acknowledge their role as advocates by invoking the chain imagery which was so 
widely used in legal and lay articles which discussed how good advocacy could 
ensure that the evidence available revealed the truth: Holmes speaks of ‘wonderful 
chains of events’ (‘A Case of Identity, Adventures, p. 30); of gathering the crucial 
bits of evidence and ‘[piecing] them together in their order so as to reconstruct this 
very remarkable chain of events’ (‘The Naval Treaty’, Memoirs, p. 247); of finding 
the ‘missing links’ of a ‘connected chain’ (The Sign of Four, p. 159). Watson too 
invokes this imagery, noting how Holmes’s reasoning creates ‘a chain’ where ‘every 
link rings true’ (‘The Red-Headed League, Adventures, p. 73).157  
As Ronald Thomas has pointed out, ‘the detective hero’s function is to 
identify that contested narrative space and to occupy it with his truth-telling 
voice’.158 Thomas argues that the truth-telling quality of Holmes’s voice derives 
from his scientific authority and views the Holmes stories as ‘attempts to establish 
the explanatory authority of science over legal argument’.159 This competition which 
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157 See for example [W. S. Austin], ‘Secret Poisoning’, Temple Bar, 6 (November 1862), 579-584 
(p.584). Robert Audley in Lady Audley’s Secret is a barrister by profession and he also uses this 
imagery. ‘The Red-Headed League’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 2 (August 1891), 190-204. 
158 Thomas, Detective Fiction, p. 9. 
159 Ibid., p. 79. 
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significance which the legal case structure holds. Reading the Holmes stories in the 
context of post-1836 adversarial advocacy practices reveals how Conan Doyle 
appropriated such techniques in order to create successful detective stories. As such, 
Holmes’s scientific expertise should not be read as an alternative to legal narratives, 
but rather as a part of them, reflecting the increasing importance of forensic science 
to the legal representational process within the courtroom. Indeed, even critics who 
focus their analysis of Holmes’s success on his scientific authority still write in terms 
which evoke the role of the advocate. Rosemary Jann, for example, notes that 
Holmes ‘reassures readers that from the fragmentary and confusing evidence left in 
the present a coherent, logically causal narrative of the past can still be constructed to 
give meaning to the most bizarre events’.160 Martin Kayman has also noted that 
Holmes’s power derives more from the narratives he weaves rather than his scientific 
expertise, rightly identifying that Holmes is more than simply a scientific detective. 
Kayman argues that Holmes’s success derives from the ‘absolute and exclusive 
monopoly’ which he has over the ‘meaning of events’, guaranteed of course by his 
‘professional knowledge’.161 Yet Kayman overlooks the other narratives of events 
which often compete with Holmes’s final explanation, which are variously offered 
by the criminal or the police, for example. What secures the success of Holmes’s 
narrative is not only his professional and scientific expertise, but also the force of his 
advocacy. Holmes is aware of competing narratives – those of ‘theorists and 
reporters’ (‘Silver Blaze’, Memoirs, p. 4), for example –  and he uses the skill of an 
adversarial advocate to ensure his narrative carries the greatest force.	  
Todorov’s analysis of the detective story in terms of fabula and sjuzet reveals 
the similarities between the detective process and the criminal trial, as both seek to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Jann, Detecting Social Order, p. 28.  
161 Martin A. Kayman, From Bow Street to Baker Street: Mystery, Detection and Narrative 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 221-228, quotations at p. 222 and p. 228.	  
	  	  
269 
reconstruct a narrative of past events so that the truth might be uncovered. In the 
Holmes stories, the advocacy of Watson and Holmes further illustrates this 
connection. Moreover, as the adversarial advocacy techniques which Holmes 
employs form part of his detective method, it becomes clear that the development of 
the detective in literature owes some debt to the introduction of the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act which provided the conditions for such methods to develop and thrive. 
Holmes is a scientist, but this is just one side of the detective. To fully understand 
Holmes’s success we must also acknowledge that the famous sleuth, along with 
Watson, is also an advocate. Characters such as Hartright in The Woman in White, 
Blake in The Moonstone, and Robert Audley in Lady Audley’s Secret had 
demonstrated the power of adversarial advocacy to reveal the truth but, as I 
highlighted in this chapter, their efforts are jeopardised by the occasional reliance on 
Providence and a continued insistence that the idea of character might be of use to 
the truth-seeking process. In the Holmes stories, Conan Doyle overcomes these 
issues by making his detective a man of science who can offer certainty that the truth 
will be revealed through the scientific method. However, the advocacy of Hartright, 
Blake, and Audley is not replaced by science, but instead fused with it to create, as 
Knight terms him, the ‘one great detective’. 162 In ‘A Case of Identity’, Holmes states 
that whilst ‘life is infinitely stranger’ than fiction, it is still made up of 
‘coincidences’, ‘plannings’ and ‘chains of events’ which can afford it meaning 
(Adventures, p. 30). The Holmes stories represent a promise to reveal this meaning to 
the reader, and by the end of any Holmes story, this promise has been fulfilled. As a 
result, the reader is left reassured that out of the seemingly unintelligible chaos will 
come meaning and order, and not only that, but it will seem (as Watson observes) 
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‘simplicity itself when it [is] explained’ (‘The Stockbroker’s Clerk’, Memoirs, p. 
75).163  
Throughout this thesis I have noted how critics like Peter Brooks have argued 
that nineteenth-century fiction often functioned to provide the reader with the 
assurance that the world in which they lived, and their existence within it, was 
capable of being comprehended and having meaning.164 I argued earlier in this 
chapter that fiction which makes crime its subject reveals this aim most fully because 
crime threatens to destroy the order of society and the value-system which the reader 
subscribes to, a value system which enables them to interpret and make sense of an 
otherwise confusing reality. In a rapidly changing, increasingly secular, modern 
society in which readers had to face the implications of technological, scientific and 
industrial advancement, the Sherlock Holmes stories offer those readers the 
reassurance that reality can be understood and articulated to others in a way which 
endows it with meaning. This reassurance is in large part achieved by the adoption of 
those adversarial-evidentiary methods of representation which flourished in criminal 
trials after the introduction of a full legal defence for all prisoners. In a number of 
studies on detective and crime fiction that aim to give a general historical and critical 
survey of the field, the Sherlock Holmes stories feature in one of the early chapters, 
and this is unsurprising given how much crime and detective fiction proliferated 
post-Holmes.165 Yet Sherlock Holmes also represents an end point, the culmination 
of the rise of the nineteenth-century literary detective. Holmes features as the end 
point of this thesis, and in doing so demonstrates the significant and long-lasting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 ‘The Stockbroker’s Clerk’ first appeared in Strand Magazine, 5 (March 1893), 281-291. 
164 Brooks, Realist Vision, Ch. 1.	  
165 See, for example, Charles J. Rzepka, Detective Fiction (Cambridge: Polity, 2005); John Scaggs, 
Crime Fiction (London: Routledge, 2005); The Art of Murder: New Essays on Detective Fiction, ed. 
by H. Gustav Klaus and Stephen Knight (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 1998); Stephen Knight, Crime 
Fiction 1800-2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Two Centuries of Detective Fiction: 
A New Comparative Approach, ed. by Maurizio Ascari (Cotepra: University of Bologna, 2000).	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impact of the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act, and the surrounding debates, on the 
development of nineteenth-century detective narratives.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Both Kieran Dolin and Jan-Melissa Schramm view the relationship between law and 
literature during the nineteenth century – connected as they are through a shared 
preoccupation with accurately representing reality through language – as 
fundamentally competitive.1 Clare Pettitt has challenged such readings on the basis 
that the interplay between law and literature during this period is much more 
complex than a ‘simple’ reading of literature as merely ‘rivalrous’ or 
‘supplementary’ to the law provides for, and she calls for further analysis of this 
relationship.2 This thesis has been, in part, a response to Pettitt’s call and, by 
analysing nineteenth-century fiction within the context of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 
debates, I have shown that the relationship between these two disciplines is not 
simply one of opposition. Instead, I have argued that law and literature’s interaction 
over the matter of representation was multifaceted, with two alternative models of 
representing reality – character-focused (‘accused speaks’) / adversarial-evidentiary 
– being employed and contested with equal vigour in both legal and literary spheres 
during the nineteenth century.  
In chapter one I demonstrated that the nineteenth-century character-focused 
novel’s method of representing reality mirrors that of the pre-1836 felony trial 
model, and so reinforces and sustains the character-focused author’s preference for 
an ‘accused speaks’ representational model. Chapters two, three and four examined 
how, in contrast, the development of sensation and detective narratives was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See and Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: Legal 
Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
2 Clare Pettitt, ‘Legal Subjects, Legal Objects: The Law and Victorian Fiction’, in A Concise 
Companion to the Victorian Novel, ed. by Francis O’Gorman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 71-90 (p. 
87). 
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significantly influenced by the adversarial-evidentiary model of representation which 
flourished in criminal trials post-1836. Furthermore, my analysis of sensation and 
detective fiction within the context of the Prisoners’ Counsel debates, and the related 
debates on evidence, has revealed how characters that are often identified as 
detecting agents can also be read as performing the function of an advocate. Chapter 
four posited the view that key to understanding the development of the fictional 
detective in the nineteenth century is an awareness of the increasing importance that 
adversarial advocacy was playing in the detective hero’s skill set. In particular, 
chapter four called for a re-evaluation of what it is that makes Sherlock Holmes such 
a successful detective. In contrast to many previous analyses of the Sherlock Holmes 
stories, which have focused on the importance of Holmes’s scientific expertise, I 
have argued that this is only part of what makes Holmes such an effective detecting 
figure, and that vital to understanding his success is an awareness of his dual role as 
both scientific detective and advocate.  
As the final chapter of this thesis focused on nineteenth-century detective 
fiction, it seemed fitting to culminate with a discussion of the Sherlock Holmes 
stories, given that Holmes is possibly the most famous literary detective ever created. 
However, following Holmes’s success there was a proliferation of literary detectives 
and so this thesis leaves room for further research into how the detective story and its 
use of adversarial-evidentiary representational practices developed after the creation 
of Sherlock Holmes. One of the most famous authors of detective fiction who 
followed Conan Doyle was Agatha Christie, and her detective hero Hercule Poirot 
has also achieved long-lasting fame and popularity. As I noted in chapter four, at the 
end of a Sherlock Holmes story the detective usually assumes the role of an advocate 
as he provides a final address to Watson and the reader in which all the evidence is 
	  	  
274 
brought together into one coherent explanation of evidence and events. Hercule 
Poirot adopts a similar tactic in the dramatic denouements Christie offers, and if 
anything his advocacy is even more pronounced in his delivery of lengthy final 
speeches in which he reveals the culprit’s identity, after first connecting together and 
explaining the meaning of all the evidence that has been presented throughout the 
narrative.3 In this way Christie’s novels suggest that the influence of the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act continues to make itself felt in detective fiction (aside from the Holmes 
stories) post-1900. Examination of later detective stories within this legal context 
might therefore prove a fruitful critical project, especially in relation to our 
understanding of the development of rules for writers of detective fiction which 
began to prescribe the way in which evidence should be presented to the reader.4 
Another possible direction for further study in light of this thesis also presents 
itself. During the course of my research it became apparent that the texts which 
formed the focus of this study – whatever concerns they might voice about legal 
structures and practices – tended, at the last, to reaffirm a trust in the English legal 
system’s ability to provide justice. This tendency is particularly striking in the case 
of the sensation novel which, as I argued in chapter three, works to endorse 
adversarial-evidentiary courtroom strategies of representation. D. A. Miller notes 
how the close of the sensation novel provides a sense of reassurance through the re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A very good example of Poirot’s advocacy comes in Death on the Nile (1937) in which Poirot first 
cross-examines a series of witnesses before finally addressing a number of interested parties with a 
speech which makes sense of the evidence and reveals who the murderer is. 
4 In 1928 Willard Huntington Wright, writing as S. S. Van Dine, listed the ‘very definite laws’ for 
writing detective stories which included that all evidence should be placed before the reader and be 
‘plainly stated and described’. See S. S. Van Dine, ‘Twenty Rules for Writing Detective Stories’, in 
The Art of the Mystery Story: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Howard Haycraft (New York: 
Carroll & Graf, 1983 [1946]) pp. 189-199 (p. 189). W. H. Auden also alluded to how a detective story 
must ‘conform to certain formulas’, see W. H. Auden, ‘The Guilty Vicarage’, in Detective Fiction: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Robin W. Winks (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 
pp. 15-24 (p. 15). 
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establishment of Victorian norms.5 I have argued that this reassurance is in part due 
to the affirmation of legal practices as ultimately effectual: whilst the protagonists 
might have to reach beyond the law initially to discover the truth, and whilst the 
villains may be punished extra-legally, the truth is finally capable of being legally 
established, even if the protagonists eventually decide not to seek legal recognition 
of that truth.6 This final endorsement of legal structures and practices suggests, 
perhaps, an underlying desire on the part of the readership to be assured that the 
justice system was one in which their trust could be placed. 
The Victorian reader’s desire that the justice system be both trustworthy and 
effectual is one which is embodied in the character of Sir Peregrine Orme in Anthony 
Trollope’s Orley Farm (1861-2). However, Orley Farm is a novel in which this 
desire is not fulfilled: at the end of Lady Mason’s trial she is declared innocent, when 
in fact guilty. Although the law fails in this case, it is clear that it is not Trollope’s 
purpose to expose a failing or corrupt legal system, but rather to engage in 
contemporary debates over Prisoners’ Counsel. Orley Farm might demonstrate a 
preference for an ‘accused speaks’ model, but it does not condemn the legal system 
as untrustworthy, it merely questions the efficacy of this one particular practice. This 
is clear from the fact that Lady Mason is not at any point presented as a threat to 
Victorian norms and order, especially as the failure of the legal system is soon 
rectified through the private restitution of the land. Orley Farm is not about a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 D. A. Miller, The Novel and the Police (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 165-
166.  
6 As in Wilkie Collins’s The Law and the Lady (1875). In this novel Valeria Woodville discovers that 
her husband was tried for poisoning his first wife, and the Scottish jury handed down a verdict of ‘not 
proven’. In her attempts to clear her husband’s name, Valeria discovers a suicide note which proves 
Eustace’s innocence. Yet, in the end, husband and wife decide to leave the verdict unchallenged, 
happy with their personal knowledge of the truth and realising that any legal recognition would 
require the public sullying of a dead lady’s name. Clare Pettitt offers an illuminating analysis of how 
the decision not to legally establish Eustace’s innocence creates a distinction between two conceptions 
of truth: the public and the private, see Pettitt, ‘Legal Subjects, Legal Objects’, pp. 85-86. 	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miscarriage of justice – indeed there are questions raised over the justice of 
inheritance laws – but rather a questioning of how justice can most effectively be 
achieved. One of the things that the Prisoners’ Counsel debates in Parliament reveal 
is a deep-rooted legal and political commitment to a fair and trustworthy justice 
system. Although not everyone agreed on the form this might take in terms of 
prisoners’ counsel, the parameters of the debate did not extend to suggesting that the 
legal system was a failure, or entirely ineffectual or corrupt. Furthermore, works of 
literature which focus most closely on crime in the nineteenth century, most notably 
sensation and detective fiction, tend to express anxieties over the exposure and 
punishment of the guilty, rather than dealing with concerns over wrongful 
conviction. The question that is repeatedly asked in such literature is whether or not 
guilt is capable of exposure. This makes an interesting contrast to some French 
novels of the same period, such as Le Comte de Monte Cristo (serialised 1844-6) and 
Les Misérables (1862), which express a deep rooted distrust of the legal system 
generally. 
This thesis has been concerned with analysing the employment of two 
different legal models of representation in nineteenth-century literature. In a novel 
like Le Comte de Monte Cristo, when the legal system is revealed to be corrupt, its 
strategies become antithetical to the novelist’s project. With this in mind a question 
presents itself: do literary appropriations of legal narrative strategies only occur in 
cultures where there is some fundamental level of respect and trust in the law? 
Further research therefore might include a comparative study of French and English 
literature’s engagement with the law in order to identify whether in France there 
existed a more straightforward competition between legal and literary 
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representations, owing perhaps to a quintessentially post-Revolutionary distrust of 
state power and authority.  
Dolin has argued that a study of nineteenth-century fiction within the context 
of contemporary law and legal practice can provide us with an ‘enhanced’ 
understanding of the period’s literature.7 By assuming the role of advocate myself, 
marshalling the evidence and connecting it together in into a coherent narrative 
designed to persuade, I have shown this to be true in the case of the 1836 Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act and surrounding debates. Specifically I have argued that much 
nineteenth-century fiction can be better understood in light of the opposition between 
the two representational modes offered by the ‘accused speaks’ and adversarial-
evidentiary trial models, an opposition which was brought to the public’s attention 
by the Prisoners’ Counsel Act debates. By situating nineteenth-century fiction within 
this important legal context, I have been able to offer new readings of a range of 
popular nineteenth-century texts. As a result this thesis has demonstrated not only 
that there existed a significant interplay between nineteenth-century law and fiction, 
but also that legal and popular debate over courtroom representational practices had a 
significant and long-lasting impact on literary representations. 
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